

HGM (79) 3rd Session

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

LUSAKA, 1-7 AUGUST, 1979

*RECORD of the Third Session held at Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka
on Thursday, 2 August, 1979 at 9.45 a.m.*

Present:

His Excellency Dr. K. D. Kaunda, President of Zambia
(*in the Chair*)

- | | |
|---|---|
| The Right Hon. Malcolm Fraser, M P,
Prime Minister of Australia | The Right Hon. Lynden D. Pindling,
M P, Prime Minister of the Common-
wealth of the Bahamas |
| HE Mr. Ziaur Rahman, President of
Bangladesh | The Right Hon. J. M. G. M. Adams,
M P, Prime Minister of Barbados |
| HE Sir Seretse Khama, President of
Botswana | The Right Hon. Mrs. Margaret
Thatcher, M P, Prime Minister of
Britain |
| The Right Hon. Joe Clark, Prime
Minister of Canada | HE Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, President
of Cyprus |
| The Hon. M. A. Douglas, Minister
for Finance, Trade and Industry,
Dominica | The Right Hon. Ratu Sir Kamisese
Mara, Prime Minister of Fiji |
| HE Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara,
President of The Gambia | HE Major Mensah Gbedemah, Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council, Ghana |
| The Hon. M. Bishop, Prime Minister of
Grenada | The Hon. R. E. Jackson, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Guyana |
| Mr. J. S. Mehta, Foreign Secretary,
India | The Hon. Carlyle Dunkley, Minister
of Public Utilities and Transport,
Jamaica |
| HE Mr. Daniel T. Arap Moi, M P,
President of Kenya | HE Mr. I. T. Tabai, President of
Kiribati |
| The Hon. C. D. Molapo, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Lesotho | Mr. J. B. Mkandawire, Deputy Secre-
tary to the President and Cabinet,
Malawi |
| The Hon. Tengku Ahmad, Rithauddeen
bin Tengku Ismail, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Malaysia | The Hon. Dr. Philip Muscat, M P,
Minister of Education, Malta |
| Dr. The Right Hon. Sir Seewoosagur
Ramgoolam, Prime Minister of
Mauritius | The Right Hon. R. D. Muldoon, Prime
Minister of New Zealand |

HE Major-General H. E. O. Adefope,
Commissioner for External Affairs,
Nigeria

The Hon. George Odum, Deputy
Prime Minister, St. Lucia

HE Dr. Siaka P. Stevens, President of
Sierra Leone

The Right Hon. Peter Kenilorea, Prime
Minister of Solomon Islands

The Right Hon. R. V. Dlamini, Minister
without Portfolio, Swaziland

HRH Prince Tuipelehake, Prime
Minister of Tonga

HE Mr. Godfrey Binaisa, President
and Chairman of the National
Executive Committee, Uganda

HE Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, *Secretary-General*

Also present:

AUSTRALIA

The Hon. Andrew Peacock
Mr. A. T. Griffith

BANGLADESH

The Hon. Prof. Shamsul Huq
Mr. Farooq Sobhan

BOTSWANA

The Hon. A. M. Mogwe
Mr. L. J. M. J. Legwaila

CANADA

The Hon. Flora MacDonald
Mr. M. Masse

FIJI

Mr. J. Kotobalavu
Mr. R. T. Sanders

GHANA

HE Mrs. Gloria A. Nikoi
Dr. I. K. Chinebuah

The Right Hon. Michael T. Somare,
C H, M P, Prime Minister of Papua
New Guinea

HE Mr. F. A. Rene, President of
of Seychelles

The Hon. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime
Minister of Singapore

The Hon. R. Premadasa, Prime Minister
of Sri Lanka

HE Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, President
of Tanzania

HE Mr. Eustace Seignoret, High
Commissioner to the United King-
dom, Trinidad and Tobago

The Hon. Vaovasamanaia Filipo,
Minister for Finance, Western Samoa

GUYANA

The Hon. Dr. Mohamed Shahabuddeen
HE Mr. N. Sinclair

KENYA

The Hon. C. Njonjo
The Hon. Dr. M. Waiyaki

MALAYSIA

Mr. P. A. Hamid
Mr. Ajit Singh

MAURITIUS

The Hon. Sir Harold Walter
The Hon. R. Ghurburrun

NIGERIA

HE Ambassador S. U. Yolah
HE Ambassador J. D. D. Sokoya

ST. LUCIA

Mr. Earl Huntley

SIERRA LEONE

The Hon. Dr. A. O. Conteh
Mr. Victor E. Sumner

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Mr. F. Bugotu
Mr. F. Saemala

SWAZILAND

The Hon. Prince Nqaba
The Hon. Dr. S. S. Nxumalo

TONGA

HRH Prince Tupoutoa
Mr. T. Tufui

UGANDA

The Hon. Mr. Otema Allimadi
Mr. E. Tumusiime Mutebile

ZAMBIA

The Hon. R. C. Kamanga
The Hon. W. M. Chakulya

INDIA

Mr. A. F. Couto
Mr. D. W. Telang

LESOTHO

HE Mr. K. C. Molapo
Mrs. T. Kikine

MALTA

Dr. A. S. Trigona
Mr. E. A. Causon

NEW ZEALAND

Mr. F. H. Corner
Mr. A. M. Bisley

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Mr. Mekere Marauta
Miss Jean Kekedo

SEYCHELLES

Mr. D. J. Thomas
Mr. R. Marie

SINGAPORE

The Hon. C. T. Goh
Mr. S. Dhanabalan

SRI LANKA

The Hon. Ranil Wickremasinghe
Mr. Bradman Weerakoon

TANZANIA

Mr. Pius Msekwa
Mr. Daniel Mloka

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO

HE Mr. J. R. P. Dumas

WESTERN SAMOA

The Hon. Fatialofa Momo'e
HE Mr. M. I. Toma

Secretariat :

Mr. E. C. Anyaoku
 Mr. C. J. Small
 Mr. M. Malhoutra
 Mr. G. M. Brownbill
 Mr. R. G. Brown
 Mr. J. R. Syson
 Mr. C. W. Sanger
 Mr. S. J. Stellini
 Dr. A. C. Bundu

CONTENTS

<i>Item No.</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Page</i>
I	World Political Scene and South East Asia	37
II	Uganda	44
III	Belize	47
IV	World Political Scene and South East Asia	50
V	The Mediterranean	52
VI	South East Asia	53
VII	Commonwealth Co-operation	55
VIII	Message from Her Majesty The Queen	55

I. WORLD POLITICAL SCENE (Resumed)
 and SOUTH EAST ASIA (Resumed)

Dr. Kaunda, indicated that the Meeting would be continuing its discussion of the World Political Scene, including the Mediterranean, and South-East Asia with the aim of concluding it by the end of the morning. He praised Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, for his contribution at the previous session, and the President of Cyprus for his moving speech and invited Mr. Fraser to speak.

Mr. Fraser, Australia, said that before coming to the problem of the Vietnamese refugees, he wished to expand on some of the differences between the circumstances of their present Meeting and of their Meeting in 1977. There had been a very marked change for the worse. In 1977 there had seemed considerable hope that the major industrialised countries would make further progress in overcoming inflation and therefore in promoting growth in world trade. Important trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round, had been under way and governments were working positively towards establishing a better economic order and reducing trade barriers and inflation. It was often forgotten that economic aspects had significant political and strategic implications. Today inflation in many industrialised countries instead of falling was rising. The resulting prospects of reduced growth in the major economies had harmful consequences for the North/South dialogue as well as within the developing world. In periods of recession nations tended to withdraw into themselves, diminishing the opportunities for others.

Significant political and strategic changes had also occurred. There had been a hope at the London Meeting that one of the major problems of Southern Africa would have been resolved by the time Heads of Government met again in 1979; it had not. Despite a treaty between Egypt and Israel, many serious problems remained in the Middle East. There were the problems of Iran and Afghanistan and renewed war in Indo-China. All those developments materially altered the strategic outlook and therefore the approach of governments towards the eighties.

After the Vietnam war and the US withdrawal from that country, Australia, with many other countries, had genuinely tried to put the past behind it and to build for the future. It had begun substantial aid programmes to Vietnam, hoping that the Vietnamese people would devote their undoubted energies and skills to rebuilding their own nation and to peaceful purposes. When the Vice-Premier of Vietnam visited Australia in mid-1978, he had professed his Government's desire to pursue peace and friendship with neighbouring countries and to work for a better world. The ASEAN nations were also hoping very much that there would be peace and stability in Indo-China and that Vietnam would not seek to promote its aims by military means. Those hopes, however, went very sadly astray. Shortly after the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam was signed, the latter began a full-scale invasion of Kampuchea. The Soviet/Vietnam Treaty was not just an economic treaty, but contained military aspects as well. Hence in a sense it could be regarded as an instrument for introducing into South East Asia and the Pacific some of the elements of East-West international tensions. It certainly represented an extension of Soviet influence in the region and there could well come a time when the Soviet Union could be seen as a Pacific naval power. It was the signing of the Treaty which gave Vietnam the confidence to launch its attack on Kampuchea. It still had 15 to 17 divisions engaged in combating guerrillas in Kampuchea and was likely to have for a considerable period since a relatively small number of guerrillas could tie down large numbers of conventional forces, as the Vietnamese well knew. As a result of Vietnam's action in Kampuchea, Australia, along with many other countries, had cut off its aid programmes because it did not believe it should subsidise invasion.

Mr. Fraser emphasised that Australia and other countries in the region had tried to hold out the hand of friendship, to forget the past and to encourage Vietnam to build for the future; they had been rewarded by renewed conflict and instability in South East Asia, and a revival of former tensions. Moreover, towards the end of 1978 a vast refugee movement began. It was of a quite different kind from that which had started in Eastern Europe shortly after World War II. The East European Governments had not wanted their people to go to the West and had built a Berlin Wall to try and stop them. The Vietnamese Government, however, was taking the reverse course, actively seeking to promote the exodus. Its purpose was to remove the ethnic Chinese minority, but in fact only about half the refugees were of Chinese origin; the others were Vietnamese who did not fit into the social and economic pattern in Vietnam, and certain indigenous minority groups who possessed an independence of spirit which was not acceptable to the Vietnamese authorities.

The exodus was now approaching 400,000, but on some estimates 50 per cent of those who left Vietnam's shores had drowned at sea. The number expelled already exceeded the number of Jews expelled from Germany in the 1930s. That fact might help to put the situation into some kind of historical and international perspective. It was not just a matter that affected South East Asia alone. He appreciated that Africa likewise faced many grave refugee problems and it was not his intention to minimise their seriousness, which he felt should also receive greater attention from the international community, but he believed the refugee movement out of Vietnam had special and very serious political consequences. If it were to continue it could destabilise the whole of South East Asia. In particular it could disrupt the remarkably successful development policies and the progress of ASEAN countries; imposing immense difficulties and strains on their Governments. While Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, were the first ports of call, Australia tended to be the second port of call, and had initiated an active refugee policy. In relation to its own population it had accepted more refugees than any other nation.

Mr. Fraser felt that if the refugee movement were a more orderly one, people would be able to accept it, but the unheralded arrival of thousands of boat people on a nation's shores created concerns of many different kinds. So tensions had developed and there were particular difficulties for the ASEAN countries. Moreover, bearing in mind the history of the past 30 years in South East Asia, it was not beyond possibility that, quite apart from its suiting the internal needs of Vietnam itself, the destabilising effect of the massive emigration could be a deliberate act of policy promoted, in part, in pursuit of the 1978 Treaty with the Soviet Union. Although there was no hard evidence for this interpretation, it was at least a legitimate possibility, that could not be entirely ignored.

In tackling the refugee problem there had been two approaches. Some progress had been made at the Geneva meeting in July 1979 in persuading more countries to accept refugees. It was recognised that unless the world community as a whole could respond in a more forthright fashion, the problem would remain a grave one that imposed great strains on South East Asia. But that was only one side of the issue. If the only response of the international community was that more countries accepted more refugees, the Vietnamese leaders would be encouraged to continue its policy. Ultimately the problem could only be resolved if it were tackled at its source, which meant a change in Vietnam's policies and attitudes.

On the face of it, it might seem as if Vietnam had shown some response to the Geneva meeting by agreeing to reduce the outflow of refugees, but in his view it would seem very unlikely that this moderation of policy would continue after the meeting of Non-Aligned countries in Havana. During his speech the previous day Mr. Lee Kuan Yew had expressed some scepticism as to whether that moderation in Vietnam's policy indicated a genuine change of attitude. He

himself strongly believed, until he was given evidence to the contrary, that it was only temporary which meant that the problem would return, more vehemently, at a later stage. What then could the Commonwealth or any other international organisation do about the situation? His own Government felt that providing aid to Vietnam had merely encouraged it to take the path that it was pursuing. That was the reason why Australia had stopped its aid programmes, as had other countries. Indeed it could be argued that as the refugees needed aid far more than did Vietnam, governments should consider diverting resources accordingly. But would that kind of pressure be sufficient to bring about a change in Vietnam's policies and what other sort of pressure was available? Ultimately international opinion counted and could have an effect if it were strongly expressed but there was no guarantee of its success, and Vietnam had shown a remarkable capacity successfully to pursue its own policies despite immense difficulties for several decades, no matter what the cost to its own people or to neighbouring countries like Kampuchea.

He hoped that the Communiqué issuing from the present Meeting would be able to make some reference to those problems and strongly express the view that that kind of trade should be stopped. For it was a trade, since the refugees were not just put into boats and pushed out to sea; they had to pay a price. The Vietnamese authorities extracted all the resources the refugee families possessed and even built the boats in which to push them out to sea. It was an organised movement, stage-managed by the Government. According to some estimates the authorities were getting \$200-250 million a year as a result of that trade in human life and human bodies. If those estimates were correct, the refugee trade would be Vietnam's biggest source of export earnings. It was indeed a new and strange way of solving the social and economic problems of a country, to export people who did not want to do what the governing clique of the moment ordered them to. It was a horrible policy and one that Australia believed ought to be strongly condemned.

The Australian Government felt that beyond cessation of aid and the strongest possible expressions of international opinion, either collectively or through bilateral contacts, not much could be done. For that reason there seemed every likelihood that the international community would have to face the prospect of a continuing exodus of between 1-2 million refugees from Vietnam. For if the hypothesis he had suggested earlier, that Vietnam's policies were motivated in part by a determination to destabilise South East Asian countries was correct, then the chances of persuading Vietnam to alter those policies were probably very slight. The Soviet Union could exert considerable influence on Vietnam if it wished to but as yet it had shown no such wish; on the contrary it even appeared to be encouraging the trade by claiming that it was merely an internal matter for Vietnam. It clearly was not merely an internal matter since it was having destructive international consequences. It was those considerations that led him to hope that the Communiqué could express recognition of the importance of the issue and of the need for the international community to understand that it was not just a question of providing new homes but of trying to see that the trade in human life was stopped and to put pressure on Vietnam to look after its people in a reasonable and humanitarian way.

Dr. Nyerere, Tanzania, asked for clarification on who was paying money to the Vietnamese authorities.

Mr. Fraser explained that the authorities extracted the savings of the people wishing to leave as the price of getting them on a boat. He had also heard that in some cases a member of a family might be kept behind as a way of ensuring that the money would be handed over. The stimulus for the exodus was Vietnam's

internal policies which made life intolerable for the groups of people concerned. In reply to a further question he went on to say that a good deal of the payment was apparently in gold.

Mr. Arap Moi, Kenya, observed that if the trade in the Vietnam refugees were allowed to continue there was a danger that organised refugee movements might be mounted on a similar scandalous financial basis in Africa, where there was already a refugee problem involving some 4 million persons. He wondered why international bodies, such as the EEC, which had taken an interest in the Vietnam situation, did not try to get to the root of the problem or why the interested governments had not sought to bring the matter up at the UN.

Mr. Fraser said a number of countries had shown a remarkable reluctance to make the sort of points he had just made. At the Geneva meeting very few had devoted attention to the policies causing the Vietnamese refugee problem. A large number of them concentrated on the humanitarian aspects which, though highly important, did not constitute the nub of the problem. The exodus was going to continue until Vietnam changed its policy and that brought the discussion back to the question of how the Commonwealth, or any other international organisation, could bring appropriate pressure to bear on Vietnam. It was a case of oppressive domestic policies which made life so intolerable for certain groups that they were prepared to give up their possessions for a slim chance to get away. The very chanciness of their ventures indicated the degree of frustration they felt. If a large number of countries were prepared to express views similar to his, ultimately even Vietnam would have to pay some regard, and the simultaneous cessation of aid would reinforce the weight of international opinion. Nobody wanted to go to war on the issue and it was doubtful whether there was a great deal else that the international community could do. If, however, the Soviet Union could be persuaded to exert its influence, that could be a material factor in altering the situation.

Mr. Clark, Canada, expressed total support for the position of the Prime Minister of Australia in regard both to the gravity of the situation and to its dangerous political dimension. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had already referred to Vietnam's temporary turning off of the tap of refugees. There was no question that one of the significant factors that had led to that had been the convening of the Geneva meeting, and Vietnam's anticipation of adverse world opinion being expressed at that forum. But there was a very great fear that the tap would soon be turned on again and he shared *Mr. Fraser's* view that the combination of cessation of aid and a strongly voiced collective opinion, by bodies such as the Commonwealth, could play a very significant role in ensuring that pressure would be brought to bear on Vietnam both directly and, as *Mr. Fraser* had suggested, through the Soviet Union. The Commonwealth represented roughly a quarter of the world's population, and if the Geneva meeting had had some temporary success it was entirely likely that the use of strong language in the Communiqué issued by the Meeting could at least prolong the period in which the flow of refugees was halted and might even begin to redress the problem. It might also give governments some grounds for bringing pressure on the Soviet Union, which in Canada's judgement would be perhaps the most important single political instrument in influencing the decisions that were taken in Vietnam.

Mr. Pindling, The Bahamas, said that his country had absorbed refugees equivalent to about 8 per cent of its own population. They, however, were "economic refugees" and he wondered whether the people who were leaving Vietnam could be similarly regarded or whether the fact that hostilities between China and Vietnam had contributed to the outflow meant that they should be regarded as political refugees.

Mr. Fraser felt that they were political rather than economic. They were fleeing the country largely because of the social circumstances in which they were compelled to live. There was obviously an economic aspect involved but they were not merely looking for better economic possibilities; it was a question of life being made unendurable, not only for the ethnic Chinese minority, who amounted to only about 50 per cent, but also for certain indigenous minority racial groups. He did not think, though, that the Chinese attack on Vietnam had contributed to the flow of refugees. The exodus had begun well before that. What had contributed enormously to the flow, and to the problems confronting Thailand in particular, had been the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the ensuing flood of refugees from that country. There had already been very grave difficulties in Kampuchea prior to the invasion due to the excesses of the Pol Pot regime, but that regime had nevertheless managed to muster people to fight the Vietnamese. Thus there had been two major refugee movements out of Kampuchea: the initial one caused by its own regime's policies—which had had terrible consequences for the Kampuchians, with estimates of the number of people killed as high as 1½ million or even 2 million—and then a second movement resulting from the Vietnamese invasion.

Mr. Muldoon, New Zealand, pointed out that a difficulty that would have to be overcome in drafting any statement on the Vietnamese refugees was that the Commonwealth would normally be inclined to condemn any government which prevented nationals from leaving a country when they wanted to do so. It was very clear that there were two broad groups of people who genuinely wished to leave Vietnam: the ethnic Chinese and the group of Vietnamese, principally professional people, who in the past had been associated with the West, particularly the US. It was therefore desirable that Western nations should take in the maximum number of such people and that had been one of the thrusts at the Geneva meeting. The Commonwealth would thus be in a difficult position if it were to urge Vietnam not to permit those people to leave, especially as member governments had criticised the Eastern European countries for refusing to let people go when they wanted to.

Mr. Fraser felt he might have inadvertently given a wrong impression of his position. The point that he had been seeking to make was that it was Vietnam's internal policy which needed changing because it was designed to make life so unendurable for a large number of its own citizens that they wished to leave the country. Unless that policy was changed the refugee movement would continue and the problem could not be solved.

Mr. Arap Moi questioned whether a Commonwealth statement should single out the issue of the Vietnamese refugees since there were other oppressive regimes where similar situations pertained, and he cited the problem of Zimbabwean refugees.

Mr. Fraser strongly supported the view that the statement in the Communiqué should not be confined to the problem of Vietnamese refugees. He had addressed his own remarks to that issue because it directly affected Australia and other countries from South East Asia and the Pacific. A statement which referred only to the problems of one area would be unbalanced and it should include appropriate references to the refugee problems in Africa as well.

Dr. Kaunda asked if *Mr. Fraser* could make some suggestion to assist in drafting a statement that would reconcile the Commonwealth's critical attitude towards the East European Governments' policies of preventing minorities from leaving with its equally critical attitude towards Vietnam's policies of encouraging minorities to depart in a disorderly manner.

Mr. Fraser thought the difficulty could be dealt with by indicating it was a country's internal policies of brutality which promoted refugee movements. The drafting should be able to cover the point so that there was a consistency in the Commonwealth's broad approach.

Mrs. Thatcher, Britain, felt there were two factors involved. The first was that governments did not normally interfere in the internal affairs of a country without very good reasons and that occurred when the internal affairs were run in such a way that they were totally repugnant to anyone who believed in certain fundamental human dignities and rights. On that basis, governments regarded themselves as competent to pronounce on internal regimes and had established a Human Rights Convention in the UN. There were certain rights so important to each and every human being that every nation should subscribe to them and ensure that they were respected within its borders. So, where the internal policies of a country were inimical to human rights, governments regarded themselves as not only competent but as having a duty to say that it was a form of tyranny which all other nations that believed in liberty must condemn. They should certainly apply that principle to Vietnam.

There was no point in trying to get Russia to help. She had tried to do just that, as the Prime Minister of Australia knew, when she went through Moscow in June. Her impression was that the Soviet Union was not at all dismayed by the introduction of a new destabilising political factor in South East Asia. That might indeed suit its ultimate design, to which Mr. Lee Kuan Yew had already referred, and which they must always keep in mind.

The only way to try to tackle the refugee problem was in relation to human rights. On that basis it would be possible to attack Vietnam on two counts: firstly, that if it ran its internal affairs properly there would be no need for people to wish to leave the country; and secondly, that if it insisted on continuing with policies which caused people to wish to leave, the exodus should be run in an orderly manner, with people being allowed to take a reasonable amount of their goods, not being put in leaky boats in such numbers that a lot of them were bound to sink. That really was to make the Vietnamese boat people refugees in the worst sense of the word.

So she felt the Communiqué could get at the issue both ways. Vietnam ought to run a system which observed basic human rights and it ought to allow people to leave in an orderly and humane way. She did not consider there was any fundamental difficulty about drafting a statement along those lines, but she hoped that throughout the discussion the issue of the Vietnamese refugees would be related to Mr. Lee Kuan Yew's analysis of the world situation. There were basically two political systems under which people lived. One was a form of tyranny which had existed throughout the ages; its modern form was a particular type of communism which centralised control and which did not recognise any ethics, rights, standards, values beyond those determined by the state or the political system itself. The other system was based on political and human freedoms, which did not come from a state but from beliefs, fundamental beliefs that were held across the globe. That was the essential choice confronting governments: to run a political system based on political, economic and human freedoms which allowed people and nations to determine their own destiny, or to run one which believed in a total central control, in dominating the lives of people and in establishing that system throughout the world by proxy wars, by subversion, by threat. That was the ultimate choice which Commonwealth leaders were deciding in the debate, and that was the context in which they must look at the Vietnamese refugee problem. She did not believe the problem stemmed solely from the design of Vietnam; it was part of a much wider scheme to destabilise the existing international political pattern by fostering anarchy in

states where there was presently stability in order to permit the establishment of a new system.

Dr. Nyerere, Tanzania, thought it would be easier to deal with the problem of the refugees in humanitarian terms. If an attempt was made to put it into the context of Communist and non-Communist systems, that is, in terms of global politics, the Communiqué would involve a judgement of political systems, which was not the real issue. The question they had to decide was whether or not they wished to tie the problem of refugees to a criticism of a Communist system.

Mr. Fraser, Australia, thought there might be ways of drafting the statement that would enable it to say something useful and constructive and at the same time meet Dr. Nyerere's point, which was a perfectly legitimate one. There was no need to mention political systems as such, but a reference could be made to what was happening inside Vietnam, though without necessarily putting a political label on it. The statement could merely sum up what was taking place and, he would hope, condemn it.

Dr. Kaunda said it was vital that Commonwealth leaders did not become judges of political systems. However, once the draft Communiqué was prepared, they would be able to see that all the points made during the discussion were taken into account.

Sir Seretse Khama, Botswana, questioned whether they ought to try to avoid making a statement about political systems. How would it be possible, for instance, to discuss The Gambia's paper on human rights without including a reference to political systems? They should not pretend they could, and should accept that they were going to be critical of political systems as well as the internal policies of certain governments, including Commonwealth Governments.

Dr. Nyerere replied that the point he was making was that they would not really be talking about Communism as such. The idea which had been put forward was that there was an inbuilt mechanism in Communism for producing the kind of situation that had developed in Vietnam and that that view should be expressed in the Communiqué. But the four million refugees in Africa, as President Moi had already said, had nothing to do with Communism. If they wanted to talk about refugees, they should talk about the refugee problem as a whole. They should not take one country which happened to be Communist and condemn that system, when there were millions of refugees in Africa who had not come from a Communist system at all.

Dr. Kaunda assured his colleagues that all their various points would be taken into consideration when the Communiqué was drafted.

Mr. Rene, Seychelles, commented that some of the things that he had proposed to talk about had already been dealt with by earlier speakers. The point which he really wanted to make was one which had been made by President Nyerere. The refugee issue was a very big problem and the views of those Commonwealth representatives who were well aware of the situation in South East Asia had been very useful. The refugee problem should be examined from a much wider angle, however, because what had happened in Vietnam would probably sooner or later die down. By the time of the next Heads of Government Meeting there might be other problems in other parts of the world. For years now similar problems, had existed with regard to the Palestinian people, in the Sahara, in Nicaragua, in Iran, in Rhodesia and in Namibia. They also were very big problems. If greater efforts were not made to understand the real causes of them, the world community would find that it was always dealing only

with their effects. The current situation in Vietnam was the result of what had been going on for decades. The world community was now faced with a very serious refugee problem, but should it not also be thinking about what was actually wrong with relations between countries, between the rich and the poor, and between the various African countries, for example? Was the refugee problem purely political or were there also contributing economic factors? In it not the case that some of those problems confronting the international community had, in fact, resulted from years of various systems which had allowed people to develop in different ways, particularly economically? In looking at the world political situation today, perhaps one should look further into the past in order to try to solve the problems of the future. In South East Asia there were very serious problems but it would not be appropriate to condemn a particular country for a particular refugee problem. Attention should be focused instead on those issues which created a particular refugee situation. In so doing, reference could of course be made to the actual situation in Vietnam. The reference to refugees in the Communiqué would have more weight if it were dealt with in that way. As Mrs. Thatcher had mentioned, the issue should be treated as a humanitarian problem as such and the political implications should be left to be read between the lines.

A more specific problem, at least for the Seychelles, was the serious build-up of military power in the Indian Ocean. It was difficult to say whether the Indian Ocean was to be the next area of concentration of the power struggle between the US and the Soviet Union. But the now almost daily build-up in the region by the two Super Powers was certainly frightening. The Meeting should express some concern about this military build-up. It might at least resolve to ask the Super Powers to get together again, as they had done previously, to discuss the matter.

II. UGANDA

Mr. Binaisa, Uganda, noted that his country had been suspended from the Commonwealth for the last four years. He expressed his appreciation for the very warm welcome accorded Uganda by the Secretary-General in his Report. The Secretary-General had used whatever resources were at his disposal to send a Commonwealth team to Uganda to analyse and advise on the priorities in the big task of reconstruction. Uganda had met with its donors for the first time about a week ago, and would be meeting with them again to see what additional assistance they could provide. He also appreciated Mrs. Thatcher's kind remarks during the opening session in welcoming Uganda back to the Commonwealth fold.

The events which had taken place in Uganda over the past eight years were too horrifying to relate. Idi Amin had perpetuated a reign of terror symbolised by an absolute disregard for the concept of human rights, particularly the most fundamental right of all: the right to life. During his regime, the people lived their lives as a privilege given to them by the President. He would circulate to delegations a brochure, showing the atrocities Amin had perpetrated, as an example of the extent to which man's inhumanity to man could go. All that was now part of Uganda's history. The Uganda National Liberation Front of which he was the Executive Chairman, together with the Tanzanian Defence Forces, had expelled Idi Amin from Uganda.

Rumours had been circulating that Uganda was now a satellite of Tanzania; that it was Tanzania which was virtually governing Uganda. That was completely incorrect. Tanzania had offered its assistance in Uganda's hour of need. Uganda could not now brush them aside and claim that everything was in order. Some

Tanzanian troops still remained in Uganda although more than 10,000 had left the country. Some 26,000 would be leaving Uganda soon. The argument that Uganda should get rid of the Tanzanians because they were a foreign army of occupation was unacceptable. The word "foreign" in the English language could mean a number of things. It should be remembered that at the time Africa was divided up by the Great Powers the African people were not consulted and in many cases the boundaries were no more than expressions of latitude and longitude cutting across tribes who spoke the same language and had the same native customs, as on Uganda's southern border with Tanzania. The Tanzanian troops in Uganda could not therefore be regarded as all that foreign.

If the Tanzanian troops were asked to withdraw from Uganda forthwith there would be little that he or the Uganda National Liberation Front could do to protect the country from acts of military adventurism. It should be remembered that Idi Amin's army had disintegrated. There was no effective army in Uganda at present: the members of the Uganda Liberation Front Army were guerrillas who had had to be taught haphazardly. They were now being retrained as professional soldiers. Tanzanian troops would not remain in Uganda after the new Ugandan Army was trained.

Uganda's new leadership was faced with a big rehabilitation problem; it had inherited a country which had been ravaged and destroyed; the infrastructure had gone; the moral character of the people had been destroyed. Both the moral and physical aspects of rehabilitation required attention. Moral rehabilitation represented the bigger task. People who were only 12 years of age when Idi Amin took power were now 20. They had reached maturity in an age of absolute corruption. They must be rehabilitated, even under conditions where rapid inflation gave incentives to profiteering.

Uganda's greatest priority was to obtain essential goods. Kenya had done much to help. They had extended a grant of 20 million shillings and had also written off a debt of 500 million shillings in demurrage charges on 100,000 tons of goods in the port of Mombasa. It was now for Uganda to assume responsibility but one problem was that there was only one railway in the country and a shortage of wagons. The job was well in hand, however, and Kenya was providing security on the long 800 miles journey from Mombasa to Kampala. Uganda was most grateful for that help. President Moi and his Government had promised to continue co-operating with Uganda for the mutual benefit of both countries.

Uganda was also grateful to President Nyerere and the people of Tanzania for all their assistance. Tanzania's intervention in Uganda was the result of Amin's aggression against Tanzania and his occupation of 800 square miles of its territory. Amin had not expected that Tanzania would be in a position to repel the aggression, going to the extent of instructing his Minister of Lands to re-demarcate the boundaries of Uganda, and the Attorney-General to re-draw the Constitution so that the occupied area would appear as part of Uganda, and appointing a governor for the area. Tanzania not only repelled the aggressor but chased him into Uganda. The guerrilla forces of the Uganda National Liberation Front took advantage of the situation, joined with the Tanzanians and expelled Amin from Uganda. Those were the facts. Some people insisted that Tanzania should have stopped the moment Amin was inside Uganda. There was, however, an historical parallel. When Hitler was in the course of being defeated, the Allies did not choose to stop their drive after winning back Austria, Poland and Belgium. They pursued him through the gates of Berlin and eliminated him and his system. The Uganda National Liberation Front and the Tanzanians could therefore not be criticised for the course they took. Amin had shown the rest of the world that he was a man who did not believe in freedom. He had no respect for anything except Idi Amin. He had appointed himself Life-President—that was another

46 source of worry because until somebody terminated his life he would continue to regard himself as President of Uganda.

Uganda's borders were still in a terrible state of war. While Uganda was at peace with such neighbours as Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda and Zaire, that was not the case with Uganda's northern neighbours. It was therefore necessary for Uganda to remain on the alert in order to be able to repel aggression. Before Idi Amin assumed power, Uganda had a police force of some 13,000. Now there were only 2,000. The majority of the most experienced and most competent officers were murdered by the Amin regime. Fortunately Britain had agreed to help with the training of a new Ugandan police force.

On the question of refugees, Uganda had been a haven for refugees ever since the early 1960s. At one time there were some 200,000 refugees from Rwanda, Zaire and the Sudan in the country. Now the situation was reversed. During the Amin regime, many Ugandans had sought refuge in neighbouring countries such as Tanzania and Kenya where they were well received and supported for which Uganda was most grateful.

There was another kind of refugee which should perhaps be mentioned which was very vital to Uganda's tourist industry: those were the elephants and lions in Uganda's national parks which were now refugees in neighbouring countries like Zaire and the Sudan. Although they did not have a High Commissioner for Refugees, he hoped that, by instinct, they would return to Uganda and boost the national tourist industry.

With regard to the East African Community and the prospects for closer union, Uganda was willing to enter into any kind of discussions at any level with neighbouring countries. The countries of East Africa were in a unique position with the English language as the official medium of communication. That asset must be exploited. Uganda was ready to make the Community a functioning reality. Because the plan had failed once before did not mean it could never work. Given goodwill, discussions could be opened with a view to entering into closer union which might even embrace such neighbouring countries as Burundi and Rwanda. It was only through closer co-operation, both in the economic and social spheres, that the interests of the countries in the area could best be promoted.

Mr. Binisa said that he had intended to talk about Cyprus but the ground had already been covered. He wished, however, to affirm that Uganda supported the concept of an independent and sovereign Republic of Cyprus.

On SALT II, Uganda noted that the US and the Soviet Union had recently endorsed the treaty. On the surface, the treaty seemed encouraging because it put in writing limitations on strategic arms and gave some confidence to small countries, such as Uganda. Underneath, however, there were some disturbing elements which seemed to have been overlooked during the talks. Certain arms which were limited by the previous SALT Treaty because of their strength and lethal potential, for example were found to be almost obsolete and in essence replaced by even more lethal ones by the time subsequent SALT talks were convened. The spy satellites which were a big concern at the beginning of the SALT II talks had become accepted monitoring devices. The focus of concern was now the killer satellites. The silo-based missiles and the multiple warheads, which were sometimes referred to as MIRVs, had been forgotten. Concern now centred on the neutron bomb. Keeping in mind that deadly weapons were being produced, even as the SALT talks were proceeding, what confidence could be placed in the various disarmament treaties? Did those talks and treaties really contribute to world peace? It could only be concluded that the Cold War was not all that cold. Uganda called for the total scrapping of all monstrous weapons of war because without that, irrespective of whether the Soviet Union and the US continued to hold talks on arms limitation or not, the world would still be exposed to the threat of nuclear war.

Reaffirming Uganda's support for the Palestinian cause, Mr. Binisa urged that, in resolving the problem, the PLO should be consulted. The Palestinian people were entitled to their democratic rights and to their lands which had been occupied during the 1967 war. The various UN Resolutions on the question should be implemented, not only in the letter but also in the spirit in which they were made.

Referring to Belize, he recalled that the problem stemmed from the territorial claim which Guatemala had made on one quarter to one third of the country. It had the tacit support of the US. Uganda supported Belize and endorsed the 1975 and 1976 UN Resolutions which affirmed the right of the people of Belize to self determination and supported their territorial integrity. His country would be happy to assist the Commonwealth Ministerial Committee in any way possible. Referring to the question of human rights, Mr. Binisa commented that, during the last OAU Summit Conference, he had made a point of naming specific countries where human rights were being violated. It was high time national leaders stood up to be counted in the cause of human rights. Uganda was particularly concerned because it had suffered so much. In Africa today there were two regimes which were well known for their absolute disregard and contempt for human rights. He intended at a later stage in the meeting to propose the establishment of some kind of Commonwealth Human Rights Court because something tangible had to be done. It might be asked how the judgements of such a body could be enforced. In his view, the mere fact that somebody would be in the dock and that judgement would be passed together with the attendant publicity would call the transgressor to order.

Mr. Adams, Barbados, expressed satisfaction that Uganda had again assumed its seat amongst its Commonwealth colleagues. He congratulated the President on his address and commented that the problems facing Uganda should make all Commonwealth members pause to think. Mr. Adams proposed that the Secretary-General might perhaps mobilise and co-ordinate a special programme of assistance for Uganda in the same way that the Secretariat had assisted Zimbabwe and Namibia. It need not necessarily have any large financial implications: if it concentrated on technical assistance, a good deal of bilateral aid might be forthcoming; Barbados would certainly participate, as it had for Zimbabwe and Namibia; it would make available training in tertiary educational or other suitable institutions.

III. BELIZE

At the last two Heads of Government Meetings, the Caribbean, and particularly Barbados, had had to take a lead in raising the question of Belize. Belize was a very old problem. Technically it originated in the colonial history of Britain and Spain in the early 19th century, but its modern manifestation went back to 1947 when the Guatemalan Government sought talks in London on the future of British Honduras, as it was then called. Guatemala was then asserting a modern claim to sovereignty over British Honduras. The situation was a paradox in today's world of decolonisation because the colonial power, Britain, was anxious to see Belize independent; and the colony, Belize, was very anxious to become independent. Over 120 members of the UN had voted year after year for full independent sovereignty and territorial integrity for Belize, but it had proved impossible to meet the wishes of all the parties principally concerned. That was because of the 19th century claim under which Guatemala insisted that it had inherited the colonial claims of Spain over the territory of British Honduras, now Belize.

The 1977 Meeting had appointed a Ministerial Committee. A report on the work of the Committee had already been circulated. In July of that year, the

Guatemalan Government, perhaps in answer to the Committee's deliberations or perhaps influenced by the preparations for a general election campaign in Belize, causing Britain to send reinforcement troops against Belize, causing Britain to send reinforcement troops to the colony. The Ministerial Committee continued to meet, principally in New York during the Sessions of the General Assembly. It had achieved some results in influencing the voting on what had now become the annual resolution.

The issues since 1977 had remained the same. There remained the issue of overall sovereignty, but the Guatemalans might possibly be prepared under certain conditions to abandon that. There was, however, the very important issue of territorial integrity, because Guatemala continued to claim between a quarter and a third of the country. Mr. Adams recalled that in London in 1977 he had warned against any cession of territory whatever and against Britain considering it. Assurances had been given then and, although Britain did discuss cession with Guatemala, it was to Britain's credit that it had rejected any cession of territory without the consent of the inhabitants of Belize. Such consent was very unlikely to be forthcoming.

Since the last Meeting the political Opposition in Belize had joined with the Government to agree on a common policy and to put the matter above party politics in Belize itself. As a result, more or less all those who had the immediate control of affairs in Belize or were likely to have future control shared a common policy. The difficulty, however continued to be the position of the US. There had been an upsurge of optimism in June 1978 when President Carter referred to a peaceful solution to the Belize situation in the context of other Central and South American discussions, such as the border difficulties between Honduras and El Salvador and also Bolivia's wish to have access to the sea. Mr. Adams had been somewhat concerned that a settlement of the Belize dispute might in some way be linked to the manner in which the other two problems were resolved because their resolution seemed to involve some release of territory or abrogation of sovereign rights over territory. It was undoubtedly true that the US had not adopted a neutral position but was biased towards Guatemala. Most observers concurred that, if the US could be persuaded to put pressure on Guatemala to accept the concept of a sovereign Belize within its present borders, the difficulties would vanish. As recently as June 1979, however, representatives of the US State Department in conversations held in Barbados repeated the view that some token cession should be considered. That was quite unacceptable to the Government of Belize and on that Belize had the full support of the Caribbean countries.

Guatemala in fact claimed that it had the best title to sovereignty but that ignored the rights of the settlers of Belize who had been there for over 180 years. It also ignored the Anglo-Guatemalan Treaty of 1857 by which British sovereignty had been confirmed. At the very least, Guatemala argued that Britain had not got the right unilaterally to grant independence to Belize. In effect that meant that Guatemala was claiming the right to block independence to Belize except on terms that Guatemala itself would agree. Both of those points contradicted Articles 1 and 6 of the UN Resolution which had been supported at the 1977 Meeting, with one marginal exception.

With regard to voting in the UN on the question of Belize Mr. Adams thanked Malawi, which had begun by abstaining on the Resolution in 1975, for coming around to a position of support. In December last year, Sri Lanka had inadvertently voted against the Resolution. In fact it was the only country to cast a negative vote but Barbados accepted that that was an unfortunate error of recording. Belize sought first a negotiated settlement with Guatemala. That was the present situation, backed by the UN Resolution on which now only a few countries abstained. The group of countries around Guatemala itself which had

refused to participate in the vote on the last occasion, and which presumably would have voted against the Resolution, consisted of only El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Morocco.

As a result of the Resolution, Guatemala was prepared to negotiate. There were a number of matters which Belize regarded as negotiable: rights of transit through Guatemala to a Caribbean port facility superior to the port facilities now enjoyed by Guatemala in the Caribbean; a good deal of economic co-operation; and perhaps the use of the territorial waters and the economic zone on the Caribbean side. In the last analysis, however, Belize still wished to become an independent country if it proved impossible to come to terms with Guatemala. The two issues which were totally non-negotiable were sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Belize Government was therefore hopeful that, in the last analysis, Britain and other interested governments would consider independence with a security guarantee. The Caribbean states fully supported Belize in that. As a part of the negotiating process, unrelenting pressure should be placed on the US. The US must be told that ostensibly it was sitting on the fence but in fact it was putting steel into the spine of the Guatemalan negotiators. It was surely in Britain's interest to have the problems of Belize off Britain's hands. The fact that British troops in Belize had been of approximately battalion size strength with significant air support would probably come as a surprise. A very substantial show of force was in fact necessary to secure even Belize's present position as a colony within its existing borders. Britain would presumably be glad to see the situation altered so that a substantial expenditure of money and the resources of the British Army were no longer required in Central America.

Barbados considered that the Commonwealth Ministerial Committee should continue. It had done very useful work in focusing world opinion on the cause of Belize and he hoped it would be allowed to continue its efforts. The Caribbean itself had been able to persuade Costa Rica and Panama to come round from a position of full support for Guatemala to a position of full support for Belize. A number of other Latin American countries—Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela—had also come round to a position of support for Belize. One last push, particularly directed against the US, should create a climate within which Belize might be able in a few years to join the Commonwealth. There were indications that Nicaragua under its new conditions might be persuaded to refrain from supporting Guatemala, which gave shelter to the Somoza Family in recent weeks, and to transfer its support, as Costa Rica and Panama had transferred theirs, to Belize.

In the last analysis it would probably be the countries of the region, primarily countries in the Organisation of American States, as well as Britain and the US, which would have to be prepared to give a security guarantee to maintain the present borders of an independent Belize. Some assistance in this direction had been given by the former Foreign Secretary: Dr. Owen's indication to the Ministerial Committee in 1977 that, if matters were not resolved with Guatemala, Britain would be prepared to participate in a multilateral peace-keeping force for an independent Belize. Britain was not prepared to provide a security guarantee on its own; nor was it reasonable to ask more of her. He hoped Belize would not have to enter independence with a guarantee and a peace force on its borders. But, if it came to that, the Commonwealth should give Belize all its support. In such an event he hoped the present British Government would renew the assurances given by Dr. Owen to the Ministerial Committee, and that Belize would be present at the next Meeting and certainly no later than the Meeting after that.

Dr. Kaunda expressed confidence that the Meeting was in agreement that the Commonwealth should continue to support Belize's legitimate demands for independence and territorial integrity. He suggested that those members of the Commonwealth who had some contacts with the US Government should make representations on behalf of Belize.

Mrs. Thatcher, Britain, confirmed that Britain wished to give independence to Belize. Through no fault of its own, however, Britain had been unsuccessful in those attempts. Britain by itself could not possibly guarantee Belize's independence. The suggestion of a multilateral force had been raised when the question of Belize was discussed in 1977. That proposal was leaked, prompting the Guatemalans to threaten invasion and to move troops to the border. General elections were scheduled in Belize before February 1980. It seemed unlikely that very much could be done until after then. She undertook to consult with Mr. Adams on what might be said about Belize in the Communiqué.

Mr. Adams acknowledged that Britain could not commit the British Army to defending a Central American frontier. It would be unreasonable to expect that. What Barbados sought was an undertaking that Britain would be prepared to participate in a general guarantee with other countries. If the British Prime Minister could confirm *Dr. Owen's* earlier assurance, it would be a great help when the Communiqué was being drafted.

Dr. Kaunda requested *Mrs. Thatcher* and *Mr. Adams* to discuss the issue together and to help with the drafting of an appropriate reference to Belize in the Communiqué.

He then referred to the proposal raised by *Mr. Adams* that the meeting should consider ways in which the Commonwealth could help in the rehabilitation of Uganda. He noted that *Mr. Binaisa* had mentioned various forms of assistance which Uganda was already receiving from Tanzania, Kenya and Britain but he agreed with *Mr. Adams's* suggestion that the Secretariat might also be called on to mobilise additional support for Uganda. He invited the Meeting to give further consideration to the matter.

Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Mauritius, supporting *Mr. Adams's* views on Belize, said that his country had committed itself in the UN to the hope that there would be a solution forthcoming which would realise the hopes and aspirations of the people of Belize.

IV. WORLD POLITICAL SCENE (Resumed) and SOUTH EAST ASIA (Resumed)

Turning to the question of refugees from Vietnam, a problem which, as noted, was a general one which also affected Africa, he said Mauritius was a multi-racial country which supported the need to find homes for the refugees from Vietnam. Vietnam was the scourge of power politics. When the US withdrew from Vietnam it left that country in the lurch and caused the world to face the ensuing problems. Many other countries were trying to assist the refugees and although Mauritius could not do very much, it was helping on an individual basis because human suffering affected everybody.

Behind all, however, lay the problems of unemployment, inflation, and balance of payments difficulties with which all developing countries were faced. Because of the world recession, those problems were becoming more acute and were creating a great deal of insecurity in smaller countries like Mauritius. He expressed concern that other countries which had the power to help and guide just looked on as democratic institutions fell. The security of the state was threatened by political uncertainties, strikes, and student agitation, all of which sprang from the prevailing economic situation. It was therefore necessary to pursue policies which attempted to reduce the pressure on democratic institutions and government. One way of doing so was to help countries build up their

resources and their power of resistance to insecurity, another measure was to adopt a policy of establishing commodity price stability in the world, as discussed in 1975 in Kingston, and aid on reasonable terms. Such measures could reduce the political and economic pressures.

Like Seychelles, Mauritius was subject to the pressures prevailing in the Indian Ocean, namely the military build-up by the Soviet Union and the US. Whilst acknowledging the wish of the big powers to preserve stability in the Gulf countries he thought the Indian Ocean should be treated separately, with a reduction in military power and left in peace. Because a number of non-Commonwealth countries were involved that could only be done through the UN at a conference which could try to bring pressure upon the two powers to reduce their build-up.

Mauritius was co-operating regionally with the Seychelles, Madagascar, Reunion, the Comoros, Tanzania and Kenya with a view to strengthening each other's economies and social structures. The most important requirement was security and in this connection he referred to the recent Francophone meeting in Rwanda at which was mooted the suggestion that there be some sort of local force which could come to the aid of a country when its security was affected. The matter had also been taken up at the OAU Conference. He hoped that there would also be an opportunity for discussion of that important issue during the course of the Meeting and how to promote security through commodity price stability and aid.

Dr. Nyerere, Tanzania, commenting on *Mr. Binaisa's* reference to the presence of Tanzanian troops in Uganda, said that they were there as a result of a request made after the war, first by President Lule, and later by President Binaisa. However it was not possible for Tanzania to continue to bear the burden of having large numbers of troops in Uganda. It wished to withdraw them and that had been made very clear to Uganda. The war had been very expensive, and maintaining troops in Uganda was also costly. Contrary to the rumour that Tanzania was being assisted to keep its troops in Uganda, he wished to stress that his Government was shouldering the full cost and it could not really afford to do so. It was therefore imperative that the Commonwealth should consider ways in which it might help Uganda, both in economic and security matters. Although Tanzania wished to withdraw its troops, it had to recognise that Uganda currently had no army and no police. Uganda's needs were clear and it was ridiculous that they should be supplied by Tanzania alone.

Dr. Muscat, Malta, congratulated *Dr. Kaunda* and the people of Zambia for hosting the meeting and the Commonwealth Secretariat for its efficient running. He expressed apologies on behalf of his Prime Minister who was unfortunately unable to attend, but wished to convey *Mr. Mintoff's* greetings. As Minister of Education, he was proud to represent Malta which was giving assistance to students from a number of developing countries including Zimbabwe.

His Government was fully aware of the last strains of colonialism in Southern Africa. A semblance of black majority rule in Zimbabwe was manifestly unsatisfactory. With widespread international backing and understanding the Front Line States would ensure the ultimate victory of the peoples of Southern Africa. Malta had and would consistently uphold the cause of the black majority in that region. It continued to pledge its full support and assistance to the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Southern Africa in their struggle.

V. THE MEDITERRANEAN

Turning to the Mediterranean, he observed that over the past two millennia, it had been characterised by succeeding centuries of deep and continual strife fanned by politico-religious bigotry and socio-cultural dissensions. Even in an age of ballistic inter-continental missiles, the Euro-Mediterranean region continued to exert its influence on the destiny of mankind. Perhaps no other area posed a more explosive threat to peace and security, not only of the region but of the world, than the eastern part of the Mediterranean. The situation in Cyprus was, as its President had himself said, still unresolved. The tragedy of the Cypriot people called for an urgent solution on humanitarian grounds. There was also a major concern for safeguarding the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the people of Cyprus. Failure to find an equitable solution to the question would not only cause more hardship to the two communities but might lead to the involvement of other nations. It had been earnestly hoped that the recent resumption of talks by representatives of the two communities would have led to a political settlement and to the establishment of a mutually acceptable and beneficial constitutional arrangement but such hopes were not realised and the dangers to the Mediterranean continued.

There was no doubt however that the paramount threat to the security not only of the Mediterranean but of the whole world was the Middle East problem and the question of Palestine. The risks of dangerous conflict remained as real as ever, with inevitable dire consequences particularly for the immediate Euro-Mediterranean region. That had nearly happened in 1973. Given recent developments purported to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East, it was important to emphasise that the central question was that of Palestine. Recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians was indispensable. No accord could lead to a lasting and genuine solution if it ignored that basic tenet. That was the fatal flaw of the so-called Camp David Accord. In the aftermath of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, Arab Ministers at their meeting in Baghdad in March 1979, had felt compelled to adopt far-reaching decisions as an expression of their total opposition to it. The divisions in the Arab world had caused much anguish to all those who cherished the cause of Arab unity and were also a serious drawback to the evolution of a comprehensive and durable solution to the Palestinian problem.

The human tragedy of the Palestinians called for an urgent solution guaranteeing them the right to a sovereign and independent state. Their inalienable rights had been identified by the UN and several resolutions had been adopted which had met the open defiance of Israel. The recommendations made by the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People had been recognised as a basis for the solution of the question of Palestine. Malta, therefore, strongly urged those Commonwealth countries who had harboured some doubts about the Committee's recommendations, to join with the overwhelming majority and actively support those recommendations at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

The serious situation in the Mediterranean was being rendered more acute by the military presence and interference of the Super Powers. The Second World War had defeated Nazism and Fascism but had dissipated Europe's political and economic strength. World supremacy had passed into the hands of the two Super Powers from outside Europe. Their rivalry was felt throughout the world, but perhaps nowhere was it so bitter as in the Southern European-Mediterranean region, so close to the vital oil supplies of the Middle East. The presence of the US had brought a certain degree of stability but recent developments in Iran and the reaction in the Arab world following the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty has shaken the stability to such an extent that the US was now prepared to interfere militarily to secure the oil supplies so vital to its economy.

SECRET

The Soviet Union was equally involved. With the US supplying arms to Israel, some Arab States had turned to the Soviet Union for equipment to defend themselves from Israeli aggression. The Soviet Union would undoubtedly lose no opportunity to extend its influence in the area.

The polarisation of the interests of the Super Powers had reached a stage where the Mediterranean countries, particularly the European ones, could no longer afford simply to watch developments. The Euro-Arab nations would have to respond together by starting a dialogue which would eventually lead to a solution to the Middle East crisis.

Dr. Muscat explained that Malta had taken several initiatives to promote closer co-operation and understanding among Mediterranean states. His Government had tried to impress upon European industrialised countries and those bordering the Mediterranean, that in the long-term their vital and economic interests were compatibly and inevitably linked. The first success was effecting a rapprochement between Italy and Libya, followed by quadripartite collaboration between four central Mediterranean neighbours, Italy, Malta, Libya and Tunisia.

There had also been initiatives at the international level. The Maltese Government had realised that the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe offered a unique opportunity to focus attention on the Mediterranean and foster Euro-Arab relations. Co-operation among European states could only reduce the risks of conflict if complemented by co-operation with neighbouring Mediterranean states and through Malta's efforts the Conference had agreed to hear the views of non-European Mediterranean states.

It was therefore imperative that Europe took a leading role, independent of the two Super Powers, and attempted to find a solution to the Middle East problem. Europe was slowly realising that her interests could not be divorced from those of the Arab states but must be safeguarded by increased co-operation between Euro-Arab countries bordering the Mediterranean.

Malta recognised that the presence of the Super Powers in the Mediterranean could not be simply wished away but the longer they remained, the more they would try to draw the states of the Mediterranean apart and into their respective orbits. If, however, Western European and Mediterranean states united they could convince both the US and the Soviet Union that the interests of peace would best be served by their departure from the region.

He hoped that Malta's efforts would find the support of the Commonwealth. Only thus would that necessary degree of independence from the Super Powers be achieved.

VI. SOUTH EAST ASIA (Resumed)

Tengku Ahmad Rithaudden, Malaysia, said he wished to comment on the two issues—the situation in South East Asia, particularly that in Indo-China and the issue of refugees—which had been the subject of international conferences in Geneva both in December 1978 and recently. The ending of the war in Indo-China in 1975 had given rise to optimism at the Kingston Meeting for the return of long-term peace and stability after three decades of war. Malaysia, with other ASEAN countries, had established contact with all three countries: Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea. In particular, contact had been made with Vietnam because it was considered important and necessary that that country be brought again into the mainstream of international and regional affairs.

In the spirit of neighbourliness, friendship and co-operation, Malaysia had wished to help Vietnam make progress with her reconstruction and rehabilitation.

SECRET

Vietnam had responded positively and friendly high-level contacts and consultations had taken place with a view to realising the ASEAN concept of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality for South East Asia. Recently, however, the situation in Indo-China had rekindled anxieties within the region that peace and stability were again threatened. Following Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978, the five ASEAN Foreign Ministers had met in Bangkok in January and issued a joint statement calling for the respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference; the withdrawal of all foreign forces; and the right to self-determination by the Kampuchean people. The statement had formed the basis of the draft resolution for the UN Security Council debate but that debate had, as usual, been ineffective and the resolution with 13-2 in favour had been vetoed by the Soviet Union.

Following China's punitive military invasion of the border areas of Vietnam in February the ASEAN Foreign Ministers had issued a statement similar to that of January to indicate their neutrality and concern about a possible escalation of the problem.

The current uneasy situation in Indo-China was a complex reflection of the larger issue of Sino-Soviet rivalry in the region. To understand it, the problem had to be viewed from such a perspective. To the Chinese, the main threat came from the Soviet Union, which was using Vietnam as a bridgehead to dominate South East Asia. The Chinese had witnessed with considerable concern the clear manifestation of Hanoi's alignment with Moscow, firstly through her membership in COMECON, and secondly by the signing of a Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in November 1978.

In October 1978, the Vietnamese Prime Minister, Mr. Pham Van Dong, had visited Malaysia and the other ASEAN countries and had pledged to co-operate towards the realisation of a Zone of Peace in South East Asia. A month later, the Friendship Treaty was signed by Vietnam and the Soviet Union. With hindsight, the motive of Pham Van Dong's goodwill visit had been clear: Vietnam had wanted to neutralise ASEAN so that she could attack Kampuchea, which she did.

Malaysia did not see a ready solution to the conflict. The Chinese had accused Vietnam of establishing hegemony in South East Asia and the Vietnamese had in turn warned the countries of South East Asia of Chinese hegemony in the area. So far as Malaysia was concerned, the question of Kampuchea was the key element in the current situation. So long as Vietnamese troops remained in Kampuchea, China would continue to support Pol Pot and any other guerrilla units fighting against Vietnam. During a recent visit by the Malaysian Prime Minister to Peking, he had been informed by the Chinese leaders that the guerrillas in Kampuchea would continue to fight even if their numbers dwindled to 20 per cent. Then there was the inevitability that Thailand would be sucked into the conflict against her will. Malaysia, therefore, firmly believed that the international community must attempt to find a solution which would not cause loss of face for Vietnam and which was acceptable to China.

Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen then turned to the urgent problem of the boat people from Vietnam. Malaysia referred to them as illegal immigrants as there was evidence of official complicity in the exodus. The UN Conference on refugees held recently in Geneva had been a recognition of, and a response by, the international community to a problem that demanded urgent international attention and solution. Vietnam had acknowledged the decisive role she played in co-operating to solve the problem at source, and in that connection, had agreed to stop the illegal departures for a reasonable period and to co-operate with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to establish arrangements for orderly departures. New pledges of increased resettlement and financial support had been made, all of which had greatly encouraged Malaysia although it was

appreciated that the problem could not be solved overnight. Malaysia felt the useful exchange of views had brought forth a better understanding of the depth and dimensions of the problem but that was not enough. The plan for action outlined at Geneva had to be effectively carried through with Vietnam's co-operation. Malaysia remained concerned about residual problems and for the time being would continue with its present cordon on further arrivals of Vietnamese boat people to its shores.

VII. COMMONWEALTH CO-OPERATION

At the request of *Mr. Fraser*, Australia, the Meeting agreed to remit to the Committee of the Whole for examination a proposal that a select committee be constituted to look at communications and the media in the Commonwealth and the feasibility of introducing a Commonwealth media exchange system.

Dr. Kaunda reminded his colleagues that it was agreed the previous day that in order to promote informality texts of speeches could be circulated.

VIII. MESSAGE FROM HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

He then read the following reply from Her Majesty The Queen to the message sent the previous day:

"Please convey my sincere thanks to all the Commonwealth Heads of Government and their Representatives assembled in Lusaka for the kind message which you have sent me on their behalf. As Head of the Commonwealth I am delighted to be here and I send you all my warmest good wishes for the success of your deliberations."

The Meeting adjourned at 1 p.m.