



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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To some extent this draft is
 in fact a conflation of Hussein's remarks ^{30 October 1981}
 at lunch as well as with you. But I
 do not think it misrepresents the tenor of his
 statements. The important passage is that sidelined
 on the second page. Apex text? (The Duty
 Dear Michael, Clem has a copy). And 30/x

Arab/Israel

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes it
 might be useful if the Prime Minister could send a message
 to President Reagan about her talks with King Hussein.
 As you know, the King is travelling on to Washington from
 London for an official visit which is due to start on
2 November. As he told the Prime Minister, this will be a
 very important meeting for him and equally for American
 policy and President Reagan personally. A helpful message
 might serve to prepare the way and at the same time show
 the President that for all our differences we are working
 actively for the same aim.

There is an additional reason for recommending such
 a message. We have been informed in confidence by Nicholas
 Veliotes, US Assistant Assistant Secretary of State, that
 there is a debate going on within the US Administration
 over whether the US should not alter its interpretation of
 Resolution 242 as it applied to the West Bank so as to bring
 it more in line with the current Israeli Government's
 interpretation, namely that the Resolution does not call
 for any withdrawal, since the Palestinians have at their
 disposal that part of the original mandate that lies east
of the River Jordan. It would be a serious blow to the
 Arab world, and to European hopes of bringing US policy
 closer to that of the Ten, if the Administration made such
 a move.

A draft message is enclosed.

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Yours ever,
Francis Richards
 (F N Richards)
 Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
 10 Downing Street

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

The immediate purpose of this note is to tell you of
 I spent an hour on 28 October talking to King Hussein, *who will*
know he is *my* *with* *on Monday next,*
 will shortly be visiting you in Washington. He is a deeply

worried man though he speaks, as always, in low key and with
 the utmost courtesy. You may find it useful before you see
 him to have a brief account of the main points we covered in
 our talks. *may I* *most warmly*
 But first let me congratulate you on the outcome

of the vote on AWACS in the Senate. *—* This is good news for all
 the West's friends in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. *And I am*
sure they will all appreciate your own fantastic
personal efforts which led to this result.

Hussein told me that one of his worries is that the Egyptians
 may be misled into concluding an agreement with the Israelis *about the West Bank*
 over the heads of the Palestinians, which the latter would be
 bound to reject. He himself very much hopes that Egypt will
 be able to return to the Arab fold, although he recognises
 the difficulties for many Arabs, not least because of the
 process of normalisation of relations between Egypt and
 Israel; but an agreement in the current autonomy talks that
 was rejected by the Palestinians would set back the prospects
 very severely. He said he had written to Mubarak in these
 terms.

We discussed also Fahd's eight-point plan. We had not at
 that time of course seen your helpful comment that they
 could form a beginning point for negotiations. He said that
 he doubted whether it would be possible for the Arabs to
 endorse Fahd's points as they stand at the Summit meeting in
 Fez if only because of Syrian opposition. Nevertheless, it
 might be possible for the Arabs to agree on something that was
 effectively the same, although expressed in different words.
 There could be dangers in this if the proposals came to be

/regarded

regarded as the irreducible minimum Arab demand; but if as you have said they can be presented as a negotiating position, it would be valuable.

In a survey of the Arab world ranging from Morocco and Mauritania in the West to the Iran/Iraq war in the East, Hussein expressed anxiety about the spreading problems that afflict so many countries in the area. He has of course no time for Qadhafi, but does not see the Libyan Army as a threat either to Egypt or indeed to the Sudan - Chad was another matter. Nearer home he himself is clearly worried by the current Israeli tendency to argue that the Palestinians, if they want a state, should seek it in Jordan, to the east of the River Jordan. This, of course, is a position which no Arab country could accept, and we have made it clear that it is not the Western position. Western countries have always taken the view that Resolution 242 calls for peace and withdrawal from occupied territory to be negotiated together, and that must mean withdrawal on the West Bank.

The one ray of hope, I believe, is that more and more Arabs are coming to see, and indeed acknowledge in public, the need for genuine negotiations with Israel. This movement will be Sadat's memorial, whatever other Arabs may say. Hussein of course has long believed in the need and now Fahd's proposals point in the same direction. If only the Palestinians could be brought to make clear ~~beyond doubt~~ their readiness to negotiate and live with the outcome and if, in their turn, the Israeli Government could show sufficient flexibility to allow

/the Palestinians

A very long sentence - hard to read - a whole without altering the text. not

the Palestinians to engage eventually in negotiations, whether direct or indirect, we might have some hope of bringing about ~~what we all so desperately need~~, a comprehensive peace in the region. It will require much ingenuity and patience and I can assure you that we will try to play our part.