

CONFIDENTIAL

2 R3

GRS 830

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUSAKA 231230Z JUL 79

P S TO P M
NO 10 DOWNING ST

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 741 OF 23 JULY

AND TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE

INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, NAIROBI, LILONGWE
ROUTINE MAPUTO, LUANDA.

Prime Minister

*ghm
24/7*

ZAMBIA ON THE EVE OF THE STATE VISIT AND CHGM

*f-a
ghm
20/7*

1. ZAMBIA IS PREPARING TO GIVE HER MAJESTY A WARM AND ENTHUSIASTIC WELCOME REFLECTING THE RESPECT IN WHICH SHE IS HELD HERE AND THE VALUE PLACED ON THE BRITISH CONNECTION.

2. DESPITE KAUNDA'S VIEW THAT SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE SOMETIMES BEEN LESS THAN STRAIGHT WITH HIM OVER RHODESIA I BELIEVE HE HAS BEEN MUCH ENCOURAGED BY YOUR STATEMENT OF 10 JULY RE-AFFIRMING THE GENUINE NATURE OF THE CONSULTATIONS UPON WHICH HMG IS EMBARKED. NEITHER THE PRESIDENT NOR HIS CLOSEST COLLEAGUES WANT 'ANOTHER SINGAPORE' BUT SEE THE CHGM AS A CRITICALLY IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING OVER RHODESIA, A PROBLEM WHICH THE ZAMBIANS REGARD AS HAVING AFFECTED THEIR PEACE AND PROSPERITY WITH PECULIAR VIRULENCE FOR MORE THAN A DECADE OF INDEPENDENCE. THEY ARE THEREFORE DISPOSED TO OFFER A GENUINE WELCOME TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER. PERHAPS THE MOST CONCRETE TOKEN OF KAUNDA'S INTENTIONS HAVE BEEN THE STEPS TAKEN TO CONTROL ZIPRA'S MILITARY CAPACITY DESPITE HIS OWN LONG STANDING RELATIONSHIP WITH NKOMO. THIS HAS NOT BEEN AN EASY DECISION EMOTIONALLY FOR KAUNDA.

3. IF WE CAN RETAIN KAUNDA'S CONFIDENCE AT THE CHGM AND THEREAFTER IN THE GENUINENESS OF OUR APPROACH OUR POSITION WILL BE MUCH STRENGTHENED. HE HAS LITTLE LIKING OR RESPECT FOR MUZOREWA BUT IN THE PAST HAS NEGOTIATED WITH PEOPLE (VORSTER AND SMITH) WHOM HE LIKED STILL LESS. HE IS ALREADY WILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE MUZOREWA AS ONE OF THE 'CENTRES OF POWER'. WHAT THEN ARE HIS DESIDERATA IN

/IN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

IN ANY SETTLEMENT? I BELIEVE HE WOULD LOOK FOR : A) AN END TO THE WHITES BLOCKING POWER IN PARLIAMENT SEMICOLON B) A CLEAR PATH TO TOP JOBS IN ALL SERVICES AND PROFESSIONS FOR BLACK RHODESIANS SEMICOLON C) IAN SMITH'S DEPARTURE FROM OFFICE - HELPFUL IF NOT AS IMPORTANT AS A) AND B) SEMICOLON D) SOME RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT IT WAS THE PF'S STRUGGLE RATHER THAN MUZOREWA'S WHICH PRODUCED POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN RHODESIA SEMICOLON E) A FRESH ELECTION UNDER EXTERNAL OR POSSIBLY JOINT PF/INTERNAL AUTHORITY SUPERVISION BUT AT ALL EVENTS UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH ENSURED THAT THE EXISTING RHODESIAN ADMINISTRATION WERE PALPABLY UNABLE TO INFLUENCE THE RESULT SEMICOLON AND F) ARRANGEMENTS WHICH AFTER THE ELECTION INDISPUTABLY LEAVE THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT. THIS LAST WOULD IN ZAMBIAN EYES BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN FULFILLING THE OBJECTIVE SET OUT IN YOUR 10 JULY STATEMENT OF ACHIEVING A SITUATION COMPARABLE TO THAT IN WHICH INDEPENDENCE WAS GRANTED TO OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES (A POINT WELL RECEIVED HERE).

4. THE NEARER WE ARE ABLE TO COME TO KAUNDA'S DESIDERATA THE MORE

'RESPECTABLE' IT WILL BECOME FOR HIM IN HIS OWN EYES AND THOSE OF OTHER AFRICAN STATES TO GIVE THE SUPPORT WE DESIRE FOR A RETURN TO LEGALITY IN RHODESIA. KAUNDA IS PRAGMATIC ENOUGH TO REALISE THAT HE MAY NOT ACHIEVE ALL HE SEEKS. BUT HE WILL BE LOOKING FOR SOMETHING MORE THAN A FIG LEAF. IT IS ACCORDINGLY CRUCIAL TO ANGLO-ZAMBIAN RELATIONS AND TO THE CONTINUATION OF ZAMBIA'S STANCE AS ONE OF THE MODERATE FRONT LINE STATES, WITHIN LIMITS ABLE AND PREPARED TO EXERCISE A CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE WITH THE PF, THAT WE SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE USING OUR BEST EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A 'RESPECTABLE' SETTLEMENT.

5. SHOULD KAUNDA CONCLUDE THAT WE ARE NOT IN EARNEST ABOUT SEEKING WIDE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, THAT WE HAD BEEN LESS THAN FRANK WITH HIM AND THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO RECOGNISE MUZOREWA IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH HE AND OTHER MODERATE AFRICANS WOULD NOT REGARD AS 'RESPECTABLE', HE IS SUFFICIENTLY COMMITTED AND EMOTIONAL TO REACT STRONGLY. IN THIS CASE, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE THE AVENUE OF KAUNDA'S ^{CHOOSING} (AND INDEED ONE WHICH COULD SPELL HIS OWN SUBSEQUENT REPLACEMENT BY SOMEONE READIER TO FALL IN WITH SOVIET WISHES), THOSE ESPOUSING THE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY OF A TURN TO THE SOVIET BLOC WOULD HAVE THEIR HAND STRENGTHENED. DEFENCE SECRETARY ZULU HAS AS YOU KNOW BEEN SHOPPING FOR WEAPONS AND TRAINING RECENTLY IN THE GDR.

CONFIDENTIAL

16.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS PRECISELY KAUNDA'S SUBSEQUENT COURSE OF ACTION BUT MANY LEADING ZAMBIANS WOULD SHARE SOMETHING OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY SHAMUYARIRA OF ZANU (MAPUTO TELNO 158) BELIEVING THAT RECOGNITION OF RHODESIAN BY BRITAIN AND SOME WESTERN POWERS WOULD LEAD TO MORE MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA THUS LEAVING THE PF AND FLS TO FIGHT IT OUT TO THE BITTER END , WITH LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO TURN EAST FOR THE WEAPONS AND HELP THEY WOULD NEED. CAUGHT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES BETWEEN ZIPRA'S PRESENCE, AND A NEWLY MOBILISED AFRICAN OPINION ON THE ONE HAND AND RHODESIAN INCURSIONS ON THE OTHER IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW KAUNDA COULD CONTINUE TO RESIST SUCH A COURSE.

ALLINSON

FILES
RHOD.D.
OADS
N AM D
NEWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
ES & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVS(MR.FREELAND)
(MR.FIFOOT)
ECON D
P & CD

DEF D
OID
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR.LUCE
PS/MR.RIDLEY
PS/MR.HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN
MR.THOMAS
MR.WILLSON
MR.WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY

3
CONFIDENTIAL