

IRAN: ADVANCE COPIES 43

IMMEDIATE

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR D MAITLAND  
MR J C NOBERLY  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR EVANS  
MISS BROWN  
HD/MED (2)  
HD/FRD  
HD/NEHAD  
HD/UND (2)  
HD/OLD (2)  
HD/DEF DEPT  
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HD/BS & SD (2)  
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HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/COD  
HD/CONS DEPT  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Lord A G Hamrick

~~PS NO 10 DOWNING ST~~

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
ASSESSMENTS STAFF )  
MR R WADE GERY ) CABINET  
MR LE CHEMINANT ) OFFICE  
MR P G FOWLER R 217 )  
DIO )

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MR F R BARRATT ) TREASURY  
MR D J S HANCOCK )

MR C W MCMAHON ) BANK OF  
MR S PAYTON ) ENGLAND  
*Mr R Williams* CRES DC  
MR W KNIGHTON DEPT OF TRADE  
MR C BENJAMIN DOI

MR D LE B JONES ) DEPT OF  
MR C LUCAS ) ENERGY

OO ISLAMABAD

GR 332

CONFIDENTIAL

X DESKBY 140900Z X

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 140442Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 105 OF 13 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN WASHINGTON PARIS ISLAMABAD (FOR S OF S'S PARTY).

MIPT: SECURITY COUNCIL: IRAN.

THE END OF THIS LONG DRAWN OUT EXERCISE CAME AS NO SURPRISE. THE SOVIET VETO WAS EXPECTED, ALTHOUGH, AS A RESULT OF HEAVY ARM-TWISTING IN CAPITALS, THE AMERICANS GOT RATHER MORE POSITIVE VOTES THAN HAD SEEMED LIKELY AT THE OUTSET. THE RELUCTANCE WITH WHICH NEARLY ALL THE NON-ALIGNED CAST THEIR VOTES IN FAVOUR WAS OBVIOUS: THE CLUMSY AND INSENSITIVE HANDLING BY THE AMERICANS OF THE INTERMINABLE PRELIMINARIES, PARTICULARLY THEIR FLAT REFUSAL TO ALLOW WALDHEIM MORE TIME TO DEVELOP HIS IRANIAN CONTACTS,

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2. WE SHALL PROBABLY FIND OURSELVES WITH A FEW RODS IN PICKLE. THE AFRICANS AND COMMUNISTS HAVE CLEARLY DRAWN THE PARALLEL BETWEEN WESTERN SUPPORT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN AND WESTERN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL. EQUALLY THE NON-ALIGNED, PARTICULARLY ZAMBIA, HAVE VERY SORE ARMS AND ARE UNLIKELY TO WELCOME REPRESENTATIONS FROM THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES ON OTHER DIFFICULT SUBJECTS.

3. IT WAS CLEAR FROM MCHENRY'S FINAL STATEMENT (OF WHICH NEITHER WE NOR ANY OTHER WESTERN MEMBER HAD ANY WARNING), ABOUT THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERS STATES TO APPLY SANCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 461, THAT THE AMERICANS ARE NOW EXPECTING PROMPT UNILATERAL ACTION BY THEIR FRIENDS.

PARSONS

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*Lord R G Hume*

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DESKBY WASHINGTON 141400Z

DESKBY PARIS 140900Z

DESKBY ISLAMABAD 140700Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 140441Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 104 OF 13 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN WASHINGTON PARIS ISLAMABAD (FOR S OF S'S PARTY).

MY TELNO 101: SECURITY: COUNCIL: IRAN

1. AT A FORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL LATE THIS EVENING, THE U.S. SECOND STAGE SANCTIONS RESOLUTION WAS VETOED BY THE SOVIET UNION, HAVING RECEIVED TEN VOTES IN FAVOUR.

2. THE COUNCIL HAD MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THIS EVENING. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTED THAT HE HAD DELIVERED A FURTHER LETTER TO FARHANG SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF YESTERDAY'S LETTER FROM

1. AT A FORMAL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL LATE THIS EVENING, THE U.S. SECOND STAGE SANCTIONS RESOLUTION WAS VETOED BY THE SOVIET UNION, HAVING RECEIVED TEN VOTES IN FAVOUR.

2. THE COUNCIL HAD MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THIS EVENING. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTED THAT HE HAD DELIVERED A FURTHER LETTER TO FARHANG SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF YESTERDAY'S LETTER FROM QOTBZADEH. HE HAD RECEIVED QOTBZADEH'S REPLY BY TELEPHONE THIS AFTERNOON. QOTBZADEH HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE IRANIANS WANTED WALDHEIM TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY AND SEND IT IMMEDIATELY TO TEHRAN WHERE IT WOULD EXAMINE THE PREVIOUS REGIME'S VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. THE COMMISSION'S WORK NEED NOT TAKE MORE THAN TWO WEEKS. IT WOULD THEN REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH WOULD ADOPT A RESOLUTION ENDORSING THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION AND DECLARING THE LEGITIMACY OF IRAN'S CLAIMS FOR THE EXTRADITION OF THE SHAH AND THE RETURN OF HIS ASSETS. (QOTBZADEH REJECTED THE FORMULA IN PARA 3(C) OF MY TELNO 95: ANYONE HAD A RIGHT TO CLAIM ANYTHING; IT WAS THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CLAIM THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAD TO ENDORSE). THE IRANIANS WOULD UNDERSTAND IF THE AMERICANS FELT OBLIGED TO ABSTAIN RATHER THAN VOTE IN FAVOUR OF SUCH A RESOLUTION (EXCLAM). ONLY AFTER IT HAD BEEN ADOPTED WOULD THE HOSTAGES BE RELEASED. QOTBZADEH ADDED THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD HELP IRAN IN THEIR LEGAL PURSUIT OF THE EXTRADITION OF THE SHAH FROM PANAMA.

3. MCHENRY THEN READ OUT A REUTERS REPORT, BASED ON TODAY'S TEHRAN PRESS, OF THE INSTRUCTIONS QOTBZADEH HAD SENT FARHANG CONCERNING YESTERDAY'S LETTER TO WALDHEIM (PARA 3 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). MCHENRY POINTED OUT THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS WERE A GREAT DEAL STRONGER THAN THE TEXT WALDHEIM HAD RECEIVED. HE HAD NO DOUBT WHICH REPRESENTED THE TRUE POSITION OF THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES.

4. I THEN INTERVENED AND SAID THAT THESE DEPRESSING DEVELOPMENTS INDICATED THAT WE WERE AT THE END OF THIS PARTICULAR ROAD. THE POSITION MIGHT CHANGE AFTER THE IRANIAN ELECTIONS, BUT A DELAY OF A FEW DAYS NOW WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE AND I THOUGHT THE COUNCIL SHOULD GO AHEAD AND VOTE ON THE U.S. RESOLUTION. THERE WERE NO OTHER SPEAKERS AND IT WAS SO DECIDED.

5. WHEN THE COUNCIL MET FORMALLY, WALDHEIM REPORTED ON HIS CONTACTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS. A SOLUTION HAD NOT YET BEEN FOUND BUT HE COULD CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS. IN A LONG AND DIGNIFIED STATEMENT, MCHENRY THEN REHEARSED THE BLIGHT OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE

COULD CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS. IN A LONG AND DIGNIFIED STATEMENT, MCHENRY THEN REHEARSED THE PLIGHT OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE SUCCESSIVE CALLS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THEIR RELEASE. THE TIME HAD COME FOR THE COUNCIL TO IMPOSE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THESE WOULD DEMONSTRATE IRAN'S ISOLATION (WHICH SHOULD BE OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO HER FOLLOWING SOVIET AGGRESSION IN AFGHANISTAN) AND PERHAPS STRENGTHEN THE VOICE OF THOSE IN IRAN WHO OPPOSED THE HOLDING OF THE HOSTAGES. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION, FOR THE DESPUTE WAS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE WORLD, NOT JUST BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES.

6. TROYANOVSKY (USSR) MADE A BELLIGERENT ATTACK ON THE U.S. PROPOSAL, TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET SOME OF HIS OWN BACK AFTER ALL THE CRITICISM THE USSR HAS RECEIVED OVER AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION STOOD FOR RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HAD SUPPORTED SCR 457 AND THE PREVIOUS APPEALS BY THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT. BUT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR ALLEGING THE EXISTENCE OF AT THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THE BILATERAL DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. DID NOT FALL WITHIN CHAPTER 7 OF THE CHARTER. SANCTIONS COULD ONLY EXACERBATE THE SITUATION. THE U.S. HOWEVER HAD REJECTED ALL ATTEMPTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND WAS NOW TRYING TO ASSOCIATE THE UN WITH ITS POLICY OF THREATS AGAINST IRAN. THIS WAS INADMISSABLE. IRAN HAD DONE NOTHING TO THREATEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, UNLIKE THE U.S. WHOSE MILITARY MOVES HAD RAISED TENSION IN THE AREA. IF THE U.S. WAS ALLOWED TO INTERVENE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS TODAY, IT WOULD BE THE TURN OF OTHER SOVEREIGN STATES TOMORROW.

7. THE GDR MADE SIMILAR POINTS, THOUGH LESS AGGRESSIVELY. MEXICO MADE QUITE A TELLING SPEECH AGAINST IMPOSING SANCTIONS AT THIS STAGE; THEY WERE SLOW TO OPERATE AND HAD NEVER WORKED IN THE PAST; THEY WOULD STRENGTHEN THE INTRANSIGENTS; IT WAS UNFAIR THAT THE WHOLE PEOPLE OF A LDC SHOULD SUFFER FOR THE ACTIONS OF A BUNCH OF FANATICS. BANGLADESH SAID THAT IT WOULD ABSTAIN BECAUSE MORE TIME FOR CONSULATIONS WAS NEEDED. CHINA EXPLAINED ITS NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE VOTE ON SIMILAR GROUNDS.

8. JAMAICA, NIGER, TUNISIA AND ZAMBIA SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION WITH VARYING DEGREES OF RELUCTANCE AND IN ZAMBIA'S CASE IN TERMS SO AMBIGUOUS THAT THEY SEEMED TO PRESAGE AN ABSTENTION. JAMAICA, NIGER AND ZAMBIA POINTED OUT (AS HAD THE GDR) THAT SOUTH AFRICA TOO HAD FAILED TO OBSERVE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BUT HAD NOT HAD SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON THEM. NIGER AND ZAMBIA MADE THE SAME POINT ABOUT

TO OBSERVE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BUT HAD NOT HAD SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON THEM. NIGER AND ZAMBIA MADE THE SAME POINT ABOUT ISRAEL.

9. AFTER THE NON-ALIGNED HAD SPOKEN, I SPOKE FOR THE RESOLUTION, BRIEFLY AND IN A LOW KEY (TEXT IN MIFT). NORWAY, PORTUGAL AND FRANCE SPOKE SIMILARLY. OF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS ONLY THE PHILIPPINES DID NOT SPEAK. NO NON COUNCIL MEMBERS PARTICIPATED.

10. THE VOTE WAS THEN TAKEN. THE RESULT WAS TEN IN FAVOUR, TWO AGAINST (USSR, GDR) AND TWO ABSENTIONS (MEXICO, BANGLADESH). CHINA DID NOT PARTICIPATE.

11. AFTER THE VOTE, MCHENRY MADE A STRONG STATEMENT REBUTTING THE CHARGES IN THE SOVIET AND GDR STATEMENTS QUOTE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN DRAFTED BY LEWIS CARROLL UNQUOTE AND ACCUSING THE SOVIET UNION OF MAKING IRRESPONSIBLE AND CYNICAL USE OF ITS VETO TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE RUSSIANS CLEARLY RESPECTED INTERNATIONAL LAW ON A SELECTIVE BASIS ONLY. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT SCR 461 STILL OBLIGED ALL MEMBER STATES, UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE CHARTER, TO ADOPT EFFECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST IRAN. THE UNITED STATES HAD ALREADY TAKEN SUCH MEASURES AND URGED ALL MEMBER STATES TO DO LIKEWISE. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S GOOD OFFICES.

12. TROYANOVSKY REPLIED IN INCREASINGLY COLD-WAR TONES. THE SOVIET VETO WAS USED ONLY TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST AND NON-ALIGNED STATES FROM IMPERIALIST INTERFERENCE. IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT SOME NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HAD SUPPORTED THE U.S. TODAY BUT TIME WOULD PASS AND HISTORICAL TRUTH PREVAIL. MEANWHILE THE U.S. WAS URGING MEMBER STATES TO ARROGATE TO THEMSELVES POWERS PROPERLY BELONGING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN DECIDING TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS OF THEIR OWN ON IRAN.

13. SEE MY 2 IFT'S.

PARSONS

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