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TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 17 OF 3 JANUARY 1980.

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, ROME, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW.

ROUTINE WARSAW, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, TOKYO, SOFIA, BELGRADE, EAST BERLIN, PEKING, DUBLIN, ISLAMABAD, DELHI, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, DACCA, OTHER NATO POSTS, SINGAPORE, KUALA LUMPUR, BANGKOK, MANILA AND JAKARTA.

MY TELNO 12 (NOT TO ALL) : AFGHANISTAN AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

1. IN RESPONSE TO THE US AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHE TO MR HURD ON 3 JANUARY, PLEASE TELL THE AMERICANS TODAY AT A HIGH LEVEL THAT THE UK IS WILLING TO CONSIDER TAKING THE ACTIONS TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION DESCRIBED BELOW, AS PART OF A CONCERTED SERIES OF PARALLEL ACTIONS BY MEMBERS OF NATO. WE HOLD TO OUR VIEW THAT TWO WORKING GROUPS ARE NEEDED IN NATO TO CONCERT THE ALLIES' ACTIONS.

2. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FIELDS FOR CONSIDERATION IS HIGH LEVEL VISITS TO AND FROM THE SOVIET UNION. PROVIDED OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE DO LIKE-WISE I AM WILLING TO LET IT BE KNOWN THAT A VISIT BY GROMYKO, WHOM I HAD INVITED TO LONDON IN FEBRUARY OR MARCH, IS NO LONG CONVENIENT. BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN HAVE OUTSTANDING INVITATIONS TO VISIT BRITAIN, AND WE COULD LET IT BE KNOWN THAT NO DATES WERE AVAILABLE FOR THE TIME BEING. SIR HAROLD WILSON, WHO WAS DUE TO VISIT MOSCOW IN MID-JANUARY IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE GB/USSR ASSOCIATION, HAS DECIDED NOT TO GO.

3. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS COMMENT ON THE POINTS IN THE US AMBASSADOR'S SPEAKING NOTE.

4. WITHDRAWAL OF AMBASSADORS FROM MOSCOW. THIS IS A MATTER ON WHICH WE WOULD WISH TO ACT TOGETHER WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE NINE. WE ARE CONSULTING THEM.

/5

SECRET

# SECRET

5. THERE ARE NO PLANS FOR BRITISH CONSULATES-GENERAL IN THE USSR. WE COULD, HOWEVER, FREEZE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON EXCHANGES ON NEW EMBASSY SITES IN MOSCOW AND LONDON.

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6. BROADCASTING ETC. THE BBC OVERSEAS SERVICES ARE GIVING FULL COVERAGE TO EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND WE ARE TAKING PARTICULAR CARE TO BRIEF THEM FULLY. OUR MISSIONS ESPECIALLY IN NONALIGNED COUNTRIES ARE BEING INSTRUCTED TO DRAW ATTENTION AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE TO THE SOVIET AGGRESSION. AT HOME, THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE A LEAD TO PUBLIC OPINION, NOTABLY IN PARLIAMENT AFTER IT REASSEMBLES ON 14 JANUARY. PUBLICITY IS BEING GIVEN TO THE PRIME MINISTERS REMARKS TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR WHEN HE CALLED TODAY.

7. OUR MISSION AT KABUL CONSISTS OF ONLY SIX UK BASED STAFF, BUT WE SHALL CONSIDER SOME FURTHER REDUCTIONS. THE NO 2 IN THE EMBASSY IS ABSENT ON LEAVE. THE FIVE UK BASED STAFF OF THE BRITISH COUNCIL ARE BEING WITHDRAWN.

8. SINCE 1971, WE HAVE MAINTAINED STRICT CEILINGS ON SOVIET DIPLOMATIC STAFF IN THE UK. WE HAVE BEGUN APPLYING OUR TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN THE UK WITH ESPECIAL STRICTNESS.

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9. THERE ARE RELATIVELY FEW SOVIET MEDIA CORRESPONDENTS IN UK AND FEW RESPONSIBLE BRITISH ONES IN MOSCOW. WE WOULD NOT LIKE THE LATTER TO BE REDUCED. NOR DO WE THINK THAT EXPELLING SOVIET CORRESPONDENTS FROM LONDON WOULD HURT THE RUSSIANS MUCH.

10. OLYMPICS. IF OTHER ALLIES DID LIKEWISE, WE WOULD NOT EXCLUDE MAKING THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS KNOWN TO THE BRITISH NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE. BUT THAT COMMITTEE IS COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS NO POWER TO FORCE IT TO TAKE ANY ACTION. WE SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN US VIEWS ON WHETHER THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE MIGHT BE PREVAILED UPON TO POSTPONE THE GAMES OR CHANGE THE VENUE.

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SECRET

/ 11

# SECRET

11. WE ARE GLAD THAT THE US IS CONSIDERING CANCELLATION OR RESTRICTION OF GRAIN SALES TO THE USSR. BRITAIN DOES NOT EXPORT GRAIN BUT CONSIDERS THAT A DECISION ON RESTRICTION BY WESTERN EXPORTERS WOULD BE A VERY EFFECTIVE LEVER AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THE UK COULD APPROACH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ABOUT STOPPING BUTTER SALES TO THE USSR.

12. THE ANGLO-SOVIET FIVE YEAR CREDIT AGREEMENT EXPIRES NEXT MONTH. WE BELIEVE THAT PREFERENTIAL INTEREST RATES MORE FAVOURABLE THAN THOSE WHICH WOULD APPLY UNDER THE OECD CONSENSUS, SHOULD CEASE. WE HAVE MADE THIS VIEW CLEAR TO FRANCE, ITALY AND CANADA, WHOSE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ALSO EXPIRE ABOUT NOW. IF THESE OTHER COUNTRIES JOIN US, WE WOULD MOREOVER BE WILLING TO CONSIDER REFUSAL TO REPLACE THE EXISTING AGREEMENT WITH A NEW ONE. ECGD EXPORT CREDIT WOULD THEN BE AVAILABLE ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS TO THE USSR.

13. THE UK WOULD BE WILLING TO JOIN IN APPLYING THE FULL REGOUR OF THE COCOM SYSTEM TO SALES OF TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT SUCH AS COMPUTERS TO THE USSR. MOREOVER, THE QUESTION OF RESTRICTING EXPORTS OF CIVIL TECHNOLOGY IN KEY AREAS LIKE CHEMICAL PLANT AND ADVANCED MACHINE TOOLS HAS NEVER BEEN STUDIED JOINTLY BY WESTERN COUNTRIES. THE UK WOULD BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE WITH OTHERS IN SUCH A STUDY.

14. AID. WE HAVE TERMINATED BILATERAL AID TO AFGHANISTAN AND ARE CUTTING OFF AID IN THE PIPELINE (ALTHOUGH STUDENTS HERE MAY REMAIN). WE SHALL OPPOSE ANY PROPOSAL FOR NEW ALLOCATIONS OF AID UNDER UNDP AND OTHER AID AGENCIES, THE WORLD BANK, AND THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. WE INTEND TO ENSURE THAT NO FURTHER EEC FOOD AID GOES TO AFGHANISTAN.

15. CIVIL AVIATION. WE EXPECT LIKE THE AMERICANS TO BE ABLE TO REDUCE SPECIAL PRIVILEGES GRANTED TO THE RUSSIANS OUTSIDE THE BILATERAL AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT.

16. THE NUMBERS OF SOVIET NATIONALS ENGAGED IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IN UK HAS BEEN LIMITED BY NUMERICAL CEILINGS SINCE 1971.

17. SOVIET FISHING IN UK WATERS IS A MATTER FOR THE EEC. THERE IS NONE AT PRESENT.

# SECRET

18. ON OTHER EXCHANGES, DEPENDING ON OTHER ALLIES' ACTIONS, WE SHALL CONSIDER :

- (A) CANCELLING A VISIT BY THE SOVIET COAL MINISTER THIS MONTH.
- (B) POSTPONING THE ANNUAL REVIEW OF OUR MEDICAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT, DUE IN MARCH WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF A SOVIET DEPUTY MINISTER.
- (C) SHELIVING PLANNED CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS, FOR INSTANCE CSCE, DISARMAMENT AND UN MATTERS.
- (D) CANCELLING PLANS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VISITS BY MILITARY STAFF ACADEMIES AND REJECTING A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF SHIPS' VISITS.
- (E) HOLDING UP NEGOTIATIONS ON A BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON VISA HANDLING.
- (F) CANCELLING A VISIT TO UK IN MAY-JUNE BY THE RED ARMY CHOIR.
- (G) CANCELLING THE ANGLO-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COOPERATION.
- (H) DELAYING ISSUING INVITATIONS FOR THE NEXT MEETING OF THE ANGLO-SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION, DUE IN MAY AND LED ON THE SOVIET SIDE BY THE FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE.
- (J) REJECTING A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN ANGLO-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS AT SEA.
- (K) CANCELLING OR DELAYING OTHER EXCHANGES WHICH MIGHT ATTRACT PUBLIC ATTENTION.

4  
SECRET

/ 19

# SECRET

19. ON THE UN, FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THE UK HAS TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN SEEKING ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HAS LOBBIED WIDELY IN CAPITALS FOR SUPPORT FOR THIS MOVE. WE ARE ALSO LOOKING INTO THE PROSPECTS FOR A SPECIAL OR EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFTER A SOVIET VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ALTHOUGH ANY WESTERN INITIATIVE OF THIS TYPE COULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING ISRAEL OR SOUTH AFRICA.

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20. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, I AM PLANNING A VISIT BETWEEN 9 AND 16 JANUARY TO TURKEY, OMAN, SAUDI ARABIA, PAKISTAN AND PROBABLY INDIA, WHICH WILL PROVIDE GOOD OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEMONSTRATING BRITISH SUPPORT FOR THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED.

21. WE SHALL CONSIDER WHETHER OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH EACH ENDORSES THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.

22. I CONSIDER THAT THE IMPORTANT THING IS FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ACT TOGETHER AND IN CONCERT AFTER PROPER THOUGHT AND PREPARATION. AN IMPRESSION OF ALLIED DISARRAY IS HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE. WHATEVER DECISIONS THE AMERICANS REACH UNILATERALLY SHOULD THEREFORE NOT BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL FURTHER CONSULTATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

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