NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

15-Feb-1991 17:57 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

(WHSR ROUTER@WHSR)

SUBJECT: TFKUOI - TROUBLE BREWING WITH FRANCE OVER

PRT: BOOK

SIT: BASORA RICE CHARLES HAASS WHSR IRAQ SANNER VAX WELCH AND RECORDED TO SELECT AND ADDRESS OF THE SECOND

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151729Z FEB 91 PROPERTY ASSOCIATES IN THE PARTY OF

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

<0SRI> DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 12958 JGP, 11/8/99 Case Ho. 98-0099-F

(TO) TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1772 INFO RUEHKK/EC COLLECTIVE RUEHWW/GULF WAR COLLECTIVE RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4544 RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 9794

<SUBJ>

TFKUOI - TROUBLE BREWING WITH FRANCE OVER POST-WAR SETTLEMENTD

<TEXT>

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 04332 EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IZ, KU, UR, UK, IR, FR, IS, PLO

SUBJECT: TFKUOI - TROUBLE BREWING WITH FRANCE OVER

POST-WAR SETTLEMENTD

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

"BEGIN SUMMARY"

2. SUMMARY: WE SEE TROUBLE AHEAD WITH FRANCE OVER OUR RESPECTIVE APPROACHES TO POST-WAR ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE GULF AND THE ARAB/ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS. PROBLEMS ARE LIKELY TO ARISE OVER BOTH PARTICIPATION AND SUBSTANCE. PARTICIPATION: THERE IS GROWING CONCERN HERE THAT THE U.S. WILL SEEK TO SHUT OUT FRANCE (AND THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY) FROM A POST-WAR SETTLEMENT. HENCE, THE GOF HAS BEGUN CONSULTATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS IT BELIEVES HAVE A SIMILAR STAKE IN ACTIVE AND ENHANCED PEACE-MAKING ROLES. THE SOVIET UNION, BRITAIN AND IRAN HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS TARGETS.

SUBSTANCE: THE GOF INSISTS THAT PEACEMAKING MUST OCCUR "END SUMMARY"

IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE(S), UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES. THE GOF IS APPREHENSIVE THAT THE U.S. WILL SEEK TO FOCUS ON ISRAEL'S STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND NOT DEAL EARLY AND EARNESTLY WITH THE CORE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THE GOF ALSO CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE ACTIVELY AND CREDIBLY REPRESENTED IN ANY NEGOTIATION -- THIS MEANS PLO PARTICIPATION FROM THE OUTSET. FRANCE HOLDS THAT A PALESTINIAN STATE MUST BE PART OF ANY SOLUTION. ON THE GULF, THE FRENCH ARE OPPOSED TO A PERMANENT MILITARY PRESENCE OF ANY SIZE FOR THE U.S. (OR EUROPE). ALL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE INTERNATIONAL OR REGIONAL IN CHARACTER, WITH NO SPECIAL ROLE ASSUMED BY THE U.S. END SUMMARY.

- 3. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND THOSE IN THE OLITICAL CLASS AND PRESS WHO INFLUENCE ITS DECISIONS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY PREOCCUPIED WITH ISSUES PERTAINING TO A POST-WAR SETTLEMENT. TALK OF IRAQI WITHDRAWAL INCREASES THAT PREOCCUPATION. IN RECENT WEEKS FRANCE HAS CLOSED RANKS WITH THE U.S. ON THE OPERATION OF THE WAR. PUBLIC OPINION HAS HELD FIRM, AND FRANCE HAS NOT FAVORED A CEASEFIRE OR A PAUSE. FRANCE'S SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED FIGHTING COULD WAVER, HOWEVER, SHOULD THE MAJORITY OF FRENCHMEN BE PERSUADED THAT SADDAM IS IN EARNEST ABOUT AN INTENTION TO WITHDRAW.
- 4. JUST WHEN FRANCE CLOSED RANKS WITH US IN THE WAR, A DEBATE OPENED HERE ON THE POST-WAR AGENDA -- WHO SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN SETTING IT AND WHAT IT SHOULD LOOK LIKE. THIS IS NOT COINCIDENTAL, AND THE TIMING AND INCREASINGLY ANTAGONISTIC TENOR OF THE DEBATE ARE NOT SURPRISING. THE FRENCH ARE PROFOUNDLY UNCOMFORTABLE IN THEIR ROLE AS JUNIOR PARTNER. BOTH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS HAVE EXPLICITLY DESCRIBED FRANCE'S GAMBLE: A LEADING ROLE IN THE COALITION IN THE WAR WILL TRANSLATE INTO A ROLE IN THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT. MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, FRANCE SEEKS ALSO TO PROTECT ITS SEAT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL -- EVEN AT THE RISK OF ALIENATING ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS.
- 5. A LEADING SOCIALIST PARTY OFFICIAL SPOKE FOR MANY HERE THIS WEEK WHEN HE SAID "THERE ARE TWO PEACES POSSIBLE, A U.S. PEACE OR A UN PEACE." WHILE FEW PUT

THE THOUGHT SO TERSELY, THERE IS A GROWING CONSENSUS HERE THAT FRANCE SHOULD BEGIN EARLY -- NOW -- TO FLESH OUT ITS CONCEPT OF A POST-WAR SETTLEMENT. FRANCE MUST DO THIS BECAUSE LEFT ON ITS OWN, THE U.S. WILL IMPOSE ITS WILL ON THE REGION. THIS IS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF THE REGION OR FRANCE. THE U.S. DOES NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE REGION, IT TENDS TO EQUATE SECURITY WITH MILITARY PRESENCE, IT WILL BE EXCESSIVELY INFLUENCED BY ISRAELI DESIDERATA. MORE TO THE POINT, THE U.S. WILL SEEK TO EXCLUDE TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE FRANCE AND THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN WHOSE NAME THE GULF WAR IS BEING WAGED.

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- 6. SPECIFICALLY, THE FRENCH ARE (VARIOUSLY)
 APPREHENSIVE THAT THE U.S. WILL SEEK TO:
- -- CREATE A SECURITY STRUCTURE IN THE GULF WHICH INCLUDES ONLY THE U.S. AND SELECTED REGIONAL OR ARAB ALLIES;
- -- ACQUIESCE IN THE DISMEMBERMENT OF IRAQ;
 -- MAINTAIN A MASSIVE, PERMANENT MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE GULF;
- -- SEEK TO ADDRESS THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT, EXCLUSIVELY, OR PREDOMINANTLY IN STATE/STATE TERMS, NEGLECTING THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION:
- -- LEAVE FRANCE (AND THE UN) OUT OF AN ARAB/ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS.
- 6. FRANCE'S CLAIM TO A POST-WAR ROLE IS BASED ON ITS STATUS AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNSC AND ITS SELF-PERCEIVED ROLE AS HAVING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH KEY REGIONAL PLAYERS. IT IS MOTIVATED BY A POWERFUL IMPULSE TO PRESERVE THIS STANDING AS A REGIONAL POWER, WITH IMPORTANT ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL INTERESTS EXTENDING FROM THE MAGHREB TO IRAN. IT SEEKS TO HOLD ON AT ALL COSTS TO ITS GREAT POWER, TO PRESERVE ITS PRIVILEGED POSITION IN NORTH AFRICA, AND ITS "SPECIAL RELATIONS" WITH MUCH OF THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD.
- 7. IN HIS FEBRUARY 7 INTERVIEW WITH REPORTERS (ONLY HIS SECOND ADDRESS TO THE NATION SINCE THE WAR BEGAN) MITTERRAND ADDRESSED HIMSELF DIRECTLY TO THE U.S., IN WHAT APPEARED TO BE A RESPONSE TO SECRETARY BAKER'S HFAC TESTIMONY. THE WAR, HE SAID, IS BEING WAGED IN THE NAME OF THE UN, SO THE PEACE MUST BE CONSTRUCTED UNDER UN AUSPICES.
- 8. THIS IS ONLY THE CLEAREST OF MANY WARNINGS

CONCERNING FRANCE'S INTENTION TO BE INVOLVED. OF COURSE, "UN INVOLVEMENT" IS CODE FOR FRENCH INVOLVEMENT. IT IS ALSO THE REFUSAL TO COUNTENANCE A U.S. MONOPOLY ON THE POST-WAR DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SCENE. FRANCE CANNOT ALONE FIGHT OFF U.S. "HEGEMONIC" TENDENCIES, HOWEVER. IT SEEKS TO NOURISH FEARS OF U.S. UNILATERALISM AMONG OTHERS WHOM IT BELIEVES ARE ALSO SEEKING AN ACTIVE ROLE. FRANCE SEEMS TO BE CONCENTRATING IN PARTICULAR ON THE SOVIETS, BRITISH AND IRANIANS. INTERESTINGLY, THE FRENCH SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT THE UK FEARS BEING SHUT OUT AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING A JOINT APPROACH. 9. THUS, FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS HAS MET TWICE WITH BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY HURD IN RECENT WEEKS, AND HE HAS SPOKEN PUBLICLY ABOUT JOINT WORKING GROUPS TO ADDRESS POST-WAR QUESTIONS; THE BRITISH HAVE SPOKEN, MORE MODESTLY, ABOUT CONTINUING CONTACTS. AFTER HIS MEETINGS IN MOSCOW EARLIER THIS WEEK, DUMAS TOLD REPORTERS THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND FRANCE HAVE CLOSE TO IDENTICAL VIEWS ON POST-WAR REQUIREMENTS. FINALLY. IRANIAN GOVERNMENT PRONOUNCEMENTS WHICH CAME CLOSE TO PREDICTING A TEHRAN-MOSCOW-PARIS ENTENTE FOR THE POST-WAR WERE NOT OFFICIALLY REBUFFED HERE (ALTHOUGH, TO BE FAIR, THE GOF MAY HAVE SOUGHT SIMPLY TO CALL AS LITTLE ATTENTION AS POSSIBLE TO STATEMENTS THAT WENT EMBARRASSINGLY FAR).

10. WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASCRIBE SPECIFICS TO WHAT IS THUS FAR A LARGELY RHETORICAL GOF APPROACH, WE EXPECT THAT FRANCE WILL BE WORKING HARD TO DEVELOP A MORE DETAILED POSITION ON GULF AND ARAB/ISRAELI BT

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PEACEMAKING. WE BELIEVE THAT FRANCE WILL WORK BOTH BILATERALLY WITH SELECTED PROSPECTIVE PARTNERS AND ALSO WITHIN THE EC. AT THIS POINT, WE LIMIT OURSELVES TO SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF FRANCE'S DEVELOPING POSITION REGARDING ARAB/ISRAELI PEACEMAKING:

-- THE GOF WILL CONCENTRATE ON THE ARAB/ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS. IT IS CONVINCED THAT IF IT DOES NOT SECURE A ROLE AS A REWARD FOR ITS WAR EFFORT, IT WILL BE SHUT OUT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

-- IT MAY SEEK TO BECOME THE PALESTINIANS'
EXTRA-REGIONAL CHAMPION. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT WHILE
THE GERMANS AND DUTCH ARE SENDING EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL
AND HAVE PUSHED EC ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL, THE
FRENCH HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT THEY, FOR THEIR PART, WOULD

BE SENDING GAS MASKS TO THE RESIDENTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

-- IT IS UNLIKELY THE FRENCH WILL ABANDON THE PLO.
-- THEY WILL HOLD FAST ON THEIR POSITION THAT THE PLO
MUST BE INCLUDED IN ANY PROCESS LEADING TO A SETTLEMENT
(DESPITE SOME VOICES HERE QUESTIONING THE PLO'S ROLE AS
"SOLE REPRESENTATIVE" OF THE PALESTINIANS.

-- THE FRENCH WILL OPPOSE AN APPROACH THAT DOES NOT SEEK TO ADDREQ THE PALESTINIAN IQE FROM THE START AND WHICH DOES NOQPROVIDE FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE AS AN OUTCOME.

-- FINALLY, THE FRENCH WILL CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE ADDRESSING ALL ISSUES THROUGH AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. MITTERRAND HAS SPOKEN OF ONE OR MORE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES DEALING WITH DIFFERENT REGIONAL ISSUES. THE FRENCH FREELY ADMIT THAT THEIR APPROACH IS VAGUE, AND IT WILL HAVE TO BE TRANSLATED INTO CONCRETE TERMS WHEN THE POST-WAR CIRCUMSTANCES BECOME EVIDENT.

11. AMMAN AND ALGIERS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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