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FM WASHINGTON 031915Z APR 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1107 OF 3 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR) UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1077 : FALKLANDS

1. AS PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE CLEAR TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI, AND AS HAIG HAS DONE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN PROCEEDING ON THE ASSUMPTION AND SAYING SO, THAT IF THE ARGENTINES INVADED THE FALKLANDS WE WOULD NOT ACQUIESCE AND WOULD DEPLOY A NAVAL FORCE TO THE AREA.
2. AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS ON THURSDAY THE AMERICANS ACCEPT THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL CERTAINLY NOT BE BROUGHT BACK TO A COURSE OF REASON IF THERE IS NO COUNTERVAILING FORCE IN THE AREA.
3. THE LONGISH TIME-SPAN BETWEEN THE DEPARTURE OF OUR NAVAL FORCE AND ITS ARRIVAL IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS PROBABLY GOING TO GIVE RISE TO A SEARCH HERE FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS. OPINION HERE MAY BECOME SOFTER AS THE PROSPECT OF MILITARY ENGAGEMENT COMES NEARER. THERE MAY WELL BE GROWING CONCERN AT THE THOUGHT OF WARFARE IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE BETWEEN A MAJOR EUROPEAN ALLY AND AN IMPORTANT MEMBER OF THE OAS.
- 4 IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE U S ADMINISTRATION WILL BECOME INVOLVED, WHETHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION SO AS TO AVERT CONFLICT. I REALISE THAT IT IS EARLY DAYS FOR YOU TO START THINKING ABOUT THIS BEFORE THE FLEET, WHOSE PROXIMITY WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO BRINGING THE ARGENTINES TO ANY NEGOTIATION, HAS EVEN SET SAIL. BUT THERE COULD BE DANGERS FOR US IN A MOVE BY THE AMERICANS TOWARDS EARLY NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS OPPORTUNITIES. WE MIGHT THEREFORE BE ADVISED TO BE READY WITH OUR OWN IDEAS OF WHAT COULD BE HELPFUL FROM THE AMERICANS, HOWEVER INAPPROPRIATE IT WILL BE FOR US TO BE PUTTING ANYTHING FORWARD PUBLICLY AT THIS STAGE. WHAT OBVIOUSLY WE WOULD WANT TO AVOID IS GETTING INTO A POSITION IN WHICH WE WERE RESTRAINED FROM TAKING OR THREATENING MILITARY ACTION OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME WITH OUR FORCES HELD IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WHILE THE ARGENTINES BY THEIR CONTINUED PRESENCE ON THE ISLANDS INCREASED THEIR DE FACTO CONTROL.

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5. IT IS MUCH TOO SOON TO GO INTO ALL THIS AND I MERELY WANTED TO SIGNAL A WAY IT MAY START TO LOOK FROM HERE. THE AMERICANS MAY WELL COME TO THE VIEW THAT THE ESSENCE OF THE DILEMMA WILL BE HOW TO GET A SHORT-TERM SOLUTION THAT AVERTS WAR OR THE THREAT OF WAR AND THAT THEREFORE MUST INVOLVE FOR US ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT HOLDING OUT THE PROSPECT OF A LONG-TERM SOLUTION THAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARGENTINES.

HENDERSON

FCO D  
SAMD  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL D  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

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