Mr Mugabe began by distributing and reading out a paper, which he described as the PF's reply to Lord Carrington. He said he would have preferred to do this at a full-scale bilateral meeting. Lord Carrington said that he found this reply most, disappointing. It was not an answer, but an interpretative statement. The other side would also wish to make such statements if the PF did. In other respects, the paper was merely a reiteration of the PF's position. We had already taken account of the PF's problems, eg on monitoring where we were now thinking in terms of 1,200, thus trebling our initial figure. This was as far as we could go. As for the PF's concern about the Rhodesian Air Force, he could give a categorical undertaking that the airports would be adequately monitored. On the disposition of the forces, Lord Carrington then read out points (a)-(h) in your brief for the meeting.

The Secretary of State stressed that there was no other way of reaching a ceasefire agreement, and no more negotiating fat on our position. It was for this reason that he had asked in good faith whether the Patriotic Front could accept our proposals or not. No more discussion was possible. Mr Mugabe said that there had been no discussion at all about disengagement on an equal basis. The PF were prepared to move to company bases if the Rhodesian forces were too. Mr Renwick said that we did not understand the proposals for a two-stage disengagement in the PF's document. Above all, the proposal in para 2(d) of that document (which suggests that movement into the second phase positions might be unnecessary) was not acceptable. Our own proposals were less complex. We were prepared to accept the monitoring of Rhodesian forces down to company level. Assembly was crucial. There could not be an adequate ceasefire with large numbers of PF forces scattered across the country. The Rhodesians would fall back towards their bases as the PF assembled. Everyone would have to be satisfied, including the Governor, that the PF had assembled in sufficient numbers with their arms.

Mr Mugabe said that they accepted reciprocity, but our definition was not clear. Lord Carrington said that the details could be discussed in the talks on implementation. The point was that all the forces would be under the Governor, and would be monitored. Once they were separated there would be no more fighting. Mr Mugabe said that it was wrong to suppose that the PF forces could not be identified; they had provincial structures and commands. Mr Renwick said that if large numbers of the PF turned up, then the ceasefire would be successfully implemented. Mr Mugabe asked why the PF should be concentrated in fewer areas than the Rhodesian forces. The ZRFS were not to be trusted. They were "ferocious creatures". In the final analysis, the PF would have to defend themselves since the Governor had no army and the monitors could only pray. Discussion of the problem would be much easier if the

Rhodesians themselves were present.

Lord Carrington said that the main objective was to stop the war. He wanted to make it clear that there was nothing more he could say to the PF: they must decide whether or not they could accept our ceasefire paper, together with his statement at Lancaster House on 28 November which had been circulated as a conference document. Mr Mugabe said that the PF had given its answer in their paper; there must be equality: if the Rhodesian forces withdrew to their batallion bases, the PF would too. Mr Nkomo became indignant, and asked what the PF were supposed to be accepting. Lord Carrington said that we could not accept the PF's interpretative paper. We had already rejected many of its arguments. He was not prepared to go through the whole business again. We were now at the end of the week, and he had a meeting with his senior colleagues on Monday. They knew that he had asked for a definitive answer. Decisions had to be taken on Monday about the next steps the Government would have to take. He would however be available to see the PF at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning if they wished.

Mr Nkomo, in a noisy and heated intervention, said that Lord Carrington was making difficulties for himself; that the PF were not his students; and were not prepared to sing his song. Lord Carrington said that we had been discussing the ceasefire arrangements for over two weeks and had gone out of our way to allay the PF's fears. We had to have an answer. Mr Nkomo said that the PF were ready to agree on a ceasefire and wanted to go straight on to discuss the details. Lord Carrington said that the details could not be discussed until the PF had accepted our proposals.

J. Fre Woles

(G G H Walden)

30 November 1979

cc:- PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Sir A Duff
Mr Day
Mr Fifoot, Legal Advisers
Mr Powell
News Dept