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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 October 1981

Lo. Amt, 27/10

Dear Richard

Sinai MFO

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To complete the picture in my letter of 26 October, I now enclose copies of Luxembourg telegrams numbers 196 and 197 reporting the discussions over lunch, and a copy of Luxembourg telegram number 204 recording what has been said to the press. The reporting telegrams do not cover the soundings which Lord Carrington made in private about the possibility of others participating if we did not: for obvious reasons Lord Carrington did not wish to make these points over the lunch table to the Ten as a whole; having received a clearly negative reaction, we thought it best not to include the point in telegrams which have been copied to all EC posts.

*Yours ever,
B.J.P.*

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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OO FCO DESKBY 270715Z

OO UKREP BRUSSELS

OO BRUSSELS

OO COPENHAGEN

OO THE HAGUE

OO ROME

OO DUBLIN

OO PARIS

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK

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GRS 550

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DESKBY 270715Z

FM LUXEMBOURG 262030Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 196 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS BONN

UKREP BRUSSELS ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY AND GRAHAM

SINAI PEACEKEEPING FORCE

1. AS EXPLAINED TO BULLARD BY TELEPHONE, IT WAS AGREED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS OVER LUNCH, WITH GREEK RESERVATIONS, THAT THE TEN SHOULD REACH AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE TERMS OF THE STATEMENTS ANNOUNCING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS. SEE MIFT FOR A RECORD OF THE DISCUSSION.

IMMEDIATE

[PS ✓]
[SIR. J GRAHAM]

ADVANCE COPY

~~SECRET~~

2. MR HURD LATER CHAIRED A MEETING OF THE FOUR, ATTENDED BY ANDREANI (FRANCE), BOTTAI (ITALY) AND RUTTEN (NETHERLANDS). AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR ON THE BASIS THAT THE UK, FRANCE AND ITALY WOULD RELUCTANTLY AGREE TO DROP THE REFERENCE TO AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE IN PARAGRAPH THREE OF THE TEXT IN FCO TELNO 65 TO CANCUN, BUT THEY INSISTED ON THE INCLUSION AT THE END OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE FOLLOWING TWO SENTENCES:

''THEY ARE READY TO PARTICIPATE ALSO IN SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IN THE OTHER TERRITORIES CURRENTLY OCCUPIED, IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THEY REGARD THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE ARRANGEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AS QUITE DISTINCT FROM THE REST OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS''.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONCURRED.

3. IT WAS ALSO AGREED TO REINSTATE IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE REST OF THE TEN THE PHRASE:

''AINSI QUE LES VUES QU'ILS ONT EXPRIMES A CETTE OCCASION''.

FINALLY THE OTHER THREE AGREED THAT, ON THE BASIS THAT THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE DRAFT PASSAGE FOR INCLUSION IN THE MESSAGES TO HAIG, SHAMIR AND KAMAL HASSAN ALL REQUESTING CONFIRMATION WAS DROPPED, THE PASSAGE IN SQUARE BRACKETS IN FCO TELNO 65 TO CANCUN (''AND THAT IN THE REGION'') SHOULD STAY.

4. THE OTHER THREE ACCEPTED MR HURD'S SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD NOW CIRCULATE TO THE TEN BY COREU THE TEXTS OF THE STATEMENTS BY THE FOUR AND BY THE REST OF THE TEN, ASKING THEM TO SIGNIFY THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE LATTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEREAFTER THE FOUR WOULD NEED TO DISPATCH THEIR LETTERS TO THE US, EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND FOREWARN THE ARABS BEFORE MAKING ANY ANNOUNCEMENT. THIS WOULD TAKE TWO OR THREE DAYS. GIVEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF DIFFICULTY WITH THE GREEKS, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DECIDE NOW WHEN THE ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE MADE, BUT THE AIM SHOULD BE TO MAKE IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. SEE MIFT.

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DESKBY 270715Z

FM LUXEMBOURG 262031Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 197 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS
BONN UKREP BRUSSELS ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

PERSONAL FOR GRAHAM AND PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT: LUNCH AT FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 26 OCTOBER;

SINAI: MULTINATIONAL FORCE

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECAPITULATED RECENT
EVENTS. THE US WOULD CERTAINLY BE DISAPPOINTED IF THE
EUROPEANS DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE. BUT
ARAB REACTIONS WOULD POSE DIFFICULTIES. THE SAUDIS MIGHT

28 OCTOBER. BUT THE JORDANIANS WOULD PROBABLY OBJECT PUBLICLY, AND THE SYRIANS CERTAINLY WOULD. THE PLO AND THE ARAB LEAGUE HAD TRIED TO WARN AGAINST EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. THE TEN NEEDED TO CONSIDER THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE, AND HOW BEST TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE IF THEY JOINED.

2. M. CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD NOT ORIGINALLY WISHED TO JOIN, BUT THAT SADAT'S DEATH HAD CHANGED THEIR ATTITUDE. THERE WAS NOW A CONSIDERABLE DANGER THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD STAY IN SINAI. THE EVACUATION OF SINAI WAS IMPORTANT TO THE NEW EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH NEEDED EUROPEAN SUPPORT. EVACUATION SHOULD BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS ARAB RECONCILIATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242. FRANCE THEREFORE ACCEPTED THE CASE FOR PARTICIPATION. THIS DID NOT IMPLY ANY RETREAT FROM THE VENICE DECLARATION, AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE REST OF CAMP DAVID. THE AUTONOMY TALKS COULD NOT SUCCEED AND A NEW BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION WAS NEEDED. THE SAUDIS HAD SAID THAT IF PARTICIPATION RELATED ONLY TO EVACUATION, AND NOT TO THE REST OF CAMP DAVID, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT IT. THE ALGERIANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE FORCE INCLUDE SOME NON-NATO PARTICIPANTS (EG NEUTRAL - HE SUGGESTED AUSTRIAN OR SCANDINAVIAN). PARTICIPANTS MUST MAKE CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS THAT THEIR COMMITMENT TO THEIR POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST REMAINED UNCHANGED.

3. COLOMBO AGREED WITH THE PREVIOUS SPEAKERS. HE SAW IT AS ITALY'S DUTY TO PARTICIPATE - ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS AND WITHIN THE VENICE FRAMEWORK. IF THE FOUR AGREED TO PARTICIPATE, THE TEN MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THEY DID SO WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THEM ALL, AND ON THE BASIS OF THEIR EXISTING POSITION (VENICE, 242 ETC.) VAN DER STOEL (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT THE ARABS APPEARED TO THINK THAT PARTICIPATION MEANT ASSOCIATION WITH CAMP DAVID. THIS MUST BE CLEARED UP SOON. ANY STATEMENT ISSUED SHOULD STAY CLOSELY TO THE TERMS OF VENICE (COMMENT: THOUGH HE DID NOT SAY SO IT WAS CLEAR HE MEANT THAT IT SHOULD NOT CONTAIN NEW ELEMENTS SUCH AS A REFERENCE TO A PALESTINIAN STATE.) HE WONDERED TO WHOM THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD BE ANSWERABLE. THIS MUST BE ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CHEYSSON AGREED.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HIS CANDID OPINION WAS THAT THE AMERICAN REQUEST SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE. BUT SINCE IT HAD BEEN HE FELT THAT ON BALANCE IT SHOULD BE MET. REFUSAL TO JOIN A FORCE INTENDED TO FREE ARAB LAND WOULD BE HARD TO JUSTIFY AT HOME. THE ARABS MUST BE CAREFULLY PREPARED BEFORE BEING TOLD OF A DECISION TO PARTICIPATE, AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LEAK OF THIS DISCUSSION. THE TEN SHOULD USE THE POLITICAL COOPERATION MACHINERY TO FINALISE A STATEMENT QUICKLY ON THE DECISION, WHICH SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR - AS M. CHEYSSON HAD SUGGESTED - THAT THE EUROPEAN POSITION WAS UNCHANGED, AND SHOULD SAY THAT PARTICIPATION IMPLIED NO OTHER ASSOCIATION WITH CAMP DAVID. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF NON-PARTICIPANTS WOULD ISSUE A SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE MAIN STATEMENT BY THE FOUR. (CORTERIER (FRG) CONFIRMED THAT THE GERMANS ENDORSED THIS APPROACH). MEANWHILE, THE PRESS SHOULD BE TOLD IF THEY ASKED THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN, BUT THERE WAS IN ANY CASE NO QUESTION OF CHANGING THE EUROPEAN POSITION AS REFLECTED IN THE VENICE DECLARATION.

5. FORTILAS (GREECE) EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITION OF POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS. THE PROBLEM WAS WHETHER THEIR DISSOCIATION FROM CAMP DAVID WOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD. COULD STEPS BE TAKEN TO ENSURE, BEFORE THERE WAS ANY QUESTION OF THE TEN GIVING THEIR UNANIMOUS CONSENT, THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A VIOLENT ARAB REACTION? THE SECRETARY OF STATE OFFERED NO GUARANTEE, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT ARAB REACTION COULD BE CONTAINED.

6. FORTILAS WENT ON THAT WHILE HE DID NOT DISSENT FROM PARTICIPATION BY THE FOUR, HE SAW NO NEED FOR POLITICAL ENDORSEMENT BY THOSE NOT PARTICIPATING. DOOGE (IRELAND) SAID THAT LORD CARRINGTON HAD SPOKEN IN LONDON ON 13 OCTOBER OF CONDITIONS FOR PARTICIPATION. THESE MUST BE MAINTAINED IF ARAB REACTIONS WERE TO BE MITIGATED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FEARED THAT CONDITIONS MIGHT GIVE THE ISRAELIS THE EXCUSE FOR REFUSING TO EVACUATE. IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE EUROPEANS TO MAKE A TOUGH DECLARATION ON THEIR OWN ACCOUNT. VAN DER STOEL AGREED STRONGLY. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS COULD DRAFT A SINGLE DOCUMENT TO EXPRESS THE POSITION BOTH OF THE FOUR AND OF THE TEN.

7. SUMMING UP THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE FOUR

7. SUMMING UP, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE FOUR FELT THAT THEY HAD TO PARTICIPATE, BUT WANTED TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE. THERE MUST BE NO PUBLICITY UNTIL THE TEN WERE READY TO MAKE AN AGREED PUBLIC STATEMENT TO ALLOW TIME TO MOLLIFY THE ARABS. HE WOULD TELL THE PRESS THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN, BUT VENICE WAS VENICE. HE HOPED THAT THE GREEKS WOULD NOT DISSOCIATE THEMSELVES; IF SO WE MIGHT HAVE TO GO AHEAD WITHOUT THEM. FORTILAS SAID THAT HE COULD NOT AGREE ON THE SPOT, BUT MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO SO IF MOST OF THE ARABS ACCEPTED EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. COLOMBO SAID THAT ANYTHING LESS THAN UNANIMOUS SUPPORT BY THE TEN FOR A DECISION OF THE FOUR WOULD MAKE A MOCKERY OF POLITICAL COOPERATION. CHEYSSON AGREED, IN MORE ROBUST TERMS. FORTILAS SAID THAT HE WOULD FEEL BETTER IF THE TEN COULD REACH A SIMILAR MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON THE CYPRUS ASSOCIATION PROTOCOL. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT IT WAS AGREED THAT THE POLITICAL COOPERATION MACHINERY SHOULD BE URGENTLY PUT INTO ACTION TO AGREE THE TERMS OF STATEMENTS. HE DID NOT ENVISAGE FURTHER MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION IN THE TEN.

THOMAS

NNNN

COULD YOU PSE GIVE ME A LIST OF NATO POSTS

TIC

ZDGH

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OO DUBLIN

PARIS

OO BONN

OO ATHENS

OO WASHINGTON

OO TEL AVIV

OO CAIRO

OO JEDDA

PP CANBERRA

PP OTTAWA

PP WELLINGTON

PP BAGHDAD

PP DAMASCUS

PP BEIRUT

GRS 600

RESTRICTED

FM LUXEMBOURG 262045Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 204 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME

DUBLIN PARIS BONN ATHENS WASHINGTON TEL AVIV CAIRO JEDDA

PRIORITY CANBERRA OTTAWA WELLINGTON BAGHDAD DAMASCUS BEIRUT

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL: SINAI FORCE

FOLLOWING FROM HEAD OF NEWS DEPARTMENT

1. AT HIS PRESIDENCY PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE END OF THE FIRST DAY OF THE COUNCIL, LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE MINISTERS HAD DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST AMONGST OTHER THINGS OVER LUNCH. NO DECISIONS WERE

SECRET

[LIMITED]

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IMMEDIATE

HO/NEWS

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HO/PRES ECE

HO/ECO (1)

HO/ECO (2)
PS

PS/HR/NEWS

PS/LPS

PS/PUS

SIR S. GARRISON

MR. S. NOBLE
MR. BULLOCK

ON FIDELITY TO THE VENICE DECLARATION.

AT THE SAME TIME, CHEYSSON WAS BRIEFING TO THE EFFECT THAT A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATE HAD INDEED BEEN TAKEN. IT WOULD BE ABSURD NOT TO PARTICIPATE. WORK WAS PROCEEDING ON A STATEMENT TO EXPLAIN THIS DECISION.

3. THE MINISTER OF STATE, MR HURD THEREFORE SPOKE OFF-THE-RECORD TO BRITISH JOURNALISTS. HE REAFFIRMED THE ON-THE-RECORD LINE IN PARA 1 ABOVE. HE EXPLAINED THAT THERE HAD INDEED BEEN NO DECISION AT THE DISCUSSION OVER LUNCH, BUT OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL WEEKS A GRADUAL CONSENSUS HAD EMERGED AMONG THE FOUR AND AMONG THE TEN THAT, ON THE WHOLE, THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE LAY IN AGREEING TO PARTICIPATE, BUT IN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LEFT NO DOUBT THAT WE SUPPORTED THE VENICE DECLARATION AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM ARAB LANDS. THE CASE HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED BY SADAT'S DEATH SINCE IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT NOTHING SHOULD IMPEDE THE RETURN OF SINAI. BUT IT WAS NOT JUST A QUESTION OF SAYING YES. THERE WERE A HOST OF RELATED QUESTIONS: HOW DO THE TEN ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THE FOUR WHO PARTICIPATE? HOW DO WE REAFFIRM VENICE? WHO SAYS WHAT TO WHOM? THIS IS A COMPLICATED DIPLOMATIC OPERATION OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. WORK WAS CONTINUING AND NO DECISION COULD BE ANNOUNCED TODAY. HE HOPED THAT IT MIGHT BE READY WITHIN DAYS RATHER THAN WEEKS.

4. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, MR HURD MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS AMONG OTHERS:

(A) WAS IT TRUE THAT THE GREEKS WERE OPPOSED TO ENDORSEMENT BY THE TEN? THE GREEKS HAD A PROBLEM. WE SHOULD HAVE TO SEE HOW IT WOULD BE RESOLVED.

(B) WERE WE SEEKING NEW CONCESSIONS FROM THE AMERICANS AS THE PRICE OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION? WE WERE NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF BARGAINING. BUT WE WOULD WISH TO MAKE PERFECTLY CLEAR THE BASIS ON WHICH COMMUNITY GOVERNMENTS WOULD TAKE PART.

(C) WOULD THE STATEMENT REPRESENT AN ADVANCE ON VENICE?

