

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSECRET

December 12, 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
 FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI **ZB.**
 SUBJECT: NSC Weekly Report #160

1. Opinion

The Moscow Warsaw Pact Summit. We have a seemingly reliable account of what transpired in Moscow, based on a debrief by the Polish Foreign Minister who attended. In essence, Kania was generally confident in early December that his handling of the Polish problem had sufficiently reassured the Soviets that a repetition of Czechoslovakia was not likely. He was thus taken aback when the sudden invitation to Moscow was issued. At the Summit the sole item was whether "Poland needed external 'help' in the form of military intervention." Kania argued strongly against it, arguing that the Party could resolve the issue and that in the event that it could not he would be prepared to seek Soviet help. In the discussions, the Czechs and the East Germans argued for providing "help," while Hungary and Romania argued against it. In the argument the latter two were eventually joined by Bulgaria. Brezhnev made it clear that the Soviet Union was willing to "help" provided the Warsaw Pact was in favor of it.

Corroborating evidence for this account has come with the statement issued yesterday by the Bulgarian Politburo, endorsing the results of the Moscow meeting and expressing Bulgarian "firm conviction that the Polish united workers party, Polish workers and entire Polish people will do everything to overcome the current complicated crisis." The Bulgarian press has also been more cautious than the East Germans and the Czechs, though more critical than the Romanians or Hungarians.

The above strikes me as consistent with the position that we have adopted: that an intervention is ready but that the final decision to launch it may not have been made, and thus there is a chance that we can perhaps help to deter it. What we have said should help Kania and Walesa to calm the situation in Poland while the good progress made on generating Allied solidarity should give Moscow further cause to reassess the potential results of intervention. If Kirkland moves expeditiously (see below), that should provide another and potentially very major item for the negative side of any Soviet ledger.

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Review on December 12, 2000
 Extended by Z. Brzezinski
 Reason: NSC 1.13(e)

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O.12958, Sec.3.6

PER sl/rlar/NC/HV RE NC-96-141
 NARS. DATE 12/14/97

2. Fact

Trade Unions and Poland. In line with our breakfast discussion of this morning, I talked in an exploratory fashion with Lane Kirkland. I asked him what his thinking was in regard to the trade union response to any Soviet intervention in Poland, and he told me that he would contemplate a total boycott. He said that he would also issue then an appeal to trade unions all over the world to do the same. I asked him if it would be useful to have some preliminary contacts with sympathetic transport unions around the world, so that some preparatory groundwork is laid and also so that it may become known to the Soviets that there would be a widespread disruption of Soviet shipping, airlines, and movement of goods to the Soviet Union. Such preliminary discussions might have some additional deterrent effect, provided that inflammatory language is not used publicly in this connection. He agreed and told me that he will be in touch both with the international transport unions and with some of the national transport union heads. His estimate is that there would be very widespread cooperation.

3. National Security Affairs Calendar (Tab A).