

- 6 MAY 1982

CG FCO DESKBY 060630Z

GR 720

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 060630Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 060222Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 660 OF 5 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

11 12 1  
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2  
= 6 MAY 1982

11 12 1  
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

Handwritten initials and signatures in circles.

MY 2 IPTS AND YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 350 AND 351  
SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS ON FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. I DECIDED NOT TO DELIVER YOUR MESSAGE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR TODAY (5 MAY). I HAD ALREADY FOUND OUT THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE PERUVIAN IDEAS; THAT HE WAS RATHER UPSET BY YOUR EMPHASIS ON THEM IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY; AND THAT HE FELT THAT HE WAS BEING USED. I ALSO HEARD THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD REPLIED SAYING THAT THEY 'ACCEPTED HIS DEMARCHE' ADDING THAT COSTA MENDEZ WOULD DISCUSS THE PROPOSALS IN DETAIL ON HIS ARRIVAL IN NEW YORK. I KNEW THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO TELL PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO KEEP OFF THE GRASS (SHE DID THIS THIS AFTERNOON) AND I SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED OF HAIG'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH HIM (PARAGRAPH 2 OF WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 1616). IN ALL THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I THOUGHT THAT HE MIGHT HAVE FOUND YOUR INTERIM REPLY A LITTLE DISMISSIVE OF HIS ROLE, AND THAT HE MIGHT AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS, CONTRAST IT WITH THE OSTENSIBLY POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM ARGENTINA. HAVING JUST EMERGED FROM A GRUELLING SESSION OS SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS (MY 2 IPTS), I AM SURE THAT I WAS RIGHT IN SO DECIDING.

2. I AGREE WITH SIR N HENDERSON (HIS TELEGRAMS NOS 1616 AND 1619) THAT IT LOOKS AS IF THE ARGENTINES ARE MANOEUVRING TO TRANSFER THE ACTION TO THE UN IN ORDER TO AVOID HAVING TO FACE UP TO THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS. FROM THIS AFTERNOON'S CONSULTATIONS IN THE COUNCIL, IT IS CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT THEY WILL HAVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT FOR SUCH A MANOEUVRE, ALSO FOR PROPOSITIONS IN FAVOUR OF A CEASEFIRE COMBINED WITH INTERMINABLE NEGOTIATIONS LEAVING US WITH OUR HANDS TIED. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES (WHO ARE NO HELP HERE) AND OURSELVES, ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ARE NOW FOCUSING ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE EXCLUSION OF ANYONE ELSE.

... OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S APPEARANCE OF PLAYING ALONG



3. IF WE DO NOT GIVE A CONVINCING APPEARANCE OF PLAYING ALONG WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WE ARE GOING TO BE DANGEROUSLY ISOLATED HERE VERY QUICKLY. I AM NOT SUGGESTING FOR A MOMENT THAT YOU SHOULD COME TO NEW YORK TO DISCUSS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S IDEAS WITH HIM AS COSTA MENDEZ IS DOING. THIS WOULD NOT ONLY BE DEMEANING, BUT IT WOULD ALSO PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE ARGENTINES BY STRENGTHENING THE FOCUS ON THE UN AS OPPOSED TO THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS.

4. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION HERE, I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR ON 6 MAY. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT OUR REPLY MIGHT FOLLOW THE LINES SKETCHED OUT IN MY TELEGRAM NO 643 (COMBINED WITH THE VIEWS IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1619). IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS WOULD PROTECT OUR BASIC POSITIONS AND WOULD NOT CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT IF PUBLISHED; IT WOULD ALSO LOOK POSITIVE, THUS KEEPING THE BALL IN PLAY, BUT WOULD CONTAIN CONUNDRUMS WHICH WOULD GIVE THE SECRETARIAT PLENTY TO WORK ON. THIS SHOULD GIVE TIME TO THE PERUVIAN IDEAS EITHER TO SUCCEED OR FAIL.

5. TO SUM UP, THE ARGENTINES' APPARENTLY POSITIVE REPLY TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONFRONTS US WITH A DILEMMA. EITHER WE CAN RESPOND POSITIVELY OURSELVES, IN WHICH CASE WE SHALL ADD CREDIBILITY TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S INITIATIVE AND MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE ARGENTINES TO USE IT AS A PRETEXT FOR EVADING THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS; OR WE CAN RESPOND NEGATIVELY, THEREBY PROVOKING AN IMMEDIATE FORMAL MEETING OF THE COUNCIL IN WHICH WE ARE LIKELY TO BE DANGEROUSLY ISOLATED.

OBVIOUSLY I WOULD PREFER IT IF WE COULD KEEP THE UN OUT OF THIS ACT AND OBLIGE THE ARGENTINES TO FOCUS ON THE PERUVIAN IDEAS. BUT THIS IS SIMPLY NOT PRACTICABLE, AND OUR BEST COURSE IS TO PLAY THINGS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE HERE AND TO AVOID ALLOWING THE ARGENTINES TO WRONG-FOOT US AND TO SECURE WIDESPREAD SUPPORT IN THE COUNCIL FOR PROPOSITIONS WHICH WE WOULD FIND UNACCEPTABLE. THIS DANGER IS NOW VERY CLOSE ALTHOUGH, WITH LUCK, WE MAY HAVE BOUGHT TIME UP TO THE WEEKEND. HOWEVER, IF I FAIL TO RESPOND IN SUBSTANCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 6 MAY THE PRESSURE ON US WILL BECOME INTENSE AND THE RISK OF HAVING TO GO INTO AN IMMEDIATE COUNCIL MEETING ON THE WRONG FOOT WILL BE VERY REAL.

6. IF YOU ACCEPT THIS RECOMMENDATION, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW YOUR DECISION BEFORE TOMORROW'S COUNCIL MEETING, WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE IN THE AFTERNOON. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS THEREFORE BY 061800Z.

FARSONS