

CONFIDENTIAL

850

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 010830Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 010512Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 229 OF 31 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY CAPETOWN LAGOS LUNADA MAPUTO
MONROVIA WASHINGTON PARIS LISBON OSLO MEXICO CITY TUNIS MANILA
DACCА PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA ABIDJAN KINGSTON NAIROBI KAMPALA
ADDIS ABABA DAKAR KINSHASA LILONGWE

MY 2 IPTS: RHODESIA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. THE MAJORITY OF THE AFRICANS CONCERNED SEEM TO WANT TO BRING THIS PARTICULAR EPISODE TO AN END BY GETTING A RESOLUTION THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THUS AVOIDING FURTHER CONFRONTATION WITH US, EG IN THE ASSEMBLY, WHICH MIGHT PUT THE WHOLE SETTLEMENT AT RISK. TANZANIA APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE MAIN ADVOCATE OF GOING THE WHOLE HOG. BY THIS EVENING, MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE TANZANIANS HAD FAILED TO CARRY THE REST OF THE AFRICANS WITH THEM, BUT ONLY ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS. THIS EVENING'S MOOD WAS IN FAVOUR OF SECURING A BRITISH ABSTENTION. AS YOU WILL SEE, THE AFRICANS HAVE COME A FAIR WAY IN THE DIRECTION OF OUR AMENDMENTS.

2. I REALISE THAT WE ARE FACED WITH A VERY DIFFICULT DECISION AND I CAN ONLY GIVE THE STRICTLY NEW YORK VIEW. I SHOULD ADD AT THIS POINT THAT, IF WE REPEATED OUR OBJECTIONS TO THE WORDING OF THE LAST PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH, OPERATIVE PARA 4 AND OPERATIVE PARA 5, I BELIEVE THAT THE AFRICANS MIGHT SOFTEN THE WORDING IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE US. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO SOFTEN THE WORDING IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY, IF AT ALL, OF OPERATIVE PARA 8.

3. IF WE TELL THE AFRICANS THAT THE REVISED RESOLUTION IS UNACCEPTABLE AND THEY REVERT THE ORIGINAL TEXT, WE MIGHT STILL BE ABLE TO SECURE A TRIPLE VETO, ALTHOUGH MCHENRY'S BEHAVIOUR TODAY HAS DEMONSTRATED GREAT RELUCTANCE TO JOIN US. MY PRESENT JUDGEMENT IS THAT WE MIGHT WELL BE ALONE IN VETOING THE REVISED TEXT AS IT CONTAINS NO DIRECT CRITICISM OF HMG WHICH COULD NOT BE COVERED BY A STRONG EXPLANATION OF VOTE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. WHAT

4. WHAT WILL THE AFRICANS DO IF WE VETO EITHER TEXT? THERE WILL BE A STRONG TENDENCY, LED BY TANZANIA, TO GO TO THE ASSEMBLY. OTHERS, SUCH AS THE RUSSIANS AND ALGERIANS, WILL ENCOURAGE THIS. WE HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ASSEMBLY DEBATE.
5. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE AFRICANS MIGHT FIND THIS OPERATION TOO DIFFICULT. BY POWERFUL ARM-TWISTING IN CAPITALS, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO PREVENT THEIR SECURING THE NECESSARY 9 VOTES FOR A UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION IN THE COUNCIL. (THE CHINESE ARE NOT KEEN ON UNITING FOR PEACE ON THIS OCCASION BECAUSE IT WOULD PLEASE THE RUSSIANS AND WE WOULD ONLY HAVE TO SECURE ONE MORE ABSTENTION FROM THE NON-ALIGNED, ASSUMING THAT THE WESTERN FOUR WOULD STAND WITH US). IF THIS HAPPENED, THE AFRICANS MIGHT FIND IT TOO DIFFICULT TO MOBILISE QUICKLY THE NECESSARY MAJORITY OF UN MEMBERS TO CALL FOR AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.
6. HOWEVER, IF THEY WERE DRIVEN OFF THE ASSEMBLY, WOULD THEY LEAVE IT AT THAT? I THINK NOT, HAVING SEEN THEIR TEMPER ON THIS OCCASION AND THE MAJOR EFFORT THEY HAVE MOUNTED - THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ETC. I THINK THAT A CHECK OF THIS KIND WOULD BE BOUND TO MAKE THEM CONCENTRATE AT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF OAU FOREIGN MINISTERS ON WAYS AND MEANS OF CONTINUING THE BATTLE WITH US OVER RHODESIA. THIS MIGHT WELL MEAN FURTHER RECOURSE TO THE COUNCIL/ASSEMBLY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT MEETING. THEY MIGHT ALSO BE INCREASINGLY DISPOSED TO BRING OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN SUBJECTS IMMEDIATELY TO THE COUNCIL, SUCH AS NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF.
7. MY JUDGEMENT IS THAT, IF WE CAN BRING OURSELVES TO ABSTAIN ON THE RESOLUTION MORE OR LESS AS DRAFTED, THE AFRICANS WILL FEEL THAT THEY HAVE HAD THEIR FIELD DAY AND WILL BE DISPOSED TO GO AWAY FOR THE TIME BEING. I HAD A FEELING THAT THE QUOTE GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT UNQUOTE (PARA 3 OF MY FIRST IPT) ON KEEPING THEM INFORMED THROUGH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS A KIND OF LIFE-LINE TO ENABLE THEM TO COOL THINGS HERE: I SHOULD NOT HAVE MUCH DIFFICULTY

/IN

CONFIDENTIAL

IN HANDLING THIS SINCE I WOULD IN FACT BE DEALING WITH BRIAN URQUHART. ONCE THE TEMPERATURE HAD COOLED, I COULD EVEN ARRANGE TO KEEP THE AFRICAN FLS INFORMED DIRECT AS WE DID WITH SUCH GOOD EFFECT THROUGHOUT THE LANCASTER HOUSE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS EXERCISE COULD PERHAPS HAVE THE EFFECT OF MAKING THEM LESS INCLINED TO BADGER US PUBLICLY IN THE UN BY PROVIDING THEM WITH A FACE-SAVING DEVICE - QUOTE WE ARE NOW GOING TO BE CONSTANTLY KEPT INFORMED BY THE ADMINISTERING POWER UNQUOTE.

8. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS, MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT WE SHOULD ABSTAIN WITH A VERY STRONG EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON PARA 8 AND ON ANY OTHER PASSAGES IN THE RESOLUTION WHICH GIVE US DIFFICULTY. BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF A VETO, COULD THE SOUTH AFRICANS NOT BE PERSUADED TO ABSORB ONE MORE INSULT FROM THE UN IF I MADE MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE TOUGH ENOUGH?

9. I AM MEETING THE AFRICANS AGAIN AT 1600Z TOMORROW (FRIDAY) AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS BY THEN. THEY SEEM DETERMINED TO TABLE THE RESOLUTION TOMORROW WITH A VOTE TOMORROW EVENING IF POSSIBLE.

PARSONS

F I L E S

RHOD D	OID
OADS	NEWS D
NAD	PS
	PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PUSD	PS/MR LUCE
PLANNING STAFF	PS/MR RIDLEY
	PS/MR HURD
	PS/MR MARTEN
CCD	PS/PUS
FRD	SIR D MAITLAND
EID (E)	SIR A ACLAND
UND	
LEGAL ADVISERS	LORD N G LENNOX
(MR FREELAND)	
	MR DAY
ECON D	MR FERGUSSON
	MR ASPIN
DEF D	MR MILLS
IPD	CPO

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

0800

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 010830Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 010354Z FEB 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 228 OF 31 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY CAPETOWN LAGOS LUANDA MAPUTO MONROVIA
WASHINGTON PARIS LISBON OSLO MEXICO CITY TUNIS MANILA DACCA
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA ABIDAJAN KINGSTON NAIROBI KAMPALA ADDIS
ABABA DAKAR KINSHASA AND LILONGWE

MIPT: RHODESIA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REVISED AFRICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION.
THE FIRST 4 PREAMBULAR PARAS AND OPERATIVE PARAS 1, 6, 8, 9 AND
10 ARE IDENTICAL WITH THE CORRESPONDING PARAS IN THE TEXT IN
MY TELNO 208.

BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN
RHODESIA (ZIMBABWE),

RECALLING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON THE SITUATION
IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND IN PARTICULAR RESOLUTION 460 (1979),

NOTING ALSO THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, HAVING RESUMED ITS
RESPONSIBILITY AS THE ADMINISTERING POWER, IS COMMITTED
TO DECOLONIZE SOUTHERN RHODESIA ON THE BASIS OF FREE AND
DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, WHICH WILL LEAD SOUTHERN RHODESIA TO
GENUINE INDEPENDENCE ACCEPTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
1514 (XV),

CONCERNED AT THE NUMEROUS VIOLATIONS OF THE TERMS OF THE
LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT,

/GRAVELY

GRAVELY CONCERNED THAT THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AND MERCENARIES IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA IS CONTRARY TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 460 (1979) AND TO THE ASSURANCE EARLIER GIVEN BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT,

1. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE TO SELF-DETERMINATION, FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE, AS ENSHRINED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1514 (XV):
2. CALLS UPON ALL PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT:
3. CALLS UPON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE THE FULL AND IMPARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT:
4. CALLS UPON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, WHILE NOTING ITS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM BEIT BRIDGE, TO ENSURE THE IMMEDIATE COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ANY OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS, REGULAR OR MERCENARY, FROM SOUTHERN RHODESIA:
5. CALLS UPON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO IMMEDIATELY TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT ALL ZIMBABWE NATIONALS FREELY PARTICIPATE IN THE FORTHCOMING ELECTORAL PROCESS, INCLUDING:
 - (I) THE SPEEDY AND UNIMPEDED RETURN OF ZIMBABWE EXILES AND REFUGEES WITHOUT THREATS, INTIMIDATION, OR ARREST, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT:
 - (II) RELEASE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS:
 - (III) CONFINE FORTHWITH THE RHODESIAN AND AUXILIARY FORCES TO BASES IN CONFORMITY WITH THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT:
 - (IV) ACCORD EQUAL TREATMENT TO ALL PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT:
 - (V) AND TO RESCIND ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS INCONSISTENT WITH THE CONDUCT OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS:
6. CALLS UPON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ALSO TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA WHICH WILL ENSURE A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION AND THEREBY AVERT THE DANGER OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT, WHICH COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:
7. CALLS

7. CALLS UPON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE ANY SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS, INCLUDING CAPTURED FREEDOM FIGHTERS, IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND TO ENSURE THEIR SAFE PASSAGE TO ANY COUNTRY OF THEIR CHOICE:
8. STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE RACIST REGIME IN SOUTH AFRICA FOR INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA:
9. CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO RESPECT ONLY THE FREE AND FAIR CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE AND NOT TO ACCORD ANY RECOGNITION TO ANY INSTITUTION SET UP IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA WHICH IS NOT THE DIRECT OUTCOME OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS:
10. DECIDES TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA UNDER REVIEW UNTIL THE TERRITORY ATTAINS FULL INDEPENDENCE UNDER GENUINE MAJORITY RULE.
- ENDS.

PARSONS

F I L E S

RHOD D	OID
OADS	NEWS D
NAD	PS
	PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PUSD	PS/MR LUCE
PLANNING STAFF	PS/MR RIDLEY
	PS/MR HURD
	PS/MR MARTEN
CCD	PS/PUS
FRD	SIR D MAITLAND
EID (E)	SIR A ACLAND
UND	
LEGAL ADVISERS	LORD N G LENNOX
(MR FREELAND)	
	MR DAY
ECON D	MR FERGUSSON
	MR ASPIN
DEF D	MR MILLS
IPD	CPO

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

GPS600

CONFIDENTIAL

● ESKBY 010830Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 010355Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 227 OF 31 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY CAPETOWN LAGOS LUANDA MAPUTO MONROVIA

WASHINGTON PARIS LISBON OSLO MEXICO CITY TUNIS MANILA DACCA

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA ABIDJAN KINGSTON NAIROBI KAMPALA ADDIS
ABABA DAKAR KINSHASA LILONGWEVYOUR TEL NO 119 AND TELECONS GOULDING/POWELL: RHODESIA AND THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I HAD A SERIES OF FAIRLY TRENCHANT TALKS WITH THE AFRICANS THIS MORNING. THE AFRICANS ON THE COUNCIL ASKED ME TO MEET THEM EARLY THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT IN MY TEL NO 208. I EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT ANY TEXT WHICH CRITICISED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY IMPLICATION, OR WHICH PURPORTED TO REWRITE PROVISIONS OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT. I ALSO EXPLAINED, STRESSING THAT I WAS TAKING THEM INTO MY CONFIDENCE, THAT AT THE PRESENT DELICATE STAGE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LANCASTER HOUSE IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR US ALL TO BEAR IN MIND THE LIKELY REACTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNAL PARTIES IN RHODESIA TO THE TEXT OF ANY RESOLUTION WHICH MIGHT BE ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL. THOUGH THE AFRICANS MIGHT NOT LIKE IT, IT WAS A FACT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND THE INTERNAL PARTIES STILL HAD IT WITHIN THEIR POWER TO WRECK THE WHOLE AGREEMENT. WE COULD NOT SIMPLY IGNORE THEIR LIKELY REACTIONS.

2. AFTER THAT PREFACE, I HANDED ROUND COPIES OF THE REVISION OF THEIR DRAFT WHICH GOULDING HAD AGREED ON THE TELEPHONE WITH POWELL AND TOOK THEM THROUGH IT POINT BY POINT. THEIR REACTION WAS REASONABLY HELPFUL AND THEY SAID THAT THEY WOULD DISCUSS OUR SUGGESTIONS WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES.

3. THE AFRICANS SUBSEQUENTLY DISCUSSED THEIR TEXT WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THEN HAD A LONG MEETING WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE VISITING FOREIGN MINISTERS. LATE THIS EVENING THEY ASKED TO SEE ME AGAIN AND GAVE ME THE TEXT IN MIFT. THEY SAID THAT THIS WAS STILL SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL TIDYING UP BUT THAT THEY WANTED ME TO KNOW OF IT

/AS

CONFIDENTIAL

AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AS THEY HOPED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO VOTE TOMORROW EVENING. THEY SAID THAT THEY HAD EVOLVED THIS TEXT IN AN ATTEMPT TO MODERATE THEIR EARLIER DRAFT IN ORDER TO ENABLE US TO ABSTAIN. IF WE DECIDED TO VETO THEY WOULD WANT TO TABLE A STRONGER RESOLUTION (PRESUMABLY SOMETHING CLOSE TO THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 208). THEY ALSO SAID THAT THEY HOPED THAT, IN RETURN FOR THEIR ATTEMPTS TO MEET OUR WISHES, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO AN UNWRITTEN GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT THAT IN FUTURE WE WOULD CO-OPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAINTAIN A FLOW OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT.

4. I THANKED THE AFRICANS FOR THE CHANGES THEY HAD MADE TO MEET US BUT EXPLAINED ONCE AGAIN THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAD WITH OPERATIVE PARA 4 AND 8 IN THE NEW TEXT. ON THE FORMER I URGED THEM TO GET CLOSER TO THE LANGUAGE OF SCR 460 AND TO AMEND THEIR TEXT TO READ:

''...WITHDRAWAL OF ANY OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN OR OTHER EXTERNAL FORCES, REGULAR OR MERCENARY, FROM SOUTHERN RHODESIA''. THEY SAID THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER THIS.

5. MY RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IN MY SECOND I.F.T.

PARSONS

F I L E S

RHOD D	OID
OADS	NEWS D
NAD	PS
	PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PUSD	PS/MR LUCE
PLANNING STAFF	PS/MR RIDLEY
	PS/MR HURD
	PS/MR MARTEN
CCD	PS/PUS
FRD	SIR D MAITLAND
EID (E)	SIR A ACLAND
UND	
LEGAL ADVISERS	LORD N G LENNOX
(MR FREELAND)	
	MR DAY
ECON D	MR FERGUSSON
	MR ASPIN
DEF D	MR MILLS
IPD	CPO

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 300
DESKBY 010830Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 010350Z FEB 80

IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 226 DATED 31 JANUARY 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY CAPETOWN

YOUR TELNO 124: RHODESIA: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE VOTE IS A STARTER. WE MIGHT HAVE GOT AWAY WITH IT IF WE HAD MADE CLEAR IN ADVANCE TO THE AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE CONCERNED THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO PLAY THEIR GAME: THAT WE WOULD ONLY OCCUPY OUR SEAT IN THE COUNCIL AT VERY JUNIOR LEVEL: THAT WE WOULD NOT SPEAK IN THE DEBATE: AND THAT WE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE VOTE. WE DISCUSSED THIS BRIEFLY AT MY MEETING WITH YOU ON MONDAY AND DECIDED AGAINST IT.

2. HAVING NOW BEEN INVOLVED HEAVILY THROUGHOUT THE DEBATE, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD GAIN ANYTHING HERE AT THIS STAGE BY NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE VOTE. THE RESOLUTION WOULD PASS, MY EXPLANATION OF NON-PARTICIPATION WOULD BE HARDLY, IF AT ALL, TOUGHER THAN ANY EXPLANATION OF VOTE I SHALL HAVE TO GIVE ON AN ABSTENTION. HENCE, THE EFFECT IN TERMS OF YOUR PARA 3 WOULD BE ROUGHLY THE SAME AND EITHER COURSE WOULD AVOID THE ASSEMBLY. TO SUM UP, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD GAIN ANYTHING FROM MAKING ON THIS OCCASION A WHOLLY UNPRECEDENTED DEPARTURE FROM OUR PRACTICE OVER 35 YEARS IN THE UN.

3. I BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT, AT THIS LATE STAGE, WE MUST MAKE UP OUR MINDS CLEARLY BETWEEN A VETO AND AN ABSTENTION. I AM TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ON THE AFRICAN RESOLUTION AS IT NOW STANDS.
PARSONS

F I L E S

RHOD D
OADS
NAD
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
CCD
FRD
EID (E)
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
ECON D
DEF D
IPD

OID
NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
SIR A ACLAND
LORD N G LENNOX
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
CPO

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

GPS750

RESTRICTED

DESKBY 010900Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 010350Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 217 OF 31 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY CAPETOWN DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA GABORONE
LAGOS LUANDA MAPUTO MONROVIA WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY PARIS LISBON OSLO MEXICO CITY TUNIS MANILA UKMIS
GENEVA ABIDJAN KINGSTON DACCA NAIROBI KAMPALA ADDIS ABABA
DAKAR KINSHASA LILONGWE

MY TELNOS 206 - 211: RHODESIA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. THE DEBATE CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE DAY. STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY ZAMBIA, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, GDR, SOMALIA, CUBA, THE ANC, NIGER, THE SOVIET UNION, VIETNAM, ALGERIA, JAMAICA, YUGOSLAVIA, CHINA AND ZAIRE.
2. MOST SPEAKERS MADE THE SAME GENERAL CRITICISMS OF OUR ADMINISTRATION OF RHODESIA AS YESTERDAY'S SPEAKERS (IE BIAS AGAINST THE PF, DEPLOYMENT OF RHODESIAN FORCES AND AUXILIARIES, PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS, EMERGENCY LEGISLATION, MARTIAL LAW, ETC), ALTHOUGH BY AND LARGE THE TONE WAS SLIGHTLY LESS OFFENSIVE.
3. KANGAI (PF) CLAIMED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN ZIMBABWE IN THE EVENT OF THE PF WINNING THE ELECTIONS WAS ALMOST CERTAIN, AND THAT THERE ARE 6000 SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AT PRESENT IN "STRATEGIC AREAS" OF RHODESIA INCLUDING SOME OPERATING UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN COMMAND AND WEARING SOUTH AFRICAN UNIFORMS, AND A "LARGE NUMBER" ON SECONDMENT, WEARING RHODESIAN UNIFORMS. HE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE DELAY IN ALLOWING MUGABE AND NKOMO TO RETURN. HE MADE THE POINT ABOUT THE HOLD-UP IN THE IMPORT OF 200 PF VEHICLES FROM MOZAMBIQUE, CLAIMING THAT THE GOVERNOR HAD DEMANDED CUSTOMS DUTIES AND THAT ONCE THESE WERE PAID MORE CHARGES HAD BEEN DEMANDED. MUZOREWA MEANWHILE HAD HAD HUNDREDS OF CARS IMPORTED FROM SOUTH AFRICA. HE DID /NOT CLAIM,

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

NOT CLAIM, AS HE HAD FORESHADOWED TO US, THAT THE ZANLA REPRESENTATIVE ON THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION HAD DISAGREED WITH THE COMMISSION'S DECISIONS ON CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. HE CONCLUDED THAT IF NO "CORRECTIVE MEASURES ARE TAKEN SOON WE SHALL NOT HAVE ANY ALTERNATIVE BESIDES THAT OF CONTINUING THE ARMED LIBERATION STRUGGLE". (IN ANSWERING SOME OF KANGAI'S POINTS TOMORROW I SHALL, AS PROMISED BY TELEPHONE, RETURN TO THE CHARGE ON THE QUESTION OF HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE DEBATE.)

4. LUSAKA (ZAMBIA) WENT OVER ALL THE USUAL COMPLAINTS BUT A GOOD DEAL LESS EMOTIONALLY THAN MKAPA YESTERDAY. HE READ OUT A LIST OF SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS OF CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS BY RHODESIAN FORCES AND AUXILIARIES. I HAVE INCLUDED THESE VERBATIM IN MIFT (TO FCO AND SALISBURY ONLY) IN CASE THERE IS ANYTHING USEFUL WHICH SALISBURY CAN GIVE ME TO SAY IN REPLY TOMORROW. LUSAKA TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT ALL EXCEPT ONE OF THESE ALLEGATIONS HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION.

5. THE GDR LECTURED US ON THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS (WHICH GIVES ME A FREE HIT IN MY RIGHT OF REPLY). THE SOVIET SPEECH WAS PREDICTABLY HOSTILE. BRITAIN AND HER ALLIES WERE TRYING TO WHIP UP TENSION IN AFRICA AND FORCE THE AFRICANS TO ABANDON NON-ALIGNMENT. THE DISCRIMINATORY AND ONE-SIDED LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN IMPOSED ON THE PF BUT WAS BEING FLAGRANTLY VIOLATED BY BRITAIN IN ORDER TO WORSEN THE PF'S ELECTORAL CHANCES. THE SO-CALLED ELECTION IN RHODESIA WAS AS MUCH OF A FARCE AS THAT OF APRIL 1979 HAD BEEN. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD ACT TO STOP BRITAIN'S ATTEMPTS TO PRESERVE THE NEO-COLONIALIST PUPPET REGIME. (HE TOO INCLUDED SOME LONG-HOPS WHICH I SHALL HIT OUT OF THE GROUND TOMORROW).

/6. ONE

RESTRICTED

6. ONE BIT OF GOOD NEWS WAS ZAIRE'S STATEMENT WHICH WAS BALANCED, RECOGNISED YOUR ACHIEVEMENTS AT LANCASTER HOUSE, EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR OUR RESENTMENT OF THE CHARGES BEING MADE AGAINST US AND ADDRESSED TO US A FRIENDLY REQUEST TO AVOID ANY VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

7. ALL THE OTHER SPEAKERS SUPPORTED THE AFRICAN COMPLAINTS, ALTHOUGH NONE OF THEM ACHIEVED THE VIRULENCE AND OFFENSIVENESS DISPLAYED BY LIBERIA AND TANZANIA YESTERDAY. AND CUBA WAS UNEXPECTEDLY BRIEF AND COMPARATIVELY MODERATE. THE ANC REPRESENTATIVE SPOKE MAINLY ABOUT THE ANC DETAINEES (ON WHOM I AM TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY - NOT TO ALL) AND ABOUT THE INIQUITIES OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES IN THE REGION.

8. I AM ALSO TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE AFRICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION.

PARSONS

F I L E S

RHOD D
OADS
NAD
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
CCD
FRD
EID (E)
UND
LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
ECON D
DEF D
IPD

OID
NEWS D
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR MARTEN
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
SIR A ACLAND
LORD N G LENNOX
MR DAY
MR FERGUSSON
MR ASPIN
MR MILLS
CPO

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY