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CONFIDENTIAL

see 1 p 11. (17)



Secretary of State

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| INDEX | PA | Action Taken |
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FALKLAND ISLAND: CABINET: 0930 HOURS 2 APRIL

1. I submit a summary check list of points for action following an Argentine invasion.
2. An early decision is needed on the choice of a protecting power in Buenos Aires following a break in diplomatic relations. I recommend that we should approach the Americans to do this.

2 April 1982

R R Fearn
South America Department

cc. PS/LPS
 PS/Mr Luce
 PS/PUS
 Mr Giffard
 Mr Ure
 H/Defence Dept
 News Dept

CONFIDENTIAL

declare war

Statement 11.
German Swiss
Nato

Chile

CABINET: 2 APRIL

POINTS FOR ACTION/DECISION FOLLOWING AN ARGENTINE INVASION

1. Security Council

✓ To seek further Emergency meeting and a Resolution condemning Argentina and calling for withdrawal of forces. Sir A Parsons has asked for discretion to do this.

2. US Action

Already acted vigorously but without effect. Essential they continue to do so. Relations with US will remain very important for Argentina.

3. Task Force

Action being taken. But need to decide when to make public. Need to inform NATO.

4. EC Partners

Identical
para. Already asked to put pressure on Argentines. But will need to come out roundly in condemnation of invasion.

5. Action with Other Governments

- a) Get Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders to work on our behalf;
- b) Follow up US approach to the Pope, with direct UK appeal for his intervention.

6. Diplomatic Relations

- a) We shall need to break off diplomatic relations;
- b) Normal notice - 4 working days reasonable (and do not want to cause our Embassy in Buenos Aires unnecessary difficulties);
- c) Summon Argentine Charge as soon as invasion reported;
- d) Decide on protecting power (Americans best: alternatives Swiss or Germans).

7. British Community in Argentina

Large British community - 17,000 passport holders. Ambassador does not consider Anglo-Argentine community to

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be significantly at risk but has taken discreet warning measures. Most vulnerable will be expatriate employees of British companies.

A 8. Retaliatory Action in Economic/Trade Field

No obvious advantage in retaliation in trade field or against airlines/shipping. Attached note sets out the scope.

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|----------------------|----|--------------|
| ALQ/50/15 | | |
| RECEIVED IN REGISTRY | | |
| DESK OFFICER | | REGISTRY |
| INDEX | PA | Action Taken |
| | | |

SECRET

POINTS ARISING FROM MINISTERS' DISCUSSION AT NO 10, 1 APRIL
(as reported by Mr Ure)

1. Task Force

Agreed that the Fleet should be placed on immediate readiness. There should be no immediate public admission of this until after an invasion had taken place when it would be referred to as a previous precautionary measure.

a) Discussed press line with MOD. Agreed that they should stick to line that we do not comment on movements of RN ships. These are confidential, operational matters.

b) Telegram sent to Washington confirming what Secretary of State told Mr Haig on the telephone about placing Fleet in readiness.

2. Resistance by marines at Port Stanley and South Georgia

No further instructions to be sent to Governor on how to use Marines. Acceptance of Marine Commander's dispositions in tel to CINCFLEET Z012200Z: to open fire to resist attempted landing over beach or by air.

3. MOD to inform Governor Port Stanley and Base Commander Grytviken of Argentine intention to attack Grytviken (action taken by MOD). Instructions to Marines at Grytviken to fire first.

Cabinet

To be at 0930 hours on 2 April: Statement in Parliament by LPS at 1100 hours.

1. (15)
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G. H. S. / 4

Mr Upe

PS

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| ALQ/050/15 | | |
| RECEIVED IN REGISTRY | | |
| DESK OFFICER | | REGISTRY |
| INDEX | PA | Action Taken |
| | | |

FALKLAND ISLANDS: UK RESPONSE TO ANY ARGENTINE ACTION

1. If the Argentines do use force against the Falkland Islands, the first requirement would be to try to secure the withdrawal of their forces. Our options would include:

(i) Reference to the Security Council

This would be an essential first step. It is the only suitable forum for discussion of a threat to the peace. UKMIS New York have already advised (in a comment on a Secret report) that we should be unlikely to obtain the necessary nine positive votes for a resolution condemning the Argentine use of force and calling on them to withdraw their forces. But they would need to lobby intensively in New York and we should act in parallel in capitals.

(ii) Action with the Americans

The Americans have been involved from an early stage, including at the highest level. They are the one Western government in a position to exercise the most influence on the Argentines, and it would be essential to continue to press them to take every action on our behalf, in Buenos Aires, with the Argentine Ambassador in Washington, and with the Argentine Permanent Representative in New York.

(iii) Action with our EC partners

All our EC partners except Luxembourg have an Embassy in Buenos Aires. We may expect sympathy and support from all our EC partners but their influence with the Argentines is much less significant than that of the Americans. It would probably be best to be selective and lobby the French, Germans, Italians and Dutch intensively, asking the others to help as best they could. We should also consider the prospects of achieving an

/agreement



agreement in Political Cooperation of the Ten, that the Argentines should be urged to withdraw their forces and that the Presidency (Belgium) should deliver a demarche to them on this basis.

(iv) Action with South American countries

All South American countries traditionally support the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the Falklands, but they have generally made it clear that they wish to see a peaceful solution to the dispute. Argentina's relations with Chile are too cool for there to be any point in asking the Chileans to act on our behalf, but Brazil, Venezuela and Peru might all be asked to exert influence on the Argentine Government.

(v) Action with the Non-Aligned

The Non-Aligned Movement also traditionally support the Argentine claim to sovereignty and we could have little hope of exerting any influence on the Movement as a whole. But we might approach those members of the Commonwealth who are also members of the Non-Aligned.

2. There would be other action we should need to take which would have no direct effect on the situation. The main one would be to expel the Argentine Ambassador and possibly all the Embassy staff. The Argentines would certainly retaliate in kind. It would seem best to ask the Americans to look after British interests in Buenos Aires. Alternatives might be the Germans or the Swiss.

3. Action on the economic front (see attached paper) would be more likely to hurt us than the Argentines and some elements would cause us legal difficulties. But it might be necessary to take action for presentational reasons.

N/T
M. Wilson
20/4/82

1 April 1982

P R Fearn
Emergency Room

cc PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD