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Prime Minister

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 021450Z AUG 79

TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA (FOR WALDEN AND CARTLEDGE)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 614 OF 2 AUGUST.

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FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 2151 OF 1/8.

FM WASHINGTON 011735Z AUGUST 79

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2151 OF 1 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK.

SLW

MYTEL NO 2139: SALT II HEARINGS: DR KISSINGER.

1. KISSINGER'S CALL TO ARMS ALIGNS HIM ESSENTIALLY WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND SENATOR NUNN IN THE DEBATE. HE WENT BEYOND THEM IN REASSERTING A STRONG LINKAGE BETWEEN THE SALT PROCESS AND WIDER SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY BUT THIS DOES NOT AFFECT THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE. THE IMPORTANT THING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION IS THAT, TO QUOTE THE NEW YORK TIMES, KISSINGER DEFTLY THREW HIS RHETORIC TO THE SENATE HAWKS BUT LEFT THE PRESIDENT THE TREATY BONE. KISSINGER'S CHARACTERISATION OF THE TREATY AS HAVING "BENEFICIAL ASPECTS" WHILE BEING ESSENTIALLY "PERIPHERAL TO OUR BASIC SECURITY AND GEO-POLITICAL CONCERNS" IS VERY CLOSE TO GENERAL JONES' POSITION OF A "MODEST BUT USEFUL STEP". HIS VERDICT REMOVES ONE OF THE LAST MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES IN THE DEBATE AS THE ADMINISTRATION APPROACHES THE BREATHING SPACE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RECESS AND THE FLOOR DEBATE THEREAFTER.

2. IN HIS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION KISSINGER HAS BEEN NOTICEABLY SOFT OVER THE "CLARIFICATIONS" OF THE TREATY HE PLAYED SO CLOSE A PART IN NEGOTIATING. HIS CONCLUSIVE REJECTION OF THE PURSUIT OF AMENDMENTS REQUIRING RE-NEGOTIATION WITH THE RUSSIANS WILL CARRY MUCH WEIGHT. HIS PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE SENATE'S ADVISE AND CONSENT RESOLUTION, CONCERNING THE PROTOCOL, THE SO-CALLED "HEAVY MISSILE INEQUITY" AND NONCIRCUMVENTION, BREAK NO NEW GROUND AND CAN PROBABLY BE ACCOMMODATED FARILY EASILY. THE POINT AT WHICH KISSINGER SEEMED TO TAKE MOST ISSUE WITH THE PACKAGE NEGOTIATED BY THE ADMINISTRATION WAS IN NOT HAVING EXTRACTED A SUFFICIENT BALANCE IN THE RESTRICTIONS OVER CRUISE MISSILES AND BACKFIRE RESPECTIVELY, THOUGH HE WAS CAREFUL NOT TO ENDORSE THE CRITICISM THAT BACKFIRE SHOULD RANK AS AN INTERCONTINENTAL SYSTEM. NEVERTHELESS HE ADMITTED UNDER QUESTIONING THAT HE WOULD HIMSELF PROBABLY HAVE RECOMMENDED THE PRESIDENT TO SIGN THE TREATY AS DRAFTED.

3. AS FORESHADOWED IN HIS ECONOMIST INTERVIEW OF 3 FEBRUARY, KISSINGER PLACED THE WHOLE EMPHASIS, IN HIS GLOOMY PROGNOSIS ABOUT THE PERIOD OF MAXIMUM DANGER, ON THE CHANGED INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT IN WHICH THE TREATY HE HIMSELF BASICALLY ENGENDERED NOW FINDS ITSELF. HE EXPLAINED THIS IN TERMS OF A SPEED-UP IN SOVIET MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, THE SLACKENING OF U.S. DEFENCE PROGRAMMES AND THE MORE BRAZEN SOVIET GEO-POLITICAL STANCE. HIS REMEDY AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL IS ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF A U.S. COUNTER-FORCE CAPABILITY (MX AND TRIDENT II) AND A RE-THINK OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINE. HIS SUGGESTION THAT FUTURE SALT TALKS BE MADE SUBJECT TO REGULAR SENATE REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PERFORMANCE IS REGARDED AS LESS REALISTIC, HOWEVER FLATTERING TO CONGRESS.

4. THE OTHER COMPONENTS OF KISSINGER'S ENHANCED MILITARY SPENDING PROGRAMME REFLECT HIS CONCERN (SHARED BY HAIG) FOR EARLY DECISIONS ON NATO'S TNF MODERNISATION (WHICH SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH HIS APPEAL FOR CLEAR-CUT AMERICAN LEADERSHIP FOR THE ALLIES): WHILE THE EMPHASIS ON THE NAVY FLOWS DIRECTLY FROM HIS ARGUMENT ABOUT THE NEED TO BE ABLE TO MEET SOVIET PROVOCATION AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL AROUND THE WORLD. HIS REFERENCE TO AIR DEFENCE AGAINST BACKFIRE IS UNCLEAR AS IT STANDS: INsofar AS KISSINGER MEANS U.S. DOMESTIC AIR DEFENCE AS DISTINCT FROM THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE, HE MAY ALSO HAVE IN MIND MORE GENERAL WORRIES ABOUT U.S. AIR DEFENCES, THE NEED FOR A QUID PRO QUO IF SOVIET AIR DEFENCES ARE TO BE RESTRAINED IN SALT 3 AND, JUST POSSIBLY, THE NEED TO PREPARE AGAINST THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW SOVIET HEAVY BOMBER.

5. HOW THIS ACCELERATED MILITARY EFFORT SHOULD BE SQUARED WITH CONGRESS' BUDGETARY PROCEDURES IS ALSO UNCLEAR. AS COMMENTATORS POINT OUT KISSINGER, INTERPRETED LITERALLY, SEEMS TO BE ASKING PRESIDENT CARTER, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO RATIFICATION BEING DELAYED UNTIL WELL INTO NEXT YEAR, TO SUBMIT A MAJOR PART OF HIS BUDGET 5 MONTHS IN ADVANCE OF NORMAL PRACTICE (THE FY81 ANNUAL DEFENCE POSTURE STATEMENT WOULD NORMALLY APPEAR IN JANUARY 1980). THE SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENCE BUDGET FOR FY80 (THE FINANCIAL YEAR WHICH BEGINS THIS OCTOBER) WOULD NOT NORMALLY BE PRESENTED UNTIL SPRING 1980. COBBLING TOGETHER AN EMERGENCY PROGRAMME DURING THE RECESS MONTH OF AUGUST SEEMS A LITTLE UNLIKELY. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHILE HIS REMARKS ABOUT HOLDING OVER RATIFICATION ECHOED HAIG'S LINE, KISSINGER WAS CAREFUL TO LEAVE OPEN TO THE ADMINISTRATION THE POSSIBILITY OF "OTHER METHODS TO ACHIEVE THIS END".

6. MEANWHILE VANCE ACKNOWLEDGED EARLIER THIS WEEK (MIFT) THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE NOT MET THE 3 PERCENT REAL INCREASE THIS YEAR BECAUSE OF ACCELERATED INFLATION AND CONGRESSIONAL CUTBACKS. HIS RENEWED COMMITMENT TO THE TARGET INDICATES WILLINGNESS TO DO MORE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND THIS WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO MEETING THE BASIC CONDITION OF KISSINGER, NUNN AND THE JOINT CHIEFS. AFTER KISSINGER'S TESTIMONY THE STATE DEPARTMENT RELEASED A STATEMENT SAYING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD CONTINUE TO PROPOSE PROGRAMMES TO "STRENGTHEN OUR STRATEGIC FORCES AND TO REDRESS EFFECTIVELY PROBLEMS THAT HAVE DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST DECADE", AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT "THE SALT DEBATE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OVERALL INCREASES IN THE DEFENCE BUDGETING". PRESIDENT CARTER WAS NOT SLOW TO MAKE THE POINT AT A TOWN MEETING IN KENTUCKY YESTERDAY THAT IN THE LAST TWO YEARS HIS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEFENCE SPENDING HAD BEEN REDUCED BY CONGRESS BY A TOTAL OF DOLLARS 5 BILLION. THIS PUTS HIM TACTICALLY AT THE RIGHT END OF THE ARGUMENT.

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TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA

TELEGRAM NO 590 OF 1 AUGUST

Prime Minister
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FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE OFFICE WAS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 2139 OF 31 JULY

BEGINS:

FM WASHINGTON 312110Z JUL 79

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2139 OF 31 JULY

INFO PRIORITY MODUK PARIS BONN MOSCOW UKDEL NATO.

MY TEL NO 2117: SALT II HEARINGS: TESTIMONY OF DR KISSINGER.

1. HENRY KISSINGER MADE HIS LONG AWAITED APPEARANCE TODAY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TO TESTIFY ON SALT II. WE SHALL BE COMMENTING SEPARATELY. IN SHORT HE GAVE CONDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR RATIFICATION, BUT WITH HEAVY EMPHASIS ON THE CONDITIONS.

2. IN A VINTAGE PERFORMANCE KISSINGER, READING FROM AN ABBREVIATED VERSION OF A TEXT CIRCULATED IN WRITING (COPY TO DEFENCE DEPARTMENT BY TODAY'S BAG), STRUCK A GRAVE NOTE FROM THE OUTSET WITH A QUOTATION FROM KANT. PEACE HAD TO REST ON A MILITARY AND GEO-POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM. THE PROBLEM WAS TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR WITHOUT SUCCUMBING TO NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL. THE PRESENT TREATY CAME UP FOR RATIFICATION AT A TIME OF GREAT DANGER TO US NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE SENATE NEEDED TO EXAMINE IT AGAINST THIS BROADER BACKGROUND. THERE HAD BEEN A SERIOUS TRANSFORMATION IN THE MILITARY BALANCE OVER THE PAST DECADE AND A HALF. THE EARLIER ADVANTAGES ENJOYED BY THE US WOULD SOON HAVE CEASED TO EXIST, REVERSING THE STRATEGIC EQUATION ON WHICH THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES HAD DEPENDED SINCE WORLD WAR 2. AS A RESULT OF THE CANCELLATION, DELAY OR STRETCHING OF SUCH PROGRAMMES AS B.1, MX. TRIDENT AND CRUISE MISSILES, SOME OF WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE US A NEW COUNTER-FORCE CAPABILITY, THEY NOW FACED THE CHALLENGE OF THE EARLY 1980'S WITH FORCES DESIGNED IN THE 1960'S. THE UNITED STATES HAD PLACED ITSELF AT A GRAVE DISADVANTAGE, BUT THIS HAD BEEN DONE VOLUNTARILY AND WAS NOT A FUNCTION OF SALT. IT WAS THEREFORE WITHIN AMERICAN POWER TO ALTER THIS SITUATION IF THEY SO DECIDED.

3. AS FOR HOW THE PRESENT TREATY AFFECTED THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, ANY FAIR MINDED ANALYSIS WOULD RECOGNISE THE BENEFICIAL ASPECTS (THE 2250 AND 820 CEILINGS, THE RESTRICTIONS ON MISSILE TESTING, THE LIMITS ON WARHEADS AND ON NEW TYPES, THE DATA BASE AND THE COUNTING RULES). BUT NONE OF THIS AFFECTED THE SOVIET THREAT TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE DURING THE PERIOD OF MAXIMUM DANGER. THERE WAS ALSO A DISTURBING NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE THEATRE NUCLEAR BALANCE, BY REASON OF THE UNILATERAL RENUNCIATION OF US CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAMMES IN THE PROTOCOL (SYSTEMS AFFECTING IMPORTANT INTERESTS OF THE ALLIES), IN RETURN AT BEST FOR RESTRICTIONS ON BACKFIRE RELEVANT PRIMARILY TO THE UNITED STATES.

4. KISSINGER WENT ON TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE WIDER CONTEXT, WITH SUCCESSIVE SOVIET ASSAULTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM SINCE 1975: ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA, ZAIRE, AFGHANISTAN, YEMEN AND CAMBODIA AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM SUPPORTED BY COMMUNIST FUNDS AS A SYSTEMATIC INSTRUMENT OF ANTI-WESTERN POLICY. IT WAS SURELY NOT PROVOCATIVE TO ASK THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCOMPANY RESTRAINT IN ARMS WITH RESTRAINT IN POLITICAL CONDUCT. OTHERWISE SALT WOULD ACT AS A SOPORIFIC WHILST SOVIET ADVENTURISM RAN FREE.

5. KISSINGER SAID THE SUPPORT EXPRESSED FOR SALT II BY THE ALLIES STEMMED FROM A COMPLEX OF FACTORS OF WHICH THE DETAILED TREATY PROVISIONS WERE BY FAR THE LEAST SIGNIFICANT. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS URGED, IF NOT PRESSED, THE ALLIES TO GIVE THEIR SUPPORT. SOME ALLIES WERE AFRAID LEST THEIR OBJECTION ENDANGER THEIR ESSENTIAL DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. ALLIED ATTITUDES SHOULD BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF A PERVASIVE AMBIVALENCE, BECAUSE WHILE REJECTION OF S A L T WOULD SHAKE ALLIED CONFIDENCE IN THE U S POLITICAL PROCESS AFTER 7 YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE THOUGHTFUL LEADERS AMONG THEM KNEW THAT THE BASIS OF THEIR SECURITY WAS ERODING AS U S STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY EBBED. THE ALLIES WERE, IN HIS VIEW, ALSO HIGHLY UNEASY ABOUT S A L T III. THE TEST OF U S LEADERSHIP WAS NOT A POLL OF THE ALLIES BUT AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO GIVE A CLEAR-CUT SIGNAL OF WHAT THE U S UNDERSTOOD BY WESTERN SECURITY AND HOW THEY INTENDED TO MAINTAIN IT.

6. KISSINGER SAID THAT AFTER MUCH REFLECTION HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT HE COULD SUPPORT RATIFICATION ONLY WITH THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:-

(A) THAT THERE WAS AN OBLIGATORY UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT ON THE NEED TO TAKE ACTION TO RESTORE THE MILITARY BALANCE. THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD SUBMIT AND CONGRESS SHOULD AUTHORISE AND BEGIN APPROPRIATING A SUPPLEMENTARY DEFENCE BUDGET AND A REVISED 5 YEAR DEFENCE PROGRAMME. THE SENATE SHOULD DELAY ITS ADVICE AND CONSENT UNTIL A NEW MILITARY PROGRAMME HAD BEEN AUTHORISED IF NECESSARY UNTIL THE NEXT SESSION OF CONGRESS. HE WOULD BE OPEN-MINDED ABOUT OTHER MEANS TO ACHIEVE A SIMILAR UNAMBIGUOUS AND OBLIGATORY COMMITMENT BY BOTH BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. THE PROGRAMME MUST INCLUDE ACCELERATION OF MX AND TRIDENT II, AIR DEFENCE AGAINST BACKFIRE, IMMEDIATE STEPS TO RESTORE THE T N F BALANCE AND BEEFED UP REGIONAL DEFENCE CAPACITY ESPECIALLY THE NAVY:

(B) SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS TO CLEAR UP AMBIGUITIES IN THE TREATY PACKAGE, WHICH WOULD NOT REQUIRE RE-NEGOTIATION:

1. THERE SHOULD BE A CLEAR CUT DIRECTIVE THAT THE PROTOCOL SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED WHEN IT EXPIRED AND THAT ANY FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON U S CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAMMES SHOULD BE SET IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATING A T N F BALANCE, WHERE THEY WOULD BE MATCHED BY SIMILAR LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET SYSTEMS SUCH AS THE BACKFIRE AND SS 20.

II. THE SENATE SHOULD SPECIFY AS PART OF S A L T II THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO ANY WEAPON SYSTEM PERMITTED TO THE SOVIET UNION, UNLESS THE SOVIET UNION AGREED TO GIVE UP A SYSTEM OF EQUIVALENT VALUE. THIS WOULD TAKE CARE OF THE HEAVY MISSILE INEQUITY IN THE ONLY FRAMEWORK (THAT OF SALT II) WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A REAL OPTION TO PRODUCE IT.

III. THERE SHOULD BE A CLEAR STATEMENT THAT THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE DID NOT INTERRUPT CO-OPERATION WITH THE ALLIES IN MODERNISATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.

IV. AN UNDERTAKING THAT THE S A L T TREATY SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED EVERY 2 YEARS BY CONGRESS TO DETERMINE ITS ON-GOING VERIFIABILITY. IN ADDITION, THE SENATE NEEDED TO MAKE A VIGOROUS EXPRESSION OF ITS VIEW THAT THE ABSENCE OF POLITICAL RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WIDER GEO-POLITICAL CONTEXT WOULD JEOPARDISE THE S A L T PROCESS.

7. QUESTIONS LATER BY SENATOR JAVITS AS TO WHETHER HE ADVISED THAT THE SENATE SHOULD REJECT S A L T II UNLESS ALL THESE CONDITIONS COULD BE FULFILLED, KISSINGER REPLIED THAT HE HAD VERY GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT VOTING S A L T II QUOTE UP AND DOWN UNQUOTE WITHOUT A MAJOR PART OF THE SPIRIT OF HIS PROPOSALS BEING MET. FAILING THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE SENATE HOLD OVER RATIFICATION UNTIL HIS CONCERNS HAD BEEN ACCOMMODATED.

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