

DATE 24/27/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

MHTO *ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EO6:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #5273 0940304
O 040333Z APR 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDCTO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0525
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0414
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 4103INFO URMISSION URNATO IMMEDIATE 0751
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0700
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 0803
USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATE 3070
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 7220
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0394
BT~~SECRET~~ STATE 085273 TOSEC 020000
NODIS
CATK0 FOR SECRETARY
E.O. 12065: ROS-1 4/3/11 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)

TAGS: PL, NATO, UR

SUBJECT: POLAND == MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PLEASE DELIVER TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY HAIG IN
PARA 3 BELOW TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

SECSTATE WASHDC 0273

DTG:040333Z APR 81 08N: 010012
TOR: 094/0300Z

598-002*87

*****~~SECRET~~*****

L-1

6/12/02

DATE 4/27/81

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR:

1. OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET POSTURE REGARDING POLAND SUGGESTS THAT AN INTERVENTION BY THE USSR IS A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PRESIDENT HAS INFORMED PRESIDENT REZAKOV OF THE SEVERE CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD RESULT SHOULD THE SOVIETS INTERVENE.

2. I HAVE DECIDED TO LEAVE ON SCHEDULE FOR MY TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT I WANTED YOU TO KNOW IF A CRISIS DEVELOPS IN POLAND, I WILL IMMEDIATELY RETURN TO WASHINGTON. UPON RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES, I WOULD CONSULT WITH THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT ON THE

SITUATION IN POLAND. THEREAFTER I WOULD TRAVEL TO BRUSSELS FOR THE EMERGENCY NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL WHERE WE WOULD DECIDE ON THE LIST OF PROPOSED MEASURES TO DEAL WITH THE POLISH SITUATION.

3. IT IS MY FIRM BELIEF THAT WE MUST, AT BRUSSELS, BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE RAPID AND CONCRETE ALLIANCE DECISIONS. NONE OF US WILL BE ABLE TO LINGER IN BRUSSELS, AND IT WILL BE DECISIVELY IMPORTANT TO CONVEY SWIFTLY TO THE SOVIETS A CLEAR AND PAINFUL SIGNAL. WE MUST NOT ALLOW THE EMERGENCY MINISTERIAL TO DEVELOP INTO A WESTERN DEBATE. UNITY AND DECISIVENESS ARE DEMANDED BY THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE AND, MOST CERTAINLY, BY OUR POLICE AND PARLIAMENTS.

4. IN ADDITION TO THE GENERAL POINTS SET OUT ABOVE WHICH I HAVE SHARED WITH ALL OF THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE FOUR OF US HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY WITH REGARD TO POLAND. THE ALLIANCE PACKAGE OF MEASURES BUILDS ON THE CONSENSUS REACHED BY OUR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIRECTORS. THE NATO LIST, HOWEVER, HAS SOME OPEN QUESTIONS AND CAVEATS THAT COULD EASILY CAUSE THE MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION TO DEGENERATE AND LEAD TO A LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR. IT WILL TAKE LEADERSHIP BY ALL OF US TO INSURE THAT THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN. YOU WILL HAVE AN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN ENCOURAGING OUR ALLIES WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO COME PREPARED TO MAKE SOME COURAGEOUS BUT

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NECESSARY DECISIONS.

1. THEREFORE, FOR ALL OF THESE REASONS, WE WILL NEED TO GET TOGETHER IN A QUADRIPARTITE CONTEXT BEFORE THE MINISTERIAL TO PLAN HOW WE CAN HEAD IT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

1. SINCERELY,

END TEXT.
CLARK

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