

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION): 13 MAY 1982

UN

Flag A
(UKMIS NY
telno.731)

(a) Sir A Parsons' negotiations with Secretary General

1. Sir A Parsons spoke as instructed. The Secretary General and his team were stunned. The Secretary General's first reaction was that the Argentines would withdraw from agreement to the 11 May formula on non-prejudgement and that the breakdown of his initiative would be inevitable. After discussion the Secretary General decided not to reveal to the Argentines all that Sir A Parsons had said but he asked Sir A Parsons to report formally to London that in the Secretary General's view his effort might now collapse if we could not moderate our position.

2. There was some discussion of details. Dependencies: The Secretariat do not believe that the Argentines are necessarily thinking of a UN presence there. In the Secretariat's provisional draft Agreement there would be no geographical definition other than the withdrawal box (on which the Secretariat have provided further details). An interim agreement would neither specifically include nor specifically exclude the Dependencies. Freedom of transit residence etc.: The idea of equal representation for Argentine residents is not an Argentine idea, but one which the UN put forward and which the Argentines accepted, without enthusiasm, as a possible compromise. Position after 31 December 1982: The Secretariat have no further thoughts other than the parties would have to trust each other and the Secretary General, who could be asked to report to the Security Council and recommend what should be done if agreement were not in sight by the end of the interim period. Sir A Parsons said we could not accept this.

(b) Secretary General's report on Argentine views

Flag B
UKMIS NY
telno.732

3. The Secretary General reported by telephone to Sir A Parsons on his fairly brief meeting with Ros. Ros, speaking privately, appeals to us to show military restraint while serious negotiations are continuing. The Secretary General suggested to Ros that there should be a moratorium on public statements while negotiations continue. Ros has nothing further to offer on the nature of the interim Administration and has reopened the question of freedom for Argentines to acquire property and their ability to buy shares in the Falkland Islands Company.

(c) Sir A Parsons' assessment

Flag C
UKMIS NY
telno.733

4. Sir A Parsons says that we are now faced with an immediate strategic decision. If we hold to our positions and the Secretary General puts them to the Argentines today, as he will feel bound to do, then Sir A Parsons agrees with the Secretary General's assessment that negotiations will be terminated. Sir A Parsons believes that if we do not moderate our position and the negotiations break down today, leaving a diplomatic vacuum accompanied only by intensifying military activity, we will be cast as the culprits and support for our position, even from allies and partners, will drain away.

5. Sir A Parsons suggests that if we need to buy more time either in the hope of reaching a solution through the present UN process or to avoid an immediate diplomatic vacuum we shall have to make substantial concessions on the nature of the interim administration and on our military withdrawal from South Georgia. Sir A Parsons sets out the minimum concessions he judges necessary to keep the talks alive, details of which are in para. 6 of telegram at Flag C.

US(a) Mr Haig's views on negotiations

Flag D (Washington telno. 1724) 6. Dependencies: We should not give in to Argentine demands. Ambassador Walters will probe the Argentine position on this.

Flag E (Washington telno.1725) Argentine negotiating tactics: The greater the Argentine flexibility on sovereignty the more difficult they will be about the interim authority. Guarantee: There should be no difficulty about supervising troop withdrawal under UN auspices; aircraft could be made available. But if there were no settlement about the future and there were renewed Argentine threats, it would be much easier if the US were involved in the UN regime and this then carried on. Adverse consequences of any British attack on Argentine mainland: While not suggesting we intend to do this Mr Haig nevertheless wishes to tell us that any such action would place Britain in the wrong and would inflame the whole American hemisphere. Negotiating difficulties: If negotiations in New York run into great difficulties on interim arrangements Haig hopes we will not break them off and rush to the Security Council.

Flag F (Washington telno.1731)

(b) Discussion Mr Haig/Secretary General

7. Sir N Henderson reports (Washington telno. 1724 at Flag D) that the Secretary General told Mr Haig that the Argentines had made a considerable concession on sovereignty. The UK should make a comparable concession and the US were best placed to extract this. Sir N Henderson says that Mr Haig fully understands the absurdity of this argument. Sir A Parsons reports that the Secretary General is encouraged by his discussion with Mr Haig which he interpreted as meaning that the US would be helpful on verification.

Flag G (UKMIS NY telno.734)

(c) Ambassador Walters' Mission

Flag H (Washington telno.1727) 8. There are no signs in Buenos Aires that the Argentines believe there has been a break through in negotiations on sovereignty. Sir N Henderson judges that Mr Haig does not expect much from the Walters' mission.

/Comment

Comment

9. Sir A Parsons will need further instructions for his meeting with the UN Secretary General today. His view is that the talks will break down today unless we can modify our position on:


(a) Interim Administration, particularly the role of the Legislative/Executive Councils (para 6(ii) of UKMIS New York telno 733): and any involvement of Argentine residents;

(b) The Dependencies. Demilitarisation (Exclusion from UN Administration: but inclusion in negotiations) (para 6(i) of UKMIS New York telno 733).

10. Other points requiring decisions are:

(a) Withdrawal. The Secretary General is sticking to his 'Box' concept and has defined the coordinates (para 6(B) of UKMIS New York telno 731);

(b) Position after 31 December 1982. Whether we should continue to insist on clear procedures allowing for an extension of UN Administration.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

13 May 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0730 HOURS, 13 MAY 1982

UN

1. Negotiations continued. Sir A Parsons speaking to the press said that it was too soon to predict a successful outcome and that he was in the thick of negotiations.

MILITARY ACTION

2. The MOD announced that two A4 Sky Hawk aircraft of the Argentine air force had been shot down. In a separate incident a Royal Navy Sea King helicopter ditched within the Total Exclusion Zone. Its crew of four were rescued by other helicopters.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

3. The European Parliament debated the Falklands situation for the second time. A resolution was passed which attributed the loss of life in the conflict to the Argentine failure to comply with SCR 502 and invited the Foreign Ministers to renew the Community embargoes on Argentina if no solution was reached by 16 May 1982.

REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

4. The Prisoners of War captured on South Georgia together with the party of civilians left Ascension by plane at 0150 GMT en route to Montevideo. Following an approach from the French Government HMG have agreed to detain one of their number, Lt Commander Astiz for a few days.

ABDUCTION OF TV CREW

5. Three members of a Thames Television crew in Buenos Aires were reported to have been abducted as they left the MFA building. Press agency reports from Argentina say that they were later discovered, naked, some 30 km from the capital. The reports add that the Minister of the Interior deplored the incident and has invited the journalists to dinner to describe their experience.

BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

6. Following a meeting between the Brazilian Foreign Minister and Mr Haig the Americans have told us that the Brazilians are willing to tell the Argentines that they should drop their insistence on including dependencies; interim administration should include some representation of the local community; and the Argentines should be flexible on the distance to which forces of both sides should be withdrawn.

13 May 1982

Emergency Unit