

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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November 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: The Allies and Grenada

Our action in Grenada threatens to have an impact on core alliance interests. As a result, we have pursued a two-pronged strategy designed to (1) consult the allies, and in particular the British, whenever possible in a positive, constructive way on future actions affecting Grenada and (2) minimize fallout from the invasion on our agenda in Europe, and more specifically on INF deployment.

While the allied attitude toward our intervention varies from country to country, there has been widespread criticism of the U.S. failure to consult adequately in advance. We have also been reprimanded for using military force to resolve the problem, although privately officials in several countries have acknowledged the value of the decisive action taken. We have also been vulnerable on the international legal justifications of the invasion. Finally, European leaders, frustrated about their lack of input in our decision, do not feel particularly well disposed toward efforts to dispel popular criticism, and therefore have not been terribly effective domestically in keeping Grenada separate from INF and Lebanon.

In order to present our case directly to skeptical European governments, Secretary Shultz is sending Ken Dam to Europe next week for consultations in key capitals. He will begin in London, and proceed on to Rome, Paris, Bonn, The Hague and Brussels, where he hopes to address the NATO Council. He will be prepared to discuss other issues the allies are concerned about, including Lebanon and INF. Throughout the crisis, we have used our ambassadors to explain our policy, and our posts have been lobbying with appropriate officials in an attempt to forestall U.N. General Assembly action inimical to our interests. We have also been encouraging our allies to get involved, where possible, in the economic and political reconstruction of the island. To the extent that the allies are so involved they will be less likely to criticize us.

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As you know, the most serious repercussions have affected our relationship with the British. Mrs. Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe have been hurt domestically by what appears to many in the U.K. to have been our failure to consult adequately with Her Majesty's government. Although the U.K. abstained in voting for the U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the U.S. action, they remain publicly critical of our decision. The invasion provoked a parliamentary debate over INF on October 31st, and last weekend a poll showed that three-quarters of the British people would not trust the United States to consult before pulling the nuclear trigger on dual-key systems. The Deputy Secretary's trip will, we hope, patch up some of the misunderstandings. In the meantime, we have been talking with the British on a daily basis about our efforts, and hope they will participate actively in our ongoing endeavor to restore democracy to Grenada.

Underlying our effort is our concern that the Grenada experience could, if mismanaged, do considerable damage to our interests in Europe. It has made it more difficult for our staunchest supporters (Thatcher and Kohl) to convince their publics of the reliability of the United States. That said, we believe that with time and an ongoing conscientious effort on our part to share information on our findings and outlook on Grenada, we will be able to limit the spillover onto our objectives in Europe this autumn. (Much will depend on how fast we are able to disengage our forces from Grenada and on whether we leave behind a stable and improved situation.) Similarly, close consultations on Lebanon with our MNF partners and on INF with the deployment countries will also be essential in this regard.

Charles Hall
or Charles Hall
Executive Secretary

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