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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 June 1979

*Sean Ryan*

Emissary from President Kaunda

The Zambian High Commission informed us this afternoon that Professor Goma, Minister of Education, would arrive in London tomorrow, Saturday 2 June, as a personal emissary of President Kaunda to convey a message to the Prime Minister. He will stay in London until Monday evening and I understand that the Prime Minister is prepared to see him at 11.15 on Monday, 4 June.

The Zambian High Commission have no details of the substance of President Kaunda's message, but we can think of no subject of sufficient importance to the Zambians at present to justify the sending of a special emissary, except Rhodesia.

I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister's use. The points to make are based on the assumption that the emissary will bring a message about Rhodesia. However, the "essential facts" include a paragraph about the Zambian decision to prosecute their case against the British oil companies which was announced this week.

I enclose a personality note on Professor Goma and an extract from Lusaka telno 318, giving the Zambian Foreign Minister's views on Rhodesia as expressed to Mr Luce.

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*J S Wall*

J S Wall  
Private Secretary


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POINTS TO MAKE

1. Express appreciation of the fact that Professor Goma has come specially to London to deliver message personally.
2. Will consider message most carefully. Professor Goma will understand if no detailed comments on its substance at this stage.
3. [If the message deals with Rhodesia] Professor Goma will know HMG's policy is to return Rhodesia to legality with widest possible international acceptance.
4. Therefore early consultations with Front Line Presidents - Lord Harlech leaving about 11 June, in Lusaka about mid-June; we will propose specific dates to Zambians very soon. Genuine exchanges on the way forward - not merely presentational exercise.
5. Recognise problems caused for Zambia by Rhodesian conflict - a major aim to bring peace to Rhodesia and surrounding states.
6. [Defensive] We intend to have consultations with the Patriotic Front leaders.
7. Hope that the Zambians will help us in finding a way forward - we need their co-operation.
8. Look forward to constructive discussion on Rhodesia at Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.



## ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Of all the Front Line Presidents, President Kaunda is the most sensitive over Rhodesia. Zambia has borne the brunt of UDI economically; the Zambian and Rhodesian economies were interdependent, and sanctions have hit Zambia severely. The re-opening of Zambia's southern rail route through Rhodesia to South African ports for essential supplies last year has left Zambia a hostage to the Rhodesians. Zambia also acts as "host" to some 15-20,000 ZAPU guerrilla followers of Mr Nkomo, whose presence is unwelcome to many Zambians, not least because of the Rhodesian attacks on ZAPU bases.

2. President Kaunda recognises the urgent need for a Rhodesian settlement. But he has a long-standing personal commitment to Mr Nkomo. There is also a history of animosity between the President and Bishop Muzorewa. With his deeply held principles but emotional temperament, it is difficult for President Kaunda to adopt a pragmatic approach towards the Rhodesian problem and he is clearly suspicious of British intentions.

### Oil supplies to Rhodesia

3. In a speech to the OAU Sanctions Committee on 29 May, President Kaunda announced that he would prosecute vigorously the Zambian Government's legal proceedings against British oil companies for supplying oil to Rhodesia in breach of UN sanctions (commenced in 1977 but not actively pursued recently). He also called upon

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African states to develop a "sanctions bomb" to be used against countries and organisations which had deliberately broken sanctions against Rhodesia.