

GR 1040

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 291515Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 768 OF 29 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WARSAW

POLAND : THE SOVIET ROLE

1. THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE HERE IN MOSCOW IS LIMITED, BUT IT MAY BE HELPFUL IF I BRING TOGETHER SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE PAST AND POSSIBLE FUTURE SOVIET ROLE IN THE POLISH CRISIS.

HOW FAR WERE THEY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW ?

2. TO START WITH THE OBVIOUS, THE POLISH INTERNAL CRISIS IS ESSENTIALLY A REFLECTION OF POLAND'S POSITION WITHIN THE SOVIET EMPIRE, ENCAPSULATED IN THE STATEMENT AT THE WARSAW PACT SUMMIT OF 5 DECEMBER 1980 AND ELSEWHERE, THAT POLAND WAS, IS AND WILL REMAIN A SOCIALIST STATE. THE SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT HAD REACHED A POINT WHICH WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF A SOCIALIST STATE. THE SOVIET UNION'S DETERMINATION TO SEE THE COURSE OF EVENTS REVERSED WAS EXPLICITLY SET OUT IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE POLISH/SOVIET SUMMIT OF 5 MARCH. IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO AVOID COMMITMENT OF ITS OWN FORCES IF AT ALL POSSIBLE BUT BY THE EARLY AUTUMN IT SEEMED THAT THEY WERE DETERMINED UPON A CONFRONTATION WITH SOLIDARITY. FROM THEN ON, IT WAS FOR THE POLES TO TAKE ACTION. IF KANIA WOULD NOT, JARUZELSKI HAD TO. THERE REMAINED THE DETERMINATION OF TIMING AND METHOD. ON THE LATTER IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT THERE WAS CLOSE COLLABORATION BETWEEN A SMALL GROUP IN THE SOVIET AND POLISH MILITARY AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE SPEAKS OF INCREASING EVIDENCE OF DIRECT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT OF THIS CHARACTER, IN PARTICULAR USE OF SOVIET WARSAW PACT COMMUNICATIONS IN ORDER TO ENSURE SURPRISE. I DO NOT HAVE DETAILS HERE, BUT PERHPAS THEY ARE AVAILABLE TO YOU FROM OTHER SOURCES. IN ANY CASE, THE REPORT SOUNDS INHERENTLY CREDIBLE. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS WERE PRESSING FOR THE ACTION TO BE TAKEN AND HELPING WHEN IT WAS, THE TIMING SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DICTATED BY THE EVENTS IN GDANSK AND RADOM AND TO HAVE BEEN OF JARUZELSKI'S CHOOSING. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN CONSULTATIONS IN GENERAL TERMS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND OTHER WARSAW PACT MEMBERS AT THE MEETINGS OF WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BUCHAREST (1-2 DECEMBER), AND WARSAW PACT DEFENCE MINISTERS IN MOSCOW, (1-4 DECEMBER) BUT I DOUBT WHETHER THEY WERE CRUCIAL. THE ACTUAL DECISION PROBABLY CAME LATER. THE KEY SOVIET-POLISH CONSULTATION PROBABLY TOOK PLACE DURING KULIKOV'S VISIT TO WARSAW AND NO DOUBT THERE WERE OTHER LESS VISIBLE VISITORS. THE TASS ACCUSATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 11,

CONFIDENTIAL

(11, 12 AND 13 DECEMBER - MY TEL NO 737), WERE, IN RETROSPECT, PROBABLY THE FIRST REFLECTION OF THE DECISION TO ACT, WITH THE REPORTS OF THE PREVIOUS FEW DAYS FALLING INTO PLACE IN THE PREPARATORY STAGE. BUT WHEREAS THE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET POLICY AND SOVIET PRESSURE IS CLEAR AND PUBLIC, THE FINAL STAGES ARE A MATTER OF INFERENCE.

HOW WILL SOVIET POLICY DEVELOP ?

3. BREZHNEV'S REPLY TO REAGAN MAY GIVE US SOME CLUES, BUT FOR THE PRESENT THE TASS STATEMENT OF 14 DECEMBER (MY TEL NO 741) IS THE ONE FORMAL SOVIET POLICY STATEMENT. IT MUST BE READ AS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY ACTION, AS COMMITTING THE SOVIET UNION TO ITS SUCCESS AND AS A THREAT OF DIRECT INTERVENTION IF THE POLES FAIL TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION WITH THEIR OWN FORCES. THERE IS A DEGREE OF COMMITMENT TO JARUZELSKI, IF ONLY BECAUSE OF THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION, BUT LITTLE SIGN OF FAITH IN THE POLISH PARTY AS AT PRESENT CONSTITUTED. CURRENT PUBLIC TREATMENT IS DESIGNED TO PRESENT THE SITUATION AS RETURNING GRADUALLY TO NORMAL : TO DEVELOP AND EMBELLISH ACCUSATIONS OF WESTERN AND SPECIFICALLY AMERICAN INSTIGATION OF THE WHOLE COURSE OF EVENTS AS AN ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE "SOCIALIST" POSITION OF POLAND; AND TO SHOW THE SOVIET UNION AS A FRIEND OF POLAND NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED, BUT READY TO "ASSIST" IF NECESSARY. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE HERE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE CURRENTLY DIRECTING THE ACTION OF THE POLISH ARMY AND MILITIA, BUT WE MAY ASSUME THAT THEY WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE SUCCESS, SINCE OTHERWISE THEY WILL BE FACED WITH THE ULTIMATE CRISIS REQUIRING DIRECT INTERVENTION. JARUZELSKI WILL FIND THAT, HAVING TAKEN ACTION, HE WILL BE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO IMPLEMENT IT IN WAYS ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PROVISION OF SOVIET ECONOMIC AID IS LIKELY TO BE MADE DEPENDENT UPON THIS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE TOO HOLDS IMPORTANT CARDS SO LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION HAS TO ACT THROUGH HIM. HAVING NOW SEEN THE "REVERSAL OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS" WHICH IT WAS SEEKING, THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE THREE OBJECTIVES :

(A) TO ENSURE THAT THE ACTION AGAINST SOLIDARITY IS PURSUED TO THE POINT AT WHICH IT CAN NEVER AGAIN PRESENT A POLITICAL THREAT;

(B) TO SEE THE POLISH PARTY RECREATED UNDER A POLITBURO WHICH CAN BE RELIED ON TO PURSUE ORTHODOX SOVIET-ALIGNED POLICIES;

(C) TO MAKE THE POLISH ECONOMY FUNCTION.

2
CONFIDENTIAL

/ 4

CONFIDENTIAL

4. THE FACT THAT ACTION WAS TAKEN BY JARUZELSKI AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT COMMIT ITS OWN FORCES DOES NOT LESSEN THE SOVIET UNION'S ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INSISTING UPON SEEING ITS VERSION OF "SOCIALISM" STAMPED ON POLAND AND I HOPE WE SHALL HOLD THEM PUBLICLY ACCOUNTABLE. WE CAN, HOWEVER, RECKON IT AS SOMETHING OF A GAIN, REFLECTING PERHAPS IN PART THE RESPONSE TO AFGHANISTAN, THAT THEY HESITATED SO LONG AND THEN CHOSE THIS COURSE. IT MUST BE HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THEIR THREE OBJECTIVES (OF WHICH THE FIRST TWO ARE PROBABLY IRRECONCILABLE WITH THE THIRD) CAN BE ATTAINED. IF JARUZELSKI WERE TO LOSE CONTROL THEY MIGHT WELL INTERVENE, BUT IF THEY ARE FACED WITH A LONG, MESSY STRUGGLE, THEY MAY ONCE AGAIN HESITATE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF, AS EAGLEBURGER HAS SUGGESTED, THE RECENT EVENTS ARE TO BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE (AND THAT IS CERTAINLY THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WILL SEE THEM) THERE IS STILL QUITE A LOT TO PLAY FOR.

5. I HAVE REPEATED THIS TELEGRAM ONLY TO WARSAW. WOULD FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER IF DESIRED.

KEEBLE

POLAND SPECIAL
STANDARD

EESD
CSCE UNIT
NAD
SED
WED
ECD (E)
ESID
FED
SAD
CAD

TRED
ERD
SEC D
OLA
CONS D
CONS EM UNIT
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
POLAND SPECIAL

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

3

CONFIDENTIAL