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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1990

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: James A. Baker, III *JAB*
SUBJECT: London Meetings

On Friday afternoon, I spent an hour alone with Douglas Hurd, then 90 minutes with Mrs. Thatcher and him. The British are strongly supportive of your troop augmentation decision, though they were clearly sobered by the details I gave them on overall forces and estimated casualties, and duration. Also, we have some remaining issues to work out with them.

UN Security Council Resolution: Mrs. Thatcher remains very skeptical about a UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force. Her principal concerns are two: (1) we would, by setting a future date, make more likely an Iraqi chemical attack near that date; and (2) it would be difficult to avoid amendments by the NAM and others that would restrict operational freedom.

She was somewhat mollified when I told her that we were seeking a very brief resolution simply authorizing "all necessary means" to implement the earlier resolutions. She also took on board my comments about US domestic political realities, especially in the wake of the very downbeat session Douglas Hurd had this week with Lloyd Bentsen, Jack Danforth, and other senators.

At the end, she said we should start working on a draft. She also agreed we would tell the press that, while Article 51 provides adequate legal authority, we want to "maintain the international coalition" as we go forward. In short, though she disagrees, I think she will go along, but you may have to seal the deal with her. Her advisors seem to all favor trying to obtain the specific UN authority.

Operational Issues: Mrs. Thatcher has no difficulty whatever with (1) current, satisfactory command and control arrangements; (2) staying with us in case of an Iraqi attack on Israel; and (3) air and ground operations against both Kuwait and Iraq. She hesitated, however (and Hurd winced visibly), when I asked for

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additional British support: (1) a full armored division (requiring two additional British brigades); (2) transportation assets, especially tank transporters; and (3) more minesweepers and surface combatants. On troops, she noted that significant lift would be required, and that the deployment would leave Germany "denuded" because few or none of the deploying troops would return to Germany. She concluded by saying Defense Minister Tom King was leaving for the Gulf this weekend, and she would be back to us after checking with him.

Embassy Kuwait: They see January 1 as the final date for their two diplomats in Kuwait City, and Mrs. Thatcher asked if we had thought of reducing our number of diplomats so we could conserve supplies to keep a presence until then (we estimate early December for our people). She also asked that we stay closely in touch with them on evacuation of dependents from Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states, and on any other precautionary steps we might consider.

Saudi Arabia: It was brought to my attention today that my November 6 memorandum to you had a mistaken word in the paragraph describing our command and combat agreement with the Saudis. The paragraph, a copy of which I gave both Saud and Bandar in Jeddah (and to which they agreed), reads:

"Should military operations commence, a joint command as currently exists will continue; However, the commander of US forces will have final approval authority for planning and conducting all military operations."

My earlier memorandum had mistakenly used the word "coordinating" rather than "conducting." I have informed General Graves, Colin's representative traveling with me, of this correction.