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FM WASHINGTON 190100Z APR 80
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 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1536 OF 19 APRIL 1980
 INFO PARIS AND BONN.

IRAN/AFGHANISTAN/USA

1. WHEN I SAW BRZEZINSKI TODAY HE EXPRESSED MORE CONCERN ABOUT AFGHANISTAN THAN IRAN. AFGHANISTAN WAS SHOWING UP THE PROBLEM OF RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND REVEALING MORE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THAN DID IRAN.
2. ON IRAN, HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR THE COMMUNITY COUNTRIES TO CONSULT TOGETHER. IT WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF THEY COULD ACT MORE OR LESS ON THE SAME LINES THAN IF ONE OR TWO OF THE COUNTRIES ADOPTED FAR-REACHING MEASURES BUT THEREBY GOT OUT OF LINE WITH THE REST.
3. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT SOME OF THE SPECULATION IN WASHINGTON ABOUT THE DISCORD WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON IRAN WAS EXAGGERATED: IT WAS ALSO COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. NOT ONLY DID IT HEAVEN THE OTHER SIDE BUT IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS TO BE SOME CRITICISM OF THE ALLIED BY THE US AUTHORITIES JUST PRIOR TO THE MEETING OF COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THE 21ST THAT COULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO ACT RESOLUTELY BECAUSE THEY THEN COULD LAY THEMSELVES OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF YIELDING TO AMERICAN PRESSURE. BRZEZINSKI SAID HE ACCEPTED THIS ENTIRELY BUT ADDED THAT I MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WERE POLITICAL REASONS IN THE USA FOR URGING THE ALLIES TO DO MORE. IN QUOTING THIS I DO NOT WISH TO GIVE YOU THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AMERICANS ARE CYNICAL ABOUT IT AND SEE ALLIED SUPPORT PURELY IN TERMS OF US DOMESTIC POLITICS. I AM QUITE SURE THAT FOR MANY REASONS THEY WANT ALLIED SOLIDARITY. MOREOVER, THOUGH BRZEZINSKI MAY SEE THE HOSTAGE PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE, US PUBLIC OPINION IS THOROUGHLY STEAMED UP: AND THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S ABILITY TO CONTROL IT. I AM ALSO PRETTY SURE THAT IF ALLIED AND US PRESSURE DO NOT SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES THE US WILL RESORT TO FURTHER STEPS WHICH WILL LEAD TO THE CUTTING OFF OF WESTERN EUROPEAN TRADE WITH IRAN. DOES THIS SUGGEST THAT IF WE ARE GOING TO HAVE THIS TRADE CUT-OFF ANYWAY, WE MIGHT AS WELL TAKE THE CREDIT FOR IT AND DO IT OURSELVES AS AN ACT OF ALLIED SOLIDARITY?
4. ON AFGHANISTAN, BRZEZINSKI THOUGHT THAT THE TALK OF CONFLICT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WAS NOT EXAGGERATED. THERE REALLY WERE QUITE DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT AND OF HOW TO MEET THE THREAT AS BETWEEN THE USA ON THE ONE HAND AND EUROPE ON THE OTHER. I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK THAT THE PRIME MINISTER OR YOU COULD BE ACCUSED OF A DIFFERENT PERCEPTION THAN THAT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF WHAT WAS INVOLVED.

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5. BRZEZINSKI ASKED ABOUT THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND I TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO REACH FINAL CONCLUSIONS TO FAR AS THE BRITISH TEAMS WERE CONCERNED. BUT THE BRITISH OLYMPIC COMMITTEE WERE NOT ACTUATED BY POLITICS, LET ALONE BY ANTI-AMERICANISM: IT WAS SIMPLY THAT THEY HAD A NAIVE BELIEF THAT THE OLYMPIC GAMES COULD BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM POLITICS.

6. I ASKED BRZEZINSKI WHETHER PRESIDENT CARTER WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S REACTION. HE LEFT ME IN NO DOUBT THAT HE WAS. SCHMIDT HAD SPOKEN HERE ON USUAL LINES ABOUT HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GERMANS IN THE EAST AND FOR MAINTAINING THE LINKS INVOLVED IN DETENTE. OBVIOUSLY SCHMIDT'S TNF STATEMENT HAS CAUSED ANNOYANCE.

7. STRAUSS HAS BEEN IN WASHINGTON FAIRLY RECENTLY AND I THINK THAT HE HAS MADE A CONSIDERABLE IMPACT ON THE AUTHORITIES HERE.

8. AFTER BRZEZINSKI HAD SPOKEN AGAIN ABOUT HIS CONCERN OVER THE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THE POST-AFGHANISTAN SITUATION, I SUGGESTED THAT AS A FIRST STEP IT WOULD HELP TO TRY TO GET CLOSER AGREEMENT ON WHAT WE THOUGHT SOVIET INTENTIONS WERE AND WHAT THEIR MILITARY POSSIBILITIES COULD BE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. BRZEZINSKI COMMENTED THAT EACH COUNTRY'S ANALYSIS WOULD REFLECT WHAT THEY WANTED THE SITUATION TO BE RATHER THAN WHAT IT REALLY WAS.

9. I ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT US POLICY ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION HAD THE EFFECT OF HAM-STRINGING THE UNITED STATES THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, AT ANY RATE SO OTHERS SAW IT. PREDICTABLY, BRZEZINSKI AGREED ENTIRELY.

10. AS YOU WILL SEE, THERE IS AN UNTIDY BUT HIGHLY IMPORTANT MESS FOR YOU TO TALK ABOUT WHEN YOU COME HERE: AND THE AMERICANS, AS I HAVE OFTEN INDICATED, ARE LONGING FOR IDEAS FROM US. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF TELLING BRZEZINSKI ABOUT YOUR POSSIBLE DATES.
HENDERSON

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