

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON**SECRET**

November 14, 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM : Edmund S. Muskie *ESM*

1. Korea: I can reconfirm our judgment that the Kim Dae Jung case will not reach President Chun until December, probably mid-month. Ambassador Gleysteen has been in touch with the military core group and senior civilian leadership quietly but firmly to convey our concern. The Chairman of the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lew, will be here all next week as David Jones' guest, and the Secretary-General to President Chun will also be in town. Each will have a wide range of appointments on the Hill and in the Government and will return with a sense of the continuing importance of the Kim issue. Ambassador Gleysteen will also return on consultation at the end of the month in order to return to Seoul with fresh instructions from you as the decision point approaches. We are also in close touch with the Japanese, who believe it is important that we continue to exert our influence in a manner which does not arouse the backlash of nationalistic reaction in Korea. We do not believe Chun has made a final decision.

Richard Allen called me late this afternoon and said Howard Baker had spoken with him about Kim. Allen said the Reagan group sent a message yesterday to the Korean Government, through the Korean Embassy here, warning of substantial harm to US-Korean relations if the Korean leadership read the American election results as implying a change in the US position on Kim. I told Allen we appreciate their help. (S)

2. Quad Talks in Paris: George Vest reports that yesterday's Quad talks with the French, British, and German

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Political Directors were candid and productive. All three knew of my letter to their Foreign Ministers on Poland. They believe Poland is not in imminent danger, but requires constant monitoring and periodic approaches to the Soviets. Both Thatcher and Carrington spoke out publicly this week on the need for the Soviets to let Poland work out its own problems. Francois-Poncet has taken a similar position and will reinforce it more strongly.

All were pessimistic about Poland's economy but felt it important to help the Poles for political reasons. They are planning to discuss aid at the November 18 meeting of Western Treasury and Foreign Ministry representatives. Their willingness to help Poland economically will be greater if the US makes a decision on what more it can do by then. (You have my memo on CCC credits.)

The French strongly supported advance contingency planning on the Allied response if the Soviets intervene. The French representative said flatly there would be no new credits for the USSR in such a situation. Both the French and German representatives said their Governments would also examine in detail ways of abrogating economic agreements with the Soviet Union. All three agreed on the need for more thoughtful and intensive examination of our objectives in such a contingency. (S)

3. CSCE: The Conference reached agreement today on procedures to govern the main meeting. Griffin Bell and Max Kampelman are satisfied the compromise agreement, proposed by a number of neutral and non-aligned states, meets all of our main concerns. They consider the outcome a success for the West. Agreed procedures provide for implementation review until the Christmas break, with a final week before Christmas for a mixture of implementation review and new proposals. This should be sufficient time for the thorough implementation review we want. The period after Christmas will be given over to new proposals, but we would not be prohibited from bringing up human rights cases if events warranted. Next week will be devoted to closed plenary sessions; thereafter, working groups will meet on implementation review. The Soviet speech today was relatively low key. (C)

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4. GAC Meeting: I met this morning with the General Advisory Committee. They have been contemplating submitting a report. I encouraged them to prepare an objective analysis of the issues at stake as we move through the transition, with the uncertainty it brings to the SALT process. (C)

5. Expulsion of Libyan Students: Ali El-Houderi, head of the Libyan People's Bureau, returned from Tripoli with guidance from Libyan authorities in response to our recent representations requesting that certain student leaders as well as one activist member of the People's Committee leave the country. El-Houderi came in today and made the following points:

-- Libyan authorities have a great desire to see relations with the United States improved and hope a new page can be turned.

-- The Committee has already communicated the request for voluntary departure to the students involved. Some students have already departed. Others will be leaving at the end of the fall semester. Some, however, wish to remain and the People's Bureau claims it has no legal means of compelling their departure.

-- The People's Committee member has resigned. He will leave when he completes his degree work in December.

This is progress, but we will assess whether it effectively reduces the possibility of renewed violence against Libyans living here or whether we should take stronger measures. (C)

6. Nicaragua: I will be sending you in the morning the revised draft cables on Nicaragua as well as a memo outlining my views on this issue. (C)

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