

*Ans*



*Dani Antish*

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Mr Miers (Middle East Department)

*Lord Carrington gave you  
the gist of this when  
you spoke with him.*

Iran

*R*

Mr Vance telephoned the Secretary of State this afternoon, following the telephone conversation between President Carter and the Prime Minister. Mr Vance said that it appeared that there were four outstanding points over the formulation of UN sanctions on Iran on which there were still difficulties between the British and American Governments. He asked how they might best be resolved. He himself was going to New York that evening.

*28/12*

Lord Carrington explained that in one or two areas the language proposed by the United States posed great difficulties for Britain, particularly over the issues of extra-territorial legislation and shipping. These were genuine problems of substance not mere drafting points. He would ensure that Sir A Parsons in New York was fully briefed to explain the problems involved and to suggest alternative formulations to cover them. If necessary an expert from Washington or from London would go to New York as well for the purpose. He asked about the timetable now envisaged by the Americans.

Mr Vance explained that the meeting of the National Security Council that afternoon had decided on a two step approach. The Americans would be seeking a Security Council Resolution on 31 December, but not involving the full text of the draft resolution which they had already shown to us. Instead, the resolution would simply:

1. deplore the failure of the Iranians to comply with the judgement of the International Court of Justice;
2. request once again the release of the hostages;
3. reaffirm the good offices of the Secretary General of the United Nations;
4. request the Secretary General to proceed to Tehran to seek to bring about the release of the hostages by a fixed date;
5. if there had been no compliance by the Iranians by that date, the Security Council will take effective measures under Articles 39 and 41.

The resolution would not however specify what the measures would be.

Lord Carrington asked what time-scale for compliance the Americans had in mind. Mr Vance replied that the stipulated interval would be one week. Mr McHenry had returned to New York immediately after the National Security Council meeting to sound out Dr Waldheim's willingness to go to Iran. It seemed likely that he would be prepared to go, though it was by no means certain that the Iranians would be willing to receive him.

Lord Carrington asked whether the Americans had definitely rejected any use of two of the sanctions most likely to have an effect on the Iranians, namely oil and food. Mr Vance confirmed that this was so for the moment. Lord Carrington expressed some surprise at this: the things that the Americans were asking for did not seem likely to hurt the Iranians very much. Mr Vance denied this: the Iranians were already suffering shortages, of up to 75%, in some of their industries and the measures proposed would accentuate this.

*What industries?*

Afghanistan

Lord Carrington confirmed that a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Brezhnev was in preparation and that this would issue as soon as President Carter's message had been sent. Sir A Parsons was also being instructed to concert with his Western colleagues action in the Security Council. Mr Vance said that President Carter's message would be delivered later that evening.

*Paul Lever*

28 December 1979

(P Lever)

cc: PS/LPS  
PS/Mr Hurd  
Sir D Maitland  
Lord Bridges  
Mr Bullard  
Head of FRD  
Head of UND  
Head of SAD  
T Lankester, No 10 ✓

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