

NOTE OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE DOWNING STREET SUMMIT CONFERENCE
AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON SATURDAY 7 MAY 1977 AT 1525

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

United Kingdom (Chairman)

Prime Minister
 Chancellor of the Exchequer
 Foreign and Commonwealth
 Secretary

Canada

The Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott
 Trudeau, PC, MP.
 Prime Minister
 The Hon. Donald S. Macdonald PC, MP.
 Minister of Finance
 The Hon. Donald C. Jamieson PC, MP.
 Secretary of State for External
 Affairs

France

Monsieur Valery Giscard d'Estaing
 President of the French Republic
 Monsieur Raymond Barre
 Prime Minister and Minister
 for the Economy and Finance
 H.E. Monsieur Louis de Guiringaud
 Minister of Foreign Affairs

Germany

H.E. Herr Helmut Schmidt
 Federal Chancellor
 H.E. Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher
 Minister of Foreign Affairs
 H.E. Dr. Hans Apel
 Minister of Finance

Italy

H.E. On. Giulio Andreotti
 Prime Minister
 H.E. On. Arnaldo Forlani
 Minister of Foreign Affairs
 H.E. Senator Gaetano Stamatì
 Minister for the Treasury

Japan

H.E. Mr. Tadeo Fukuda
 Prime Minister
 H.E. Mr. Ichiro Hatoyama
 Minister of Foreign Affairs
 H.E. Mr. Hideo Bo
 Minister for Finance

United States of America

Mr. Jimmy Carter
 President of the United States
 The Hon. Cyrus R. Vance
 Secretary of State
 The Hon. Michael Blumenthal
 Secretary of the Treasury

Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation

The afternoon session opened at 1525 hours.

The Prime Minister said that it was agreed that the Conference should discuss non-proliferation in this afternoon session. He then invited President Carter to open the discussion. Everyone present was very interested in his far-reaching programme announced on 20 April.

President Carter said that there was real evidence of public displeasure in the United States of America about nuclear energy development. Last year 22 States had put an option on their ballot papers to prohibit the construction of nuclear plants. Nevertheless, from his own background in nuclear power he felt that the world would depend more and more on nuclear power. It would be hard for the United States to continue with their policy of exporting uranium unless the growing public disquiet was dispelled. Canada's unfortunate experience with India had particularly shocked public opinion. There were no automatic answers to the problem, but it was clear that solutions must be on an international basis. The supplying countries' friendship with consumer countries would be endangered if they were forced to react unilaterally.

When he became President he had been faced with his predecessor's moratorium on exports, but last week he had decided to release further supplies. His general aim was to lay down strict prohibitions to prevent the manufacture of nuclear explosive material but to allow the development of nuclear power. The frictions which had developed between friendly countries would get worse if solutions were not found.

In order to try to make progress in this direction the United States Government had decided to expand their enriched uranium production capability, improve accountability for waste

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products and to supply fuel for all countries complying with a programme of safeguards. They believed it necessary to assess the future of the plutonium economy and of the fast breeder reactor in particular - in his view breeder technology was still some 20-25 years off. The United States had already built, at great cost, two reprocessing plants which had not worked. They had decided to cease building further plants, but had not placed constraints preventing other countries building their own.

President Carter then said that he could see the reluctance of the participants at the Conference to depend on the United States for their nuclear fuel. But they should understand his difficulty of persuading the United States' Congress and people to ship nuclear supplies without proper safeguards. He therefore wanted to suggest that the seven countries present should set up a group of technicians to produce, within two months, a study of these matters. The study, which should be concerned with the complete nuclear fuel cycle, should include an assessment of uranium reserves and of the intention of nuclear suppliers to increase their nuclear enrichment facilities. It should define possible constraints to be placed on consumer countries before they were given supplies, look at the breeder programme and consider facilities for disposal. Other countries, such as Brazil, could be associated with the studies at a later stage.

Concluding his opening remarks, President Carter said that progress was urgent since the United States Government, and other governments, were having to take decisions on a day to day basis without an adequate framework.

The Prime Minister then asked President Carter whether his proposal for a preliminary study was distinct from the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Programme (INFCEP) referred to in his 20 April statement. President Carter indicated, in reply that the preliminary study, which would continue for two months, was distinct.

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/Mr. Trudeau

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Mr. Trudeau, after agreeing with President Carter's proposal, argued that it was based on major unstated premises. They were first that there was a great danger of nuclear proliferation and second that Governments could, and should, do something about it. He doubted whether everyone at the conference shared those premises. Some might believe that nothing could be done to stop countries having the bomb.

President Carter said that the CIA had done a sobering study on the prospective technical capability of various countries to manufacture nuclear devices. It suggested that 12-15 countries might have that capability and some might already be able to explode a nuclear device without being provided with any more fuel. Relevant countries included South Africa, Korea, India, Taiwan and Brazil. Perhaps the world had not sufficiently deplored India's nuclear test with the result that the Indian Government had become instant heroes. Perhaps the response should have been to deprive India of further nuclear supplies.

After President Giscard had declined the Prime Minister's offer of the floor, Chancellor Schmidt said that the Federal Republic subscribed to Mr. Trudeau's two premises. Nevertheless, the consequences of a programme to stop nuclear proliferation needed to be faced. The programme would need to embrace a great many states, which he categorised in four ways; the nuclear weapon states, the non-weapon states, the partners of the nuclear weapon states and the partners of the non-weapon states. In addition, if arrangements additional to the existing Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) were agreed, and these arrangements did not include from the beginning all important groups, the countries not covered would need to be watched very carefully.

/ Chancellor Schmidt

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Chancellor Schmidt then recalled that the Federal Republic had signed the Brussels Treaty long before the NPT. He had pressed for the NPT's ratification in the German Parliament, when it had run into difficulties. He believed that the peaceful use of atomic energy was a vital means of safeguarding the world energy supplies and of maintaining technological progress. Not all those present at the conference had signed the NPT, which created a legal basis for preventing proliferation. It would be important that the arrangements in the NPT ran parallel with any new arrangements for safeguards involving the provision of nuclear supplies.

He agreed with the study sketched out by President Carter, but it would not prove successful if it did not take account of the interests of other countries vitally concerned. Indeed, unless properly handled it might provoke them to take retaliatory action. He therefore suggested that it should include some of those countries who would be using uranium by 1985 or so.

Mr. Trudeau then asked Chancellor Schmidt how such countries would react and where they would get their uranium from. In reply Chancellor Schmidt said that it was easy nowadays to make a nuclear bomb in a back garden. It needed to be borne in mind that there was a great deal of uranium still to be discovered; indeed there were uranium supplies in Germany though they were costly to recover. Technological knowledge was also spreading, Mr. Trudeau then asked the Chancellor, whether he was not really saying that nothing could be done to prevent nuclear proliferation. Chancellor Schmidt replied most emphatically ("no, no, no") that he did not accept this, but if certain countries were excluded from the beginning from the consideration of these important issues, there would be difficulties. He was willing to participate in the study provided existing initiatives, including the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Club, were not prejudiced. His concluding point was that the more "have not" or "must not" countries there were, the greater the feeling of discrimination and the less the chance of successful cooperation.

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Mr. Jamieson then asked Chancellor Schmidt what he meant by discrimination. Chancellor Schmidt replied that he was trying to give a sociological or psychological reaction of the some 140 countries involved. The Conference participants might understand their motives better if they had in mind Yugoslavia, not Brazil. Unless countries such as Yugoslavia were taken into the discussion room on these matters, there would be no cooperation.

Mr. Jamieson said that it was a question of national pride with the Yugoslavs. Chancellor Schmidt said that it had to be recognised that national pride was an important fact of international life, and he stressed that additional uranium would be found in the years ahead, just as additional oil supplies, e.g., in the North Sea and Alaska, had been found recently. Mr. Vance asked whether the Chancellor had it in mind to invite to join the study only the threshold countries or all those with nuclear reactors. Chancellor Schmidt replied that he could not answer this question, but added that such countries should have a presence.

Signor Andreotti said that he wanted to make two points. First, he was convinced that the task of securing non-proliferation was more urgent today than at the signing of the NPT. Article 4 of that Treaty had given an assurance of access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses. He was quite content for there to be a two months' study to consider these problems, but he wanted to emphasise that Article 4 should be retained in its entirety. Indeed, the Conference should restate the substantial importance of that Article and the continuation of the provision of enriched uranium for scientific research and normal industrial development.

Second, he had read in the last few days of discoveries by French scientists of methods of developing plutonium cycles and breeder reactors without running the risk of material produced being put to a military use. He asked President Giscard to provide some information on this development.

President Giscard, after recognising the dangers of nuclear proliferation, declared his Government ready to share in the responsibility of preventing it. He therefore shared the

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views of President Carter and Mr. Trudeau, though he acknowledged that for a number of reasons the French Government had not signed the NPT. Nevertheless, the French approach departed in some respects from the American approach because France believed that electricity from nuclear sources would be essential in the future, in particular in view of the coming oil shortage. This was why countries which agreed not to seek nuclear military technology should have a right to nuclear energy.

While he acknowledged that nuclear enrichment was a possible factor for proliferation, the construction of reprocessing plants was very expensive, and in his view there was little danger of medium-sized countries building them. His Government also did not think that it was realistic to expect countries which were of medium size geographically to be able to store non-processed nuclear waste. Nuclear waste material should therefore be destroyed. The difficulty was that plutonium was the by-product of this process.

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Turning to the question of breeder reactors, President Giscard said that he believed that there would be a shortage of natural uranium by 1985-1990 and France would be knocking at the door of the monopoly uranium producers. This was relevant to the development of breeder technology since a breeder reactor enabled uranium to be used fifty times more efficiently than a normal reactor. It appeared that breeder reactors were no more dangerous in their operation than existing reactors, but the risk was in the plutonium which they produced, which could be subverted to military use. However, his technical advice was that two thousand people working in secrecy for eighteen months would be necessary to manufacture a nuclear bomb using plutonium. It was difficult to imagine terrorists having the facilities for this, though the risk did exist.

Against this background he welcomed the United States' proposals. He could not accept, as Chancellor Schmidt had seemed to suggest, that it was up to each country to decide whether to make available nuclear technology to other countries. The French Government's decision not to go ahead with a contract to supply nuclear plant to South Korea demonstrated that. They had taken this decision because it had been made clear to them that, despite the South Koreans' public statements, their purpose was to manufacture an atomic bomb. It also needed to be borne in mind both that only a few countries needed reprocessing facilities (such as the Federal Republic, Japan and the EURODIF countries), and only those countries which were embarking upon breeder technology needed plutonium (such as France, the Federal Republic and the USSR). The aim should therefore

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be to seek to prevent the transfer of technology which was not necessary for the production of nuclear energy.

French scientists were developing techniques which would help to prevent proliferation. In essence, these techniques enriched fuel to a level which was insufficient for military purposes. If that critical level was reached, a chemical process took over, like a slow atomic explosion, which made the material unusable for military purposes for at least 25 years.

President Giscard then said that he could imagine a form of service contract where the reprocessing countries reprocessed other countries' waste, the plutonium was retained by an international agency and the rest of the waste was sent back to the customer country. The technology involved needed further investigation, as did the contractual forms which would keep risks to a minimum. Concluding his opening remarks, President Giscard said that he could therefore accept the Americans' conclusion, though his analysis was rather different.

Chancellor Schmidt, replying to President Giscard's earlier comment, said that the President had misunderstood him. He did not believe that any country should be left to do what it wanted in this field, but no country should be discriminated against.

Mr. Fukuda said that he appreciated and agreed with the import of President Carter's comments, but the conference participants should remember that Japan was the first country to be baptised by a nuclear holocaust. This historic fact has led his country to three principles. They should not manufacture nuclear weapons, nor allow them to be brought into Japan, nor own any nuclear weapons. There was therefore no likelihood of Japan developing any dangerous nuclear technology.

/Mr. Fukuda

Mr. Fukuda then recalled that the morning discussion had dealt with the structural causes of world recession, one of which could be the shortage of energy. There was a real risk of a grave shortage of energy emerging at the beginning of the 21st century before fusion technology was developed. Unless the energy gap was bridged, the world economy would lack confidence. The development of nuclear energy in the interim was the answer. In the last few years Japan had spent some \$1 billion in an experimental reprocessing plant, based on US advice, which was expected to be operative this autumn.

He agreed that Article 4 of the NPT embodied an important principle, which could not be ignored. It would be welcome if all countries could agree to President Carter's propositions, but he believed this unlikely, e.g. in the case of the USSR, China and India. Indeed, it was difficult to expect poorer countries to accept the President's propositions, and this made it particularly necessary to bear Article 4 in mind. He certainly agreed that professional experts should explore the questions of global surveillance and control of plutonium.

President Carter said, at this point, that President Giscard had misunderstood his earlier statement about the importance of nuclear energy. The present United States Administration certainly agreed that the development of nuclear energy was vital for the future and it wanted to see it expanded in the civilised world. Indeed, this had been demonstrated by the fact that the US had exported nuclear fuel, on a no profit basis. Nevertheless, unless it was possible to convince the American people that there was proper international supervision, there could be no progress in nuclear energy matters. The sale of reprocessing plant to countries, which were not signatories of the NPT, was most worrying.

Nor could he agree with President Giscard's assertion that a lot of space was necessary to store spent nuclear fuel. One square mile would be sufficient if the people concerned agreed to it.

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Study was therefore needed not just to find the technical answers to storage questions, but to discover means of allaying people's concern. He did not believe that it would ever be possible for the US Government to store nuclear waste material from other countries. Nor did he agree with President Giscard's statement that uranium supplies would run out in about ten years' time. There was at least 25-35 years' supply available, and when that period was over, breeder reactor technology could perhaps be introduced. But the important point for the present was to find assurances to satisfy the people of his country. This was demonstrated by the fact that hundreds of demonstrators were now in gaol in the USA because of their protests against the light water reactor.

Mr. Trudeau observed that President Giscard and President Carter came to the same conclusion, despite disagreement on the facts. The only difficulty with Chancellor Schmidt's approach was that he wanted to ensure that a larger number of people were party to the bargain. He then asked President Giscard whether he was seeking full fuel cycle safeguards.

In reply, President Giscard said that he believed that reprocessing was a technical necessity and work had to be carried forward on breeder reactors, particularly as Europe's uranium resources were limited. This was what led him to believe that work needed to be done on the breeder reactor. Without its efficient use of uranium, France would have to import 50 times more uranium from such countries as the USA, Canada and Niger with all the difficulties involved. He believed that it was necessary to seek all legal and physical safeguards on the fuel cycle. This approach went beyond that in the NPT.

/Mr. Trudeau

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Mr. Trudeau then said it appeared that President Giscard agreed with President Carter about the need for safeguards on plutonium in order to stop the production of explosive devices. In his view the question of reprocessing was secondary to that. President Giscard said that he would not subscribe to sweeping statements of principle against reprocessing. In reply to a question from Mr. Trudeau, President Giscard said that he would not say that countries like Japan could reprocess without safeguards. He would want to insist to such countries that the plutonium was returned.

Chancellor Schmidt, referring to President Carter's statement that nuclear storage needed only 1 square mile, asked President Carter to confirm that he had said that the USA would not be willing to accept other countries' waste. President Carter, said, in reply, that it would be a mistake for other countries to assume that the USA and Canada would store other countries' waste products simply because they were large countries. It was difficult to get the State Governments in his country to accept transfer of nuclear waste across State borders. Vermont had imposed an absolute ban on nuclear production. Chancellor Schmidt said that President Carter's statement had important political implications for Germany because demonstrators in Germany were saying that they would only accept nuclear power plants in their country if the US accepted the waste. President Carter, in a further intervention, stressed that his previous statement was not intended to be unfriendly, but simply an accurate statement of the facts. Chancellor Schmidt commented that though neither friendly nor unfriendly, it expressed the interests of the US Government.

Chancellor Schmidt then said that he agreed with President Giscard about the need for safeguards. He realised that Germany was under criticism for its Brazilian Contract, but the Trilateral Agreement with Brazil involved the surveillance by the Vienna Agency in which several countries participated. Indeed, Germany had fulfilled more than the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, going far beyond

existing legal safeguards. His Canadian friends should note that Germany had lived up to their obligations ^{his country} but/did not want to be put in a position where they had additional obligations imposed on them. Mr. Trudeau commented that Canada was in no position to throw stones at anyone in view of what had happened in India. Mr. Jamieson said that the Canadian Government accepted that the German Government had lived up to their international obligations.

Dr. Owen then said that there was a need progressively to tighten up on safeguards and to cover a wider group of countries. The danger was in delay and he strongly supported President Carter's call on 20 April for INFCEP and his suggestion that this Conference should call for a preliminary assessment by a group of experts. It was also necessary to make progress in the London Nuclear Suppliers Club and perhaps to widen its membership. The discussion on reprocessing should perhaps take account of some scientists' doubts on the practicalities of storing waste for long periods of time; and the British Magnox plants were a case in point. Difficult scientific and technical assessments were necessary here.

President Carter then asked whether the Conference was agreed that reprocessing should only be carried out under stringent safeguards. Without this, it would be difficult for the US, Canada and Australian Government to provide nuclear fuel. It was up to each country to decide whether to go ahead with breeder reactors and reprocessing plants. In the United States reprocessing plants had not worked well, but he hoped that those of the participants of the Conference worked well, and that their peoples allowed them to store nuclear waste.

The Prime Minister then observed that the difficulty of President Carter's position was that he had to persuade other countries that his policy on these matters stemmed from his perception of the problems of nuclear proliferation and was not based on the fact that America was an energy

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personally
 rich country. He/accepted that President Carter's
 stand was based on his concern about nuclear
 proliferation and he agreed with the need for proper
 safeguards. But it was important not to give the
 impression of depriving other countries of the benefits
 of nuclear technology. The two months' technical
 study suggested by President Carter was in everybody's
 interest.

/Mr. Vance

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Mr. Vance commented at this point that he saw no inconsistency between President Carter's proposal and the work of the London Suppliers Club.

President Giscard then asked whether it was being suggested that there should be an advance beyond the concepts of the NPT. Or was the proposal that there should in addition be "physical guarantees", e.g. involving restrictions on the sale of nuclear plant. He favoured such restrictions, but since all the countries sitting at the Conference were involved in reprocessing he did not think that any conditions agreed should be applied between themselves. The discussion should therefore be concerned with the sale of reprocessing nuclear plant and services to other countries. Pilot experimental plants could be sources of proliferation and these needed to be considered as well as other proliferation techniques. He then asked the Prime Minister where President Carter's suggested committee would meet and what it would discuss.

The Prime Minister then said that there was a need for some preliminary study between the seven participants of the Conference. A group of experts should therefore be established, with precise terms of reference, to study in detail the proposals described by President Carter on 20 April. After the Prime Minister had said that it might be necessary to bring in the Soviet Union, President Carter said that his contacts had suggested that they did not want to be involved at this stage. Continuing, the Prime Minister said the group of experts should provide their report by the end of June or the beginning of July. It would be important to take care to avoid giving the impression of fixing things up between the big seven industrial countries. Any proposal for a committee of experts should therefore be presented as if it flowed from the normal consultations between the Seven. As for location of the experts' discussion, he understood that Paris was very pleasant in the spring! He then suggested that the aides should be asked to agree terms of reference for the expert group; these need not necessarily be reproduced in the communique.

Mr. Trudeau then said that the study suggested by President Giscard differed from that suggested by President Carter in that the French President had referred to the possibility of legal and "physical" (i.e. the sale or non-sale of nuclear plant and services) guarantees. He was also worried about President Giscard's point that safeguards should only be applied to other countries, but not to the Seven, since this would be clear discrimination. Nor did he see how his proposal for physical or legal safeguards could be applied for example in the case of the USA and France, who had a nuclear bomb, and Germany and Canada who had not, but who might want to produce one one day. The Prime Minister said that it was impossible to answer these questions and the expert group should consider whether safeguards should be confined to the existing legal framework, with possible "physical" safeguards in addition. President Carter said that the US Government were willing to let Japan have nuclear fuel, but would want to be able to tell Congress of the safeguards if it was to be reprocessed. Mr. Trudeau then asked the conference participants whether they would apply those safeguards to themselves. The Prime Minister reminded him that the United Kingdom adopted full international inspection procedures. Mr. Trudeau said that the United Kingdom was not building nuclear bombs.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister was non-committal in reply. President Carter then said that these points needed to be considered, but they could not be answered during this discussion.

Chancellor Schmidt then said that he hoped that he would not read reports of the discussion in the press suggesting that some countries would not keep to their international nuclear commitments, since this could cause an uproar in Germany. Indeed, it would be necessary for the conference to consider what they would say in public, and he reminded the participants that it had not been agreed that Ministers should speak to the press at lunch time. Progress in furthering understanding had certainly been made in the afternoon's discussion, and it would be important not to endanger that progress by unwise disclosures. His preference was to limit this part of the communique to one sentence or so giving the terms of reference for the experts' group.

President Giscard, after commenting that the participants' positions were close, drew attention to one point of difference. This was whether the system of safeguards should apply to the participants present. If they did, there would be difficulties, particularly as various agreements already existed, e.g., between the United Kingdom, France and Germany and France and Japan. It was important in his view to avoid giving any impression that existing agreements were being brought into question. For this reason he liked the approach set out in the first few sentences of the draft paper circulated by the US delegation. Mr. Trudeau said that there was a conflict between the approaches of President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt. The President wanted the system of safeguards to be applied to the Seven. The Chancellor wanted no discrimination. He suggested that the Prime Minister should speak to the Press on behalf of the conference as a whole, and he agreed that the passage for the communique might be based on the first three sentences of the United States Paper. At this point Chancellor Schmidt suggested that an extra sentence should be added to the effect that an expert committee had been established with the task of deciding how to bring about the situation referred to in the first three sentences.

/ Signor Andreotti

Signor Andreotti said that he could agree with a statement on these lines, but it should be made clear publicly that there was no questioning of the NPT and that the group of experts would not be discussing the future of Article 4. The Prime Minister then asked the Conference whether anyone wanted the experts to discuss Article 4 and there was general agreement that no-one did.

Mr. Trudeau then said that the establishment of a study would not help him to restart shipments of nuclear fuel to India. President Carter agreed that the establishment of the study would be no help in this sense, but its results and any system of assurance based on it could be of some help in the future. The Prime Minister then suggested to Mr. Trudeau that he could answer criticism about restarting shipments by saying that the Seven recognised the need for the establishment of a system of international assurances, but meanwhile they had sufficient confidence in each other to decide when shipments were appropriate. It was not possible on the basis of a 1½ hour's discussion to refer in the communique to "physical" safeguards of the type referred to by President Giscard.

Chancellor Schmidt said that he believed that if a study on the lines suggested was available in about 8 to 10 weeks' time, it would take months and years to bring its conclusions into effect. It was not possible to ask for more from this Conference. Referring to his earlier comments about the need not to provoke other countries by excluding them from the study, Chancellor Schmidt said that he would have wanted to include in the study certain threshold states, but not countries such as South Africa or Israel. The Conference needed to bear in mind that their decision not to invite other countries to participate in the experts' group would not encourage a feeling of confidence abroad. The most which could be achieved was to agree a formula based on the first three sentences in the American paper. The experts should then get to work and the matter should be discussed again between the Seven, but not necessarily at Head of Government level. At that stage further consideration should be given to the involvement of other countries.

/ Mr. Fukuda

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Mr. Fukuda agreed with the proposal for an experts committee, but observed that China and the USSR would need to be persuaded of its conclusions in the longer run. Once the experts committee had reported, the world should have an opportunity to ponder its views. He agreed that the afternoon's discussion needed careful public presentation, and he suggested that the line with the press should be that they had discussed a broad range of issues, including energy questions. Matters referred to had been other sources of energy, including solar energy, as well as the importance of energy conservation.

Herr Genscher said that he wanted the expert committee to be given the job of producing a system of safeguards against nuclear proliferation. It should be made clear that the outcome of its study would be discussed with the Nuclear Suppliers Club so as to eliminate risk of misunderstanding.

President Giscard said that the Conference would mislead the world if they gave the impression that the expert group was studying nuclear proliferation. The study should be based on the need to meet energy requirements.

Summing up the discussion, the Prime Minister said that the United States' President had proposed on April 20 that there should be a nuclear fuel evaluation programme. The proposal before this Conference was the establishment of an expert group to see whether the terms of reference could be agreed for this programme. The group should also see whether it could agree on a common approach on these matters. The emphasis should be on meeting energy requirements with as little nuclear proliferation as possible. It should be clearly understood that the search for safeguards continued in parallel with the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Club.

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Finally the Prime Minister said that, as Mr. Fukuda had commented, there were other important energy questions. Some of these could be discussed tomorrow when the representative of the Commission was present.

Discussion on this item concluded at 1755.

Human Rights

The Prime Minister then asked President Carter to introduce discussion of this item.

President Carter said that he hoped that participants at the Conference would communicate with each other, e.g. through NATO or their Foreign Ministers, so that the forthcoming Belgrade Conference did not become a divisive issue between them but was used for constructive purposes. In his speeches on human rights he had tried not to single out any country, even the USSR, for criticism. The United States Government had themselves taken action to increase the rights of their citizens, e.g. by removing all travel restrictions. He made no apology for his espousal of the cause of human rights and was grateful for the support which had been given to him by some of the participants at this Conference. The Prime Minister then asked President Carter whether he was satisfied that everything possible was being done in NATO to get a common position for the Belgrade Conference. Mr. Vance said that he was satisfied but there was work still to do.

The Prime Minister then said that it was perfectly natural for a new United States Administration to express its position in the way President Carter had done. He accepted what the President had said. Each of the participants at the Conference had their own view on how best to talk to the Soviet Union. He personally made a distinction between support for human rights and support for people using the cause of human rights to change the Soviet regime. The British Government were not seeking to change the Soviet regime though they would of course welcome moves towards greater freedom.

Chancellor Schmidt said that he agreed with the views of President Carter and the Prime Minister. Since the Final Act of Helsinki full human rights had been acquired for some 65,000 Germans in Romania, the German Democratic Republic and elsewhere and he hoped to increase this number to 200,000 or more. He fully accepted the Prime Minister's point that the cause of human rights should not be used to dismantle regimes. The more silent the work, the more people got out from behind the Iron Curtain. There was no contradiction here with the views of President Carter.

Signor Andreotti welcomed President Carter's statement because it gave a higher moral and spiritual tone to the international political debate. The quest for human rights was worldwide and applied to areas such as Chile where human rights were not as they should be. President Giscard said that President Carter's initiative had given the Western world an ideological tone which it had lacked, but he would not enter into discussion at this conference on questions of method. Mr. Trudeau also said that his country had achieved significant results in persuading the Communist regimes to release people. Mr. Fukuda said that he fully appreciated President Carter's position, but each country would need to consider its own position when translating his principles into action so as to take account of different circumstances.

Discussion on Sunday

On the suggestion of the Prime Minister it was agreed that on Sunday discussion should begin with the Third World and the attitude in CIEC. It should then deal with trade and other aspects of the world's energy situation not covered today.

Press

President Carter then asked what should be said to the press. The Prime Minister said that he was ready to say nothing, but simply refer to the forthcoming communiqué and

/press

press conference. President Carter suggested that they should say that there had been a productive discussion on the nuclear energy problem. The Prime Minister said that he did not like the new technique of talking to the press after each meeting. Chancellor Schmidt agreed. Mr. Healey suggested that they should highlight their discussion on human rights, and say that they had started on energy questions and would continue the discussion tomorrow. The Prime Minister then said that he was sure that his colleagues would be responsible in what they said to the press after the session.

The session ended at 1815.

N.L.W.

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