

Ref: B06476

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Chequers Meeting on the FalklandsOrder of Proceedings

Your meeting which starts at 10.30 on Sunday, 25th April could conveniently be taken in three phases:

- I The normal attenders at OD(SA) should meet, without military briefers present, to hear the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's report on his Washington visit. He may wish Sir Ian Sinclair to be present. No decisions should be taken.
- II With military briefers present the Sub-Committee should be given an up-date on the military situation and reminded of the issues coming up for decision. This should lead into a discussion in depth of options and implications, as suggested by the Defence Secretary. Such discussion could continue, less formally, over lunch.
- III After lunch, normal OD(SA) attenders should reconvene alone, to identify major decisions which are imminent in both the diplomatic and the military fields. They should be talked through and related to each other, thus pulling together the threads from both I and II. But the Sub-Committee may well feel that they would like to reflect overnight before taking any final decisions; and on present evidence there are none which need deciding before 26th April.

Papers

2. For Phase II the briefers will table an up-to-date military timetable and a critical path for military decision-taking. Other relevant papers are listed on the agenda notice, as follows.



(a) OD(SA)(82) 22, the Defence Secretary's note on call-up. You want to discuss this in the Sub-Committee, but the Defence Secretary will not be pressing for discussion on Sunday.

(b) OD(SA)(82) 23, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's note on United Nations possibilities. This may be relevant to Phase I.

(c) OD(SA)(82) 24, the Ministry of Defence recommendations on Rules of Engagement for the proposed Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ). This will be central to Phase II.

(d) The Defence Secretary's minute to you of 22nd April on Maritime Rules of Engagement, relating to submarines between 10° and 35° South, ie off Brazil. You have provisionally agreed to this proposal (Mr Coles' letter to Mr Omand of 23rd April). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may be dubious. But it is not a major issue and could well wait a few days.

(e) Sir Robert Armstrong's minute to Mr Coles of 22nd April on Falkland Islanders and financial help for those wanting to leave temporarily. You have now agreed to this (Mr Coles' letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of 23rd April) and made further suggestions for broadcasts to the Islanders. Special broadcasts may well be appropriate when the TEZ is announced and again after the airfield has been destroyed (if these are the decisions in each case). This will be relevant to Phase II.

(f) My minute to Mr Coles of 23rd April on Falklands Military Decisions about SSN Conqueror and about Argentine Boeing 707s. This need only be noted. But a further decision, on shooting down 707s if necessary, may be imminent by Sunday. If so it will come up in Phase II.

(g) The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's Private Secretary's letter to Mr Coles of 23rd April on the Dependencies. This may be relevant to Phase I.

Issues

3. The main issues in Phase I will be
- How wide is the gap between our minimum requirements and the maximum Mr Haig thinks he could eventually negotiate?
 - Has Mr Haig taken on board how essential it will be for the United States to act as guarantor of any agreement?
 - Which disputed points are most difficult from his point of view and which are most essential from ours?
 - Is Mr Haig ready to go on trying? If so, what does he see as the next move? If he plans to revisit Buenos Aires, when?
 - Is it possible to negotiate at all with the present Argentine Government? If not, what are the prospects for it falling?
 - How does Mr Haig see further British military moves (eg TEZ and bombing the airfield) in relation to the diplomatic process? What are the lessons of South Georgia?
 - How solid is American support for Britain? Will it alter if there is bloodshed? Would they object to certain uses of their facilities on Ascension? In what circumstances would they be prepared to apply economic sanctions?
 - What are the diplomatic alternatives if the Haig process collapses ?
4. Phase II will high-light four major decisions.
- (i) Declaration and enforcement of the TEZ and related ROE.
 - (ii) Taking out Stanley airfield: whether, how and when?
 - (iii) Use of Special Forces: when, how inserted, how tasked?

- (iv) Should the Amphibious Group now sail from Ascension?
Do the Sub-Committee accept the Defence Secretary's provisional view that once sailed it must be used unless there is a diplomatic settlement, ie that a decision to sail it is tantamount to a decision to assault the Islands if there is no settlement by the third week in May?

5. Item (ii) above is rightly seen by the Ministry of Defence as an integral part of (i). International (and domestic) opinion may see it as a step change from (i), because it is essentially active rather than passive.

6. Item (iii) essentially relates to (iv). The main role of the SAS will be to gather intelligence for a landing. The case for using them therefore turns on how seriously the landing option is contemplated.

Passage deleted and retained

under Section 3(4)

*W. Wayland
8 May 2012*

7. Other decisions identified in Phase II will include

- *Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4)*
 - messages to the Islanders;
 - repossessing Southern Thule;
 - submarine offensive against the Argentine navy outside the TEZ.
- W. Wayland,
8 May 2012*

8. Phase III might be handled as follows.

- First, focus on inter-relations. The diplomatic prospects affect the military decisions, and vice versa. What are the particular lessons of that, as things stand on Sunday?



- Second, does the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary need any immediate guidance on his next moves vis-a-vis the Americans?

- Third, how far can we distinguish between (a) our absolutely vital requirements in a settlement and (b) other important issues on which we could in the last resort compromise? The diplomatic process must not be allowed to cloud our vision on (a); nor to break down because we are too zealous on (b).

- Finally, what specific military and diplomatic decisions should the Sub-Committee aim to take on 26th April? The diplomatic decisions will of course include how far to tell the Americans about the military ones.

23rd April 1982

R.L.W.

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