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FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 242146Z SEPT 80
TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1346 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV BEIRUT DAMASCUS AMMAN CAIRO

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD WASHINGTON PARIS BONN JEDDA KUWAIT

INFO SAVING MUSCAT ABU DHABI QATAR BAHRAIN KHARTOUM TRIPOLI

TUNIS RABAT.

*Prime Minister**To see all**mb**MAD
17/26/80*FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY: SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION
WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER: 24 SEPTEMBER IN NEW YORK.**IRAN/IRAQ**

1. SHAMIR USED THIS TO ILLUSTRATE HIS ARGUMENT THAT THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE TROUBLED SITUATION IN THE AREA. LORD CARRINGTON SAID HIS INTERPRETATION WAS THAT THE IRAQIS HAD DECIDED THAT THE PRESENT TIME OF IRANIAN WEAKNESS WAS THE MOMENT TO PURSUE THEIR LONG STANDING DEMANDS. WHETHER THEY ALSO WANTED TO BRING DOWN KHOMEINI AND BANI SADR WAS A MATTER FOR SPECULATION. IF SO, THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE THOUGHT THROUGH THE CONSEQUENCES. A FRAGMENTED IRAN MIGHT NOT EVEN SUIT THE RUSSIANS; THEY WOULD PREFER TO TAKE OVER THE COUNTRY INTACT. SHAMIR EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT SADDAM HUSSAIN, WHOM HE SAW AS ASPIRING TO THE MANTLE OF NASSER.

ARAB/ISRAEL

2. SHAMIR SAW THE IRAN/IRAQ CRISIS AS IMPROVING THE PROSPECTS OF PROGRESS ON THIS, BECAUSE THE PROBLEM WOULD BE LESS IN THE LIME-LIGHT AND SADAT LESS OBLIGED TO LOOK OVER HIS SHOULDER AT THE REST OF THE ARABS, THE NON-ALIGNED, ETC. SHAMIR EXPLAINED HIS HOPES FOR THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS IN THE COMING MONTHS. NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE RESUMED, PROBABLY IN OCTOBER. THERE WAS THE IDEA OF A SUMMIT AFTER THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS, AND TALK OF A SUMMIT USUALLY LED TO IT BEING HELD. THERE WERE SOME POSSIBILITIES OF REACHING A CERTAIN AGREEMENT ON AUTONOMY. AFTER THAT THE ATTITUDES OF THE LOCAL POPULATION WOULD BECOME CLEAR, AND ISRAEL HOPED THAT NEW ELEMENTS WOULD EMERGE WHEN, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THERE WAS THE CHANCE OF ELECTED PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATING IN NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE AREA.

3. SHAMIR ASKED WHAT THE NINE WOULD DO WHEN THE THORN MISSION WAS CONCLUDED. HE HOPED THERE WOULD NOT BE SOME NEW DECISION DAMAGING TO THE ISRAEL/EGYPT NEGOTIATIONS. LORD CARRINGTON HOPED THAT ANY DECISION BY THE NINE WOULD BENEFIT THE SITUATION AS A WHOLE.

4. ON JERUSALEM, SHAMIR RECALLED THAT THIS HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY SET ASIDE AT THE TIME OF CAMP DAVID ITSELF. IT WAS STILL USELESS TO THINK OF DISCUSSING IT.

5. LORD CARRINGTON SAW THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM AS INTER-CONNECTED WITH OTHERS. MANY ISLAMIC COUNTRIES WERE UNWILLING TO PUT THEIR EFFORTS BEHIND GETTING THE SOVIET UNION OUT OF AFGHANISTAN SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO PROGRESS ON ARAB/ISRAEL, WHICH TO THEM WAS MORE IMPORTANT.

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6. SHAMIR SAID HE WAS AWARE OF THIS LINE OF THOUGHT, BUT THE ISRAELI VIEW WAS THAT PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SETTLED ONE BY ONE. THE ZONE OF STABILITY CREATED BY THE ISRAEL/EGYPT PEACE TREATY WOULD BE ENLARGED IF THERE WERE AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT. AFTER THAT THERE WOULD BE THE CHANCE OF BRINGING IN JORDAN. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT WOULD BE RECOGNISED BY ANY ARAB COUNTRY. SHAMIR SAID THAT EGYPT, AND SADAT PERSONALLY, HAD AT ONE TIME BEEN BITTERLY HOSTILE TO ISRAEL. THEY HAD CHANGED, AND ONE DAY ALL ARABS MIGHT CHANGE.

7. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT ANYTHING WAS POSSIBLE ONE DAY, BUT MEANWHILE THE WORLD FACED A PERIOD OF VERY GREAT DANGER. THE ARAB STATES WERE BEING DRIVEN TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. SHAMIR DOUBTED IF THIS WAS HAPPENING, OR AT LEAST NOT BECAUSE OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. HE SAW NO OTHER WAY FORWARD THAN CAMP DAVID, DIFFICULT AND SLOW THOUGH THIS MIGHT BE. HE CONCEDED THAT IT WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD WANT TO TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS: SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO AUTONOMY AGREEMENT, ISRAEL COULD NOT BEGIN TO IDENTIFY PALESTINIANS TO WORK WITH. BUT WITH AN AGREEMENT THEY COULD SEE WHERE THEIR INTERESTS LAY AND WOULD COME FORWARD.

8. LORD CARRINGTON SUPPOSED THAT THE REFERENCES TO THE PLO HAD BEEN THE CAUSE OF ISRAEL'S PARTICULAR OBJECTION TO THE VENICE DECLARATION BY THE NINE AND OF SHAMIR'S DISOBLIGING REMARKS ABOUT HIM PERSONALLY. DID ISRAEL REALLY BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS POSSIBLE WITHOUT TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE PLO? SHAMIR REPLIED THAT PROGRESS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE WITH THE PLO. THEIR RAISON D'ETRE WAS REJECTION OF PEACE WITH ISRAEL. THEIR METHODS MIGHT BE THE SAME AS MUGABE'S, BUT THEIR AIM WAS DIFFERENT IN KIND. THEY WANTED A FREE ARAB PALESTINE AND THE ABOLITION OF THE JEWISH STATE. A RETURN TO THE 1967 FRONTIERS WAS ONLY THE FIRST STAGE FOR THEM. THEY HAD MADE THEIR BELIEFS CLEAR IN DAMASCUS IN MAY.

9. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT SUCH A POLICY WAS, OF COURSE, TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO BRITAIN AND THE NINE. THE PLO MUST RECOGNISE ISRAEL, AND ABANDON THE COVENANT. BUT SO LONG AS ISRAEL HAD NOT EVEN ATTEMPTED TO TALK TO THE PLO, SHE COULD NOT PROVE THAT HER VIEW OF THE PLO WAS THE RIGHT ONE. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE A LASTING SETTLEMENT WITHOUT BRINGING IN THE PLO. SHAMIR REPEATED THAT HIS VIEW WAS THE EXACT OPPOSITE, AND IT WAS SHARED BY HIS GOVERNMENT AND HIS PARTY.

LEBANON

10. SHAMIR SAID THAT AS A COUNTRY LEBANON DID NOT EXIST. THE GOVERNMENT WAS A FICTION AND ITS TERRITORY WAS OCCUPIED BY SYRIANS, THE PLO AND VARIOUS ARMED GROUPS. ISRAEL HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OR AMBITIONS.

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11. LORD CARRINGTON ASKED WHETHER ISRAEL WOULD CARRY OUT MORE STRIKES AGAINST LEBANON. SHAMIR SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE STRIKES BUT THEY WOULD BE AGAINST THE PLO. GREAT TROUBLE WAS TAKEN NOT TO HARM CIVILIANS. THE STRIKES WERE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE PLO RAIDING ISRAELI VILLAGES. IT WAS BETTER TO HANDLE MATTERS IN THIS WAY THAN WAIT FOR A SPECTACULAR PLO ATTACK, TO WHICH ISRAEL WOULD BE BOUND TO RETALIATE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO MUSCAT ABU DHABI QATAR BAHRAIN KHARTOUM
TRIPOLI TUNIS RABAT

PARSONS

Repetition to BEIRUT
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

MIDDLE EAST STANDARD

NENAD	MAED
MED	ES & SD
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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