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windfall months.

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SWIP 3AG

a tax on their

We spoke about the position on taxing the banks following your meeting with the clearers. Sir Jeremy Morse also sent me a copy is at present refinanced by the Government.

banks in November when I opened discussions with them and it has

3. The proposal would reduce the PSBR in 1982. And Jeremy Morse is right in saying that it would bring a greater immediate benefit to the PSBR than cost sharing or a levy. But this would be rely cosmetic and would certainly be seen as such. It is exactly the sort of device which Harold Lever used to invent for bring down the rate of monetary growth and could even increase it. Moreover part of the PSBR reduction in 1981-82 would be achieved at the expense of increases in public expenditure in later years

4. It is easy to see why the banks made the offer. The proposed transfer of fixed rate lending would be largely costless - even profitable for them. But equally, looked at from our point of

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view. it fails completely to meet my request for a real contribution to the Exchequer from the profits which they make as a result of their monopoly of current accounts when interest rates have been high.

5. We therefore proposed to the banks that they should contribute two-thirds of the subsidy element in the fixed rate lending on their books. This meant that they would have made a real contribution to reducing the PSBR. The banks were apprehensive about the continuing nature of such a contribution. So following the early discussions. I also explored an option under which the Government would no longer pay any subsidy on pre-1978 fixed rate business; this would have yielded about \$150 million next year but would wither away over the next 3 or 4 years. This met the banks' fears that they should not be subject to a continuing arrangement.

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6. I made it quite clear to the banks that the alternative to coming to some compromise agreement of this kind would be a tax on their current accounts. They responded, both orally and in writing to say that they would prefer a tax to any such arrangements. So they have put me in a position of having no alternative but to tax them because - seemingly on grounds of principle - they are unwilling to contemplate voluntary measures which would make a worthwhile contribution to reducing the PSBR.

7. Finally, Sir Jeremy's letter mentions the damaging effect he thinks a tax would have on pay negotiations. I have already taken him up on this point. His argument seems to be that public recognition that the banks have windfall profits will give banking unions a new trump card. Given the banks' record of excessively high settlements, this is a pretty astonishing claim. To suggest that the unions are unaware of the banks' present healthy profits and are not already well able to deploy these

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arguments in negotiation is very far-fetched. Indeed, if a special tax is imposed, the clearers can argue that they can only afford smaller pay increases.

M.

(G.H.) 6 February 1981

SECR Mr Walters

John Sty

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9 February 1981

## Additional Revenue from the Banks

The Prime Minister has read the Chancellor's minute of 8 February, and has noted his view that there is now me alternative but to lattroduce a tax on the banks windfall profits.

John Wiggins, Esq.,
HM Treasury SECRET

KRRY