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closed, 40 years.*

PRIME MINISTER

Bilateral with President Carter

This was not discussed at your briefing meeting yesterday. Perhaps therefore I could offer a suggestion about handling, since clearly there is a limit to what can be covered in a working breakfast.

2. He will of course want to hear how you see the United Kingdom domestic situation. Apart from this I suggest that you could usefully group the discussion under 3 heads:

(1) The Summit itself

Your bilateral comes at the half-way point and depends on how things have gone. You could usefully impress on him the crucial importance of the United States letting oil prices rise both as a conservation measure and to encourage the development of alternative sources which would then become economic. It is no good having targets or communiqués unless the United States can act on this.

(ii) Political

In particular Rhodesia (our tactics over the next few months) and the Middle East, (where you will want to urge him, with his election in mind, to take action soon to mend fences with the moderate Arabs).

(iii) Defence

- (1) Our deterrent: no decision for some time yet but grateful to him for agreeing to talks.
- (ii) * ~~~~~ *
- (iii) Our intelligence relationship: reconfirm importance.
- (iv) SALT - above all the need to be clear about TNF before starting on SALT III.
- (v) CTB.

(John Hunt)

26th June, 1979

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closed, 40 years, under a
FOI Exemption 27.10.09*

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PRESIDENT CARTER

RHODESIA: Lord Hailsham's + Mugomwa's missions.

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under a FOI Exemption.

AWayland

27 October 2009

UK DETERRENT:

Decision on Polaris successor will
take some time.

But grateful for your agreement to
talks between our officials.

CTB:

We recognise importance of achieving
10 National Seismic Stations in Soviet Union.
But Soviet Demand for 10 NSS in
UK is absurd: will need strong US
support if we are to bridge them.

In the light of your talks with
Gorbachev, how flexible do you think the
Russians might be?

We could propose UK withdrawal
from Separate Verification Agreement and
reconsider in light of Soviet reaction.
What do you think?