

CONFIDENTIAL
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FM WASHINGTON 221910Z DEC 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 4343 OF 22 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

Le. Paul

IRAN: UN ACTION

1. VANCE ASKED TO SEE ME TODAY ON THE ABOVE. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MCHENRY. HE SAID THAT THE LATTER WOULD BE DELIVERING A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS AFTERNOON ASKING FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. EVEN INFORMAL DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE UNLIKELY BEFORE WEDNESDAY. VANCE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD DISCUSS THE TERMS OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS. MCHENRY WOULD BE GETTING IN TOUCH WITH SIR A PARSONS VERY SOON AND THE AMERICANS WOULD TRY TO HAMMER OUT A DRAFT WITH THE MAXIMUM AGREEMENT FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE TABLING ANYTHING.
2. MCHENRY SAID THAT TECHNICALLY SPEAKING THE COUNCIL WAS ALREADY SEIZED OF THE IRAN ISSUE. THE LETTER WOULD THEREFORE ASK THE COUNCIL TO RESUME DISCUSSION OF IT. IT WOULD REFER TO ARTICLE 41. WHEN I REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER (FCO TELNO 817), VANCE SAID THAT THE DETAILS OF WHAT SANCTIONS THEY HAD IN MIND WOULD BE SPELT OUT IN A PAPER WHICH MCHENRY WOULD GIVE SIR A PARSONS: BUT HE CONFIRMED THAT THEY ARE NOT INTENDING TO BLOCK IRAN'S EXPORTS OR TO AFFECT FOODS OR MEDICINES.
3. I REFERRED TO THE PROVISION IN ARTICLE 41 FOR THE SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND ASKED WHETHER THEY WERE INTENDING TO INCLUDE THIS IN THE RESOLUTION. VANCE SAID NO. I THEN ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD ANY THOUGHT ON HOW FAR THE PASSAGE OF A RESOLUTION WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH CONTINUED IRANIAN PROTECTION OF FOREIGN MISSIONS IN TEHRAN. VANCE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD PROBABLY INCREASE THE RISK OF AN INCIDENT SOMEWHAT. THAT RISK HAD OF COURSE ALWAYS

CONFIDENTIAL

BEEN PRESENT. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE KNEW OF ANY PRECEDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 41 AND THE MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS BY PARTICIPATING STATES. HE DID NOT APPEAR TO KNOW OF ANY.

4. VANCE SAID THAT SANCTIONS WOULD NOT COVER QUOTE COMMUNICATIONS UNQUOTE BY WHICH HE APPEARED TO MEAN POSTAL AND TELEPHONIC SERVICES, BUT THEY WOULD BE LIKELY TO COVER RAIL, SEA AND AIR TRANSPORT. MCHENRY DREW A PARALLEL WITH RHODESIA WHERE POSTAL AND TELEPHONIC SERVICES OF THE COUNTRY HAD NOT BEEN SEVERED AND WHERE THEY HAD HAD DIFFICULTY, FOR INSTANCE, IN PREVENTING THE IMPORT OF TELEVISION PROGRAMMES.

5. I ASKED VANCE HOW LONG THEY EXPECTED TO TAKE TO FINALISE A DRAFT RESOLUTION. MCHENRY WOULD NOT GIVE ANY TARGET DATE, BUT SAID THAT THEY WANTED ONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT THERE WOULD BE THE USUAL CONSULTATION PROCESS. THEY WOULD MUCH PREFER TO WORK SOMETHING OUT WITH THE MAXIMUM CONSENSUS BEFORE TABLEDRTPRZKLCLEDTHEY INTENDED TO FOLLOW THE SAME PROCEDURE AS THEY HAD IN PREPARING THE PREVIOUS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON IRAN.

6. I ASKED VANCE HOW MANY MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THEY HOPED WOULD VOTE FOR THEM. MCHENRY REPLIED THAT THEY DID NOT GIVE UP HOPE ON ANY EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA (TO BE REPLACED BY THE DDR ON 1 JANUARY). VANCE INTERJECTED THAT GROMYKO HAD BEEN GIVEN THE SAME MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT AS OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS. HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT HE MUST DISCUSS IT WITH BREZHNEV BUT THAT IT WAS CLEARLY AN IMPORTANT AND SERIOUS MATTER. GROMYKO THEN RESTATED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. HE SAID THAT HE COULD GIVE NO INDICATION OF THE SOVIET POSITION UNTIL THEY SAW THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION. HE HAD TAKEN NOTE THAT THE US GOVERNMENT DID NOT PROPOSE TO BLOCK IRANIAN EXPORTS.

7. WHEN I ASKED ABOUT AMERICAN EXPECTATION OF SUCCESS IN THE COUNCIL, MCHENRY SAID THAT COUNCIL MEMBERS WOULD HAVE TO THINK OF ALTERNATIVES. IT WAS HARD TO CONTEMPLATE THE FUTURE OF THE UN AS AN INSTITUTION IN THE FACE OF IRANIAN BEHAVIOUR UNLESS SOME KIND OF ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST IRAN WAS AGREED. THE RANGE OF ACTION REMAINED OPEN. THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ASK FOR MERLEY SYMBOLIC ACTION.

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8. ON REACTIONS FROM INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, VANCE SAID THAT THEY HAD HAD NO REACTION FROM BANGLADESH. BOLIVIA HAD PROMISED ACTIVE COOPERATION - BUT WOULD OF COURSE NOT BE THERE AFTER THE END OF THE YEAR. THE REACTION FROM CHINA HAD BEEN POSITIVE ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO COMMITMENT. THE AMERICANS HOPED THAT THEY MIGHT GET BETTER THAN THE AVOIDANCE OF A VETO. THE CHINESE CLEARLY DID NOT WANT TO BE IN THE SAME BOAT AS THE SOVIET UNION. MCHENRY POINTED OUT THAT THE CHINESE ATTITUDE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS BECOMING MORE FLEXIBLE, AS SHOWN BY THEIR POSITIVE SUPPORT OVER THE RHODESIAN SANCTIONS RESOLUTIONS.

9. MCHENRY SAID THAT JAMAICA WOULD BE DIFFICULT BUT THEY DID NOT RULE OUT HER SUPPORT. PORTUGAL WAS ALL RIGHT. VANCE SAID THAT THEY EXPECTED ZAMBIA AND NIGERIA TO HAVE AN EYE TO THE ISSUE OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. VANCE CONCLUDED THAT THEY MIGHT GET THE NECESSARY NINE VOTES.

10. REVERTING TO THE EVENTUAL TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION I ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS PLAN TO INCLUDE THE FREEZING OF IRANIAN ASSETS. AFTER A PAUSE VANCE REPLIED THAT THEY HAD TAKEN NO FINAL DECISION ON THIS.

11. I EMPHASISED TO VANCE THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTING US IN ADVANCE OF ANY PUBLIC ACTION, STRESSING THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR MISSION AND OUR PARTICULAR ROLE GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF LONDON AS A FINANCIAL CENTRE. VANCE SAID THAT THIS WAS ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD.

12. MAY I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO DECIDE WHETHER TO REPEAT TO TEHRAN.

HENDERSON

F I L E S

MED PS/MR HURD
NENAD PS/PUS
DEF D SIR A DUFF
CONS D MR FIGG
CONS EM UNIT MR J C MOBERLY
SED MR BULLARD
NAD LORD BRIDGES
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