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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

David Welch
(RH)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *J.A. Baker*

SUBJECT: CAIRO MEETINGS

UNCLASSIFIED

In Cairo, I spent two hours with Mubarak and ninety minutes with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian, who was just starting his tour of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq. Both meetings were very productive and continued the good progress we made yesterday.

Mubarak

Mubarak was very upbeat, in large measure because he said Egyptian public opinion was solidly behind him. He was extraordinarily pleased by our success on Egyptian debt and your letter to him on that subject.

Mubarak was fully on board with our approach of laying a foundation for action if we decide to move forward on the military option. He strongly recommends pursuing a new UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. He said that he needs such a resolution for domestic political reasons, just as I believe we need it for US domestic political purposes. Mubarak said that he would work hard on the NAM, especially Ethiopia, Malaysia, and Zaire, as well as China and the Soviet Union.

He did not want any public discussion of command and control issues, but accepted that his forces would have to be under our operational control in the event of hostilities.

He said he would need to get back to us on our request to use the airbases at Cairo East and West for offensive strike operations. (The bases are now being used solely for deployment-related logistics activities.) He also said that our request to provide a third division might be difficult because of a lack of equipment, but he agreed on the need to bring his existing two divisions on line in a fully-supported manner. He also agreed to our request for Egypt to provide training and advice to Saudi and other GCC forces currently deployed in the Kingdom.

Qian

The tone of the Qian meeting was positive throughout, beginning with the following exchange during a brief press availability at the start of our meeting:

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PER E.O. 12958
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Q: Mr. Foreign Minister, is your government willing to consider a United Nations resolution that would authorize force in the Persian Gulf?

FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN: I think all the resolutions adopted by the United Nations are intended to increase the pressure on Iraq so as to achieve a peaceful settlement.

Q: And would authorizing the use of force increase the pressure for a peaceful settlement?

FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN: We'll still have to wait and see. Because all of the armed forces have two roles to play. One is to fight a war. The other is to seek peace. Do you agree with me?

SECRETARY BAKER: I do, indeed.

During our discussion, I emphasized to Qian that augmentation of the multinational force and passage of a UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force are two essential steps in the search for a peaceful resolution, since they would send an unequivocal signal to Saddam that we would not permit him to remain in Kuwait. I told Qian that we could accept a decision on their part not to contribute forces to the multinational effort, but we would not understand if they stood in the way of our pursuing an appropriate resolution at the UN. Although I did not press him either for a response or commitment on the resolution, Qian clearly got the point. I told him to consider carefully my presentation, as well as those of the Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Egyptians. My sense is that following Qian's return to China, they will conclude it is in their interests to either support a resolution or at worst abstain.

I told Qian that Saddam would push him while in Baghdad to accept a partial solution, a path that had to be rejected lest Saddam and the world conclude that aggression pays. Qian responded that he was taking no proposal to Baghdad, nor did he have the authority to mediate or consider any Iraqi proposal. His purpose was to emphasize China's commitment to full implementation of the UNSC resolutions, and to make clear to Saddam the political, economic, and military strength of the international coalition arrayed against him. He would tell Saddam directly that the only way to avoid further bloodshed was for him to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait.

On bilateral issues, Qian expressed his leadership's appreciation for your strong stance on MFN. He also pressed for me to commit to come to China and for his previously proposed 1989 visit to the US to be rescheduled.

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I told him that I wanted to come to China, and that you wanted me to do so. But I told him that it was important for my visit to be carried out in a way that advanced rather than complicated the bilateral relationship, and that would require more effort on both our parts to establish the requisite domestic political foundation. He seemed to accept this point, and then asked when Bob Kimmitt could come to China to resume the Under Secretary level discussions begun in the previous Administration. (These discussions were begun when Ambassador Zhu was the Chinese interlocutor in Beijing, and it was he who first suggested resumption of the discussions.)

I told Qian that Bob might be able to come in late November or early December, but that I wanted to confirm that decision with you before agreeing formally. As indicated above, I do not think we need a visit by me to obtain their support or acquiescence on the UN resolution. If obtaining that support or acquiescence depended upon my going, of course, I'd be ready to go.

If I do go, however, we need to recognize that a visit at this time will rekindle the domestic debate, which could cause real problems for the Chinese as well as us. For now, then, I recommend that you authorize me to tell Qian that we accept their proposal for Bob to visit before the end of this year, and that one of his agenda items will be preparing the way for a possible visit by me in 1991.

cc: Brent Scowcroft

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