

Afghanistan

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FM FCC 131520Z AUGUST 81
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 440 OF 13 AUGUST 1981.
INFO PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, ISLAMABAD, TEHRAN, KABUL, MOSCOW,
UKDEL NATO.
INFO ROUTINE TO DELHI, PARIS, PEKING, UKREP BRUSSELS, ALL OTHER
EC POSTS, JEDDA TOKYO.

AFGHANISTAN

1. DE CUELLAR GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS RECENT TALKS IN ISLAMABAD AND KABUL WHEN MR HURD AND SIR J. GRAHAM CALLED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON ON WALDHEIM.
2. DE CUELLAR SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN NO BREAKTHROUGH, HE HAD CONSOLIDATED SOME OF THE GAINS FROM HIS FIRST VISIT TO THE AREA. HE WAS NOW CONVINCED THAT BOTH PAKISTAN AND BABRAK KARMAL WANTED THE UN TO BE INVOLVED. (IRAN REMAINED OUTSIDE THE DEBATE AND WAS NOT PREPARED TO SEE DE CUELLAR: BUT DE CUELLAR DID NOT SEE THIS AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO HIS STRATEGY.) BOTH THE AFGHANS AND THE PAKISTANIS HAD SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN A SETTLEMENT, THE AFGHANS EVEN GOING SO FAR AT THE END OF DE CUELLAR'S TALKS TO ASK THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD NOW CONSIDER A VENUE AND A DATE FOR TALKS. BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED ON AN AGENDA THAT WOULD COVER (IN NO ORDER OF PRIORITY) WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, THE QUESTION OF INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THE PROBLEM OF GUARANTEES AND REFUGEES. THERE HAD HOWEVER BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON THE FORMAT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PAKISTANIS WOULD PREFER DE CUELLAR CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS BY MEANS OF 'SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY'. THE PAKISTANIS HAD ALSO AN OBVIOUS PREFERENCE TO DISCUSS FIRST THEIR MOST BURDENSOME PROBLEM OF THE

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REFUGEES. DE CUELLAR HAD DISCUSSED THE FORMAT OF TALKS WITH BOTH KARMAL AND THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHOSE VIEW WAS THAT THE PROBLEMS WERE TOO COMPLEX TO BE DISCUSSED PROPERLY BY SUCH METHODS. THEY WANTED A JOINT MEETING AT WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HIMSELF WOULD BE PRESENT. BOTH SIDES WANTED TO DISCUSS STRATEGY SEPARATELY WITH WALDHEIM IN NEW YORK BEFORE ANY FURTHER DECISIONS WERE TAKEN. THIS WOULD THEREFORE BE THE NEXT STEP. THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD CALL SEPARATELY ON WALDHEIM NEXT MONTH. DE CUELLAR ADDED THAT WHILE BOTH ZIA AND AGHA SHAHI RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EC INITIATIVE, THEY SAW THE TALKS INVOLVING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS THE ONLY WAY FORWARD TO A SOLUTION.

3. WALDHEIM COMMENTED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL NOT TO TALK OF THESE EXCHANGES IN TERMS OF THEIR RELATION TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS. EACH SIDE SAW THE DE CUELLAR MISSION IN ITS OWN TERMS. THERE WAS CLEARLY A DIFFERENCE OF APPROACH BETWEEN THE AFGHANS, WHO WANTED DIRECT BILATERAL TALKS INVOLVING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AND THE PAKISTANIS WHO, TOGETHER WITH MUCH OF THE WORLD, WERE NOT YET CONVINCED THAT SUCH TALKS WOULD BE USEFUL.

4. MR HURD COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH PAKISTANI ATTITUDES WERE OCCASIONALLY ERRATIC BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURES ON THEM, THEY HAD GIVEN STRONG SUPPORT TO THE EC INITIATIVE, WHICH WAS NOW SUPPORTED BY OVER 70 COUNTRIES. OUR PROPOSALS REMAINED ON THE TABLE: THEY WERE NOT IMMUTABLE BUT WE SAW NO TACTICAL ADVANTAGE IN CHANGING THEM AT PRESENT. HE ASKED HOW DISCUSSION AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON AFGHANISTAN WOULD GO. WALDHEIM SAID THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON HIS REPORT. BOTH SIDES HAD ASKED DE CUELLAR THAT HE PRODUCE A POSITIVE REPORT. HIS INCLINATION WAS TO TAKE IT IN TWO STAGES: TO PRODUCE A FACTUAL REPORT OF HIS EFFORTS, WHICH WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE HAD CHANGED IN THE INTERVENING MONTHS: AND TO FOLLOW THIS UP BY A SECOND REPORT (OR AN APPENDIX TO THE FIRST) FOLLOWING HIS TALKS WITH THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE ASSEMBLY COULD WELL END UP WITH A RESOLUTION SIMILAR TO LAST YEAR'S. MR HURD SAID THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THE UN WOULD FIND ITSELF IN A POSITION

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OF FACILITATING BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN WITHOUT ANY QUID-PRO-QUO FROM KARMAL HIMSELF. WE WOULD BE UNHAPPY IF THE AFGHAN REGIME GAINED SUCH A DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS. WE NEEDED TO KEEP THE FOCUS ON SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. GRAHAM ADDED THAT KARMAL COULD NOT HIMSELF BIND THE RUSSIANS OVER THE QUESTION OF SOVIET TROOPS.

5. DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND A WORSENING INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE AFGHANS HAD NO REAL POLITICAL LEADERS: FREEDOM FIGHTERS HAD BECOME BETTER ORGANISED AND ARMED (BY SAUDI ARABIA, CHINA, THE US AND EGYPT). WALDHEIM CONCLUDED THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM BUT COULD DEGENERATE INTO A FUTILE EXERCISE LIKE THE CAMBODIAN CONFERENCE.

6. DE CUELLAR WAS CLEARLY INCLINED TO PRESS AHEAD INTO THE OPENING WHICH HE THOUGHT HE HAD CREATED. WALDHEIM WAS MORE AWARE OF THE DANGERS, BUT THE IMPRESSION WHICH THEY CREATED BETWEEN THEM WAS NOT ROBUST. OUR COMMENTS MAY FOR THE MOMENT HAVE REDRESSED THE BALANCE IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MIND.

7. INSTRUCTIONS TO CERTAIN POSTS FOLLOW SEPARATELY.
GILMOUR

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