

HGM (79) 5th Session

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
LUSAKA, 1-7 AUGUST 1979

*RECORD of the Fifth Session held at Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka
on Friday, 3 August, 1979 at 9.45 a.m.*

Present:

His Excellency, Dr. K. D. Kaunda, President of Zambia
(in the Chair)

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| The Right Hon. Malcolm Fraser, M P,
Prime Minister of Australia | The Right Hon. Lynden O. Pindling,
M P, Prime Minister of the Bahamas |
| HE Mr. Ziaur Rahman, President of
Bangladesh | The Right Hon. J. M. G. M. Adams,
M P, Prime Minister of Barbados |
| HE Sir Seretse Khama, President of
Botswana | The Right Hon. Mrs. Margaret
Thatcher, M P, Prime Minister of
Britain |
| The Right Hon. Joe Clark, Prime
Minister of Canada | HE Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, President
of Cyprus |
| The Hon. M. A. Douglas, Minister of
Finance, Trade and Industry,
Dominica | The Right Hon. Ratu Sir Kamisea
Mara, Prime Minister of Fiji |
| HE Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara,
President of The Gambia | HE Mrs. Gloria Nikoi, Commissioner
for Foreign Affairs, Ghana |
| The Hon. M. Bishop, Prime Minister of
Grenada | The Hon. R. E. Jackson, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Guyana |
| The Hon. Shyam Nandan Mishra,
Foreign Minister, India | The Hon. Michael Manley, Prime
Minister of Jamaica |
| HE Mr. Daniel T. Arap Moi, M P,
President of Kenya | HE Mr. I. T. Tabai, President of
Kiribati |
| The Hon. C. D. Molapo, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Lesotho | Mr. J. B. Mkandawire, Deputy Secre-
tary to the President and Cabinet,
Malawi |
| The Hon. Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen
bin Tengku Ismail, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Malaysia | The Hon. Dr. Philip Muscat, M P,
Minister of Education, Malta |
| Dr. The Right Hon. Sir Seewoosagur
Ramgoolam, Prime Minister of
Mauritius | The Right Hon. R. D. Muldoon,
Prime Minister of New Zealand |
| HE Major-General H. E. O. Adefope,
Commissioner for External Affairs,
Nigeria | The Right Hon. Michael T. Somare,
CH, M P, Prime Minister of Papua
New Guinea |
| The Hon. George Odum, Deputy
Prime Minister, St. Lucia | HE Mr. F. A. Rene, President of
Seychelles |
| HE Dr. Siaka Stevens, President of
Sierra Leone | The Hon. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime
Minister of Singapore |

The Right Hon. Peter Kenilorea, Prime Minister of Solomon Islands

The Hon. Prince Nqaba, Minister for Commerce, Industry, Mines and Tourism, Swaziland

HRH Prince Tuipelehake, Prime Minister of Tonga

HE Mr. Godfrey Binaisa, President and Chairman of the National Executive Committee, Uganda

The Hon. R. Premadasa, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka

HE Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania

HE Mr. Eustace Seignoret, High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Trinidad and Tobago

The Hon. Vaovasamanaia Filipo, Minister for Finance, Western Samoa

HE Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, *Secretary-General*

Also present:

AUSTRALIA

The Hon. Andrew Peacock
Mr. A. T. Griffith

BANGLADESH

The Hon. Prof. Shamsul Huq
Mr. Farooq Sobhan

BOTSWANA

The Hon. A. M. Mogwe
Mr. L. J. M. J. Legwaila

CANADA

The Hon. Flora MacDonald
Mr. Michael Shenstone

DOMINICA

Mr. J. N. Johnson

THE GAMBIA

The Hon. L. K. Jabang
Mr. F. A. J. M'Boge

GRENADA

Mr. G. Louison
HE Mr. Fennis Augustine

INDIA

Mr. J. S. Mehta
HE Mr. K. Natwar-Singh

KENYA

The Hon. C. Njonjo
The Hon. Dr. M. Waiyaki

THE BAHAMAS

HE Mr. R. F. Anthony Roberts
Mr. H. L. Turnquest

BARBADOS

The Hon. H. de B. Forde
Mr. A. W. Symmonds

BRITAIN

The Right Hon. The Lord Carrington
Sir Antony Duff

CYPRUS

HE Mr. Nicos Rolandis
HE Mr. Filios Grammenopoulos

FIJI

Mr. J. Kotobalavu
Mr. R. T. Sanders

GHANA

HE Mr. E. M. Debrah
Mr. S. E. Quarm

GUYANA

The Hon. Dr. M. Shahabuddeen
HE Mr. Cedric Joseph

JAMAICA

The Hon. Carlyle Dunkley
Dr. R. B. Manderson-Jones

KIRIBATI

Mr. A. Baiteke
Mr. A. O. Davies

LESOTHO

The Hon. C. D. Mofeli
Mr. T. T. Thahane

MALTA

Dr. A. S. Trigona
Mr. E. A. Causon

NEW ZEALAND

Mr. F. H. Corner
Mr. A. M. Bisley

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Mr. Mekera Marauta
Miss Jean Kekedo

SEYCHELLES

Mr. E. Etienne
Mr. F. Marie

SINGAPORE

The Hon. C. T. Goh
Mr. Lim Chee Onn

SRI LANKA

The Hon. Ranil Wickremasinghe
Mr. Bradman Weerakoon

TANZANIA

The Hon. B. Mkapa
Mr. P. Msekwa

UGANDA

The Hon. Otema Allimadi
Mr. Tumusiime Mutebile

MALAYSIA

Mr. P. A. Hamid
Mr. Ajit Singh

MAURITIUS

The Hon. Sir Harold Walter
The Hon. R. Ghurburrun

NIGERIA

HE Ambassador S. U. Yolah
HE Ambassador E. N. Oba

ST. LUCIA

Mr. Earl Huntley

SIERRA LEONE

The Hon. Dr. Abdulai O. Conteh
Mr. Victor Sumner

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Mr. Francis Bugotu
Mr. Frank Saemala

SWAZILAND

The Hon. S. S. Nxumalo
Dr. E. V. Dlamini

TONGA

HRH Prince Tupouto'a
Mr. T. Tufui

WESTERN SAMOA

HE Mr. M. I. Toma
Mr. A. L. Hutchison

ZAMBIA

The Hon. R. C. Kamanga
The Hon. W. M. Chakulya

Secretariat:

Mr. D. A. Anderson
Prof. K. S. Murshid
Mr. M. Malhoutra
Mr. G. M. Brownbill
Mr. H. M. Lynch-Shyllon
Prof. Sir Kenneth Stuart
Mr. C. W. Sanger
Mr. R. G. Brown
Mr. A. V. Hayday
Mr. S. J. Stellini

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

Dr. Kaunda drew attention to the document which had been circulated—the Report of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa, June 1977–June 1979, HGM (79) 10. In inviting *Dr. Nyerere* to introduce the item, he referred to him as the doyen of the Commonwealth, not only because of his length of time in office but also in terms of his deep-rooted love for mankind. In addition, his struggles for his country's independence and the support he had given to various liberation movements in Southern Africa, including UNIP, when Zambia was struggling for independence, clearly qualified him to make the key address.

Dr. Nyerere, Tanzania, commented that he did not consider himself Dean of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth, that honour belonged to *Eric Williams* who was not at the Meeting.

He was going to assume that all those present, without exception, wished to see an end to the war in Rhodesia and the establishment of a democratic system of government there. Rhodesia had been, and still was, dominated by a racial minority. In law it was a British colony, and in pursuing its policy of decolonisation Britain had, except in two cases, consistently transferred power to an elected government with a democratic constitution. Most of those present around the table were there because of that policy and whatever their other differences they were united in support of that policy. He believed that no member of the Commonwealth was willing to acquiesce in the creation of another South Africa which had been the product of an earlier phase of British decolonisation and which had become an object lesson of the dangers of failing to transfer power firmly to the mass of the people.

Since their previous Meeting in 1977 there had been a political change in Rhodesia. There was a majority of black faces in the Salisbury Parliament, a black Prime Minister and a black President. The colour change had followed elections on what purported to be a one-person-one-vote basis, and 64 per cent of the electorate, as estimated by the Smith regime, was said to have voted. Whether one believed the election process itself to have been free and fair depended upon whether one believed free elections were possible on a battle-field when they were organised by one of the contending armies, and perhaps upon whether one believed the Boyd Report or the Chitness and Palley Reports. But whatever the truth about the freedom of people to take part in, or to boycott, the election, all of those present knew that the Constitution of what called itself Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was the real issue. He did not consider it necessary to argue the case for saying that the Constitution was not democratic. The Secretary-General's Report summarised the position very well and he did not propose to repeat it. Not only were those fighting against the rebel regime excluded both from the preparation of the Constitution and participation in the so-called elections, but also the Constitution did not involve a real transfer of power from the minority to the majority. The levers of government power had been put beyond the reach of the Cabinet and retained by the minority community. The change, although visible, was therefore more cosmetic than real. Consequently it did not end the war. Instead, the war against Zambia, Mozambique, and against the freedom fighters continued as before; the liberation forces had neither political nor military reason to lay down their arms and Africa did not have any reason to urge the freedom fighters to stop the armed struggle.

He hoped, therefore, that the Commonwealth could, at its Meeting, reach a consensus on action which could bring the war to an end by establishing a democratic system of government for Rhodesia. That could be done if all acted purposefully in accordance with modern Commonwealth traditions and if all co-operated to get the Rhodesians over the last hurdle.

The principle of majority rule had been accepted in words by all Rhodesians and that, in itself, was an advance. However, what was necessary but still lacking,

was a Rhodesian constitution which established majority rule, which could be recognised by all as democratic and in support of which all could use their influence on the contending groups. Britain had the responsibility, the experience and, he hoped, the political will to produce such a constitution and to put it to an all-parties constitutional conference. The Commonwealth might also have some local knowledge or other special qualifications to help in that exercise.

He acknowledged that there were minority communities in Rhodesia, but Rhodesia was not unique in that regard. The constitutions of many countries made special provision for the parliamentary representation of minorities which might not otherwise be elected—many African Commonwealth countries, including his own, had started independence with such provisions. Tanganyika's Independence Constitution had guaranteed the Asian community 11 and the European community 10 seats in the National Assembly. He believed that New Zealand had such provision for the Maori people.

Mr. Muldoon, New Zealand, concurred, saying that such a provision had been in effect for a century.

Dr. Nyerere, continuing, also referred to Australia and Canada which both had indigenous minorities. Although he did not know the actual position in those countries, he could conceive that the minorities might have special and guaranteed representation in their legislatures. Britain also had recognisable minorities of immigrants whose children would be full citizens of that country. Although it was more difficult to envisage the possibility of special minority representation at Westminster, such representation would not be considered an offence against the concept of democracy. However, what was not conceivable, was that any of those countries—Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or any African state—could ever agree to giving those minorities political power beyond that contained in their special Parliamentary representation. The demand for a democratic Rhodesian constitution similarly did not rule out the existence of reserved seats for minorities—even out of proportion to their numbers—but it did exclude control being retained by the minority community over the Judiciary, the Public Service, the Police and Armed Forces, the economy and many kinds of legislation through constitutional devices, entrenched clauses, and transitional arrangements which made any talk of majority rule ridiculous.

The first requirement in Rhodesia, therefore, was a democratic constitution. The second requirement was that the government formed under such a constitution should be chosen through fair and free elections. It was not possible just to introduce a new constitution and to co-opt representatives of the external nationalists into the Salisbury Government structure. Everyone had to feel involved and committed to working on the basis of a new constitution. The only hope of that happening would be if the people themselves could express their opinion about all those who were contending for governmental power. It had to be recognised, however, that free and fair elections in Rhodesia were only possible if there was a cease-fire and if they were internationally organised and supervised. He hoped that the Commonwealth and all its members would be able and willing to play a part in that process and to assist the responsible power, Britain, both in election supervision and in the interim arrangements which internationally supervised elections presupposed. Those two conditions—a democratic constitution and internationally supervised elections—were essential if the war in Rhodesia was to be brought to an end quickly and by means other than military victory.

His third proposal, which he said he was making with some diffidence, was intended to make the first two proposals easier to implement. It had no other purpose. He had wanted to make the proposal both in 1973 and in 1975 but on both occasions had been discouraged from doing so. He had subsequently put it in writing and wished, at the present Meeting, to revive the suggestion that

there should be established a Commonwealth Resettlement Programme and Fund for those Rhodesian whites who did not wish to live and work under an African government. He knew and accepted the argument that an independent Zimbabwe would need the skills and capital of its white citizens. However, the history of Rhodesia indicated that many of the white community were just not willing to work for and with a real African government, either because they were racists or because they were unable to accept the loss of economic privilege which majority rule would necessarily involve. At the present time, such people were fighting to maintain the dominant position of the minority. If they could be provided with a chance to leave Rhodesia in peace and with some money for resettlement elsewhere, that would make a contribution to shortening the war and reducing the suffering of both black and white. He believed that genuine white Rhodesians would stay; they would not leave their country because such an opportunity existed. However, it had been estimated that something like 30 per cent of Rhodesia's present white population had entered that country since UDI. Those immigrants were involved in the fighting; they were helping to keep it going. It was arguable though whether they were really Rhodesians willing to serve their country, whatever happened. He recalled that Kenya was often quoted as a good example of racial harmony and political stability since independence, but pointed out that what was not so often quoted was the fact that the Kenya white settlers had been paid large sums of money by Britain so as to make possible that racial harmony and peaceful transition into independence. Assisting the white opponents of majority rule to leave Rhodesia would save human lives and money and would be a service to international peace. The present trend of white emigration from that country suggested that such a move would not be unwelcome to many of those who now constituted a barrier to peace and democracy.

He stressed that it was on those three points, and especially on the first two, that he hoped a Commonwealth consensus for action could be obtained. He had been very encouraged at the Opening Session by Mrs. Thatcher's statement that the British Government was wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia and that its aim was to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the Commonwealth and the international community as a whole would find acceptable. He was looking forward to a more specific statement about the British Government's proposals and plans.

He observed that Bishop Muzorewa and Ian Smith were taking a very hard line and refusing to face up to the need for major constitutional changes. They were doing so because they believed that sanctions would come to an end, and recognition would be forthcoming on the existing constitutional basis or after a few more cosmetic changes. It was essential that they were made to realise that that would not happen, and that the only way to get sanctions lifted was to accept a democratic constitution and internationally supervised elections. To lift sanctions on any basis less than that would be a betrayal of all the principles of justice which the Commonwealth tried to stand for. It would also be an announcement to the whole world, including its racists and tyrants, that justice could be defied with impunity so far as the Commonwealth was concerned. Certainly the war would not be brought to an end by the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia before a democratically elected government had been brought into existence. The only effect of such an action would be to make the war more prolonged, more racialist and more internationalised. If there was a failure to provide the alternative of a real transfer of power through international action, then the war would continue until the nationalists had won, however long that took. He did not believe that any member of the Commonwealth would be made happy by such a prospect; but it was the logic of any failure to achieve a genuine transfer of power by non-military pressures. It was therefore necessary to remember that those who were fighting for the liberation of their country were doing so not because they preferred the bullet but because the ballot was denied them. They were still being denied a meaningful ballot, but the changes which had taken place had

been achieved because thousands of young men were willing to die, and had died, in order that some might live in freedom. The Meeting could help to make more dying and more killing unnecessary; it could help to end the war in Rhodesia.

Dr. Nyerere concluded by saying that the Commonwealth itself might be jeopardised if it failed to act immediately to bring justice to the people of Zimbabwe. A prolonged and internationalised war would inevitably divide the Commonwealth and even that might not be the worst international effect. He hoped, therefore, that, together, the members of the Commonwealth would decide to stop the drift to disaster by working in co-operation for an early and genuine transfer of power to the majority of the people of Zimbabwe.

Dr. Kaunda, before inviting Mr. Moi to speak, thought it would be useful if the Meeting reflected briefly on the history of Kenya. He recalled that when Mzee Jomo Kenyatta led the people of Kenya in their struggle against colonialism, one British Governor had referred to him as the "leader of death and darkness". Subsequently, he was referred to by the same people as "the leader of the most civilised country in independent Africa". He hoped that in the same way the time would come soon when those who were currently called "terrorists" could be called "gentlemen" and "great leaders of the world". He reminded the Meeting that before Mzee's death, there had been much speculation by the media as to what would happen to Kenya once Mzee had died. However, to the credit of Mr. Moi and his colleagues, Kenya had not only been kept together, but was moving forward in the right direction.

Mr. Moi, Kenya, expressed the hope that the present Meeting would be the last to discuss Zimbabwe in war and that by the time of the next Meeting Zimbabwe would be living in peace.

Before commenting on Southern Africa, however, he wished to take the opportunity to comment on the situation in Uganda. Although it could be argued that the Tanzanian/Uganda issue was a bilateral matter, Kenya as a neighbour of Uganda had made its own contribution. Since 1971 it had shared the burden of refugees and had made sacrifices by employing doctors, teachers and others in the private sector as well as businessmen who had come to Kenya because of the instability and insecurity in Uganda. As a member of the Commonwealth, Kenya cherished its ideals and felt that by doing so it set an example to the racist regime in South Africa. Similarly, Kenya proposed to co-operate in so far as the East African Community was concerned. However, he wished to point out that Kenya's border with Tanzania was closed by Tanzania, thus limiting the extent of Kenya's co-operation.

Referring to Kenya's struggle for independence, he noted that it had started from within. The leader of that struggle had sprung from the people and his support came from them. Following independence, expectations had been high and Kenya's leader recognised that they could not be fulfilled immediately. The life of the new nation started slowly and survived because of his understanding of the problems facing it at the time.

Turning to the problems of Southern Africa, he stressed that the difficulties facing humanity were caused by hate. Hate between the races in the Southern part of Africa was the biggest weapon and could not be removed overnight. Unless love and unity could emerge to create confidence the difficulties would continue. He agreed that a democratic government must be established in Rhodesia, but wondered how this could be done. The current international political scene was characterised by instability and time had already been spent discussing various aspects of that. All were agreed that what was required was concerted action if the adverse effects of political instability on humanity were to be alleviated. The suffering by refugees in South East Asia, Africa and

indeed the rest of the world needed to be viewed as a common problem requiring a common approach and urgent action. Current efforts to seek realistic solutions to the refugee problem in South East Asia had to be extended to cover similar problems in other parts of the world, especially Africa which already had more than four million refugees. However, if there was to be any progress in solving the problems, attempts also needed to be made to determine the causes of such problems.

The Commonwealth stood for certain definite values and all needed to have the political courage to make bold decisions whenever they were called for. This was especially urgent in respect of the inalienable rights of a people to independence. Freedom was indivisible; people were either free or not free. Zimbabwe was not yet free, and it was the duty of the British Government, in consultation with other Commonwealth Governments, to provide definite guidelines for a genuine transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe. If nothing was done at the Meeting to cause an end to the killing and suffering then the high expectations already built up in Africa and in world opinion by the occasion of the Meeting would not be satisfied.

He had felt reassured by the remarks made by the British Prime Minister that Britain remained faithfully committed to her political responsibility over Rhodesia to ensure a genuine black majority rule in that country. It was his hope that that bold statement would be followed rapidly by appropriate action to bring legality in Zimbabwe on the basis of an independent constitution transferring real power to the people. He believed that it was within the competence of the Meeting to pronounce itself on that issue and to recommend positive measures: namely, a return to legality; an agreement to review the constitution with the view to rendering it acceptable to the people of Zimbabwe as a whole—a round-table conference involving all freedom fighters; a general amnesty for all freedom fighters; free elections supervised by acceptable international arrangements; and eventual transfer of real power to the black majority through the ballot box. In his view, those five proposals would bring some tangible hope to the people of Zimbabwe. It was important that Mr. Nkomo, Mr. Mugabe, Bishop Muzorewa, and Mr. Sithole and the others should all sit together and talk about the future of Rhodesia.

Mrs. Thatcher, Britain, acknowledged that the problems of Southern Africa were not limited to Rhodesia but she considered that it was the British position on Rhodesia that her colleagues would wish to hear about. The Rhodesian question had hung over the Commonwealth for many years. The present trouble began in 1965 when the then Rhodesian Government made the illegal declaration of independence. That was followed by years in which the efforts of successive British Governments to achieve a settlement based on the wishes of the majority of the people of Rhodesia were frustrated. They were years in which the political rights of the majority were denied. Then came the war which brought great hardship and suffering both inside Rhodesia and in neighbouring countries. What began as a struggle between the white minority and the black majority had more recently taken on a very different dimension. As Dr. Nyerere had said there was now in Rhodesia an African President, an African Prime Minister and an African majority in Parliament. There had been elections in which for the first time the African majority had been able to elect the leaders of the Government.

There were those who appeared to believe that the world should simply go on treating Bishop Muzorewa as if he were Mr. Smith. The change that had taken place in Rhodesia, however, could not be dismissed as being of no consequence. It was the British Government's view that the opportunity created by the changes which had taken place in Rhodesia should be exploited to see if the solution, for so long elusive, could now be found. The people of Rhodesia deserved every assistance to help them to resolve their political differences

peacefully rather than by force. There were no longer issues dividing the people of Rhodesia which warranted the use of the bomb and the gun to kill and maim men, women and children by the thousand, or which could justify the misery of hundreds of thousands in refugee camps.

The changes that had taken place had provided the basis from which a solution capable of winning general international acceptance could now be developed. Britain had already held extensive consultations. On the British Government's behalf, Lord Harlech had met the heads of government of seven African states, as well as Mr. Mugabe and representatives of Mr. Nkomo. Richard Luce, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had been in touch with the governments of a further five African countries. Britain had also been in contact with all the other members of the Commonwealth, with its European Community partners and with the US. Those consultations had been of great value to the British Government in helping to identify what the solution should be.

Mrs. Thatcher expressed appreciation to all those Commonwealth leaders who had assisted Britain. From those consultations certain common factors had clearly emerged. The first and most fundamental was the view that the constitution under which Bishop Muzorewa had come to power was defective in certain important respects. Those defects were apparent in the provisions which made it possible for the white minority to block in the Parliament constitutional changes that would be unwelcome to them. That was a valid criticism. Such a blocking mechanism had not appeared in any other independence constitution agreed to by the British Parliament. The principle that there should be some guaranteed representation for minority communities during a certain minimum period following the transfer of power on independence was not new. The importance to Rhodesia of encouraging the European minority to remain and to continue to play a useful part in the life of the community was not being challenged but that was a very different matter from enabling them to block all change.

The second common factor was the other main criticism of the constitution relating to the composition and powers of the various service commissions. That criticism was also valid. It was clearly wrong that the Government should not have adequate control over certain senior appointments.

The third common factor was that those consulted also considered it essential that the circumstances for a solution should involve the present external parties so that their supporters outside the country might return home in peace and play their full part in the future political life of the country.

The fourth factor to emerge from the consultations was the general conviction that any solution of the Rhodesia problem should derive its authority from Britain as the responsible colonial power. The international community had, in fact, lost few opportunities to emphasise that it was Britain's constitutional responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis of justice and democracy, fully comparable with the arrangements which it had made for the independence of other countries. Britain accepted that responsibility and had every intention of discharging it honourably.

The British Government had looked forward to the present Meeting as an important stage in that process of consultation before it made its final policy decision and initiated what it was to be hoped would prove to be the final approach to a solution. Mrs. Thatcher indicated that the British Government would welcome further views on the problem from Commonwealth colleagues although she pointed out that the British Government had reached a stage where it believed it could see the form that an attempt at a solution should take. She felt she should make certain points about the British position quite clear. The

British Government was wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia. It accepted that it was Britain's constitutional responsibility to grant legal independence on that basis, and that only Britain could do it. It also accepted that the objective must be to establish that independence on the basis of a constitution comparable with the constitutions which Britain had agreed with other countries. Finally it was deeply conscious of the urgent need to bring peace to the people of Rhodesia and its neighbours. Britain would, therefore, present its proposals as quickly as possible to all the parties and at the same time call on them to cease hostilities and move forward together to a settlement. Britain's aim was to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the Commonwealth and the international community as a whole would find acceptable. There was now a chance to achieve that, and it must be taken.

Mr. Premadasa, Sri Lanka, referred initially to the remarks which Mr. Adams had made during the Third Session concerning Sri Lanka's stand on Belize. It was possible that Sri Lanka's vote had been incorrectly recorded at the UN General Assembly on one occasion, but Sri Lanka's position had always been in support of the territorial integrity of Belize and of the inalienable right of its people to self-determination and independence. Sri Lanka, in fact, was one of the 25 Non-Aligned countries which had sponsored a resolution in the UN General Assembly in 1975 calling for recognition of Belize's right to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity. The most recent resolution of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, of which Sri Lanka was the current Chairman, also reaffirmed that stand. Sri Lanka supported that policy unequivocally. Britain had a special responsibility to ensure that Belize attained a secure independence.

The need to declare the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was a matter of the greatest concern to Sri Lanka. Her interest stemmed directly from the desire to ensure that nations of the region were left to live in peace without any outside interference. Great power rivalry for influence in any area heightened tensions which already existed there and could often threaten the region's peace and stability. Sri Lanka was happy that some states, which had previously been members of military alliances, had now withdrawn their membership. Military pacts and alliances, whatever their objectives, were contrary to the requirements of peace. Equally, the existence of foreign bases, military installations and the like, far from leading to a relaxation of international tensions, only intensified them. Sri Lanka similarly insisted that the regional powers in the Indian Ocean should also exercise restraint and act in the interests of peace. That approach had been fundamental to Sri Lanka's way of thinking from the very inception of her efforts to establish the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was adopted in the UN in 1971 and it was a matter of regret that not much progress had been made in its implementation despite the fact that the *ad hoc* committee set up for that purpose had been in continuous session. It was nonetheless heartening that the countries of the region had met recently in New York and reaffirmed their commitment to the Declaration. Those countries looked forward to an early resumption of negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union which would result in the de-militarisation of the area.

Mr. Premadasa recalled that the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries which had met in Colombo in June had unequivocally supported the view that the regime in Rhodesia resulting from the election in April was illegal and was a manoeuvre designed to perpetuate racist minority rule under a new guise. Sri Lanka fully supported the three-point plan proposed by the President of Tanzania earlier in the session for a peaceful settlement as a practical solution for the Rhodesian dispute.

Mr. Binaisa, Uganda, remarked that it was paradoxical that Rhodesia, which was one of the first African countries to be settled by the British, should be the

last country to be granted legal independence. The test was whether Britain would be able to grant legal independence to the only remaining colony in Africa. People tended to remember what came last rather than what came first. People would not remember March 1957 when the first black African country, Ghana, was granted independence, but they would remember if the present Meeting failed to result in independence for the last black colony on the African continent.

Aspects of Mrs. Thatcher's outline on how Britain proposed to solve this problem had been impressive but it would have been more helpful if she had spelt out the plan in more detail. It would not be easy to convince those now fighting to put down their arms for the sake of a few pleasantries offered at the Meeting. They would want to know the details of the plan. General de Gaulle had been confronted by a formidable task in granting independence to Algeria which was geographically close to France and where, at the time, one million Frenchmen lived. He nonetheless had the courage of his convictions. He recalled his generals from Algeria and reached a settlement with the Algerian freedom fighters. Unless Britain was prepared to act along similar lines in the case of Rhodesia it was difficult to see how the present conflict would end. There were only 240,000 whites in the colony. Ian Smith and his generals, furthermore, were confronted by the most courageous and committed fighters who were determined to continue the struggle until they had gained their freedom.

Recognition of the Muzorewa Government was tantamount to granting legitimacy to a poacher who had become a gamekeeper. Muzorewa had been appointed to a place of trust by the leaders of the Freedom Movement to represent them and it was in that capacity that he attracted the attention of Ian Smith. Smith recruited him to do the dirty work for white minority interests because he was a black. In such a light the Bishop could hardly be described as a genuine freedom fighter who had taken initiatives on behalf of the people of Zimbabwe. Smith and his henchmen committed high treason by proclaiming the territory independent of British control. They were not apprehended or convicted for it. They proceeded to encourage those Africans who remained in Rhodesia to participate in an election which they believed would give their white regime an aura of respectability in the eyes of the international community. For that reason many Africans considered that Muzorewa had betrayed them. They therefore tended to associate him with Ian Smith and refused to recognise his government.

Some people contended that the length of time that white people had lived in Rhodesia was one factor in support of the argument that special consideration should be given to them during the first few years of independence. The criterion for the granting of special rights to white minorities during the post-independence period, however, should not be based on the length of time white people had lived in Rhodesia, but on the degree to which they were committed to the country's future. That approach had been successfully implemented in Kenya and it could be repeated in Rhodesia. The British Government should be prepared to give the full details on how it proposed to resolve the conflict. The arrangement entered into between Smith and Muzorewa did not provide the basis for a solution. Britain must be prepared to listen to the demands of the freedom fighters. He echoed what Dr. Kaunda had said about Kenya. The same thing could well be repeated in the case of the freedom fighters in Rhodesia.

A major cause of the failure to resolve the conflict was the fear which many Rhodesian whites held for their future in an independent Zimbabwe. The whites in Kenya had previously harboured similar fears but these had been dispelled once Mzee had demonstrated that he could handle power with responsibility. The same kind of responsibility would be demonstrated by the present leaders of the Zimbabwean Freedom Movement in an independent Zimbabwe. It was the whites' fear of the unknown which had caused so much of the hatred. Such fears, however, were groundless. Their forefathers had opened up Rhodesia and had done a tremendous amount of work in constructing roads, schools and

hospitals. Commonwealth members had similarly derived much from their association with Britain over many years but Britain had placed many of them in a difficult position over the Rhodesian question and many were now having to consider whether it really was to their benefit to remain part of the Commonwealth.

Dr. Stevens, Sierra Leone, expressed his appreciation for the hospitality accorded to Commonwealth members by Dr. Kaunda and his Government, particularly in view of the difficult economic circumstances which Zambia was experiencing.

Sierra Leone fully endorsed the proposals made by President Nyerere for resolving the conflict in Rhodesia, particularly because he had suggested constructive alternatives and not simply indulged in criticism as often happened at conferences.

Most of the aspects of the Rhodesia problem had already been treated in detail during the session although the question of sanctions needed to be further examined. That fundamental issue had tended to be forgotten during the long period that the Rhodesian dispute had continued. Sanctions were first imposed on the regime in Rhodesia not because of the internal political and constitutional arrangements but because of the forcible departure by that regime from the path of constitutional rectitude as understood in the Commonwealth. The unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 was an act of rebellion against the lawful authority of the administering power, Britain, and Rhodesia was still in a state of rebellion. The return of Rhodesia to legality and its full subscription to the principles of majority government was the challenge now facing the Commonwealth. As Britain had previously done in granting independence to virtually every other state represented at the Meeting, it would be appropriate if the British Government invited all the interested parties in Zimbabwe to a Lancaster House-type conference which would ensure the representation of all political interests.

He had been much impressed by the cordial atmosphere, the sense of responsibility and dedication prevailing in the Meeting. He had noted carefully the British Prime Minister's assurances concerning the future of Zimbabwe but they still left doubts in some minds. A readiness on the part of Britain to provide fuller details of its programme for granting independence to Zimbabwe would help to allay those doubts. If the problem were allowed to continue much longer it could well jeopardise the existence of the Commonwealth. In the case of both Zimbabwe and South Africa, dangerous forces were waiting in the wings to take advantage of every mistake. It was therefore imperative that the Meeting came to some decision on Rhodesia. Britain would be able to close her colonial era in a spirit of dedication, and joy if it handled that last matter responsibly.

Mr. Clark, Canada, observed that he was very pleased that his intervention was following the wise words of the President of Sierra Leone, whose contribution had been very constructive. He was struck particularly by *Dr. Stevens'* reference to the atmosphere of mutual understanding that had permeated the discussion that morning and which was such a valued tradition in the Commonwealth. One of the things that had certainly been evident in the discussion was the willingness on the part of all participants to recognise the different and often difficult situations that each leader faced at home and of which they had to take account in the contributions they made to, and the decisions they took at, the Meeting. He had been particularly pleased and encouraged by the common determination of the spokesmen for both the Front-Line States and Britain to make some very real progress on the Rhodesian issue and, as the President of Sierra Leone had remarked, to come to the table not simply to express concern or to speak about the past, but with the clear intention of trying to find concrete areas on which agreement could be based.

As Prime Minister Manley had said the Meeting was at least moving forward. One test of the wisdom of any national leader participating in international consultations was the ability to recognise when general agreement had been reached. While there were some very important matters of practical detail that still had to be discussed in relation to the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia issue—elections, sanctions, and the status of various armed forces—those matters would probably be more usefully considered over the weekend, when they would have an opportunity to discuss particular points they wished to include in the Communiqué. For that reason, while he would have some other comments to make about Rhodesia at a later stage he wanted to say something now about Namibia, that other issue in Southern Africa that had preoccupied the Commonwealth, and indeed the UN and the world, for many years.

In spite of very many years of struggle, reinforced by the firm support of all African nations particularly the Front-Line States, and by pressure from the international community as a whole, the people of Namibia had still been unable to achieve genuine independence. In April 1977 Canada had joined with the four other Western members of the Security Council, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the UK and the US, to try to find some practical way to bring about the peaceful transition to independence in Namibia under UN auspices in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 385. The Governments of the Five believed that such an approach was the approach best designed to bring about an internationally acceptable solution and in a just and fair manner. The 1977 Meeting had noted the five power initiative and expressed the hope that it would contribute to a transfer of power within the framework of principles established by UN resolutions, particularly Security Council Resolution 385.

Since that time, Canada and its partners in the Five had devoted a great deal of energy and effort to that initiative. One by one a number of the major problems had been resolved and the gap between the two sides gradually narrowed. In due course the Five were able to make a specific proposal. He wished to express deep appreciation to the Front-Line States and to Nigeria for their very constructive and helpful efforts during the past two years, efforts which had played a major part in the progress that had been achieved so far towards the mutual goal of an independent Namibia. The Five were particularly grateful for the valuable personal support of President Kaunda, President Nyerere, Sir Seretse Khama and General Obasanjo. With the agreement in 1978 of both South Africa and SWAPO to the Western proposals and their endorsement by the Security Council, it really seemed as if an historic moment had been reached. It had been expected that very soon thereafter the implementation of the Western proposals and the arrival of the UN Transitional Assistance Group would begin and it was hoped that by the time Commonwealth leaders met in Lusaka Namibia would be well under way towards independence. Unfortunately there had been long delays in obtaining agreement to the UN Secretary-General's plan for implementing the proposals. The plan had been approved by the Security Council in September 1978 in Resolution 435 and developed in more detail in Dr. Waldheim's report of 26 February 1979. SWAPO had also agreed to the UN Secretary-General's plan. However, South Africa had maintained its objections to what it considered to be deviations from the original proposals. Specifically it objected to provisions in the Secretary-General's report which called for the restriction of SWAPO armed personnel inside Namibia at the time of the ceasefire to designated locations under UN supervision within Namibia, rather than stipulating the disarming of all SWAPO personnel within the territory. The South Africans also objected to the absence of specific provisions for UN bases outside Namibia.

It remained the very firm conviction of the Five that those few outstanding difficulties could be satisfactorily resolved so as not to impede further the implementation of the plan. To develop momentum, the Five had appointed

Sir James Murray as a special envoy to explore those problems. The Governments of the Five were united in their confidence in Sir James and were convinced that his discussions with the Government of South Africa would produce some positive results. Naturally a key factor would be the willingness of the principal participants and other interested parties to persevere in their efforts for a negotiated settlement. The Governments of the Five had every intention of continuing to work towards a peaceful resolution of the Namibia problem under UN auspices. They continued to believe that the implementation of resolution 435 and of the Secretary-General's report was the best available course for preventing further bloodshed and for bringing about an internationally acceptable settlement in that territory. He hoped that it may have been helpful to bring Commonwealth Heads of Government up to date on the situation as seen by the Five Governments designated by the UN to look into the question.

Dr. Kaunda thought there would be an exchange of views on the matter during the weekend and added that during the recent visit to Luanda of the Secretary-General of the UN, certain other developments had taken place which might help Heads of Government to persevere with the forward movement that Mr. Clark had referred to.

Mr. Clark looked forward to the opportunity for himself and for officials in the Canadian delegation of being brought up to date on new developments by the Front-Line States.

Mr. Muldoon, New Zealand, said he had listened with great interest to two very important addresses that morning one by the President of Tanzania, the other by the British Prime Minister. Each of them, after very careful deliberation, had analysed the vexed problem of Zimbabwe in a masterly fashion, in relation to the difficulties that Heads of Government face at the Meeting. On reflection it appeared to him that their views overlapped to such a great extent that there seemed a very real chance of achieving a positive result by the end of the Meeting. In his opinion each of them saw the principal defect of the situation at the present time to be the constitution. All the other points they had made were also valid but the constitution was the principal defect. President Nyerere had said "Britain can produce a constitution"—which was an important statement in itself—"and we out of our experience can advise". That was simple common sense. The Prime Minister of Britain had said, "We accept the responsibility and will present our proposals as soon as possible." Those two statements went to the heart of the matter. Moreover, each of them had also said, "Then we can end the war". Commonwealth leaders were obviously unanimous about that in order to bring to an end the human suffering and economic damage, but they would have to recognise that the cessation of hostilities would not be easy for either side. In their deliberations they would have to recognise too that there must be a harmonisation of views based on acceptance of the fundamental thesis that the constitution was defective and could not be allowed to stand in its present form and that something new must be put in its place.

The President of Kenya had also made a very important point when he referred to an amnesty. That was a point that should not be lost sight of and he believed that the amnesty must apply to everyone who had been engaged in the struggle in Zimbabwe. There must be no thought in anyone's mind that after peace had been achieved there would be some kind of retribution for all the terrible things that had been done by either side. As he had said at the beginning, very real progress had been made that morning, and he hoped the Meeting would be able to build on it.

Mr. Molapo, Lesotho, said that he too had listened with great interest to the contributions that had been made. The Commonwealth had been concerned with the Zimbabwean question for the past 14 years; it was now putting forward

possible solutions. However, in his view, the Commonwealth would be overlooking a very important fact if it failed to appreciate the role of South Africa behind the events in Zimbabwe. A few years before South Africa had committed itself to the principle that the struggle in Southern Africa would be won or lost on the Zambezi. That meant South Africa was committed to maintaining Zimbabwe as a buffer state and would therefore do everything in its power to have a government there which would be pliable and willing to work for the best interests of South Africa. If the Commonwealth overlooked that reality and thought it could achieve an easy solution to the Zimbabwean problem, it would find that the whole issue would ultimately have to be resolved through force.

Commonwealth leaders believed in democratic processes but at the same time they should be realistic and take the intransigence of South Africa into account. South Africa had hailed the so-called internal settlement and commended the April elections as a break-through in the longstanding deadlock, claiming that there would be peace between the internal and external groups in Zimbabwe. Indeed the internal settlement was an arrangement that had been manipulated by South Africa itself and certainly it could not have come about without South Africa's blessing since such an arrangement was so obviously to its advantage.

The so-called elections had taken place and the only result had been the entrenchment of the power of the white minority. The elections had been presented as an instrument for the transfer of power to the black majority, but an analysis of them and of the Constitution had demonstrated that the only positive outcome was the introduction of new faces in the regime. It had further been claimed that the participation of black Zimbabweans in the elections amounted to a referendum indicating their approval of the internal settlement. Sixty-four per cent of the black electorate were said to have voted. But it would be as well to remember what had happened at the Namibian elections in December 1978: Africans were carted into Namibia to participate in the vote—he personally knew the names of people who were sent. In those circumstances, how could it be maintained that the Namibia elections had established a valid government that was acceptable to the people of Namibia? The elections that were held in Zimbabwe must be regarded as unacceptable, for similar reasons.

Some people had maintained that amendments could be made to the Constitution. The Rhodesian Constitution had 170 clauses, 123 of which were entrenched in order to guarantee permanent power to the minority. A few years ago the Commonwealth, Britain included, declared that UDI was illegal. But it was being mooted in certain circles that UDI had been rendered legal or could be tacitly regarded as such. If Muzorewa had achieved any genuine power he could perhaps be said to have effected a UDI from Smith, but Smith outmanoeuvred him and changed the situation so as to make him a lackey, a front man whilst Smith retained the real power. For that reason the Lesotho Government felt it would be very wrong for the Commonwealth to try, directly or indirectly, to tamper with the Constitution in the erroneous belief that it could thus create an acceptable solution.

Lesotho refused to condone the legality of UDI in any circumstances and therefore maintained that the Constitution must be scrapped, must not even be considered. Legality must be restored. The Union Jack should once more fly over Salisbury, even if it were for only one hour. It must be demonstrated that legality had been restored to Rhodesia and then Britain should use the normal legal processes, that had been so ably analysed at the Meeting, for granting Rhodesia a constitution. Zimbabwe must be led to independence in exactly the same manner that all Britain's other colonies had attained their independence. He would therefore not fall in line with those who suggested that the present Rhodesian Constitution could be used as a basis for working out a solution. They should use the other independence constitutions in existence as a model, instead of trying to amend 170 objectionable clauses in order to remove the entrenchments.

Mr. Molapo added that he wished to note in passing that one of the biggest insults in the internal settlement constitution had been to call the country Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Cecil Rhodes was the greatest colonialist imperialist of the 19th century and Zimbabweans and other Africans were being asked to accept the perpetuation of his name in harness with that of Zimbabwe, a name which represented some of the greatest achievements of African culture.

He had listened with great interest to what the British Prime Minister had said, but he wished she had put forward definite and concrete steps to be taken to summon a constitutional conference where a new constitution would be formulated so that Zimbabwe was led to independence like other African states. He had paid great attention too to the suggestions that had been made by the President of Tanzania. He accepted them all with one reservation, he would not give a golden handshake to rebels.

Major General Adefope, Nigeria, said he wished to thank the Canadian Prime Minister for his statement on Namibia and to appeal to the Five to continue to put pressure on South Africa to persuade it to allow the UN contact group to enter Namibia. He himself had accompanied the leader of SWAPO to New York to ensure that he accepted the proposals, to ensure that he put in writing, in the form of a letter to the UN Secretary General, an undertaking that SWAPO would observe the cease-fire if South Africa would do the same. So he hoped that with continued pressure on South Africa it might still be possible to see a free and independent Namibia. South Africa was balking because SWAPO had pointed out certain flaws in the proposals which would have put it at a disadvantage if any elections were held.

On the problem of South Africa itself he did not think much needed to be said. It was a question of time. No Government could turn back the clock, and the evolution of history would continue in spite of all obstacles.

With regard to Zimbabwe, he recalled Dr. Kaunda quoting the previous evening a letter written by a small boy to God which had ended by saying that "God had better make it quick". He would say to the British Prime Minister that the British Government had also "better make it quick". At the same function Mr. Manley had said that a successful conference would provide a just solution to the problem of Zimbabwe. Later that evening Zambia's television programme closed with a meditation which ended with the words "once we allow the Commonwealth to break up, we are spiritually dead. May the Lord watch over you". He had wondered whether the speaker really meant physically dead. Some weeks before Mr. Julian Amery, a staunch member of the British Conservative Party, had stated that Nigeria was bankrupt, poor and in search of loans. Mr. Amery was quite right. Nigeria was poor; it was looking for loans and would accept them wherever it could get them. His country had a very large population—not less than 90 million—but Nigerians were committed and dedicated to the total liberation of Africa and that would continue to be the position when the new civilian government came to power in October. He therefore did not want the Nigerian position to be misunderstood.

He wished to ask the British Prime Minister the same question he had asked when Lord Harlech visited Lagos a few weeks earlier and to which his Government had still not received an answer. Ever since UDI, the British Government had assured African Governments that it had been making attempts to bring to an end the illegality of the Smith regime. The question he had asked Lord Harlech and was again asking was how the British Government intended to make that regime accept proposals that were acceptable to Africa and to the rest of the international community, and which Britain was considering putting forward in the face of the strong criticisms voiced at all international forums, including the UN, of the April elections. Lord Harlech had replied that he did not know but

thought it would be by persuasion and he himself had then told Lord Harlech that in that case there would be no hope of seeing an end to armed conflict in Zimbabwe.

If one read the Communiqué issued at the end of the 1977 Meeting in London, one found that the situation had not advanced an inch. No change of any kind had taken place in Zimbabwe. As he had just said, Nigeria would like to know how any new proposals would be implemented; his delegation would not wish to leave the present Meeting with a mere promise of new proposals that would be submitted at some unspecified future date. He felt the Meeting was entitled to know those proposals and also the time-frame for implementing them. Anything short of that would not be acceptable.

His Government saw the situation in Zimbabwe as embracing two issues. The first was that there must be genuine majority rule. In the London Communiqué, Heads of Government noted in that connection the statement of the administering power regarding its timetable for the independence of Zimbabwe in 1978. They had gone on further to recognise the need for practical measures to ensure the transfer of effective power, which included not only the removal of the Smith regime but also the dismantling of its apparatus of repression. But since 1977 that apparatus had increased in might, judging by the thousands of men, women and children who had been massacred in Mozambique, Zambia, and Angola. The second issue was the extension of apartheid, which was at the crux of the problem of Zimbabwe. As his colleague from Lesotho had first pointed out, the Commonwealth could not solve the problem of Zimbabwe because it was an extension of apartheid which had to be eliminated. Mere talking would not achieve that, however.

When the Anglo-American proposals were first put forward Nigeria gave them its full support. At every stage his Head of Government remained in communication with the British Prime Minister and President Carter regarding progress. They had died a natural death. Unfortunately, the promise held out by the British Prime Minister in her statement to the Meeting that morning did not inspire confidence that the end had been reached. If Commonwealth leaders had to leave the Meeting without hearing proposals for concrete measures for changing the situation in Zimbabwe within a time-frame, Nigeria would regard their gathering as a failure and would have to reconsider the usefulness of belonging to an association where its position was not taken into account, in view of the 1977 Communiqué, and its advice was disregarded. That statement should not, however, be seen as an attempt at blackmail but rather as a reflection of the depth of frustration his countrymen and other Africans felt about the Zimbabwean problem, which he hoped would not be minimised. He very much hoped, therefore, that it would be possible for the British Prime Minister to offer the Meeting some assurance that would give confidence that whatever proposals emerged from further consultations would be implemented. Nigeria would also want to be satisfied as to how the proposals were intended to be implemented.

Sir Dawda Jawara, The Gambia, recalled that he attended his first Commonwealth Meeting in the year of Rhodesian UDI, 1965. He endorsed the comment made by the President of Sierra Leone; in his view the atmosphere of the present discussion over the Rhodesian issue, which had been with the Commonwealth for so long, had been calmer, more realistic and more objective than he had witnessed before. Whether or not there had been any forward movement in the actual situation in Rhodesia, the atmosphere augured well for the Meeting reaching decisions which would have a positive affect on the situation in Zimbabwe.

He first wanted to congratulate President Nyerere for his exposé and his objective proposals. To echo the Foreign Minister of Lesotho, his only doubts

lay in the idea of seeking a solution through amending the internal settlement constitution. If amendment could be made which would satisfy all parties—and that, of course, was an important point of agreement between President Nyerere's statement and that of the British Prime Minister—it would be a great achievement for the Meeting, for Africa and for international peace. But he doubted whether it was possible. So, although he was very happy about the extent of the overlap between the Tanzanian and British proposals, the Meeting should not lose sight of the fact that an amended constitution stood only a slim chance of being universally accepted. He would, therefore, like for the record to make a proposal of his own. Not surprisingly, it had great similarities to the proposals made that morning as well as to the Anglo-American proposals.

He was convinced that if the Commonwealth really wanted to find a solution to the problem of Zimbabwe, it should go back to fundamentals. Britain, being technically and legally the administering power in Rhodesia, should first try to bring about a return to legality by assuming *de facto* control for her colonial territory. This would of course necessitate the surrender of power to Britain by the internal settlement Government. He was not proposing that it should be brought about by force, however. At earlier Commonwealth Meetings there were frequent calls for Britain to use force in Rhodesia in order to restore it to legality, but that stage had now passed. The surrender of power by the internal settlement Government should be brought about by negotiation, but for the regime to be persuaded to give up power there had to be a *quid pro quo*, which could be an undertaking by the Patriotic Front to agree to a ceasefire. Of course, Britain itself would have to be willing to resume its role of administering power in Rhodesia not only by establishing an administrative presence there but also by taking over the control of the military situation, either by itself or, as proposed by President Nyerere, in association with an international presence provided perhaps by the UN or the OAU. A constitutional conference should then be called by Britain, to be attended by all Rhodesian political parties and important sections of the Rhodesian community. That should take the form of the traditional constitutional conference that had served as the mechanism for leading most of the Commonwealth countries from colonial status to independence. After the outlines of a new constitution had been hammered out at such a conference, the next step would be for Britain, again with or without the assistance of outside powers, to supervise the elections based on the new constitution.

The merits of such a procedure would be the following: firstly, there would be a proper return to legality; secondly, the British Government would be playing, and would be seen to be playing, its proper role as administering authority in Rhodesia; thirdly, all parties concerned would have given up something in the spirit of compromise, inasmuch as the Patriotic Front would have to agree to a ceasefire, the internal settlement Government would have to surrender power to Britain, and Britain would have to agree to resume its proper role and authority in Rhodesia; and lastly, the people of Zimbabwe would have the chance freely and democratically to choose their new leaders, whoever they might be, under conditions of peace so that there would be no need to recognise any one faction as having the right to govern Rhodesia.

They might be radical or fundamental proposals, but he was convinced that in the new climate of compromise in the Commonwealth and with the necessary political will they would have a chance of succeeding. The opportunity for making them work was greatly enhanced by the Meeting being held in Lusaka. However, in advancing his proposals, he wished to stress that he also saw great merit in those put forward both by President Nyerere and Mrs. Thatcher. He hoped that the various views expressed could lead to an acceptable solution and to majority rule in Zimbabwe.

He wished to add a comment about the timing of sanctions and recognition. Those were most important matters if the desired results in Zimbabwe were to be

achieved. Sanctions should be maintained until legality was restored in Rhodesia, or until the unlikely event of a constitution drawn from outside Rhodesia being accepted by all the parties concerned. The same consideration also applied to the timing of recognition. Sanctions and recognition were the two main levers at the disposal of the international community for continuing to exercise an influence on the course of events in Rhodesia until a majority Government was established on the basis of a democratic constitution on which all were agreed. It was a very complex and difficult problem to resolve but he had no doubt that after their private discussions at the weekend Commonwealth leaders would be able to see some light, leading to a fairly early solution of that crucial issue.

The Chairman adjourned the Meeting at 1.10 p.m.

THE STYLE AND FORMAT OF COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

*Office of the Commonwealth Secretary-General,
Marlborough House, Pall Mall,
London SW1Y 5HX.*

19 June, 1979

C.152/1

At London, in June 1977, Heads of Government, after discussing in Restricted Session the question of the style and format of their Meeting, asked me to put forward for consideration at Lusaka suggestions responsive to their general wish to strengthen the special qualities of their consultations.

High among these qualities, as emphasised by Commonwealth leaders at London, was the character of the occasion as "their meeting"—as a meeting of Heads of Government. It is this character which, in many respects, gives the Meeting its unique flavour—even among other summit meetings. Heads of Government are not there to place their imprimatur on resolutions hammered out by ministers over preceding days or even in committees sitting contemporaneously. They do not come to deliver addresses to each other and to wider audiences beyond the conference room. They come to meet; to be with each other; to talk to one another; to strengthen their practical ways of co-operating within the Commonwealth association; to try to enlarge understanding of each other's point of view, and, therefore, the prospects for their convergence. They come knowing that they will not always agree, but mindful that their jointly shared objectives (as agreed, for example, at Singapore in the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles) imply that where they must agree to differ it should be on means, not ends.

Many elements of the style and format of Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings have contributed to giving them these qualities—and those elements have developed in pragmatic ways responsive to need, not fashion. As the Commonwealth has grown in number and variety there has come a greater consciousness of the importance of preserving these elements. The Ottawa Meeting in 1973 represented a particularly important moment of awareness, and the work of Commonwealth Senior Officials that preceded that Meeting contributed to the significant strengthening of the element of informality. The call in London was essentially for the avoidance of its erosion as the Commonwealth continues to grow from 32 member countries at Ottawa to 39 in Lusaka.

In responding to the request for suggestions then made I have, of course, taken full account of the discussion of this matter by Heads of Government at the London Meeting. I also sought the help of Senior Officials at their last meeting in Kuala Lumpur and have been greatly assisted by their ideas in formulating the suggestions now set out in the attached note. I hope these suggestions might be considered by Heads of Government immediately after the adoption of their Agenda at Lusaka so that the consultation there may benefit from the decisions reached upon them.

With deep respect,

(Signed) SHRIDATH S. RAMPHAL

SUGGESTIONS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

A. Speeches

- (i) It should be the general understanding among Heads of Government that set speeches in the form of prepared texts read at the Meeting would be avoided. This does not exclude interventions on the basis of prepared notes, nor does it debar a prepared statement where a Head of Government considers that special circumstances warrant it.
- (ii) As an exception to (i), Heads of Government requested to be lead speakers on particular Agenda items may, if they wish, make prepared presentations or, alternatively, speak to such a presentation which might then be circulated.
- (iii) As a corollary to (ii), it will be the aim to restrict lead speakers to one for each principal Agenda item or sub-item, although in special cases individual Heads of Government may be asked to initiate discussion on a particular issue within an item or sub-item.
- (iv) Apart from lead speakers, and then only where appropriate, interventions would not be in the nature of tours d'horizon but aim to be succinct and pithy, more in the nature of dialogue than debate.
- (v) Heads of Government could, where they consider it essential, ask the Secretariat to circulate to their colleagues prepared texts on particular issues on the Agenda of the Meeting—either in advance of its commencement or during its course.

B. Restricted Sessions

- (i) It should be the aim to have more Restricted Sessions—*i.e.* sessions limited to Heads of Government and the Secretary-General. No official record will be kept of these sessions, but, where they result in a consensus position, the Chairman will normally report this to the Executive Session and so have it incorporated in the records of the Meeting.
- (ii) There should be no press briefing on the substance of discussions in Restricted Sessions, either privately or on behalf of the Meeting. Unless otherwise agreed, the press will simply be informed of the subject being discussed in particular Restricted Sessions.
- (iii) It will be for Heads of Government themselves to determine during each Meeting how many of their sessions or parts of sessions should be restricted; but provision would be made in the draft time-table of each Meeting for at least two Restricted Sessions—one before and one after the week-end "retreat".
- (iv) In putting forward the annotated Agenda the Secretary-General may suggest particular matters for discussion in Restricted Sessions; but, since these sessions are essentially an aid to Heads of Government in attaining the objectives of the Meeting, there must be maximum flexibility at the Meeting itself as to the subjects or aspects of Agenda items to be discussed in Restricted Sessions as well as to the question of timing, frequency and duration of such sessions.

C. Informal discussions

Opportunities for informal discussion between Heads of Government on a one to one basis or in groups are a greatly valued element of Commonwealth Meetings. They should not be limited to the week-end "retreat" but consciously

provided during the course of the Meeting. The following are three suggestions for enlarging these opportunities:

- (a) slightly longer coffee-breaks, say, to thirty minutes;
- (b) a forty-five minute "relaxer" at the end of each day's proceedings for conversations over refreshments in the executive lounge;
- (c) the formal social programme to be kept to the minimum so as to allow maximum opportunity for informal "get-togethers" over lunch and dinner.

D. Representation

- (i) In general terms, given its character as "their meeting", everything possible should be done to encourage attendance by Heads of Government themselves.
- (ii) Correspondingly, it would be understood that Heads of Delegation who are not themselves Heads of Government would not normally catch the Chairman's eye in preference to those who are.

E. The Chairman

It would be the understanding of all Heads of Government that at each Meeting the Chairman is the principal custodian of the Meeting's informal character and of its traditional style and format. As such, he would be on guard to preserve them, to prevent discussions becoming stylised, to encourage a free exchange of ideas and opinions, and to promote a meeting of minds. In doing so, he would be entitled to expect the support and co-operation of his colleagues.

F. Communiqué

The Communiqué is an important element of every Heads of Government Meeting. It is an essential vehicle for conveying to the people of the Commonwealth and the wider international community the wide-ranging interests and concerns of Commonwealth leaders. It should be the aim to maintain it within manageable proportions; to convey the true character of the conversations between Heads of Government, and to highlight areas of consensus and decisions for co-operation.