

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

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ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

*The U.S. just does not  
require the rearmament  
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 112115Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2098 OF 11 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS

INFO ROUTINE MODUK, AMMAN, CAIRO AND JEDDA

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h-a.*

LEBANON

1. I DISCUSSED THE LATEST POSITION THIS MORNING WITH EAGLEBURGER, WHO OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS HAS BEEN THE MOST SENIOR FOCAL POINT IN WASHINGTON ON THIS QUESTION. I ASKED HIM FIRST ABOUT THE REPORTED EXCHANGES WITH BREZHNEV. HE SAID THAT BREZHNEV HAD NOW SENT TWO MESSAGES, BOTH CAUTIOUS AND MODERATE IN TONE. BREZHNEV HAD AVOIDED THREATS BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS MUST TAKE CARE OF THE INTERESTS OF THEIR FRIENDS, THE SYRIANS. THE PRESIDENT HAD REPLIED TO BREZHNEV'S FIRST MESSAGE IN A SIMILAR MODERATE TONE, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE BUT ENTERING INTO NO COMMITMENTS. A SECOND MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM BREZHNEV LAST NIGHT STILL VERY RESTRAINED IN TONE BUT CALLING ON THE US TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE ISRAELIS TO GET THEM TO STOP. A REPLY TO THIS WAS IN PREPARATION, DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE ISRAELI CEASEFIRE.

TO THE ISRAELI CEASEFIRE.

2. I ASKED EAGLEBURGER WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOW PLANNING TO DO. HE SAID HE SAW THE PROBLEM IN FOUR PARTS. THE FIRST AND MOST URGENT PROBLEM WAS TO TRY TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE BACK TO THE 40KM LINE WHICH THEY HAD STAKED OUT AS THEIR ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE. I EXPRESSED SURPRISE; WERE THE AMERICANS ACCEPTING THAT A 40KM BUFFER ZONE HAD BEEN A LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVE IN THE FIRST PLACE? WOULD THIS NOT GIVE CREDENCE TO THE DAMAGING IDEA THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN PRIVY IN ADVANCE TO ISRAELI INTENTIONS, AND THAT THEY HAD ONLY REACTED SHARPLY WHEN THE ISRAELIS HAD GONE WAY BEYOND THIS? EAGLEBURGER RECOGNISED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD BE CRITICISED IF THEY DID NOT PRESS THE ISRAELIS TO GO BACK BEYOND THE 40KM BUFFER ZONE. BUT THE AMERICAN VIEW WAS THAT A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE WAS JUST NOT FEASIBLE. NOR DID EAGLEBURGER THINK IT WAS REALLY IN ANYONE'S INTEREST TO TRY. LEGITIMATE OR NOT, THE IMPORTANT THING AS HE SAW IT WAS TO TRY TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO FACE UP TO WHAT THEY HAD SAID WAS THEIR OBJECTIVE OF CREATING A ZONE FROM WHICH ARTILLERY AND ROCKET FIRE AGAINST ISRAELI VILLAGES COULD NOT TAKE PLACE.

3. THE NEXT PROBLEM AFTER THAT WAS THE MEDIUM TERM ONE OF EITHER EXPANDING UNIFIL OR ESTABLISHING SOME SORT OF MFO FOR THE SOUTHERN LEBANON. THIS LED ON TO THE THIRD POINT - THE OPPORTUNITY OF TRYING TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE LEBANON (GETTING A GOVERNMENT WITH STRENGTHENED AUTHORITY, BUILDING UP SOME KIND OF LEBANESE ARMED FORCES, GETTING ALL OTHER FORCES, INCLUDING THE SYRIANS, TO WITHDRAW). IT WAS EARLY DAYS TO SEE HOW BEST TO SET ABOUT THIS BUT IT WAS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY WHICH MUST NOT BE MISSED. THE ISRAELIS WOULD NEED TO BE VERY CAREFULLY HANDLED OVER ALL THIS.

4. FINALLY, THERE WAS STILL THE PROBLEM OF AUTONOMY ON THE WEST BANK. THE DIFFICULTY OF DOING ANYTHING ON THIS WOULD NOW BE EXACERBATED BY THE LARGE NUMBERS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES TRYING TO GET INTO JORDAN. ARAFAT'S AUTHORITY HAD BEEN STRUCK A PERHAPS VITAL BLOW.

5 EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE SORT OF THINKING HE HAD OUTLINED REFLECTED HOW HAIG WAS LOOKING AT THE PROBLEM AT PRESENT. THERE WERE OF COURSE OTHERS IN WASHINGTON WHO, LIKE THE EUROPEANS, WOULD PREFER TO SEE A MUCH TOUGHER APPROACH TO THE ISRAELIS. BUT EAGLEBURGER'S OWN VIEW WAS THAT HITTING THE ISRAELIS WITH A BASEBALL BAT WOULD ACHIEVE NOTHING. THEY HAD PUT THEMSELVES INTO A STRONG POSITION AND WOULD NO DOUBT BE USING WHAT THEY HAD GAINED BEYOND THE 40KM LINE AS BARGAINING CHIPS FOR WHAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONCEDE ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF IT. EAGLEBURGER THOUGHT THAT WITH IMAGINATION IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO USE THE NEW SITUATION TO BUILD A MORE STABLE BASIS FOR THE FUTURE. MOST OF THE LEADS WERE

THE 40KM LINE AS BARGAINING CHIPS FOR WHAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONCEDE ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF IT. EAGLEBURGER THOUGHT THAT WITH IMAGINATION IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO USE THE NEW SITUATION TO BUILD A MORE STABLE BASIS FOR THE FUTURE. MOST OF THE ARABS WERE NONE TOO HAPPY ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF SYRIA IN THE LEBANON. THE LEBANESE, IF THEY COULD BE PERSUADED TO WORK TOGETHER, WANTED NOTHING BETTER THAN TO GET BACK CONTROL OVER THEIR OWN COUNTRY.

PLEASE SEE M I F T.

THOMAS

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TO: [Illegible] FROM: [Illegible] SUBJECT: [Illegible] RE: [Illegible]

[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible due to poor scan quality. It appears to be a continuation of a memorandum or report, possibly containing details about the situation in Lebanon and the role of Syria. Key words like 'Lebanon', 'Syria', and 'Israel' are faintly visible.]