



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 May 1979

Dear Bryan,

Lord Carrington's Talks with Mr Vance

*Prime Minister has seen
BGM
23/5*

You may like a short summary of yesterday's discussions between Lord Carrington and Mr Vance. This concentrates on those subjects which Mr Vance has said he would like to raise with Mrs Thatcher (my letter of 18 May).

Defence and Arms Control

Mr Vance said that, although the US was bound to be in an adversary relationship with the Soviet Union, it remained vitally important to secure real restraint on the use of nuclear weapons. The Administration hoped to secure ratification of the SALT II agreement by the Senate in October although they realised it would be a tough struggle. He expressed his gratitude for the British statement which had been very helpful. He hoped that the forthcoming NATO Foreign Ministers meeting would express support for the treaty.

Meanwhile the Americans would need to take decisions on improving their own strategic nuclear forces. The most likely option would be the introduction of a new ICBM which would be mobile, probably deployed on rails in specially constructed trenches.

Mr Vance stressed the Administration's determination to follow up the successful negotiation and, they hoped, ratification of a SALT II Treaty by a searching examination with America's European allies of the preparations for the next stage of SALT. At the Vienna meeting on SALT II the main discussions between Mr Carter and Mr Brezhnev would also include further arms control measures, international issues and US-USSR bilateral relations. It was possible that an agreement on anti-satellite warfare might be reached.

When Lord Carrington mentioned our specific interest in the wording on transfer of nuclear technology, Mr Vance assured him that the Americans did not see the terms of the SALT II Treaty as limiting in any way US ability to press ahead with UK/US co-operation. He subsequently repeated that assurance very firmly in private conversation with Lord Carrington.

On TNF modernisation Lord Carrington said that it was important for European countries to sort out their own priorities in close consultation with the US. Mr Vance agreed that we must have a decision on this by the end of the year.

Mr Vance said that the Administration would prefer to get SALT II out of the way before sending any comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to Congress. He attached importance, however, to concluding the present trilateral discussions before the NPT Review Conference next year. Lord Carrington expressed his concern at the ridiculous

/ Soviet

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Soviet demands that Britain should build 10 National Seismic Stations and asked Mr Vance whether he thought the Soviet Union could be persuaded to drop this ultimatum and whether he thought that it would be feasible for the UK to cease to participate in the separate verification agreement, while signing the Treaty itself. Mr Vance said the Americans would do what they could to help but that he could not honestly see the Russians settling for less than 5 or 6 NSS, and he did not see how the UK could cease to take part in the verification agreement. But one or two ideas were thrown out for feasible ways of getting round this difficulty, which we are following up.

On MBFR Mr Vance mentioned the recent Soviet bilateral contacts which suggested some Eastern movement on Phase I data. He assured Lord Carrington that the Administration had no intention of pursuing this without full consultation with the allies but they thought it right to probe Soviet intentions.

Rhodesia

Lord Carrington explained to Mr Vance that the Government had committed themselves in the Manifesto to return Rhodesia to legality if we were satisfied that the six principles had been fulfilled. There was no timescale set down, but we were bound to honour our commitment. We were under considerable political pressure to move quickly. He saw no prospect whatever of renewing sanctions in November.

Mr Vance explained the difficulties the Americans were in as a result of the Case-Javits Amendment. The President was obliged to make a determination whether the regime had met two essential conditions - free and fair elections and readiness to take part in an all-party conference - not later than two weeks after the installation of the new Rhodesian government. A positive determination would lead to the lifting of sanctions. The danger of this course was that (a) it would be regarded by many in the non-aligned world as aligning the US with South Africa against black Africa; and (b) it would increase the opportunities for Soviet and Cuban penetration. The Americans were working along the lines of a statement saying that sanctions would be lifted provided certain specific conditions were met, e.g. willingness to amend the Constitution; to attend all-party talks; and to submit any revisions of the Constitution to a new test of acceptability. After some discussion, in which the Americans stressed the political pressure which they also were under domestically, our side suggested that it might be better for the President to make his determination without spelling out the conditions in too specific terms.

A group of officials then pursued the subject further while Mr Vance and Lord Carrington turned to other subjects. The officials reported that the President's determination might acknowledge that the elections in Rhodesia were a significant advance; that they did not however fully fulfil the Case-Javits criteria; that the President would keep the question under close review and report back to Congress after 6 months; and that in the meantime the US Administration would hope to see an attempt to reach an accommodation with the external parties, some de-escalation in the fighting and further advance towards true

/democracy.



democracy. Mr Vance doubted whether an imprecise statement of this kind would satisfy Congressional opinion. He wanted more time to think. He and Lord Carrington agreed to meet again on Wednesday, following the meeting with the Prime Minister, to continue their discussion.

Arab-Israel

Mr Vance stressed that the US believed a comprehensive peace, incorporating a resolution of the Palestinian question in all its aspects, was essential. At the moment the question of Israeli settlements was the most emotive issue. It was important to put pressure on Mr Begin to agree to freeze further settlements during negotiations.

Lord Carrington told Mr Vance that the Nine had decided at Cahors to ask him to tell the Americans of the Nine's concern about Mr Begin's position and to ask whether a statement, worked out by the Political Directors, would be helpful. Mr Vance welcomed this, provided it was made clear that the Nine supported the peace process, working towards the essential goal of a comprehensive peace, and that it clearly pointed to the crucial importance of the settlement issue. Lord Carrington and Mr Vance agreed to pursue the question further when they next meet for the NATO Ministerial meeting in the Hague (on 30 and 31 May) during the usual Quadripartite Dinner the first evening. After further discussion, which also embraced the problems of UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, Lord Carrington agreed to pass on to the Prime Minister an earnest request from Mr Vance that she should, when she meets Mr Begin on 23 May, press him hard on the settlement question and also urge him to bring Major Haddad under control, since failure to do so could lead to withdrawal of UNIFIL and further chaos in Lebanon.

Agenda for the Tokyo Economic Summit

Mr Vance welcomed the emphasis which had been placed in the preparatory talks on the need to focus the attention of the Economic Summit on three main areas: energy, macro-economic issues and North/South. Although the American record on energy conservation was poor, he welcomed the idea that the Summit might lead to agreement on a conservation programme and a subsequent increase in investment in alternative sources of energy. Lord Carrington pointed out that the energy crises would intensify North/South problems and Mr Vance thought this was the best argument to use with OPEC countries.

Yours ever
G G H Walden

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cc Roger Facer (MOD)
Martin Vile (Cabinet Office)