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DESKBY 050530Z (RIYADH) 050830Z (F C O)

FM WASHINGTON 050010Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2 OF 4 NOVEMBER

AND TO F C O

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, CAIRO, TEL AVIV AND JEDDA.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE: SINAI FORCE

1. WHEN I SAW HAIG AT 2030Z TODAY HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD JUST SEEN THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER TO WHOM HE HAD EXPRESSED HIS PROFOUND CONCERN IF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT WAS DELIVERED TO EGYPT OR ISRAEL. HAIG ADDED THAT THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER WAS NOT AT ALL AU COURANT.

2. KNOWING THAT I HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH YOU FOLLOWING HIS FIRST REACTION THIS MORNING HE ASKED ME ABOUT YOUR RESPONSE AND I SPOKE AS YOU HAD ADVISED ME: IT WAS A EUROPEAN TEXT: IT HAD BEEN DIFFICULT TO PUT TOGETHER: IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ALTER: THE ARABS WERE ANGRY ENOUGH AS IT WAS: THIS WAS THE MINIMUM WE COULD DO: WE HAD NOT ASKED THE USA TO ENDORSE THE STATEMENT: YOU FELT YOU HAD GONE OUT OF YOUR WAY TO HELP AND COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE EUROPEANS COULD BE EXPECTED TO JOIN A FORCE AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE ARABS WITHOUT SETTING OUT THE BASIS UPON WHICH THEY DID SO.

3. HAIG GAVE A LONG ACCOUNT OF HOW THIS REQUEST FOR BRITISH PARTICIPATION HAD COME ABOUT. HE KNEW THAT YOU HAD ALWAYS BEEN RELUCTANT BUT THE AMERICANS WERE FACED WITH THE INTERLOCKING VETO: OTHER COUNTRIES NECESSARY FOR THE FORCE WOULD NOT TAKE PART UNLESS THE BRITISH DID. HE ALSO KNEW THAT WHEN THE PRESIDENT HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE SUBJECT THE LATTER'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN NEGATIVE, THOUGH NOT COMPLETELY CLOSED. HAIG REFERRED TO HIS TALKS WITH YOU AND GENSCHER IN CAIRO IN A TENT AND TO THE DISCUSSION AT CANCUN. HE MENTIONED SPECIFIC ASSURANCES THAT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM LONDON THAT BRITAIN WOULD BE READY TO JOIN WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS AT ALL. WHEN VELIOTES HAD DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH DOUGLAS HURD LAST WEEK HE HAD BEEN GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THE STATEMENT ABOUT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A SIMPLE DECLARATION THAT WOULD CONFIRM SUPPORT FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF THE ISRAELI/ARAB PEACE TREATY AND CONTAIN A BRIEF RE-STATEMENT OF ADHERENCE TO VENICE. VELIOTES WHO WAS PRESENT INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN NO INKLING THAT WE WERE GOING TO QUOTE ELABORATE UNQUOTE ON VENICE IN OUR STATEMENT.

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4. HAIG SAID THAT AT CANCUN YOU HAD MENTIONED THE DEMARCHE YOU HAD HAD FROM ARAB COUNTRIES THREATENING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. HE HAD THEREUPON CARRIED OUT A CHECK IN ALL CAPITALS AND FOUND THAT NO COUNTRY EXCEPT SYRIA HAD ENTERED ANY RESERVATION ABOUT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN THE SINAI FORCE.

5. HAIG SAID THAT THE WORDING OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE FOUR WOULD INFURIATE THE ISRAELIS AND WOULD CERTAINLY LEAD THEM TO REJECT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION ON THOSE TERMS. THEY WOULD USE IT AS AN EXCUSE FOR NOT RETURNING SINAI: IT MIGHT WELL TRIGGER AN ATTACK ON THE LEBANON. IF THE EGYPTIANS EXPRESSED THEIR APPROVAL OF THE STATEMENT, WHICH THEY WOULD CERTAINLY DO, THIS WOULD IMPAIR RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM AND ISRAEL.

6. HAIG SPOKE ABOUT THE QUOTE PARANOIA UNQUOTE IN ISRAEL. THERE WAS A CRISIS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES (HE TOLD ME FOR MY EARS ALONE THAT THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HERE HAS RESIGNED). TO MY QUESTION OF WHAT HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR BOUT OF PARANOIA HE SAID IT WAS DUE TO THE LEBANON, THE U S REACTION TO THE IRAQI REACTOR RAID, THE DEATH OF SADAT, AND OF COURSE AWACS. HAIG WENT ON TO SPECULATE ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE INSISTED ON MAKING OUR STATEMENT. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO TRY TO PUT TOGETHER A FORCE WITHOUT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. THIS WOULD LEAD TO A CRISIS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR EUROPEAN PARTNERS, NOT LEAST WITH BRITAIN. HE SAID THAT IN PRACTICE HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PUT TOGETHER SUCH A FORCE AND THAT THIS WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE PEACE PROCESS.

7. REVERTING TO THE LEBANON DANGER HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE CERTAINLY PREPARED TO MOVE AND TO TAKE OVER ALL THE PLO AREA SOUTH OF THE LITANI, WHICH THEY WOULD NOT WITHDRAW FROM. THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO BATTLE WITH SYRIANS WITH THE OBVIOUS DANGERS OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. HE ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS SPECULATION.

8. HAIG SAID THAT HE WAS SO WORRIED THAT, IF IT WOULD HELP, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO FLY TO LONDON TOMORROW AND HAVE A MEETING WITH THE FOUR PROPOSED PARTICIPANTS. HE THOUGHT THAT HE MIGHT IN ANY CASE HAVE TO GO TO ISRAEL TO TRY TO QUETEN THEM DOWN.

9. I SAID THAT IF BEGIN HAD NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING FROM SINAI THEY WOULD MAKE ANYTHING AN EXCUSE FOR NOT DOING SO. THE REASON THEY WERE REACTING IN THIS EXCITABLE WAY WAS LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE AWACS DEAL AND THEIR FEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT BE SHOWING INCREASED INTEREST IN SAUDI ARABIA. BUT NONE OF THIS WAS A REASON WHY THE EUROPEAN POWERS, IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST THAT DID NOT MEET THEIR INTERESTS SHOULD JEOPARDISE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A PERSONAL ASSURANCE FROM BEGIN THAT HE WOULD WITHDRAW FROM SINAI AS AGREED EVEN IF THIS MEANT HIS RESIGNATION.

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10. HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE FRENCH WERE EAGER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORCE. (INCIDENTALLY FROM THE WAY HE SPOKE IT WAS APPARENT TO ME THAT IT WAS CHEYSSON WHO HAD ENCOURAGED HIM TO THINK PREVIOUSLY THAT WE HAD LOBBIED THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS AGAINST PARTICIPATION.) HAIG ALSO THOUGHT THE ITALIANS WOULD LIKE TO TAKE PART. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT YOU WOULD THINK BUT ON THE FACE OF IT I DID NOT THINK WE WOULD OBJECT IF THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS WERE READY TO PARTICIPATE WITHOUT ANY STATEMENT OF THE KIND PROPOSED. BUT I DID NOT THINK THAT AS FAR AS THE FRENCH WERE CONCERNED THEY WOULD WANT TO DO SO WITHOUT A STATEMENT ABOUT THEIR BASIS OF PARTICIPATION.

11. AT THIS POINT IN OUR CONVERSATION HAIG RECEIVED A MESSAGE THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT WELL BE GOING AHEAD ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AND COMMUNICATING THE TEXT TO THE ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS. HAIG GAVE ORDERS THAT THEY SHOULD BE ASKED TO REFRAIN FROM DOING THIS. I SAID THAT YOU HAD EMPHASISED HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS GOING TO BE AT THIS STAGE TO START TINKERING WITH A TEXT THAT HAD BEEN AGREED TO WITH SUCH DIFFICULTY. BUT SO THAT I COULD EXPLAIN TO YOU WHEREIN LAY HAIG'S PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY COULD HE TELL ME HOW IDEALLY HE WOULD LIKE OUR TEXT REVISED.

12. HE SAID THAT THE WORDING OF THE STATEMENT BY THE FOUR WAS EXTREMELY OFFENSIVE TO ISRAEL. HE THOUGHT THAT ALL THE WORDING FROM QUOTE SIMILARLY THEY WELCOME THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL... UNQUOTE IN PARA ONE DOWN TO QUOTE... A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE UNQUOTE AT THE END OF PARA TWO SHOULD BE ELIMINATED (THIS IS HALF THE MESSAGE). IN PLACE OF THE WORDS QUOTE THAT WITHDRAWAL UNQUOTE AT THE END OF THE FIRST SENTENCE OF (1), WORDS SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE INSERTED, QUOTE FULFILLMENT OF THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL UNQUOTE.

13. AS REGARDS THE STATEMENT OF THE TEN, THIS ALSO WAS OBJECTIONABLE. INDEED HE DID NOT SEE WHY THE TEN HAD TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT AT ALL RELATING TO ACTION BY THE FOUR. I INDICATED THE COMMUNITY OF INTEREST OF THE COMMUNITY. I ASKED HAIG, EMPHASISING THAT IT WAS A PURELY PERSONAL QUESTION, WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER IF, INSTEAD OF A STATEMENT ISSUED COLLECTIVELY BY THE FOUR OR BY THE TEN, THE SAME LANGUAGE WERE USED BUT BY EACH GOVERNMENT IN ITS SEPARATE PARLIAMENT. HIS ANSWER TO THIS WAS TO SAY THAT AMERICA COULD NOT OBJECT TO ANYTHING ANY GOVERNMENT SAID IN ITS OWN PARLIAMENT.

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14. OUR TALK WAS CONCLUDED BY HAIG IMPLOING THAT WE HOLD THINGS UP UNTIL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAVE HEARD OF HIS GRAVE REACTION. I UNDERTOOK TO INFORM YOU AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE ABOUT OUR TALK. ALTHOUGH AS YOU WILL SEE HAIG WAS IN AN EXTREMELY AGITATED FRAME OF MIND I WOULD NOT WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS AT ALL ABRASIVE.

15. I HOPE THAT POSTS TO WHOM I AM REPEATING THIS TELEGRAM WILL TREAT IT AS FOR PERSONAL INFORMATION ONLY FOR THE MOMENT.

16. COD, F C O, PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO. 10, PRIVATE SECRETARY, PS/LPS, PS/MR HURD, BULLARD AND GREENSTOCK.

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