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TELEGRAM NUMBER 423 OF 6TH JULY

FOR INFO PRIORITY NATO POSTS DUBLIN MADRID UKREP BRUSSELS
EAST BERLIN WARSAW SOFIA BUDAPEST BUCHAREST AND PRAGUE

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH GROMYKO, 6 JULY: TNF
FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

1. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO REPEAT KNOWN POSITIONS. HE WELCOMED SOVIET READINESS FOR TALKS ON TNF AND THE AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO START THEM IN 1981. HE SAW TWO DIFFICULTIES: THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVED THAT NATO WOULD GAIN AN ADVANTAGE IF THE DECISION OF DECEMBER 1979 WAS IMPLEMENTED, AND NATO BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM WOULD PERPETUATE SOVIET SUPERIORITY. THE FIGURES AVAILABLE TO THE UK DID NOT BEAR OUT THE SOVIET ARGUMENTS, AND NO DOUBT THE REVERSE WAS THE CASE. THE QUESTION OF FIGURES WAS ONE FOR EXPERTS RATHER THAN FOREIGN MINISTERS.

2. GROMYKO TOOK A RATHER HECTORING AND VERY ANTI-AMERICAN LINE. HE REPEATED THE CLAIM THAT NATO ALREADY HAD A SUPERIORITY OF 1.5 TO 1 IN QUOTE THROWABLE NUCLEAR WEIGHT UNQUOTE. THE MODERNISATION OF SOVIET MISSILES AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF SS20S WOULD CHANGE THIS BALANCE VERY LITTLE. THE AMERICANS REACHED THEIR CONCLUSIONS ONLY BY SUCH DEVICES AS EXCLUDING AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AMERICAN BOMBERS BASED IN EUROPE. THE AMERICAN MILITARY WERE NO FRIENDS OF THE TRUTH, AND EUROPEAN STATESMENT WERE VICTIMS OF DECEIT OR MINSINFORMATION. LORD CARRINGTON SHOULD LOOK DEEPER INTO THE MATTER. THE SOVIET UNION STOOD FOR APPROXIMATE EQUALITY OF 'ROCKET-NUCLEAR WEAPONS' AND FOR EQUAL SECURITY. THEY WERE READY TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE IN NATURAL CONJUNCTION WITH THAT OF AMERICAN FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS.

3. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED THAT NEITHER SIDE MUST BE DISADVANTAGED BUT REPEATED HIS POINT THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN BY ESTABLISHING AGREEMENT ON THE FACTS. GROMYKO REVERTED TO THE ARGUMENT THAT SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS COULD NOT REACH THE UNITED STATES, WHEREAS AMERICAN FBS COULD REACH THE SOVIET UNION. WAS THIS A FACTOR TO BE IGNORED? AMERICAN MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE WERE TANTAMOUNT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN SALT 1. GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS PLAYED A POLITICO-MILITARY ROLE.

4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE CONVERSATION WAS FOLLOWING A STANDARD COURSE. HIS OWN CALCULATIONS SHOWED A SOVIET SUPERIORITY

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OF FOUR TO ONE AT THE POINT WHERE GROMYKO HAD SPOKEN OF AN INFERIORITY OF ONE TO ONE AND A HALF. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO SIT DOWN AND TALK, TAKING ACCOUNT OF EACH OTHER'S ARGUMENTS. THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE READY FOR SUCH TALKS, BUT THE AMERICAN SYSTEM WAS SUCH THAT TIME WOULD BE NEEDED TO PREPARE FOR THEM.

5. GROMYKO MAINTAINED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT REALLY WORKING IN THIS DIRECTION. THE AMERICANS HAD EMBARKED ON THE ROAD OF DECEIT. THIS MIGHT SUIT SOME ALLIES WHO DID NOT CHOOSE TO MAKE THE EFFORT TO STUDY THE FACTS. EVENTUALLY THE TWO SIDES WOULD SIT DOWN AND PUT THEIR CARDS ON THE TABLE. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WAS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS DELIBERATELY DECEIVING ITS ALLIES WHILE PRESSING AHEAD WITH ONE HALF OF THE 1979 DECISION. IF AMERICA CONTINUED THE LINE OF UPSETTING THE EXISTING BALANCE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE COMPELLED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION. IF LORD CARRINGTON DID NOT SEE THIS, IT WAS PERHAPS BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN SUPPLIED WITH FALSE DATA. IT COULD NOT BE IN THE SOVIET UNION'S INTEREST TO PLAY FALSE WITH THE FACTS; IT COULD TOO EASILY BE EXPOSED BY THE NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION WHICH HAD BEEN ADOPTED AS THE BASIS FOR VERIFICATION OF SALT I.

6. LORD CARRINGTON CLOSED THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE NOTE THAT NATO'S GLCMS AND PERSHIN 2S WOULD NOT BE OPERATIONAL UNTIL 1983, WHICH LEFT TIME FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW DUE TO START IN 1981.

7. BULLARD BRIEFED COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS HERE THIS EVENING ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING.

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