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
FM MOSCOW 061600Z JUL 81

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 423 OF 6TH JULY

FOR INFO PRIORITY NATO POSTS DUBLIN MADRID UKREP BRUSSELS

EAST BERLIN WARSAW SOFIA BUDAPEST BUCHAREST



AND PRAGUE

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH GROMYKO, 6 JULY: THE FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

- 1. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO REPEAT KNOWN POSITIONS. HE WELCOMED SOVIET READINESS FOR TALKS ON THE AND THE AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO START THEM IN 1981. HE SAW TWO DIFFICULTIES: THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVED THAT NATO WOULD GAIN AN ADVANTAGE IF THE DECISION OF DECEMBER 1979 WAS IMPLEMENTED, AND NATO BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MOROTORIUM WOULD PERPETUATE SOVIET SUPERIORITY. THE FIGURES AVAILABLE TO THE UK DID NOT BEAR OUT THE SOVIET ARGUEMENTS, AND NO DOUBT THE REVERSE WAS THE CASE. THE QUESTION OF FIGURES WAS ONE FOR EXPERTS RATHER THAN FOREIGN MINISTERS.
- 2. GROMYKO TOOK A RATHER HECTORING AND VERY ANTI-AMERICAN LINE.

  HE REPEATED THE CLAIM THAT NATO ALREADY HAD A SUPERITRITY OF 1.5 TO

  1 IN QUOTE THROWABLE NUCLEAR WEIGHT UNQUOTE. THE MODERNISATION OF

  SOVIET MISSILES AND THE DEPLOYEMENT OF SS2ØS WOULD CHANGE THIS

  BALANCE VERY LITTLE. THE AMERICANS REACHED THEIR CONCLUSIONS ONLY

  BY SUCH DEVICES AS EXCLUDING AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THE

  MEDITERRANEAN AND AMERICAN BOMBERS BASED IN EUROPE. THE AMERICAN

  MILITARY WERE NO FRIENDS OF THE TRUTH, AND EUROPEAN STATESMENT WERE

  VICTIMS OF DECEIT OR MINSINFORMATION. LORD CARRINGTON SHOULD

  LOOK DEEPER INTO THE MATTER. THE SOVIET UNION STOOD FOR APPROXIMATE

  EQUALITY OF 'ROCKET-NUCLEAR WEAPONS' AND FOR EQUAL SECURITY.

  THEY WERE READY TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR

  WEAPONS IN EUROPE IN NATURAL CONJUNCTION WITH THAT OF AMERICAN'

  FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS.
- 3. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED THAT NEITHER SIDE MUST BE DISADVANTAGED BUT REPEATED HIS POINT THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN BY ESTABLISHING AGREEMENT ON THE FACTS. GROMYKO REVERTED TO THE ARGUMENT THAT SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS COULD NOT REACH THE UNITED STATES, WHEREAS AMERICAN FBS COULD REACH THE SOVIET UNION. WAS THIS A FACTOR TO BE IGNORED? AMERICAN MEDIUM RANGE WEAPO S IN EUROPE WERE TANTAMOUNT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN SALT 1. GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS PLAYED A POLITICO-MILITARY ROLE.
- 4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THE CONVERSATION WAS FOLLOWING A STANDARD COURSE. HIS OWN CALCULATIONS SHOWED A SOVIET SUPERIORITY

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OF FOUR TO ONE AT THE POINT WHERE GROMYKO HAD SPOKEN OF AN INFERIORITY OF ONE TO ONE AND A HALF. SETHE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITE STATES WOULDHAVE TO SIT DOWN AND TALK, TAKING ACCOUNT OF EACH OTHER'S ARGUEMENTS. THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE READY FOR SUCH TALKS, BUT THE AMERICAN SYSTEM WAS SUCH THAT TIME WOULD BE NEEDED TO PREPARE FOR THEM.

- WORKING IN THIS DIRECTION. THE AMERICANS HAD EMBARKED ON THE ROAD OF DECEIT. THIS MIGHT SUIT SOME ALLIES WHO DID NOT CHOOSE TO MAKE THE EFFORT TO STUDY THE FACTS. EVENTUALLY THE TWO SIDES WOULD SIT DOWN AND PUT THEIR CARDS ON THE TABLE. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WAS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS DELIBERATELY DECEIVING ITS ALLIES WHILE PRESSING AHEAD WITH ONE HALF OF THE 1979 DECISION. IF AMERICA CONTINUED THE LINE OF UPSETTING THE EXISTING BALANCE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE COMPELLED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION. IF LORD CARRINGTON DID NOT SEE THIS, IT WAS PERHAPS BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN SUPPLIED WITH FALSE DATA. IT COULD NOT BE IN THE SOVIET UNION'S INTEREST TO PLAY FALSE WITH THE FACTS: IT COULD TOO EASILY BE EXPOSED BY THE NATIONAL MEANS OF DETECTION WHICH HAD BEEN ADOPTED AS THE BASIS FOR VERIFICATION OF SALT I.
- 6. LORD CARRINGTON CLOSED THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE NOTE THAT NATO'S GLCMS AND PERSHIN 2S WOULD NOT BE OPERATIONAL UNTIL 1983, WHICH LEFT TIME FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW DUE TO START IN 1981.

KEEBLE

FEO/WHITEHALL D DEFENCE D

<sup>7.</sup> BULLARD BRIEFED COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS HERE THIS EVENING ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING.