

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 290830Z

FM WASHINGTON 282332Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3941 OF 28 DECEMBER

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO BONN PARIS MOSCOW MODUK UKREP BRUSSELS
WARSAW ROME UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS DUBLIN

MIPT (SAVING TO SOME): EC LUNCH FOR HAIG: POLAND

1. AFTER REFERRING TO THE LATEST DISCUSSIONS ON FOOD FOR POLAND IN COREPER (UKREP BRUSSELS TELNO 5048) AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE TEN TO ENSURE THAT THIS REACHED ITS PROPER RECIPIENTS, I ASKED HAIG TO EXPLAIN THE AIMS OF THE ADMINISTRATION. TO WHAT EXTENT HAD THEY COMPLETELY WRITTEN OFF JARUZELSKI, OR DID THEY CONSIDER THAT SOME CONTACT WITH THE POLISH ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED? WHAT WAS THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE?

2. HAIG BEGAN BY REFERRING TO HIS INTERVIEW PUBLISHED YESTERDAY IN THE WASHINGTON POST (TEXT BY BAG - NOT TO ALL) IN WHICH HE HAD ADDRESSED THESE QUESTIONS. THE US HAD NOT BEEN SURPRISED BY THE RESORT BY THE POLES TO INTERNAL REPRESSION. IF THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES HAD DONE IT BY DIRECT INTERVENTION THE COST TO THEM WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE BEEN VERY HIGH. THE LONG CATALOGUE OF HARD INTELLIGENCE ABOUT RUSSIAN MOVEMENTS INCLUDING THE PRINTING IN RUSSIA OF THE MARTIAL LAW LEAFLET, GAVE THE LIE TO THE APPALLING CLAIMS, EVEN BY SOME IN THE WEST, THAT SOLIDARITY WAS TO BLAME FOR THE CRACK-DOWN. SOLIDARITY MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE TIMING OF EVENTS, BUT THE REPRESSION COULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO ITS EXCESSES. IT WAS EQUALLY WRONG, THOUGH CLOSER TO THE TRUTH, TO SEE MOSCOW'S HAND BEHIND EVERYTHING JARUZELSKI HAD DONE.

3. IT WAS VITAL THAT NO-ONE ON EITHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES WHICH SERVED THE RUSSIAN AIMS. NEITHER HE NOR THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED, AS HE SAID IN HIS INTERVIEW, THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE TOTALLY IN CONTROL OF EVENTS IN POLAND. FORCES STILL EXISTED THERE WHO WERE TRYING TO PURSUE THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT AND KEEP THE RUSSIANS OUT.

4. ON FOOD AID THOSE WHO WAVED THEIR FINGER AT THE US (AS GENSCHER APPEARED TO HAVE DONE TODAY) HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD WASHINGTON'S POLICY. LONG BEFORE THE PRESENT CRISIS HAIG HAD URGED ON GENSCHER, CHEYSSON

ON FOOD AND THOSE WHO WAVED THEIR FINGER AT THE US (AS GENSCHER APPEARED TO HAVE DONE TODAY) HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD WASHINGTON'S POLICY. LONG BEFORE THE PRESENT CRISIS HAIG HAD URGED ON GENSCHER, CHEYSS AND YOURSELF THE NEED TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONALITY BOTH IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE AS A RESTRAINT TO REPRESSION, AND AS AN ELEMENT IN THE POLISH ECONOMIC REFORMS. WESTERN GOVERNMENTS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE POURING MONEY DOWN THE POLISH RAT-HOLE. PRESENT US POLICY ON FOOD WAS NOT TO DEPRIVE THE STARVING POLES, BUT TO REFUSE TO REFURBISH THE LARDERS OF THE REPRESSORS. THE ASSURANCES OF THE REGIME WERE NOT SUFFICIENT AND THE WEST SHOULD THINK IMAGINATIVELY ABOUT EXPANDING OUR IDEAS ON ASSISTANCE TO INCLUDE ON-THE-SPOT MONITORING, BY DONOR COUNTRIES, WITH HELP PERHAPS FROM THE POLISH CHURCH. (HE SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THIS RESPECT IN WHAT I HAD SAID ABOUT E.C. COUNTRIES MONITORING)

5. IN DEALING WITH THE RUSSIANS, THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT RESPONDED IN THE OLD-FASHIONED WAY, POSING CHALLENGES TO SOVIET VITAL INTERESTS OR TRYING TO ROLL BACK THE SOVIET EMPIRE. HOWEVER TWO RECENT EVENTS - POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN - REPRESENTED A DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE WEST HAD THE RIGHT AND THE OBLIGATION TO RAISE THIS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORA, IF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND DETENTE WERE TO BE PURSUED WITH SUCCESS. A US OR WESTERN FAILURE TO ACT WOULD DIMINISH OUR CREDIBILITY IN MOSCOW AND DO LASTING DAMAGE TO THE ALLIANCE.

6. HAIG BELIEVED THAT, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF FRANCE, THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS LAGGED BEHIND THE US IN THEIR ATTITUDES TO MOSCOW'S INVOLVEMENT. HE HAD THE FEELING THAT PUBLIC OPINION THROUGHOUT THE WEST WAS UPSET AND FRUSTRATED AT THE LACK OF WESTERN ACTIVITY. WE COULD NOT IGNORE THAT PRESSURE. THE US WOULD NOT TACKLE THE RUSSIANS IN A SPIRIT OF CONFRONTATION OR ISOLATIONISM BUT WE MUST RECOGNISE THAT THE POLISH PROBLEM WOULD BE EASIER TO SOLVE WITH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ASSISTANCE OF MOSCOW.

7. WHILE HE RECOGNISED THE GREAT HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF EVENTS IN POLAND, HAIG REPEATEDLY EMPHASISED THAT THE GREATEST DANGER WAS THE IMPACT SOVIET MOVES MIGHT HAVE ON WESTERN UNITY. IT WAS CLEAR FROM INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD FOCUSED THEIR ATTACK ON THE ERG WHERE THEY WERE USING EVERY AVAILABLE CHANNEL TO CLAIM THEIR SUPPORT FOR MODERATION. NEITHER PUBLICLY NOR IN PRIVATE TO THE US WERE THEY MAKING SUCH CLAIMS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE RUSSIANS WERE CONTINUING THEIR PEACE OFFENSIVE AND THEIR APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL WHICH WERE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED

WORDS, THE RUSSIANS WERE CONTINUING THEIR PEACE OFFENSIVE AND THEIR APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL WHICH WERE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO SPLIT WESTERN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY WESTERN GERMANY, FROM THE US. IF THEY SUCCEEDED, EVENTS IN POLAND WOULD PALE IN CONTRAST. WHATEVER HAPPENED THERE, THE OUTCOME WOULD BE THE WORST POSSIBLE FOR THE WEST.

8. HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN FREQUENTLY IN TOUCH BY TELEPHONE AND NUMEROUS MESSAGES WITH HIS WESTERN COLLEAGUES, AND WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO EC MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL THIS WEEK. I INTERJECTED THAT NONETHELESS THE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS WOULD BE IMPORTANT. HE REPEATED HIS EARLIER SUGGESTION IN NATO THAT A MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY (REPEAT EARLY) JANUARY. THE ALLIANCE HAD NEVER SUFFERED FROM AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL ON A SUBJECT OF SUCH HISTORIC IMPORTANCE. IF WE DID NOTHING, WE WOULD DESERVE THE CRITICISM WE WERE ALREADY GETTING. (COMMENT: I THINK THAT THIS PROPOSAL HAS MORE SIGNIFICANCE NOW THAN WHEN IT WAS MADE BEFORE THE POLISH CRACK-DOWN).

9 HAIG CONTINUED THAT AS A RESULT OF TODAY'S MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE, HE EXPECTED AN ANNOUNCEMENT, ON WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD BE CONSULTED, TO BE MADE SHORTLY ABOUT FURTHER STEPS. THESE WOULD NOT BE CATAclysmic IN CHARACTER BUT IF THE RUSSIANS REMAINED UNCOOPERATIVE FURTHER STEPS BEYOND THESE WOULD BE TAKEN. DISCUSSING AVAILABLE WESTERN LEVERAGE, HAIG DISTINGUISHED TWO TYPES: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL. THE RESTRAINT THE RUSSIANS HAD EXERCISED OVER THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS, DESPITE THE RISE OF AN INDEPENDENT TRADES UNION MOVEMENT AND THE CHALLENGE TO THE POLITICAL AUTHORITY OF THE PARTY, DEMONSTRATED THAT THE EASTERN EUROPE OF 1981 HAD CHANGED FROM 1968 OR 1956. THE SERIOUS INHIBITIONS AGAINST SOVIET INTERVENTION HAD NOT DISAPPEARED WITH MARTIAL LAW. IT WAS UP TO THE WEST TO DISCOVER THE TRUE NATURE OF THESE AND TO APPLY OUR LIMITED ASSETS IN ORDER TO REINFORCE THEM. IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT, AS THE RUSSIANS AND SOME IN THE WEST CLAIMED, THAT THE POLISH REVOLUTION WAS OVER AND THE REPRESSION SHOULD SOON PASS. THE RESULTS OF THE ECONOMIC SHAMBLES IN POLAND HAD STILL TO BE FELT AND THE POTENTIAL FOR DESTABILISATION REMAINED GREAT. POLAND DEPENDED ON THE WEST FOR HER ECONOMIC VITALITY, WHICH IMPROVED OUR INTERNAL LEVERAGE. IT WAS THEREFORE ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO ENSURE CLOSE COORDINATION ON FOOD SUPPLIES, AND NOT TO LIFT PREMATURELY OUR PRESSURE IN THIS AREA.

10. HOWEVER, THE REAL LEVERAGE ON THE RUSSIANS WAS EXTERNAL. THEY HAD SHOWN MASSIVE MISJUDGEMENT OVER AFGHANISTAN, EARNING INTERNATIONAL OPPROBRIUM ESPECIALLY FROM THE THIRD WORLD. MOSCOW NEEDED A DEAL ON ARMS CONTROL AND ECONOMIC AID FROM THE WEST. THEY FACED DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS THEMSELVES AND FURTHER TROUBLE IN EASTERN EUROPE AS A RESULT OF POLAND. IF HOWEVER THEY SAW A CHANCE OF SPLITTING THE ALLIANCE ESPECIALLY THE FRG FROM THE US, THEY WOULD CONTINUE THEIR PRESENT COURSE. WE HAD UNPRECEDENTED LEVERAGE, AND SHOULD DO ALL WE COULD TO ENHANCE IT.

11. QUESTIONED ABOUT SPECIFIC STEPS, HAIG SAID THE WORST THING THE ADMINISTRATION COULD DO WOULD BE TO THREATEN CANCELLATION OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS OR TO ADD THEM TO A PACKAGE OF OTHER MOVES. THE US HAD PASSED THE POINT OF TREATING ARMS CONTROL AS NORMAL BUSINESS. WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WAS HOSTILE TO THE REPRESSION IN POLAND, WE MUST NOT LET IT BE TURNED AGAIN AGAINST OURSELVES. THE PRESIDENT FELT VERY STRONGLY ON THIS POINT. ARMS CONTROL WAS A DIFFERENT AND SEPARATE PART OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY. FOR THE MOMENT, WHILE THE US COULD NOT AFFORD TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTINUE IRRESPECTIVE AND IN IGNORANCE OF WHAT THE SOVIETS DID ELSEWHERE, IT WAS BEST TO KEEP FUTURE POLICY FUZZY, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE POSITIVE, AND TO AVOID RAISING PUBLIC CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE CANCELLATION.

12. ON CSCE HAIG SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY IF THE NEXT MEETING WERE CANCELLED. INDEED HE HOPED WITHIN THE NEXT DAY TO GET REAGAN'S AGREEMENT THAT AN EMERGENCY SESSION BE CONVENED. ALTHOUGH SOME PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON THOUGHT THAT THE CONTINUATION OF CSCE WAS AN AFFRONT WHILE REPRESSION CONTINUED IN POLAND, TO CANCEL IT WOULD REMOVE THE FUNDAMENTAL LEGITIMACY OF OUR OWN POSITION IN CRITICISING THE REPRESSION. WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION COULD EASILY UNDERSTAND THE POINT THAT HELSINKI REPRESENTED A SOLEMN AGREEMENT TO WHICH ALL SIGNATORIES WERE BOUND. TO THAT EXTENT, AS HE POINTED OUT IN HIS PRESS INTERVIEW OF 27 DECEMBER, HELSINKI HAD CHANGED THE POLITICAL MAP OF EUROPE ESTABLISHED AFTER YALTA. TO ARGUE ABOUT ROLLING BACK THE SOVIET EMPIRE WOULD IMMEDIATELY INVOLVE US IN DEBATES ABOUT SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AND EVEN CONDOMINIA. THIS THE WEST AND US MUST AVOID (EVEN THOUGH THE RUSSIANS DID NOT OBSERVE THE PRACTICAL SPHERES OF INFLUENCE ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD). WE SHOULD PLAY ON THE SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT LEGITIMACY.

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13. ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ABOUT WHICH I EXPRESSED EUROPEAN SCEPTICISM IN THE LIGHT OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE (RHODESIA AND AFGHANISTAN) AND THE US LIFTING OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO, HAIG AGREED THERE COULD BE NO DOUBLE STANDARDS OR HALF-SANCTIONS. HE HAD PERSONALLY OPPOSED THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO (THOUGH HE NOTED ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HE WAS BEING JESUITICAL IN DOING SO, THAT IF THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED WE WOULD NOT HAVE OUR PRESENT LEVERAGE). HE SHARED THE SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PARTIAL SANCTIONS, BUT EMPHASISED THAT AN EMBARGO IMPOSED BY ALL GRAIN-PRODUCERS WOULD HAVE A TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON THE RUSSIANS, EVEN IF THEY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE COMPELLED TO ACT AGAINST THEIR VITAL INTERESTS. ANY SANCTIONS HAD TO BE IMPOSED ON A BROAD FRONT AND IN UNISON. OTHERWISE THEY WOULD NOT WORK, AND THOSE WHO IMPOSED THEM WOULD BE SINGLED OUT FOR SOVIET REACTION. HAIG ALSO NOTED THAT THEIR GROWING INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION WAS A FURTHER IMPORTANT RESTRAINT ON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

14. IN SUMMARY HAIG MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

← (I) WE MUST MAINTAIN WESTERN COHESION:

(II) THE RUSSIANS HAD A RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN POLAND. IF WE IGNORED THE UNEQUIVOCABLE EVIDENCE IT COULD PRODUCE UNPLEASANT RESULTS:

(III) WE HAD CONSIDERABLE LEVERAGE TO WORK FOR A COMPROMISE IN POLAND. JARUZELSKI WAS NOT A TOTAL STOOGUE OF THE RUSSIANS. WE SHOULD AIM TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THE CHURCH, SOLIDARITY AND OTHERS RESPONSIBLE FOR DISBURSING HUMANITARIAN AID.

FCO PASS SAVING:- ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN LISBON
LUXEMBOURG DUBLIN OTTAWA OSLO REYKJAVIK THE HAGUE

HENDERSON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3940 OF 28 DECEMBER

INFO UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, MODUK, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, 29/11

WARSAW, UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, DUBLIN

MY TELNO 3886 (NOT TO ALL): EC LUNCH FOR HAIG

*Mustard
29/12
@ 2.00*
Prime Minister

These 3 telegrams give interesting background, but are somewhat overtaken by the message from No 10 D St. Haig today. Wm

- mt*
1. I GAVE A LUNCH TODAY FOR SECRETARY HAIG AND MY EC COLLEAGUES. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY STOESSEL, EAGLEBURGER, VELIOTES, HORMATS AND HOLMES.
 2. HAIG CAME STRAIGHT FROM A MEETING TO DISCUSS CONTINGENCY MEASURES ON POLAND AT THE WHITE HOUSE. HE INDICATED PRIVATELY THAT THIS HAD GONE WELL AND HE HAD SECURED WHAT HE WANTED. THE IMPLICATION OF SUBSEQUENT PERSONAL REMARKS TO ME WAS THAT HE WAS FIGHTING A CONSIDERABLE BATTLE AGAINST CHEST-BEATERS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT.
 3. HAIG WAS AT HIS BEST, BETTER INDEED THAN I HAVE SEEN HIM; AND I THINK THAT ALL THE COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES WERE IMPRESSED. TRUE, THEY HAD DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING HIM, PARTICULARLY THOSE NEW TO HAIG SPEAK. BUT THEY AGREED AFTERWARDS THAT HE HAD BEEN CALM, CONVINCING AND INFORMATIVE. PERSONALLY I FOUND THE CONVOLUTIONS FAR LESS COMPLICATED THAN USUAL. THERE WAS NO INJURED INNOCENCE, EXCEPT IN THE OUT BURST AGAINST GENSCHER (SEE BELOW) WHICH ALL BUT THE GERMAN WERE ABLE TO ENDURE WITH EQUANIMITY. HE SPOKE OF THE TROUBLE HE INSISTED ON TAKING TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH EC FOREIGN MINISTERS. FOR ONCE I DID NOT FEEL THAT HE WAS ENGAGED IN SOME MAJOR TASK OF SELF-CONTROL. HE IS JUST OFF TO CALIFORNIA, MECCA AT THE MOMENT. HE TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT HIS NEXT FOREIGN TRIP WOULD BE TO ATTEND A NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING IN JANUARY WHICH HE FAVOURED.
 4. TWO PARTICULARLY STRIKING POINTS WERE THE WARMTH WITH WHICH HE CRITICISED ALLEGED REMARKS TODAY BY GENSCHER ABOUT POLAND, AND THE EMPHASIS HE PLACED ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN WESTERN UNITY THROUGHOUT THE POLISH CRISIS. (SUBSEQUENTLY THE FRG CHARGE HAS TOLD ME THAT THE REPORTS OF GENSCHER'S COMMENTS WERE IN-ACCURATE, AND THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE NOW AWARE OF THE TRUE POSITION)
 5. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION EARLIER, EAGLEBURGER INDICATED THAT DURING

5. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION EARLIER, EAGLEBURGER INDICATED THAT DURING HIS EUROPEAN TOUR HE HAD RECEIVED A MORE SYMPATHETIC RECEPTION IN PARIS AND ROME THAN IN LONDON OR BONN. (WE UNDERSTAND FROM OTHER CONTACTS THAT HE FEELS EUROPEAN OPINION IS QUOTE SOME WAY AHEAD UNQUOTE OF SOME EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ON POLAND. HE REPORTEDLY HAD A DIFFICULT MEETING WITH GENSCHER, WHICH INCLUDED AN ARGUMENT OVER EL SALVADOR, DURING WHICH EAGLEBURGER CONTRASTED THE LACK OF CONCERN SHOWN FOR THE US POSITION THERE WITH HAIG'S EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE US POLICIES ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL IN A MANNER DESIGNED TO REDUCE PROBLEMS FOR THE FRG.)

6. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE LUNCH-TIME DISCUSSION ARE REPORTED IN MIFTS, WHICH COVER: POLAND, US/SOVIET RELATIONS, US/EC RELATIONS (POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL) THE DEFENCE APPROPRIATIONS BILL AND THE TWO-WAY STREET, THE SINAI MFO AND LIBYA (THE LAST TWO RAISED BY HAIG)

7. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, I EXPRESSED THE GRATITUDE OF THE TEN FOR THE READY AND FREQUENT CONSULATION WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. WE WERE CONSCIOUS OF THE TROUBLE HAIG PERSONALLY TOOK TO CONSULT THE ALLIES. SAYING THAT THEY WERE STILL UNDER EMBARGO. I REFERRED TO THE WORDS YOU WOULD BE USING IN YOUR INTERVIEW TO VOICE OF AMERICA ON 2 JANUARY ON THE COMMUNITY PRESIDENCY. YOU WOULD BE MENTIONING THE EXCEPTIONAL TROUBLE THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION HAD TAKEN TO CONSULT ITS ALLIES AND YOU WOULD BE PAYING TRIBUTE TO THE EXAMPLE MR HAIG SET IN THIS RESPECT.

FCO PASS SAVING: ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, DUBLIN, OTTAWA, OSLO, REYKJAVIK, THE HAGUE.

HENDERSON

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