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FM RIYADH 042040Z NOV 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 9 OF 4 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY MUSCAT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, KUWAIT, DOHA, JEDDA,
BAGHDAD. WASHINGTON, MODUK (DS11 DS5 DS8 D SALES 1).

INFO SAVING SANAA, ADEN.

OMAN/US/UK DISCUSSIONS

1. IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH PRINCES SAUD AND SULTAN ON 4 NOVEMBER HE MENTIONED THAT THE OMANIS HAD ASKED US AND THE AMERICANS FOR TRILATERAL TALKS. THERE WAS NOT QUESTION OF A PACT. WE WOULD MERELY HELP THE OMANIS ASSESS THE THREAT AND THEIR DEFENCE NEEDS. THE DATE HAD BEEN PUT OFF UNTIL FEBRUARY. WE WISHED TO KEEP A LOW PROFILE. THE AMERICANS, WE THOUGHT, WERE INCLINED TO ADOPT TOO HIGH A PROFILE. WE WOULD SUGGEST TO THEM THAT IT WAS NOT HELPFUL TO THE OMANIS FOR THE AMERICANS TO BE SO VISIBLE IN OMAN AND TO BE TALKING SO MUCH ABOUT THEIR RELATIONS WITH OMAN.

2. SAUD COMMENTED THAT EVERY TIME QAIS ZAWAWI SAID THERE WERE NO U S BASES IN OMAN THE AMERICANS CONTRADICTED HIM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THEY WERE KEEN TO ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE RDF. SAUD SAID HE DOUBTED IF THE RUSSIANS COULD BE TRICKED INTO BELIEVING IT MORE CREDIBLE THAN IT WAS.

3. SULTAN SAID THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO ARMS AND MILITARY HELP FOR OMAN SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO MILITARY PACT OR BASES. THE VISIBLE PRESENCE OF THE U S IN OMAN, AND PUBLICITY FOR THIS, WAS NOT IN OMAN'S INTERESTS. THEIR NEED WAS FOR HELP TO TAKE ON THEIR OWN DEFENCE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WANTED THE OMANIS TO TAKE OVER THEMSELVES THE ROLE PLAYED BY OUR MILITARY IN OMAN AS SOON AS PRACTIBLE. SULTAN SAID THIS SHOULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH GIVING TRAINING AND EXPERTISE TO THE OMANIS.

FCO PASS ALL AND SAVING TO SANAA, ADEN.

MUIR

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

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