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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON  
17-18 DECEMBER 1979

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STEERING BRIEF

Brief by Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Introduction

1 President Carter is preoccupied with three things: the Iran crisis, ratification of SALT II and his own standing in the US. His chances of securing both the Democratic nomination and eventual re-election have recently improved, largely because of his handling of the Iran affair. In addition the media and thus the public have taken a closer look at Senator Kennedy and have not liked what they have seen.

British Objectives

- 2 Our objectives for the visit as a whole are:
- (a) to underline the importance we attach to our relationship with the United States (which is wholly consistent with the new Government's greater commitment to Europe) and the value we attach to keeping in close contact with our most powerful ally;
  - (b) to ensure that we are consulted on US handling of the Iran crisis, particularly in advance of any American action which could affect British and Western interests;
  - (c) to ensure that the United States continues to adopt a helpful attitude towards our policies on Southern Africa,

/particularly

particularly Rhodesia;

(d) to discuss with President Carter world economic issues, including energy;

(e) to ensure that the US Administration at a high level is in no doubt about the realities of the Northern Ireland situation and about the Government's approach to it. Also, if still necessary, to apply pressure on the Americans over arms for the RUC;

(f) to discuss defence and arms control matters, including prospects for ratification of SALT II, for a SALT III Agreement and the TNF modernisation programme;

(g) if necessary to reassure the President that our resolute attitude towards Britain's budgetary contribution to the EEC need not have repercussions on the Community's cohesion or commitment to our common objectives.

(h) to demonstrate to the American public that Britain is under new management and following new policies but that the close relationship between Britain and the United States continues;

(i) to continue the working relationship between the Prime Minister and the President.

Probable US Objectives

3 President Carter will see the visit as an opportunity to show himself to his electorate as a President who is not a lame duck but in command of affairs and enjoying the confidence of one of America's principal allies; and to the Prime Minister as a President fully supported by his people. During the talks with the Prime Minister he will wish:-

(a) to secure continuing British support over Iran without restricting US freedom of action;

(b) to maintain British support for the ratification of SALT II.

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He will probably ask the Prime Minister to take a helpful line with the members of Congress she meets. He may also wish to discuss arms control and defence matters, including TNF modernisation;

(c) to discuss world wide economic and energy issues and the economic outlook in the United States and the United Kingdom against the background of United States preoccupations with inflation and dependence on imported oil;

(d) to be assured of the Government's determination not to allow our current arguments in the EEC to weaken the latter's cohesion as an effective partner in the Western democratic system;

(e) to learn how Her Majesty's Government see the way ahead on Rhodesia and Southern Africa;

(f) to secure continuing British support over Camp David and to exchange views in general over the Middle East;

(g) to seek a more active British role in the Caribbean area;

(h) to continue the working relationship with the Prime Minister.

Strategy and Tactics

4 The talks with President Carter are scheduled to last only  $1\frac{3}{4}$  hours. There will be no other suitable opportunities for making our main points to him. The four most important for us are:-

(a) certain defence matters (see separate briefing);

(b) the US handling of the Iran crisis: and in particular that eventual US action against Iran should be such as to avoid damage to all our interests;

(c) to keep the record straight on Northern Ireland and press

the President on the question of arms for the RUC (if still unsettled); and

(d) to ensure continued US support for our Rhodesia policy.

5 President Carter may be interested in the outcome of the Dublin European Council and concerned that wrangling in the Community over the budget problem could impair European unity and reduce the ability of the Member States to respond effectively on a joint basis to current international problems. The Prime Minister could point out the seriousness of the budget problem and the necessity of solving it if the Community is to make progress towards its major goals. The UK will remain firm on the substance of the problem; and a period of difficulty may be unavoidable if at the next meeting of the European Council there is a lack of political will to provide an equitable settlement. But it will be the British objective to confine the argument to the Community itself and to avoid repercussions on defence and on international cooperation; and we would expect our partners to share that approach.

6 The rest of the time with the President could be used for (in some cases further) discussion of broad defence and arms control issues, plus international economic, monetary and energy questions. Detailed defence and arms control matters could be left over for the session in the afternoon with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Calls on the UN Secretary General and the President of the General Assembly

7 These are essentially courtesy calls and we have no pressing objectives. For suggested topics, please see Resumé of Briefs, paragraph 21.

8 Personality Notes on President Carter, Secretary Vance, Dr Brzezinski, Secretary Brown, the Chiefs of Staff, Dr Waldheim and the President of the General Assembly are at Annex A. The list of briefs is at Annex B. Essential Statistics on the US are at Annex C.

RESUME OF BRIEFS

Defence Matters (Including TNF and Procurement). Brief No 2

9 In addition to the item at 4(a) above: this will be a useful occasion to assess with the Americans the outcome of the NATO discussion on TNF modernisation at its meeting on 12 December. There are two other subjects which could be taken up with President Carter or Dr Brown: equipment collaboration and defence efforts outside NATO. On the former, our message is that we welcome US efforts to widen the opportunities for transatlantic collaboration and their recognition of the need to preserve a viable defence industry in Europe. But there is still a lot to be done to give concrete expression to this. On the latter, the Prime Minister might express support for efforts by the US and other individual Allies to respond to the challenge to Western interests outside NATO and explain our own role.

Arms Control and Disarmament (Including SALT, MBFR/EDC, CTB).

Brief No 3

10 For President Carter, the main topic will be SALT ratification, on which he will look for helpful comments from the Prime Minister during her meeting with Congressmen. The visit will be a good opportunity to make clear that HMG have no intention of allowing British systems to become involved in

SALT III and strongly support the position agreed on this in the NATO Special Group. Defensive notes are included for use in case the President raises CTB and asks the Prime Minister to reconsider her position on National Seismic Stations.

International Economic and Monetary Questions. Brief No 4

11 Prospects for world growth and inflation are poor: oil price developments imply further deterioration. But major countries are stressing that control of inflation is paramount even if, as in the UK and US, at the expense of growth. Less developed countries may be badly hit and debt service problems will increase.

International Energy Questions. Brief No 5

12 The Prime Minister and President Carter will want to exchange views on the outcome of the IEA Ministerial meeting of 10 December, and on world energy prospects in the light of Iran and with the OPEC Ministerial meeting in Caracas beginning on the day of the visit. President Carter may seek support for his energy package, stress the need to strengthen the import targets agreed at Tokyo, and possibly raise some North Sea issues. The Prime Minister will want to reaffirm support for the US energy package, and the importance of demand restraint, pledge cooperation in meeting agreed objectives, and reaffirm our wish for continuing US participation in the exploitation of North Sea Oil.

Northern Ireland (Including Arms for the RUC). Brief No 6

13 Our objectives are:

- (a) to bring home to President Carter and the Administration the political realities of the Northern Ireland situation and to convince them of the Government's determination to establish a generally acceptable system of Government in Northern Ireland

while fulfilling our duty to protect the citizens of all denominations against terrorism; and

(b) (if this issue is still unsettled) an early resumption of licencing of arms supplies to the Royal Ulster Constabulary; President Carter must be left in no doubt of the disastrous effect of the major public row that will be unavoidable if supplies are not resumed early next year.

East-West Relations (Including both USSR and China). Brief No 7

14 The Prime Minister may wish to describe the British Government's policy towards the Soviet Union and its allies and towards China. The Prime Minister may also like to ask President Carter's views on the prospects for US/Soviet relations in the light of the debate on SALT II ratification, TNF modernisation, Sino-American relations, the recent dispute over Cuba and current events in Iran.

Regional Questions. Brief No 8

15 (A) Rhodesia

The Prime Minister will wish to outline the latest developments on Rhodesia, to thank the President for the help the Administration has given us so far, and to enlist his continued support.

(B) Iran and Gulf Security

The Prime Minister will wish to express sympathy and support for President Carter in the Iran crisis. At the same time, she might seek to establish that the President recognises the need to keep Western friends of America as fully informed as possible of US intentions, to consult them as much as possible over any American action and to avoid endangering our friends in the area or supplies of oil and the world financial

and energy markets.

(C) Pakistan

Our worries about Pakistan include the failure to protect diplomatic missions on 21 November, the nuclear programme (we hope they can be persuaded not to test) and the apparent inability of President Zia to tackle Pakistan's problems.

(D) Indo-China

After the successful United National General Assembly vote on 14 November, calling for foreign forces to be withdrawn from Cambodia, we are looking for ways of underlining our support for ASEAN and our continuing resistance to Vietnamese ambitions. The situation in Thailand is now well under control but we support efforts to reduce tension on the borders.

(E) Cuba and the Caribbean

We share United States concern at the expansion of Cuban influence in the Caribbean. We are carrying our measures, especially on the security side, to help contain it. We need to convince the US of the resolve shared by the British Government and Premier Price to take Belize to an early and secure independence. We shall first pursue a negotiated settlement with Guatemala. If this fails, we may then need to consider, as a second best solution, a multilateral defence guarantee for an independent Belize. It is our view, if the present deadlock is not swiftly resolved, that there will be new scope for Cuban mischief. We must persuade the US to come off the fence on this issue and help convince the Guatemalans that an early negotiated settlement is essential for stability. In return we offer to continue our cooperation over measures to restrain Cuban influence in the area.

(F) The Near East (Including Arab/Israel)

We continue to support US peace efforts but are concerned at the lack of progress in the autonomy talks. Pressure must be brought on Israel to be more flexible and on the Palestinians to commit themselves to a negotiated peace. A new Security Council resolution reaffirming 242 and endorsing legitimate Palestinian political rights could have value if the text were right.

(G) Southern Africa

The tentative signs of internal reform in South Africa offer probably the only hope of peaceful change in that country. We should welcome them and resist attempts further to isolate South Africa, unless she takes provocative steps making it politically impossible for us to do so. The Namibian problem depends to a great extent on a Rhodesia solution, but we must ensure that momentum is maintained in preparation for implementing the Western Five's settlement plan.

Shipping Policy. Brief No 9

16 The generally free flow of trade investment between our countries is an excellent example to the world. All the more pity that it is disturbed by the imposition of certain US economic policies on business conducted wholly or partly outside the USA. In ocean shipping the insensitive US regulatory system leads to constant jurisdictional clashes and economic penalties for ship-owners. There are also political implications; the US and the UK should not be seen to be at loggerheads in an area of such strategic importance as shipping. We and other major shipping nations have for some time been engaged in a dialogue with the

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USA designed to replace US unilateralism with a non-international approach. It is important that we still continue the search for an agreed solution - and be seen to be doing so - though we readily acknowledge the difficulties.

Aviation Matters. Brief No 10

17 The Americans would like to see substantial changes to much of the Bermuda II Air Services Agreement. We are largely content with the Agreement as it has brought benefits to UK consumers through a range of services at attractive low fares while enabling our airlines to obtain a major share of the market. But we are prepared to negotiate further changes of value to consumers such as new US gateways. There are no points for the Prime Minister to raise, but a short defensive brief has been included.

Trade Issues. Brief No 11

18 The response to the expected deterioration in world trading conditions has to be constructive. In the UK we will resist demands for wholesale protective measures. In exceptional cases we may be compelled to act, as over US synthetic textiles. But we have no intention of letting the conclusion of the multilateral trade negotiations signal the over-vigorous use of such protection as that agreement sanctions. We hope there is a similar determination on the part of the Americans.

Anti-Trust/Extraterritoriality (Including Protection of Trading Interests Bill). Brief No 13

19 The Prime Minister could say that we have been concerned at the way in which US courts have continued to extend their jurisdiction beyond what we consider justified. HMG are

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therefore seeking legislation powers which could be used to redress the balance. We hope they will not have to be used; but look to the US Government to help solve the underlying problems through genuine negotiation and appropriate influence on their courts.

United States: Internal Political and Economic Scene

(Background Brief) Brief No 14

20 President Carter's prospects, both for the Democratic nomination and re-election; his challengers and their prospects; the major issues facing the Administration (the wave of anti-American feeling in Iran and elsewhere, SALT II ratification, energy policy, the US economy).

United Nations Matters. Brief No 12

21 In talks with the UN Secretary General, the Prime Minister might confirm the invitation to pay an official visit to the UK in 1980. She might go on to discuss the role of the Security Council, in the light of the Indian initiative to enlarge it, and a Libyan initiative to abolish the Permanent Members' veto. She might go over this and the role of the General Assembly with its current President (Mr Salim, Tanzania); also, the development of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

6 December 1979

PRESIDENT CARTER

Born 1924, Plains Georgia. Brought up in a farm in a small community nearby (population now 683) and helped his family run a general store.

He attended the US Naval Academy at Annapolis (the first of his family to attend college) then served 10 years in the Navy, mainly in the submarine force; his service included a period with the controversial Submarine Programme being created by Admiral Rickover and courses in reactor technology and nuclear physics. He resigned his commission on his father's death from cancer in order to take over the family business.

From 1953-1963, Mr Carter devoted himself to modernising and building up the family peanut warehouse business and farm and involved himself in community affairs. In 1962 his younger brother Billy took over the farm business, and at 37 Mr Carter turned to politics.

After serving as a State Senator in the Georgian Legislature, Mr Carter was elected Governor of Georgia in 1970 on his second attempt. In spite of an apparent conservative bias in his campaign, Mr Carter startled Georgia by taking a forthright stand against racial discrimination; he also reorganised the State Government, re-structured the budget and instituted prison reforms. During his Governorship he made his first visits abroad (apart from Naval shore leave), to South America and Europe. Mr Carter first visited London in 1973 as a guest of HMG and in May 1977 as President.

In December 1974 Mr Carter announced his candidacy for the Democratic Presidential nomination and spent 1975 travelling around the United States making himself known and building a political organisation. In January 1976 he began his formal campaign. Convincing wins in the primaries enabled him to win the Democratic nomination, and took him on to a narrow victory over President Ford.

As President, he at first seemed unable to stop campaigning and get on with governing the country. Much of his energy seemed to be concentrated on largely symbolic actions, which were at first popular (his fire-side chat about energy, 'town meetings' in small communities, public phone-ins). But his poor handling of the Congress, which was not helped by the fact that hardly any of the young georgian 'Mafia' whom he installed in the White House had Washington experience, began to undermine his standing on Capitol Hill. Although he achieved some foreign policy successes (the Panama Canal Treaties, the Camp David settlement, normalisation of relations with China, the signature of SALT II), the lack of credible domestic and energy policies caused the view that he was an inept President to spread to the country at large. By June 1979 his popularity had fallen to an all-time low for any President since polls were taken: even lower than that of Mr Nixon on the eve of his resignation.

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Further misfortunes followed and did nothing to improve his standing. But recently, Mr Carter's prospects, at least for securing the Democratic nomination, have brightened considerably.

President Carter and his wife Rosalynn have four children. The family including Mr Carter's mother, Lillian, have remained active on Mr Carter's behalf, not always with happy results.

CYRUS VANCE

SECRETARY OF STATE

Born 1917 in Clarksburg, West Virginia, (allegedly of Welsh ancestry). Cyrus Vance was educated at Yale and Yale Law School. He served in the Navy during the War, then practised law. He served on Senator Lyndon Johnson's Armed Services Committee in the late 1950s.

Mr Vance first joined the Defence Department under President Kennedy, and was Deputy Secretary under President Johnson (1964-66). He was the President's Special Representative in Cyprus (1967) and Korea (1968), and the US negotiator in the Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam 1968-69. He then practised law in New York (he was Burmah Oil's adviser) and played an active foreign affairs role as Vice Chairman of the Council of Foreign Relations. Although he held Office during the early part of the Vietnam War, he was not among those held responsible for US involvement, and played an important part in getting the Paris peace talks started.

Like President Carter and Vice President Mondale, the Secretary of State is a firm believer in the maintenance of the Western Alliance. His role has been to carry out the policies of President Carter, rather than to initiate his own. There have been reports of friction between him and the President's Security Adviser, Dr Brzezinski. These are probably exaggerated. Dr Brzezinski has not made the same attempt to undermine the Secretary of State as Dr Kissinger did when he was National Security Adviser. Nonetheless, Mr Vance made it fairly clear that he was not pleased when Mr Strauss was appointed to be the President's personal representative in the Middle East, and has stated his intention of resigning at the end of President Carter's present term, even if the President is re-elected.

Married, and has five children.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Born 1928 in Poland. Went to Canada 1938; naturalised US citizen 1958.

Academic background (Soviet affairs, public law and government), culminating as Professor of International Relations at Columbia. Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff under the Johnson Administration (when he concentrated on Soviet and Communist affairs). Had a hand in writing Carter's main foreign policy statements during and after the Presidential campaign. Director of the Trilateral Commission (to which he recruited Mr Carter) until July 1976.

As National Security <sup>Council</sup> Adviser he has concentrated on the super-power relationship, whether because this tends to re-assert itself whilly-nilly as a fact of international life or because Brzezinski himself has something of a visceral preoccupation with the Russians vide his line on the need to stand up to the Russians in Africa; his theory of the "arc of crisis" his enthusiastic drive for normalisation with China; and the pugnacious line he is reported to have taken about the Soviet brigade in Cuba.) But he is responsible for a recent Presidential directive which requires that the case for arms control negotiations with the Russians should be set firmly in the context of overall US foreign policy objectives and security interests and justified rigorously in those terms.

A recent article summed him up thus: "though bright and articulate Mr Brzezinski seems to lack a strategy for translating abstract ideas into policy. But more than anyone else in the Carter Administration, he has an ability to rationalise foreign policy setbacks and successes as if they were part of a grand design".

He is married with three children.

HAROLD BROWN - United States Secretary of Defence

Harold Brown was born in New York City in 1927 and educated at Columbia University, receiving his doctorate in physics there in 1949. In the Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, (University of California) 1952/61 he was placed in charge of the development of the Thermo Nuclear Weapon under Edward Teller. He was also involved there in projects investigating the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Subsequently, he played a major role in the development of the Appollo and ABM projects, and also participated in the nuclear test ban talks (1958/59) and SALT in Helsinki, Vienna and Geneva. He was Director of Defence, Research and Engineering under President Kennedy (1961/65) and Secretary for the Air Force under President Johnson (1965/69). Prior to his present appointment he was President of the California Institute of Technology. Over the years Harold Brown has grown considerably in stature. He is today more sophisticated, realistic and, some would say, more liberal.

He is very highly regarded in Washington and by the military as a 'middle of the road' contender with a sound knowledge of defence issues and a lively interest in arms control.

He is married and has two children.

GENERAL DAVID JONES (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff): since 1978

Born in 1921. He attended the University of North Dakota and Minot State College until the outbreak of World War II. He entered the Army Air Corps, beginning aviation cadet training in April 1942 and receiving his commission in February 1943. His assignments have included operational and command positions in bomber, tanker, training and tactical fighter units as well as service in staff position in the Strategic Air Command and Headquarters US Air Force. He was assigned to a bombardment squadron during the Korean War and accumulated more than 300 hours on missions over North Korea. In 1969 he served in Vietnam as Deputy Commander for Operations and then as Vice Commander of the 7th Air Force. He also served as Inspector, Operator, Planner and Commander in Chief of United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). Concurrent with duty as Commander in Chief USAFE, Jones was Commander of the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force. From 1974-1978 he was Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. Not an outgoing personality but well respected for the qualities he has shown as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the past year his loyalty to the Administration over matters such as SALT has earned him unfair criticism. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves for two years and may be re-appointed. He is the nation's highest ranking Military Officer.

GENERAL ROBERT BARROW (Commandant of the Marine Corps):

Commandant of the Marine Corps since July 1979.

Born 1922. Commissioned as a Marine Corps Second Lieutenant in 1943, he served during World War II as Commander of an American team attached to Chinese nationalist guerillas, which operated extensively in Central China. After the war, he remained in China for another year.

He returned to the United States in October 1946.

Served as a Company Commander attached to the 1st Battalion, First Marines, 1st Marine Division, in the Korean War, earning the Silver Star Medal. Led his company in the Chosin Reservoir Campaign, earning the Navy Cross. Returned to the Far East in 1952 for a one year special assignment.

Served as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, from September 1964 until July 1967, and was awarded his first Legion of Merit. Served in Vietnam. During the nine months he served as Commanding Officer of the Ninth Marines, his regiment took part in numerous combat actions and he was awarded the army distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism.

Promoted Brigadier General in 1969 and Major General on 5 September 1972.

1975 appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower.

1976 CG Fleet American Forces Atlantic.

July 1978 appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps.

A steely-eyed Southerner who has firm control of the US Marine Corps by dint of quiet but strong leadership. Given to somewhat long periods of reflective silence but when he speaks is well worth listening to.

Married with 5 children, including a twin boy and girl.

LT GENERAL EDWARD MEYER CHIEF OF STAFF US ARMY:

Chief of Staff US Army since June 1979.

Born 1928. Graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1951. Served with the 40th Infantry Division in Korea as an Infantry Company Commander and a Battalion Staff Officer. In the early 1960s he served on the Allied Staff at SHAPE HQ and on the Department of Army Staff in the Office of the Chief of Staff. In the mid 1960s he served as a Deputy Brigade Commander and Battalion Commander in Vietnam. After a tour on the Joint Staff in Washington, he returned to Vietnam three years later to command a brigade and to serve as a Division Chief of Staff.

In the early 1970s General Meyer was a Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC, collaborating on books on US Forces in Europe and the defence portion of the Federal budget. He subsequently served in Germany before becoming Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans in November 1976.

Beneath his "country boy" manner he is intelligent and shrewd with a quick and decisive mind. He is an avid reader on political and military subjects sleeping only three hours a night in order to devote the remainder to reading.

ADMIRAL THOMAS HAYWOOD (US Chief of Naval Operations)

Chief of Naval Operations since July 1978.

Born in California in 1924. Graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1947 and subsequently trained as a navy aircraft pilot. Served in a navy fighter squadron in Korea. After ten years in naval aviation as a fighter pilot, he joined the staff of the Secretary of the Navy in 1961.

1963-65 served as Executive, later commanding, Officer of the Navy Fighter Squadron.

1965 Commander of one of the attack carrier air wings of the US Navy. He served in the Mediterranean and later in South East Asia.

1967 graduated with an MSC in International Affairs from George Washington University.

1969 Commander of the attack carrier USS America.

1970 promoted Rear Admiral.

1973 promoted Vice Admiral.

1975 Commander of the US 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific.

A tall, quiet-spoken man, his main emphasis to date has been on the manpower front, although in the longer term his primary concern is with the size and shape of the fleet. He is well aware of the importance of the RN contribution to the Atlantic.

Married with two daughters.

GENERAL LEW ALLEN (Chief of Staff US Air Force):

Chief of Staff US Air Force since July 1978.

Born 1925. Graduated from US Military Academy West Point in 1943. 1950-54 University of Illinois. Graduated with Doctorate in Physics (his thesis was on high energy photonuclear reactions). Later worked at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission and was involved in several of the nuclear test series. 1957 Science Adviser to the Physics Division of the Air Force Weapons Laboratory. Later moved to the Pentagon, working in the Office of the Secretary of State.

1969 became Director of Space Systems at the Pentagon.

1973 Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community.

1977 assumed command of the Air Force Systems Command.

1978 Vice Chief of Staff and later Chief of Staff.

Regarded as a technocrat rather than a leader, General Allen's appointment was greeted with some misgivings within the USAF but his appointment of an effective deputy who looks after the day to day running of the Air Force has resolved that problem while Allen himself is now well respected and liked. He is a kindly, approachable man and appears well disposed towards the United Kingdom.

Married with 5 children.

WALDHEIM, KURT (DR)

Secretary-General of the United Nations

Austrian. Born 1918. University of Vienna (Doctor of Jurisprudence).

Austrian Diplomatic Service 1945-64. Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs 1968-70. Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations 1971-72. Elected Secretary-General of the United Nations 1972 and re-elected in 1976 (second term expires 1981).

Dr Waldheim is a painstaking and cautious man who sees his role primarily as a conciliator. He is touchy about the authority and prestige of the UN and appreciates recognition of his unique position in world politics. He has sought, with some success, to promote the wider involvement of the UN in issues of international peace and security as well as economic and social development. He has also sought to use his own position to promote the settlement of disputes among Member States (eg Iran/US).

Although he was aware when first elected that the UK had reservations about his candidature, he trusts and likes Britain, and his relations with the UK Mission have been consistently good and helpful. He last visited London in July 1979 when he called on the Prime Minister.

Married, two children (one son living in London). Interests - horses and the UN.

SALIM, HE SALIM AHMED

Permanent Representative of Tanzania at the United Nations, New York, since 1969. President of the 34th Session of the General Assembly, 1979.

Born about 1933 in Pemba. Moslem.

1962-63 General Secretary of Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) January 1964 reported to be running a 'Zanzibar Office' in Cuba. 1964-69 Ambassadorial appointments and a post in Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

February 1969 appointed Ambassador to China and North Korea. December 1969 appointed Permanent Representative at the United Nations, New York.

One of Tanzania's most able diplomats and influential at the UN. Aspires to succeed Dr Waldheim as Secretary-General.

The generally constructive approach which he now adopts has been helpful to British interests, eg over Rhodesia. He has been a skilful and moderate President of the Assembly during 1979.

Married, two children.

DAVID ROCKEFELLER:

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Chase Manhattan Bank.

Age 64. The youngest son of John D Rockefeller and brother of the late Nelson Rockefeller, he is one of the most prominent bankers in New York and an influential spokesman for US business interests, both domestic and international.

He is noted for his interest in world affairs (and particularly developing countries), is Director of the Centre for Inter-American Relations and Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations. This has given rise in the past to the criticism that he has given more attention to social and international affairs than to Chase Manhattan Bank. (Rockefeller concerns himself with determining the Bank's broad policy, leaving the detailed implementation to the Bank's President, Willard Butcher).

Rockefeller founded the Trilateral Commission in 1972 and was instrumental in appointing President Carter to it when Carter was Governor of Georgia. A number of leading members of the Carter administration have a background in the Trilateral Commission, notably Vance, Harold Brown and Brzezinski.

Chase Manhattan Bank has been directly involved in the freezing of Iranian assets. The Bank precipitated matters by declaring the Iranians to be in default on a major loan. Chase was leading even though the Iranians claim they wished to make the necessary payment. The action is reported to have disturbed other (non-US Banks) participating in the loan. Together with Dr Kissinger, he has been criticised for pressing the Administration to let the Shah enter the US.

Rockefeller is a noted art collector and Rockefeller Plaza contains a major collection of modern art.

- (1) Cuba and the Caribbean
- (2) The New East European Area/Israel
- (3) Southeast Asia
- (4) Shipping Policy
- (5) Arabian Matter
- (6) Trade Issues
- (7) United Nations Matter
- (8) Arab Trust/Trade
- (9) Financing Problems of Middle East
- (10) United States - Israel
- (11) Economic Policy

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO  
WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK: 17-18 DECEMBER

<u>PMVY(79)</u> _____	<u>Subject</u>
1	Steering Brief
2	Defence Matters (including TNF, procurement)
3	Arms Control and Disarmament (including SALT, MBFR/EDC, CTB)
4	International Economic and Monetary Questions
5	International Energy Questions
6	Northern Ireland (including Arms for RUC)
7	East-West Relations (including both USSR and China)
8	Regional Questions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- (A) Rhodesia</li> <li>(B) Iran and Gulf Security</li> <li>(C) Pakistan</li> <li>- (D) Indo-China</li> <li>(E) Cuba and the Caribbean</li> <li>- (F) The Near East (including Arab/Israel)</li> <li>(G) Southern Africa</li> </ul>
- 9	Shipping Policy
10	Aviation Matters
- 11	Trade Issues
12	United Nations Matters
13	Anti-Trust/Extraterritoriality (including Protection of Trading Interests Bill)
14	United States: Internal Political and Economic Scene

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ANNEX C

BASIC STATISTICS

		<u>USA</u>	<u>UK</u>
Population (millions)	1978	218.4	55.9
Labour Force (millions)	1978	100.4	26.4
Unemployed as percentage of civilian labour force	1978	6.0	5.8
	Sept 1979	5.8	5.2
Gross National Product (US\$ billion)	1978	2127.6	311.9
GNP per capita (US\$)	1978	9698	5579
Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP by volume (per cent)	1973/1978	+2.4	+0.9
Annual Rate of Growth of Industrial Production (per cent)	1978	+5.7	+3.1
Consumer Prices (percentage change over year earlier)	1978	+7.6	+8.6
	Sept 1979	+12.1	+16.5
Balance of Payments on Current Account (US\$ million)	1978	-13895	+1981
<u>Trade</u>			
UK Exports to USA (£million)	1977	3055.5	
	1978	3477.2	
Percentage increase in volume	1973/1978	-1.3	
UK Imports from USA (£million)	1977	3644.7	
	1978	4222.6	
<u>Defence</u>			
Spending	5% GNP		
Total Armed Forces	2,022,000		

Sources: OECD Economic Survey of USA, November 1979  
 OECD Main Economic Indicators, November 1979  
 D of T Overseas Trade Statistics of UK,  
 1977 and December 1978  
 11SS The Military Balance (1979-80)