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December 24, 1981

Moster Shard Shart Pr. 5

Dear Prime Minister:

As we are both aware, events in Poland are at a critical point where Poland's future ability to attain the diversity, liberalization and renewal which we so strongly wish are in the balance. I believe that it is necessary to make unmistakably clear to both the Polish authorities and the USSR -- which is deeply complicit in recent tragic developments in Poland -- that the repressions must cease and that legitimate Polish elements, including the church and Solidarity, must be part of a genuine process of reconciliation. I also believe that it is necessary to put both Warsaw and Moscow on notice that otherwise, there will be severe costs.

I am therefore sending letters to both General Jaruzelski and to President Brezhnev which will leave no doubt about the broader stakes at issue in Poland today. I want you to be aware of the content of these letters, which are summarized below.

As you can see from these messages, I believe we are at the point where a firm stance and strong action are necessary. You should be aware that, at present, I do not envisage putting arms control processes at hazard among the steps with which the USSR must reckon. Otherwise, however, we are -- as I am informing President Brezhnev -- considering the full range of issues affecting our relationship.

I believe it is crucial for us and other friends and partners to act in harmony to maximize the chances for peaceful evolution in Poland, and I hope that you will agree on the importance of concerting our actions and the signals we send to both Warsaw and Moscow. I hope, thus, that we will be in a position to act together if the suppression of civil liberties in Poland does not soon cease.

I am sending parallel letters to all of our colleagues in NATO, Spain, Australia, Japan and New Zealand.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Letter to General Jaruzelski

- -- Expression of deep concern over recent developments in Poland, including imposition of martial law, arrests of thousands of workers and intellectuals, and reports of beatings and even killings. The impossibility of reconciling these violations with obligations under the Helsinki Final Act and the U.N. Charter.
- -- Recognition that Poland has been under considerable external pressure to roll back reforms of the past 16 months, and statement that the U.S. cannot idly ignore the violations of human rights in Poland, since to do so would make us a party to the repression.
- -- A statement of U.S. decisions with regard to Poland, including suspending consideration of agricultural assistance; withholding of undelivered sales of commodities; suspension of renewal of export insurance by the Export-Import Bank; not extending existing bilateral air transport services beyond expiration of March 31, 1982; no allocation to Poland in 1982 of U.S. fisheries stocks; and consideration of further steps which could have a severe impact on mutual relations, particularly in the economic sphere.
- -- Hope that the U.S. will not be forced to take such further steps, but the need for a full review of U.S. policy toward Poland if repression continues.
- -- U.S. readiness to reconsider these actions once the Polish Government has taken concrete steps to end repression, freed those detained, and begun a search for reconciliation and negotiated accommodation with the true representatives of all the social, spiritual, and political elements of Polish society.
- -- Urging Jaruzelski to take steps to move Poland to genuine compromise and negotiation. •

Letter to President Brezhnev

- -- Recent events in Poland have filled the people of the United States with dismay. Since the imposition of martial law, the elementary rights of Polish people have been violated daily, with massive arrests, incarcerations in overcrowded jails, suspension of rights of assembly and brutal assaults by security forces on Polish citizens.
- The Soviet Union has repeatedly intervened in Polish affairs in recent months. The June 5 CPSU letter to the Polish leadership warned that internal Polish developments were intolerable to the USSR. This and numerous other such communications placed pressure on the Polish Government. They were accompanied by a steady barrage of media assaults, military exercises on Poland's borders and warnings of intervention unless Polish civil liberties were restricted.
- -- These actions are a clear violation of many international agreements, including the Helsinki Final Act.
- -- Since Afghanistan, nothing has so outraged U.S. public opinion as the pressure and threats exerted by the Soviet Government on Poland to stifle its freedom.
- -- Attempts to suppress the Polish people, either by Polish forces under Soviet pressure, or through more direct use of Soviet force, will not bring about stability and could unleash a process which cannot be controlled.
- -- The only solution is to allow the Polish Government and people now to begin a process of reconciliation. This cannot be done in the present atmosphere of terror, arrests, and bloodshed. Spiritual, political and social forces in Poland must be part of a new national dialogue. This is as essential to solve Poland's major economic problems as it is to heal the political wounds.
- -- The Soviet Union can either acknowledge the need for this process or continue to prevent it. The consequences of each of these courses for our relationship are clear.

- -- Over the course of 1981, we had begun to develop a framework to guide our relations in the years to come. We had set forth a concrete agenda for negotiations on critical regional and arms control issues. We have been expecting to build a better relationship and increased cooperation.
- -- The Soviet Union must decide whether we can move ahead with this agenda or not. The responsibility of the USSR for repression in Poland undermines the basis for an improvement in our relationship. We have no intention of dictating a change in the relationship of political forces in Europe. We recognize the interest of the Soviet Union in a stable Poland. But reconciliation and moderate reform in Poland are no threat to the USSR.
- -- The United States cannot acquiesce in suppression of the Polish people's legitimate desire for a process of renewal. Should the Soviet Union pursue this course the United States will have no choice but to take concrete measures affecting the full range of our relationship.
- -- We bear a mutual obligation to demonstrate wisdom, moderation and restraint. The U.S. is prepared to join in helping heal Poland's wounds and to meet its real needs if the USSR reciprocates.
- -- A call on the USSR in the next few days to make clear its understanding of the need for reconciliation in Poland.