

OUT TELEGRAM

Subject for Rhodesia - Pt 15

↓	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1	ZCZC	PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. 733/80
2	GRS	
3	CONFIDENTIAL	
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6	FM FCO 1500Z FEB 80	
7	TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM	
8	TELEGRAM NUMBER	
9	AND TO SALISBURY, NAIROBI, MAPUTO, GABORONE, LUANDA, ACCRA,	
10	LAGOS, MONROVIA, PRETORIA, ADDIS ABABA, DAKAR, KINSHASA, LUSAKA,	
11	FREETOWN, KINGSTON, LILONGWE, BANJUL, MBABANE, ABIDJAN,	
12	WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, EEC POSTS, OTTAWA, CANBERRA,	
13	WELLINGTON	
14	MIPT: PRESIDENT NYERERE'S MESSAGE	
15	1. Following is the text of the Prime Minister's reply:	
16	Dear President Nyerere,	
17	Thank you for your letter. I think you know my views on	
18	many of the points which you have raised. Sir Peter Moon has	
19	dealt very fully with others in meetings with you and members of	
20	your Government.	
21	The present role of the Rhodesian Forces, of which the	
22	auxiliaries form a part, stems from what was agreed at Lancaster	
23	House. The agreements provided that the Rhodesian forces should	
24	first disengage to the vicinity of their bases to allow the	
25	Patriotic Front forces to assemble. It was made clear that	

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File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Rhodesia Policy
Drafted by (Block capitals) C D Powell		
Telephone number 233 3466		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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2 what would happen thereafter would depend crucially on the
3 success of the assembly phase. The sentence actually used by
4 Lord Carrington in his statement of 11 December read: "If all
5 Patriotic Front forces inside Rhodesia assemble with their arms
6 and there is no further movement by externally-based Patriotic
7 Front forces into Rhodesia, there would be no need in these
8 circumstances for the Governor to ask the Rhodesian forces to
9 deploy from their company bases."

10 Although a large number of Patriotic Front forces did
11 assemble, regrettably there was considerable movement of armed
12 men across Rhodesia's borders after the cease-fire came into
13 effect, some of it by PF forces which had arrived immediately
14 beforehand from other countries.

15 There is indisputable evidence, which comes not from
16 Rhodesian sources but from our own police advisers and the
17 Monitoring Force, that several thousand ZANLA forces have
18 received instructions not to assemble. They remain at large
19 in the eastern part of the country and, in the terms of the
20 Lancaster House Agreement, are unlawful. Their activities have
21 included intimidation of the rural population, interference with
22 the legitimate campaigning of other parties and widespread
23 violence. Under the terms of the agreement, the Governor is
24 entitled, indeed bound, to employ forces under his authority to
25 deal with the problem. In the western part of the country, in
26 contrast, conditions are generally peaceful, and the deployment
27 of Rhodesian forces including the auxiliaries is scarcely
28 necessary.

29 It is true that auxiliaries also perform guard duties for
30 teams trying to re-establish the infrastructure of schools, cattle
31 dips and so^{on}/_n in the rural areas. This is necessary because of
32 attempts by ZANLA forces to interfere with the return to
33 normality and to prevent the rural population from beginning to
34 enjoy the benefits of the cease-fire. I cannot agree that this

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2 role is reprehensible or illegal: on the contrary, it is
3 humane.

4

5 There is a further very important point. The Commonwealth
6 Monitoring Force has devoted a major part of its efforts over
7 the last six weeks to monitoring the security force auxiliaries.
8 They have covered virtually every auxiliary detachment throughout
9 the country and have interviewed the local population in areas
10 where auxiliaries are present. The general conclusion is that,
11 with very few exceptions (all of which have been subject to
12 disciplinary action or action by the courts), the auxiliaries are
13 fulfilling their role as part of the defence forces and are
14 not engaging in political activity. Mr Mugabe has made a number
15 of complaints. These are, of course, being investigated but many
16 of those investigated so far have proved to be unfounded.
17 By contrast the unassembled ZANLA forces are of course not
18 subject to monitoring.

19

20 You go on to suggest that the right course would be for
21 Britain to increase the number of its officials in Rhodesia and
22 expand the monitoring force. As you will know, we are
23 providing 500 British policemen to supervise polling stations
24 in rural areas: this is a direct counter to intimidation as
25 well as an additional check on the conduct of the poll. The
26 Monitoring Force is fully adequate for its tasks, which are
27 to observe the ceasefire and report breaches. We do not
28 need to know more about breaches of the ceasefire: the evidence
29 is all too plain and is reflected in the statistics of the
30 Ceasefire Commission's report. What we need is effective action
31 to deal with them and with intimidation: and this we shall get
32 only when the leaders concerned face up to their responsibilities
33 under the Lancaster House agreements and are not given any

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2 grounds to believe that they can break their undertakings with
3 impunity.

4
5 You refer to the present situation as "terrible". That
6 hardly seems to me an appropriate term when one compares the
7 position now with that only a few short weeks ago. But there
8 are very clear risks. I am very concerned about the attacks
9 on Mr Mugabe and other political figures. The Governor
10 is taking steps to deal with this, and some arrests have
11 been made.

12
13 However, by far the greatest danger is the intimidation
14 which is being practised by Mr Mugabe's party throughout the
15 eastern provinces. This is not a judgement arrived at lightly;
16 it is based on evidence painstakingly assembled by the election
17 supervisors we have deployed in the areas concerned, and on
18 reports from the monitoring force as well as from specific
19 complaints from other political parties, for whom it has been
20 impossible to campaign freely. Particularly pernicious have
21 been the threats to continue the war if ZANU(PF) loses the
22 election. Among those who have complained, Mr Nkomo has been
23 outspoken in his criticism of ZANU(PF) intimidation and has
24 called for urgent and effective measures by the Governor to
25 bring it under control.

26
27 As you know, Lord Soames has taken powers to penalise
28 those who practise intimidation. I hope that this will
29 prove a deterrent. He has so far had to use the powers in
30 only a very limited number of cases. But unless there is a
31 marked improvement in the situation it may be extremely
32 difficult to hold fair elections in certain parts of
33 the country. If the Governor does not take effective action

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2 to deal with the problem, there is a real risk that one
 3 or more of the other parties will decide not to recognise the
 4 elections in consequence of ZANU(PF)'s activities. I need
 5 not tell you what a very serious situation this would create.

6
 7 It was agreed at the Lusaka meeting that Britain would
 8 organise free and fair elections to determine the issue of
 9 who would govern Rhodesia on independence. We made clear
 10 that we would accept this responsibility, but only for the
 11 limited period needed to organise elections. If the activities
 12 of any party prejudice the holding of fair elections, the
 13 future position would be in doubt.

14
 15 We shall continue to do everything we can to conduct
 16 elections which will be as fair as possible in the circumstances.
 17 But time is short, and it will require a major effort by those
 18 in Africa who wish to see us succeed in this task to convince
 19 ZANU(PF) of the risks of the course on which it is at present
 20 embarked. Otherwise everything which has been achieved at, and
 21 since, Lusaka could be put at jeopardy.

22
 23 The period between now and independence will be
 24 exceptionally delicate. We have worked out some positive steps
 25 to deal with the position of the PF forces in the assembly
 26 places. Sir P Moon will brief you on these. At the same time,
 27 if we are to get through successfully, it will be vital that
 28 you and other African leaders should make clear unequivocally
 29 that you will not support any party which decides to continue
 30 the war after the elections, and add your influence to ours in
 31 urging calm and restraint. I hope very much that you will
 32 give us your co-operation over this.

33
 34 CARRINGTON

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