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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 250001Z FEB 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 167 DATED 24 FEBRUARY 81

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

WALDHEIM

1. I CALLED ON WALDHEIM THIS AFTERNOON (24 FEBRUARY) TO GO OVER THE GROUND IN ADVANCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CALL ON 28 FEBRUARY.
2. HIS MORALE WAS A BIT BETTER THAN WHEN I LAST SAW HIM THE DAY BEFORE HE LEFT FOR NEW DELHI. AT THAT TIME, HE HAD SUFFERED SO MUCH FLAK FROM SO MANY QUARTERS THAT HIS STATE OF MIND WAS, TO PUT IT MILDLY, LOW. A SERIES OF NON-CONTROVERSIAL BILATERAL VISITS ON HIS RETURN TRIP FROM DELHI HAD DONE A FAIR AMOUNT TO RESTORE HIS EQUILIBRIUM.
3. HE WAS HOWEVER WOUNDED BY THE AMERICAN REACTION (TRANSMITTED TO HIM IN A TELEGRAM WHICH REACHED HIM IN VIENNA) TO HIS ACTIONS IN DELHI OVER AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID WITH SOME HEAT THAT IT WAS PERFECTLY IN ORDER FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TO HAVE IT OUT WITH EACH OTHER IN STRONG LANGUAGE, BUT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD TO TREAD A NARROW AND DIFFICULT PATH. IF (AS THE AMERICAN TELEGRAM HAD APPARENTLY SUGGESTED) HE HAD PUBLICLY DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN, THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE END OF ANY USEFUL ROLE HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY. HE HAD PUT THESE POINTS TO MRS KIRKPATRICK WHO HAD MOLLIFIED HIM BY SAYING THAT THE AMERICAN INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN DESPatched WITHOUT HER KNOWLEDGE, THAT THEY REPRESENTED MIDDLE-RANK THINKING IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND THAT SHE SYMPATHISED WITH HIS POSITION.
4. WALDHEIM WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS NOW WAITING FOR THE PAKISTANIS. THEIR LAST WORD AT NEW DELHI HAD BEEN THAT THEY WOULD NOT GO INTO TALKS WITHOUT IRAN BEING PRESENT AS WELL. IN THE PRESENT IRANIAN MOOD THIS MEANT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO TALKS. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT ZIA WAS ONE OF THE NON ALIGNED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WHO WOULD BE VISITING TEHRAN SHORTLY (PRECEDED BY AGAH SHAHI) IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. THE PAKISTANIS WOULD LOOK AT THE QUESTION AGAIN IN THE LIGHT OF WHATEVER THEY GOT OUT OF THE IRANIANS AND WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH WALDHEIM.
5. SIMILARLY, ON CAMBODIA, WALDHEIM DID NOT INTEND FOR THE MOMENT TO GO AHEAD AND CALL AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AS PROPOSED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION. HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS IN DELHI WITH THE ASEANS AND SEPARATELY WITH THE VIETNAMESE. BOTH SIDES HAD SAID THAT THEY WANTED TO HAVE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS AMONGST THEMSELVES IE BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. WALDHEIM INTENDED TO CONFIRM IN WRITING WITH THE ASEANS THAT THEY WERE NOT EXPECTING HIM TO GO AHEAD IMMEDIATELY WITH CALLING THE CONFERENCE.

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6. I TOLD HIM THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HEAR HIS VIEWS ON THE NEW DELHI CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE APART FROM THE QUESTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA. NAMIBIA AND THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR (HE HAD A LONG TALK WITH THE SULTAN OF OMAN ON HIS WAY BACK FROM DELHI) WERE OTHER SUBJECTS WHICH MIGHT COME UP.

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