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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 June 1980

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Ann's 17/6

Prime Minister

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M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 DOWNING STREET

Dear Richard,

① If Afghanistan is to ^{Ann's} regain her sovereignty & political independence surely she can choose whether she be directly non-aligned or neutral? Or are we indirectly accepting 'Frankfurtischheit' by the device of calling it 'non-alignment'?

POLITICAL DISCUSSION AT THE VENICE SUMMIT

1. I attended, as the Prime Minister's representative, a Quadripartite meeting under French chairmanship near Paris on 3 - 4 June, to prepare for political discussions among the Seven Powers at Venice. Knowledge of this will be kept secret. I was accompanied by Robert Wade-Gery and Roger Garside of our Planning Staff. The Americans, Germans and French were each similarly represented by a senior man from their Foreign Ministry, supported by a member of the White House staff or its French and German equivalent. (A list of the participants is attached).

?) Agree to Ann's agenda. a general thrust of communication we would like suggested meeting. mb.

2. The meeting was brisk and to the point. We agreed (ad referendum) on three documents:

- a) a draft "annotated agenda" for the political part of the Venice Summit (Annex A);
- b) two versions (see below) of a draft passage for inclusion at the end of the Summit communiqué (Annexes B and C).

The French made it clear that they have accepted the need for some political discussion at Venice and that it should be reflected in the communiqué. But they implied that it had not been easy to persuade President Giscard to accept this. (I think this is a bit overdone. The French played a full and, on the whole, constructive part in the discussion at our meeting and in drafting the texts I have just mentioned. Indeed the draft communiqué they themselves proposed was much more robust than I expected).



3. We also agreed on a procedure for merging this 4-Power preparation with that which will now have to be undertaken by the Venice Seven, without revealing our prior collusion particularly to the hyper-sensitive Italians. The latter have proposed a meeting of the Seven in Rome on 16 June to discuss the political part of the agenda. Ostensibly in preparation for that, The French will now let them have, as a unilateral French document, the draft communiqué passage at Annex B. Then, shortly before the 16 June meeting the Americans will give the Italians, as a unilateral United States document, the annotated agenda (Annex A). When we all meet in Rome, the British, French and Germans will of course support the "American" annotated agenda, without revealing our part in drafting it. Similarly, we, the Americans and the Germans will in principle support the "French" draft of the communiqué passage; but we will, by agreement, severally suggest certain modifications designed to convert the French text at Annex B into the slightly preferable version at Annex C. (The English text of that was written in a hurry and will need a bit of polishing). I am afraid this seems a rather complicated web. But I think that, provided none of us reveal the fact of our prior Quadripartite discussions, it should work out all right at the Seven power meeting.

4. There was general agreement to recommend that, because of Italian susceptibilities, there should not be any meeting at Venice of either the Four Heads of Government or the Foreign Ministers. The latter will of course meet anyway on the eve of the subsequent NATO meeting in Ankara (as they always do on such occasions, under "Berlin" cover). On the other hand, we learned from David Aaron that Brzezinski is aiming to have a discreet breakfast meeting at Venice with Wahl, von Staden and Robert Armstrong. This has happened without comment at some of the previous Summits.

5. So much for procedure: but most of our discussion was on matters of substance, revolving essentially around the Afghan crisis and its implications. There were four areas where certain differences emerged:-

- (i) As has been the case almost from the start, the Germans and French professed to see the implications of the crisis primarily in regional terms; and at one point I had to refute firmly the French contention that it was mistaken to regard detente in Europe as necessarily weakened by Soviet activity in other parts of the world. The Americans and we were, as I expected, agreed in arguing that the crisis could not be confined to its regional implications, but had to be seen in a wider context. In this argument there was also anuance between the German and French approach. The Germans see regional containment of the Russians in terms primarily of propping up other countries under threat with economic or military assistance; whereas the French accept more

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readily the need for counter action as well, e.g. in material support for the Afghan resistance.

- (ii) The Germans thought that Chancellor Schmidt would want to widen the political discussion at Venice to include various world trouble-spots, in particular Namibia. The French argued that they had only agreed reluctantly to have political discussion at all, because of the Afghan crisis; it should therefore concentrate on that subject and on issues which could naturally be related to it (eg arms control - see below). We and the Americans recognised that Heads of Government could raise whatever points they wished. But we reminded van Well that time at Venice was limited; and tried in particular to dissuade the Germans from diverting the discussion to issues like Namibia which, though important, were really peripheral to the main topic. It emerged pretty clearly that Chancellor Schmidt would like as wide-ranging a discussion as possible so that he can go to Moscow, a week later, in the role of accredited purveyor of Western views on the main political problems of the world. Up to a point this has merit, in that it might encourage him to caution. Equally, I do not think the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary would want him to seem to be our spokesman in Moscow. The Americans were notably cool towards his visit; and the French made no secret of their unwillingness to see him play this role.

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I think he is
worse to go
than*

- (iii) It was agreed that President Carter should tell his colleagues in Venice how he saw prospects for arms control (particularly SALT II and TNF/SALT III) post-Afghanistan; and the Germans said that Chancellor Schmidt would wish to respond. In this context, Aaron went out of his way to say (clearly on instructions) that one of the main reasons for the current disaffection in the United States with arms control in general and SALT II in particular was the belief that the Alliance was disunited and European support for American policy inadequate. Frankly, I think we should treat this with some reserve; but it was notably the meeting's clearest example of American whip-cracking.

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(iv) The Germans explained, in a surprisingly apologetic tone, that Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow would be very much a "routine affair". But they admitted that it would include signature (not by the Chancellor himself) of the programme of action to implement the Soviet-German long term Economic Agreement signed in 1978. Aaron said firmly that the United States Government were "disappointed" by this news; they had been urging their Allies, ever since Afghanistan started, to take economic action against the Soviet Union analogous to their own. The Soviet-German Agreement would be seen as a move in the opposite direction. I gave him some support.

6. More important in my view than these differences, which were to be expected, is the fact that they did not inhibit agreement either on the annotated agenda or on the draft communiqué passage. The latter (Annex C), or something like it, should I think make a significant impact, representing as it does a robust condemnation of the Russians in a document to which the French are prepared to join the Americans (and the rest of us) in subscribing.

7. With the Rome meeting in view, which I would propose also to attend, perhaps you could let me know if the Prime Minister is broadly content with the draft communiqué passage (version II at Annex C) and with the draft annotated agenda (Annex A). She is, of course, in no sense committed to them.

8. I am sending a copy of this letter to Robert Armstrong; and I have informed Lord Carrington of the position reached.

Taus car,

Michael

Michael Palliser

DRAFT ANNOTATED AGENDA

AFGHANISTAN

1. Objective: } To return to a sovereign, independent, non-aligned
Afghanistan at peace with its neighbours and
deter further Soviet aggression.

It implies: - withdrawal of Soviet forces;
- a Government broadly acceptable to the people;
- arrangements designed to ensure that Afghanistan
neither threatens nor is threatened by its
neighbours.

2. Action by the Seven should develop in five main areas:
- a) Pressures on Soviet Union
 - in the region:
 - . to support Afghan resistance
 - . to deter Soviet military escalation
in Afghanistan
or across its borders.
 - directly on Soviet Union.
 - b) Providing an acceptable political solution. We should consider initiatives to be discussed with interested parties.
 - c) To prevent new Soviet initiatives in the region in the form either of subversion or the use of force, by strengthening countries there and by providing reassurance to them.
 - d) Encouragement for parallel actions by others, eg the initiative envisaged by the Islamic Conference and direct support given to the resistance.
 - e) Discouragement of recognition of the Babrak Karmal regime, through contacts with the non-aligned countries.
3. Implications for arms control and the CSCE process.
4. Implications for China and relations with that country.



DRAFT COMMUNIQUÉ - VERSION I
(French to give to Italians)

[En définissant cette stratégie globale et en manifestant notre volonté commune de la mettre en oeuvre]* nous avons conscience d'assumer les responsabilités qu'ont les trois grandes régions industrialisées du monde - Europe occidentale, Japon, Amérique du Nord - de contribuer à créer les conditions d'une croissance économique harmonieuse et soutenue.

Les circonstances actuelles nous imposent cependant de souligner aujourd'hui que nos efforts ne porteront leurs fruits que si, parallèlement, nous savons préserver un monde où le droit soit universellement observé, l'indépendance des peuples respectée, la paix internationale maintenue et garantie.

C'est pourquoi nous voulons réaffirmer que l'intervention militaire soviétique en Afghanistan est inacceptable et que nous sommes déterminés à ne pas l'accepter. Incompatible avec la volonté d'indépendance du peuple afghan, avec la sécurité des Etats de la région et avec les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies, elle met en cause les fondements de la paix.

Nous nous sentons, à cet égard, en plein accord avec le sentiment de l'immense majorité de la Communauté Internationale tel qu'il s'est exprimé à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies et au cours des deux sessions de la Conférence Islamique.

Nous déclarons en conséquence que les troupes soviétiques doivent se retirer et que la possibilité doit être rendue au peuple afghan de déterminer librement son avenir. C'est à cette double condition que pourra être restaurée une situation conforme aux exigences du droit et de la paix, et par là aux intérêts de tous.

Nous sommes résolus à faire ce qui dépend de nous pour atteindre cet objectif. Nous sommes prêts, également, à seconder toute initiative dans ce sens, et en particulier celle qui a été décidée par la Conférence Islamique, ainsi qu'à contribuer à la sécurité des autres Etats de la région.

* Linking passage to the economic section of the communiqué, which will precede this.

DRAFT COMMUNIQUÉ - VERSION II
(our objective as a final draft)

1. [In defining this global strategy and in demonstrating our common will to translate it into action],* we are conscious of the responsibility of the three great industrialised regions of the world - Western Europe, Japan and the United States - to work for conditions in which harmonious and sustained economic growth can take place. But we cannot do this alone. Others must play their part.

2. Moreover, the present situation reminds us that our efforts will only bear fruit in a world where the rule of law is universally observed, the independence of states is respected and international peace is maintained and assured. We call upon all countries to join us in working for such a world, and we welcome the readiness of non-aligned countries and regional groups to accept responsibility in this respect.

3. With this in mind, we reaffirm that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is unacceptable now and we shall not accept it in the future. It is incompatible with the will of the Afghan people for independence, with the security of the states of the region, with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with efforts to maintain genuine détente. It undermines the very foundations of peace in the region and in the world at large.

4. We fully agree with the views expressed on this issue by the overwhelming majority of the international community in the General Assembly of the United Nations and by the Islamic Conference at both its sessions.

5. We therefore declare that the Soviet troops must be withdrawn and the Afghan people given the freedom to determine their own future. Afghanistan should be permitted to regain the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and non-aligned character that it once enjoyed. Thus, a situation can be restored that conforms to the requirements of law and peace, and thereby serves the interests of all nations.

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*[Linking passage to the economic section of the communiqué, which will precede this.]



6. We are determined to do everything in our power to attain this objective. We are also ready to support initiatives that others may undertake to this end, particularly that of the Islamic Conference. And we shall support efforts to enhance the political independence and the security of the states in the region from the threat of outside domination.

How ?

SECRET
BURNING BUSH

PARTICIPANTS IN QUADRIPARTITE MEETING,
PARIS, 3-4 JUNE

FRANCE

M. Gabriel Robin, Political Director, MFA.
M. Patrick Leclercq, Diplomatic Counsellor,
Presidential Secretariat
M. Edouard Braine, staff of Political Director.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

State Secretary van Well, MFA
Ambassador von Staden, Chancellor's Office
Herr Reinhard Schenk, Head of West European Dept., MFA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
Mr David Aaron, National Security Council Staff
Mr George Vest, Assistant Secretary of State (Europe)

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Michael Palliser, Permanent Under-Secretary, FCO
Mr Robert Wade-Gery, Cabinet Office
Mr Roger Garside, Planning Staff, FCO

SECRET
BURNING BUSH