

afghanistan

DISTRIBUTION SELECTORS
FILE COPY
42854 - 1

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 745

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 091845Z AUG 80

TO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 783 OF 9 SEPTEMBER.

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, JEDDA, KUWAIT
INFO ROUTINE KABUL, DACCA, PARIS, BONN, PEKING, BUCHAREST,
UKDEL NATO
INFO SAVING LUXEMBOURG.

YOUR TELNO 1284 OF 9 SEPTEMBER (NOT TO ALL): AFGHANISTAN

1. THE MINISTER OF STATE (MR HURD) DISCUSSED THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHEN THE LATTER PASSED THROUGH HEATHROW ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK TODAY.
2. AGHA SHAHI COVERED MUCH OF THE GROUND DEALT WITH IN HIS CONVERSATION REPORTED IN YOUR TUR, INCLUDING THE POINTS IN PARAGAPH 1(3). HE STRESSED THAT THE COMMITTEE OF THREE'S EFFORTS HAD BEEN PREJUDICED BY (A) THE DETERIORATION IN QOTBZADEH'S POSITION IN IRAN AND THE CONSEQUENCE THAT IRAN COULD NO LONGER PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN THE COMMITTEE, AND (B) THE GROWTH OF ARAB ANGER ABOUT AMERICAN ATTITUDES ON ARAB/ISRAEL AND ARAB DISINCLINATION IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES TO ALIENATE THE RUSSIANS BY ACTION OVER AFGHANISTAN. THERE HAD BEEN A WEAKENING IN ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED RESOLVE ON AFGHANISTAN. AS FAR AS EUROPE WAS CONCERNED, PAKISTAN HAD BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTED BY THE REACTIONS EXCEPT THOSE FROM BRITAIN.
3. IT WAS NOW NECESSARY TO DEVISE AN INITIATIVE TO PREVENT THE CUBANS OR THE INDIANS TAKING OVER THE PROCESS. HE DEFENDED HIS PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE. BABRAK KARMAL WOULD HAVE TO ATTEND. THE RESISTANCE COULD NOT PARTICIPATE (BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS WOULD WALK OUT) BUT THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO SEND A DELEGATION TO LOBBY PARTICIPANTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

42354 - 1

4. THE ROMANIANS HAD BEEN CONSIDERING A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN. AGHA SHAHI HAD OBJECTED THAT THIS WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION OF BABRAK KARMAL AND WOULD AVOID THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

5. THE RUSSIANS HAD SO FAR REJECTED AGHA SHAHI'S PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE THOUGH THE ROMANIANS STILL WISHED TO TRY TO PERSUADE THEM TO ACCEPT IT. AGHA SHAHI CONFIRMED THAT A PAKISTAN DELEGATION WOULD GO TO MOSCOW ON 12/13 SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS ITEMS ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S AGENDA, BUT THAT ON AFGHANISTAN THEY WOULD SIMPLY LISTEN AND REPORT.

6. HIS MAIN NEW POINT WHICH HE PARTICULARLY ASKED TO BE KEPT SECRET RELATED TO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RULER AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF KUWAIT IN ISLAMABAD THE PREVIOUS DAY. ACCORDING TO AGHA SHAHI, SHEIKH SABAH HAD EXPRESSED SYMPATHY WITH THE EXPOSED POSITION OF PAKISTAN VIS A VIS THE SOVIET UNION AND HAD ADVISED THAT PAKISTAN ENTER INTO A DIALOGUE WITH THE RUSSIANS. KUWAIT WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE OVER THE INITIATIVE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND WOULD SOUND OUT THE SAUDIS. BUT THEY FELT THAT IT SHOULD BE CONFINED TO NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES (INCLUDING BABRAK KARMAL) AND EXCLUDE THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. SABAH HAD APPARENTLY BEEN UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT OUR IDEAS FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR A SPECIAL COMMITTEE.

7. MR HURD SAID THAT ONE OF OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERNS ABOUT AGHA SHAHI'S PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE INCLUDING BABRAK KARMAL WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD THEREBY GAIN A CONCESSION WITHOUT ANY MOVE ON THEIR PART. THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES HAD TAKEN A LEAD WHICH WE IN THE WEST HAD RESPECTED. FOR THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO ABANDON ITS PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE STATUS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WOULD BE A BIG STEP BACKWARDS. IT WAS NOT LOGICAL TO ALLOW DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE AMERICANS OVER ISRAEL TO PREVENT CONTINUED PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS OVER

CONFIDENTIAL

42854 - 1

AFGHANISTAN. AGHA SHAHI SAID THAT THE PROBLEM WAS WHAT BACKING COULD BE MOBILISED FOR ANY GIVEN POLICY. PAKISTAN RETAINED AN OPEN MIND ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE UNGA. BUT THEY FEARED THAT ANY VOTE ON THIS OR A SIMILAR PROPOSAL COULD WELL REVEAL A DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES OPPOSED TO THE RUSSIANS.

8. IT WAS AGREED THAT THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE DISCUSSED FURTHER WHEN I SEE AGHA SHAHI IN NEW YORK LATER THIS MONTH. HE SAID HE WOULD THEN BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO REPORT ON THE MOOD OF THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES (AFTER THE FORTHCOMING MEETING IN MOROCCO). FULL RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.

9. WE SHALL NOW REFLECT FURTHER, BEARING IN MIND THE CONSIDERATIONS IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TUR, UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1235 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 3943. WE SUSPECT THAT AGHA SHAHI WAS PUTTING INTO THE MOUTHS OF THE KUWAITIS ARGUMENTS WHICH ARE STRONG IN HIS OWN MIND. TOWARDS THE END HE SPOKE CONFIDENTIALLY OF MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE UNITY OF PAKISTAN FROM THE USSR, AND RENEWED DIFFICULTIES WITH INDIA. HE NO LONGER THINKS IT SAFE FOR PAKISTAN TO GIVE A LEAD.

CARRINGTON

NNNN

X

DIST

LIMITED

SAD

EESD

MED

NENAD

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS

SIR J GRAHAM

MR DONALD

MR J NOBERLY

MR FERGUSSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10
DOWNING STREET]

3

CONFIDENTIAL