ATES HAASS HILL SCOWCROFT SUNUNU

SIT: CALDWELL CHARLES HAASS SIT SUM VAX

<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

<TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4673

<SUBJ>SUBJ: PRESIDENT BUSH'S RESPONSE TO SADDAM'S
MESSAGE - NEXT STEPS

<TEXT>BT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 04326

NODIS DECARTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IZ

SUBJ: PRESIDENT BUSH'S RESPONSE TO SADDAM'S

MESSAGE - NEXT STEPS REF: STATE 247900 1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

- 2. ON JULY 28 FONMIN AZIZ AGREED TO CONVEY THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO SADDAM IMMEDIATELY (REFTEL).
- 3. AZIZ SAID HE HAD BEEN ON THE VERGE OF CALLING ME IN ANYWAY. EARLIER IN THE MORNING, SADDAM HAD ASKED HIM TO CONVEY TO US THAT HE WAS "VERY PLEASED" WITH THE INITIAL REACTION TO HIS MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BUSH.
- 4. BY THIS, SADDAM IS APPARENTLY TELLING US
 THAT HE WILL IGNORE THE WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE
 WHICH CONTAINED DIRECT QUOTES OF HIS COMMENTS
 TO ME. THE WASHINGTON POST, HOWEVER, WAS NOT
 THE ONLY UNPLEASANT SURPRISE SADDAM HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO IGNORE, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT.
- 5. AS I WAS TALKING TO AZIZ, THE ARABIC NEWS SERVICE OF THE BBC (FAR AND AWAY THE MOST LISTENED TO STATION IN IRAQ) WAS CARRYING AS THE HEADLINE ITEM A "DECISION" BY THE USG TO RESTRICT EXPORTS TO IRAQ. AZIZ CHOSE NOT TO RAISE THIS--JUST AS WELL, AS I HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF THE DECISION.
- 6. I UNDERSTAND THE DEPARTMENT HAS GIVEN HIGH PRIORITY TO ENSURING STABILITY IN THE GULF. I NOTE ALSO EMBASSY CAIRO'S BELIEF THAT MUBARAK BELIEVES HIS AND KING FAHD'S DIPLOMACY WILL WORK BEST IF THE USG NOW ADOPTS A LOW PROFILE.
- 7. I WANT, THEREFORE, TO OFFER TWO SUGGESTIONS.
 IF WE ARE TO MANAGE THIS CRISIS EFFECTIVELY, WE
 IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL HAVE TO BE SURE
 THAT THERE ARE NO MORE BOLTS FROM THE BLUE.
 THERE ARE SEVERAL MAJOR ISSUES ON WHICH THE

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JULD MAKE AND ANNOUNCE A DECISION SOON: EXIM, THE FURNACES, EXPORT LIMITATION ASURES. IF ANY OR ALL OF THOSE DECISIONS ARE ANNOUNCED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, IRAQIS WILL BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE POLITICALLY INSPIRED AND WILL TAKE THEM AS PART OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S RESPONSE TO SADDAM, A RESPONSE EQUIVALENT TO THUMBING OUR NOSE AT HIM AND DOING IT IN PUBLIC. THIS WOULD BE LIKELY TO COMPLICATE THE EFFORTS OF FAHD AND MUBARAK. 8. SECOND, WE HAVE DEFINED OUR NATIONAL INTEREST IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AS THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY. WE WANT THE OIL TO FLOW WITHOUT HINDRANCE, BUT WE HAVE NEVER TAKEN SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS ON INTRA-OPEC OR ARAB BORDER DISPUTES. IF WE MAINTAIN OUR TACTIC OF RELYING ON ARAB DIPLOMACY TO BRING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THIS NEWEST DISPUTE, AND I AGREE THAT THIS IS OUR BEST BET, WE WILL HAVE RESOLUTELY TO SWALLOW OUR DISTASTE AT THE IRAQI PROTECTION RACKET.

- 9. SADDAM AND THE IRAQIS, ALL OF THEM, BELIEVE THEY HAVE PROVIDED PROTECTION TO THE NEIGHBOR-HOOD. IF THE KUWAITIS WILL NOT GIVE IRAQ THE CASH SADDAM INSISTS HE NEEDS (AND HE WILL ACCEPT INDIRECT DONATIONS, E.G., THROUGH SOME FUND DEVICE), KUWAIT WILL BE FACED WITH CONSEQUENCES.
- 10. EVEN IF WE WERE TO CHANGE RADICALLY OUR POLICY, FOR EXAMPLE, BY ADOPTING THE KUWAITI LEGAL POSITION ON THE BORDER, IRAQ COULD OCCUPY THE NARROW STRIP WHICH THE IRAQIS INSIST IS THEIRS, AND ON WHICH THERE ARE NEW KUWAITI WELLS AND FARMS (AS DESCRIBED BY EMBASSY KUWAIT), WITHIN THE SPACE OF AN HOUR OR SO.
- 11. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE AT EMBASSY BAGHDAD, THEREFORE, WE THINK THAT THE BEST HOPE FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT WE WANT IS THAT THE BT

#4326

BT

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 BAGHDAD 04326 NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IZ

SUBJ: PRESIDENT BUSH'S RESPONSE TO SADDAM'S ARABS SUCCESSFULLY PREACH CONCILIATION (IN CASH TERMS) TO KUWAIT AND THAT FAHD AND MUBARAK CAN PREVAIL ON SADDAM TO SCALE BACK HIS ABSURDLY HIGH FINANCIAL DEMANDS.

12. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS KUWAIT.

GLASPIE

#4326

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 4326 <TOR> 900730093048 MSG000270639048
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 4326 <TOR> 900730093053 MSG000270639053