

[26] RHODESIA: POLICY:

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(28) ADVANCE COPY

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ASPIN

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR P J FOWLER)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D
HD/S AF D

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT
HE/WAD

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A
~~MR PIPCOY LEGAL ADVISER RM K164~~

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Read in full

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 071058Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 525 OF 7 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK LUSAKA NAIROBI MAPUTO OTTAWA

GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA LAGOS MONROVIA WELLINGTON

WASHINGTON PRETORIA ADDIS ABABA CANBERRA

PRIORITY PEKING MOSCOW PRAGUE DAKAR KINSHASA KHARTOUM TOKYO

E E C POSTS KUWAIT KINGSTON BRIDGETOWN DACCA NEW DELHI SINGAPORE

GEORGETOWN FREETOWN PORT LOUIS PORT OF SPAIN LILONGWE VALLETTA

BANJUL COLOMBO ACCRA KUALA LUMPUR NICOSIA OSLO STOCKHOLM

LISBON MADRID ATHENS MBABANE ABIDJAN

INFO SAVING NASSAU MASERU CASTRIES SUVA PORT MORESBY HONIARA

NUKUALOFA VICTORIA TARAWA UKDEL NATO SOFIA BUDAPEST BUCHAREST

EAST BERLIN BELGRADE CAIRO ALGIERS TUNIS TRIPOLI RABAT TEHRAN

MY TELS NOS 467 AND 500: RHODESIA: ELECTIONS

1. WITH THE ELECTIONS NOW ONLY THREE WEEKS AWAY, THE PROBLEM FACING
ME WITH INCREASING URGENCY IS HOW TO ARRIVE AT AN ELECTION WHICH
WILL ENABLE US TO EXTRICATE OURSELVES FROM RHODESIA WITHOUT A
GENERAL RESUMPTION OF THE WAR AND WITH THE PROSPECT OF A REASONABLE
MEASURE OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE OUTCOME AND FOR OUR PART

MEASURE OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE OUTCOME AND FOR OUR PART IN IT.

2. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE FROM SOME OF MY RECENT TELEGRAMS, THE CHANCES OF PROCEEDING TO AN ELECTION WHICH MEETS BOTH THESE CRITERIA ARE DIMINISHING. THE OVER-RIDING PROBLEM IS A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION BEING CONDUCTED BY Z A N U (P F) THROUGHOUT THE EASTERN PROVINCES. IN MANY OF THE RURAL AREAS NO OTHER PARTIES ARE ABLE TO CAMPAIGN. THE POPULATION ARE BEING TOLD THAT IF THEY VOTE FOR ANYONE OTHER THAN MUGABE THEY WILL BE KILLED; AND THAT IF MUGABE DOES NOT QUOTE WIN UNQUOTE THE ELECTION, THE WAR WILL BE RESUMED. NEITHER MUZOREWA NOR NKOMO BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PROCEED TO THE ELECTION UNLESS EFFECTIVE ACTION IS TAKEN TO CHECK THIS SYSTEMATIC INTIMIDATION.

3. THE POLITICAL PARTIES - AND, NO LESS IMPORTANT, THE RHODESIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS - ARE PROBABLY NOW PREPARED TO RESIGN THEMSELVES TO AN ELECTION RESULT WHICH GAVE MUGABE A REASONABLE PROPORTION OF THE COMMON ROLL SEATS. BUT IF MUGABE IS ABLE BY THE METHODS HE IS AT PRESENT ADOPTING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY TO EMERGE AS BY FAR THE LARGEST AFRICAN PARTY IN PARLIAMENT, NONE OF THE OTHER PARTIES - INCLUDING NKOMO - NOR THE WHITE COMMUNITY WILL ACCEPT THE RESULT. AT THE SAME TIME WE SHALL BE FACED WITH AN INTERNATIONAL CLAMOUR THAT MUGABE SHOULD BE ASKED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. THERE IS A SERIOUS RISK THAT EITHER NKOMO OR MUZOREWA OR BOTH WILL ANTICIPATE SUCH AN OUTCOME BY WITHDRAWING FROM THE ELECTION ON THE GROUND THAT MUGABE HAS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO CAMPAIGN. THIS WOULD PUT US IN THE IMPOSSIBLE POSITION OF HAVING TO SPEND MUCH LONGER IN THIS COUNTRY, IN A FRESH ATTEMPT TO SET UP AN ELECTION.

4. IN SIMPLE TERMS THE NEED IS TO FIND A MEANS OF CUTTING MUGABE DOWN TO HIS TRUE SIZE WITHOUT - IF POSSIBLE- EXCLUDING HIM FROM THE ELECTION ENTIRELY OR PROVOKING HIM TO WITHDRAW FROM IT. THERE ARE VARIOUS FORMS OF POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE I CAN APPLY TO THIS END, AND AM ALREADY APPLYING. THESE INCLUDE THE ORDINANCE WHICH I MADE ON 5 FEBRUARY AND THE EFFORTS I AM CONTINUING TO MAKE TO INDUCE MUGABE TO BROADCAST AN UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT TO HIS FOLLOWERS ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENTS. BUT THESE MEASURES WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT IN THEMSELVES. THE UNANIMOUS VIEW OF THE OTHER PARTIES ON THE ELECTION COUNCIL IS THAT THEY DO NOT GO FAR ENOUGH. WITH THE ELECTIONS NOW SO CLOSE, WE ARE ALREADY NEARLY PAST THE POINT AT WHICH WARNINGS WILL SUFFICE.

5. I HAVE CONSIDERED FULLY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES COULD TAKE MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO STAMP OUT Z A N U (P F) INTIMIDATION. BUT THEY ARE ALREADY FULLY STRETCHED. THERE MAY BE SOME IMPROVEMENT WHEN THE RESERVISTS BECOME AVAILABLE - IN PRACTICE ON 16 FEBRUARY - BUT THAT IS ALREADY SO CLOSE TO

THERE MAY BE SOME IMPROVEMENT WHEN THE RESERVISTS BECOME AVAILABLE - IN PRACTICE ON 18 FEBRUARY - BUT THAT IS ALREADY SO CLOSE TO THE ELECTIONS AS TO BE LIKELY TO HAVE ONLY A VERY LIMITED EFFECT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY FURTHER MEASURES BY THE POLICE OR SECURITY FORCES, EITHER ALONE OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE POLITICAL STEPS I HAVE TAKEN SO FAR, WILL PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS. POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTION IS THE LEAST ATTRACTIVE OPTION OF ALL.

6. ONE COURSE OPEN TO ME NOW WOULD BE, UNDER THE NEW ORDINANCE, TO EXCLUDE Z A N U (P F) FROM CONTESTING THE ELECTION IN CERTAIN DISTRICTS. I HAVE NOT RULED THIS OUT. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY SUCH A STEP. BUT THE DISADVANTAGE OF TAKING THIS ACTION - AS DISTINCT FROM TAKING THE POWER TO DO SO AS I HAVE DONE - IS THAT IT WILL BE SEEN AS A MEASURE DIRECTED AGAINST Z A N U (P F) ALONE. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH LIMITED ACTION MIGHT NOT CAUSE IT, MORE EXTENSIVE USE OF THIS POWER COULD LEAD TO MUGABE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ELECTION IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH HE COULD STILL GET MOZAMBIKAN SUPPORT; AND TO AN EXODUS OF Z A N L A FORCES FROM THE ASSEMBLY CAMPS (THOUGH THE LATTER EVENTUALITY MAY WELL OCCUR AT SOME POINT IN ANY EVENT).

7. I HAVE THEREFORE BEEN LOOKING AT ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF:

A. BRINGING MORE EFFECTIVE PRESSURE TO BEAR ON MUGABE TO CURTAIL Z A N L A INTIMIDATION AND PERMIT THE OTHER PARTIES TO CAMPAIGN; AND

B. IMPOSING SOME PENALTIES ON Z A N U (P F) FOR THE WHOLLY UNFAIR ADVANTAGE THEY HAVE ALREADY GAINED FROM WHAT NKOMO DESCRIBES AS A CAMPAIGN OF TERROR IN THE EASTERN RURAL AREAS.

8. I HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE STEP FOR ME TO TAKE WOULD BE TO PUBLISH A FURTHER ORDINANCE ENABLING ME TO DECLARE, IN RELATION TO A PARTICULAR DISTRICT OR AREA, THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO HOLD FAIR ELECTIONS IN THAT DISTRICT BECAUSE IT IS SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY CONTINUING VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION; AND THAT THEREFORE NO POLLING WILL TAKE PLACE IN THAT AREA. I WOULD THEN SPECIFY IN THE FAIRLY NEAR FUTURE (AND WELL ENOUGH IN ADVANCE OF THE ELECTIONS FOR THIS TO HAVE A PRACTICAL EFFECT) THE DISTRICTS IN WHICH INTIMIDATION WAS SO EXTENSIVE AS TO RENDER IT UNLIKELY TO BE POSSIBLE TO HOLD A FAIR ELECTION IN THEM, UNLESS THE SITUATION IMPROVED AND THE PARTIES WERE ABLE TO CAMPAIGN FREELY. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF AREAS (EG THOSE IN WHICH Z A N L A ATTACKED THE BUSES LAST SUNDAY AND THAT IN WHICH NKOMO'S CANDIDATE WAS MURDERED) WHERE A GOOD CASE COULD BE MADE FOR SUCH A PROPOSITION. AN INABILITY TO POLL IN THESE AREAS WOULD OF COURSE HAVE SOME EFFECT ON ALL PARTIES; BUT IN PRACTICE IT IS Z A N U (P F) WHICH WOULD SUFFER MOST ELECTORALLY. THE MEASURE WOULD NOT BE OVERTLY DISCRIMINATORY (THOUGH MUGABE WOULD SEEK TO REPRESENT IT AS SUCH): IT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DISFRANCHISING THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA; BUT IT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY, BECAUSE POLLING

THE EFFECT OF DISFRANCHISING THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA; BUT IT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY, BECAUSE POLLING FOR THE PARTY LISTS WOULD STILL TAKE PLACE IN THE OTHER PARTS OF THE ELECTORAL DISTRICT(S) CONCERNED.

9. I WOULD THEN WAIT TO SEE WHAT THIS CLEAR WARNING DID. IF IT ENABLED THE OTHER PARTIES - PARTICULARLY NKOMO AND MUZOREWA - TO CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVELY IN THE AREAS CONCERNED, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO CARRY OUT THE THREAT EXTENSIVELY. I DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY IN THE END TO DECLARE (BUT ONLY VERY SHORTLY BEFORE THE ELECTION) WHAT IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE CASE, NAMELY THAT IN A LIMITED NUMBER OF DISTRICTS IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONDUCT A FAIR ELECTION AND THAT POLLING WILL NOT THEREFORE TAKE PLACE.

10. DUFF AND RENWICK AND I HAVE DISCUSSED THESE IDEAS WITH THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER, SIR JOHN BOYNTON, WHO AGREES WITH THEM. THEY OFFER IN MY VIEW THE BEST HOPE OF IMPOSING EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON MUGABE TO RESTRAIN HIS FOLLOWERS; AND OF GIVING A SUFFICIENT DEMONSTRATION TO THE OTHER AFRICAN PARTIES AND TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY THAT I AM NOT READY TO LET THE PRESENT LEVEL OF SYSTEMATIC INTIMIDATION CONTINUE WITH IMPUNITY. IF IT DOES, THERE IS A VERY GRAVE DANGER THAT OTHERS WILL TAKE THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS (AS TO SOME EXTENT THEY ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO DO) AND THAT WE WILL LOSE THE SUPPORT NOT ONLY OF MUZOREWA AND WALLS, BUT ALSO OF NKOMO (ALL OF WHOM AT PRESENT ARGUE THAT THERE IS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR THE TOTAL BANNING OF MUGABE FROM THE ELECTIONS).

11. ANY MEASURES AGAINST Z A N U (P F) CARRY WITH THEM OBVIOUS DANGERS - THE RISK OF THE WAR BEGINNING AGAIN, WHETHER GRADUALLY OR SUDDENLY; AND A FURTHER DETERIORATION IN OUR RELATIONS WITH MUGABE'S BACKERS. BUT WE CANNOT HOPE TO AVOID THESE DANGERS IN INACTION. IF MUGABE WINS BY INTIMIDATION I WOULD NOT EXPECT THE RESULT TO BE ACCEPTED FOR THE REASONS I HAVE STATED. IF HE GAINS ONLY A REASONABLE NUMBER OF SEATS THERE WOULD BE SOME POSSIBILITY OF A VIABLE COALITION GOVERNMENT, WHETHER IT INCLUDED HIM OR NOT; BUT THERE IS ALWAYS THE RISK OF AN EXODUS FROM THE Z A N L A CAMPS.

12. THE MAIN POINT IS THAT I HAVE TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST Z A N U'S INTIMIDATION IF WE ARE NOT TO LOSE ALL SUPPORT INSIDE THE COUNTRY. THE KEY FROM AN INTERNATIONAL POINT OF VIEW IS, AS I SEE IT, THAT WE CONTINUE TO CARRY NKOMO WITH US. THE SCENARIO I CAN ENVISAGE IS TO FIND OURSELVES BEING PRESSED BY ALL THE OTHER PARTIES TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION AGAINST Z A N U. JUST HOW SEVERE THAT WILL HAVE TO BE AT THE END OF THE DAY (OR WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WILL BE) IT IS TOO EARLY YET TO SAY. NKOMO'S OWN WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH US AT PRESENT IS POSTULATED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE FIRM ACTION TO DEAL WITH Z A N L A.

13. AN IMPORTANT COROLLARY TO TAKING ACTION AGAINST (IN EFFECT)


US AT PRESENT IS POSTULATED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE FIRM ACTION TO DEAL WITH Z A N L A.

13. AN IMPORTANT COROLLARY TO TAKING ACTION AGAINST (IN EFFECT) MUGABE IS TO TRY TO CONTAIN MACHEL'S REACTION. WE HAVE TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM THAT MUGABE'S INTIMIDATION TACTICS ARE UNACCEPTABLE; AND WE MUST ALSO TRY TO EXTRACT FROM HIM A PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT, WHATEVER THE RESULT OF THE ELECTION, HE WILL NOT SUPPORT A RETURN TO THE WAR. THESE OBJECTIVES MAY BE UNATTAINABLE, BUT WE WILL PURSUE THEM IN THE FIRST PLACE WITH HONWANA HERE IN SALISBURY, AND MAY THEREAFTER WISH TO MAKE A SPECIAL APPROACH TO MACHEL PERSONALLY.

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