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ANGLO/ARGENTINE MINISTERIAL TALKS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS:
NEW YORK, 28-29 APRIL 1980

Present

Mr Nicholas Ridley MP (Minister of State)	Comodoro D Carlos R Cavandoli (Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs)
Mr G W Harding (AUSS)	D Carlos M Ortiz de Rozas (Argentine Ambassador to UK)
Mr A J Williams (HM Ambassador Buenos Aires)	Embajador D Angel M Oliveri Lopez (Head of Malvinas Department)
Mr A Monk (Falkland Islands Councillor)	Comodoro D Carlos Bloomer Reeve (Principal Private Secretary)
Mr G A Duggan (SAMD)	D Ricardo H Forrester (MFA)
Mr K D Temple (PS)	Coronel (R) Luis Gonzalez Balcarce (MFA)

First Day, Monday 28 April: Morning Session, 1000 hours, (Argentine Mission)

1. Comodoro Cavandoli welcomed Mr Ridley and said he was very hopeful about the talks. In the year since we had last met, much had happened in the UK, in Argentina, and in the world. There were many problems but also some successes, including the normalisation of our relations. He would like to underline Argentine satisfaction with Ambassador Williams. He looked forward to working with him and was grateful to have him. He congratulated the UK on the Zimbabwe settlement and the elimination of an old and outstanding problem in Southern Africa. Now that Zimbabwe was over, he was glad to have the opportunity to carry forward our negotiations: he agreed we should have an open agenda, and suggested we conduct our talks with the greatest informality. We knew each other well. He emphasised the absolute confidentiality of the talks which had always been guaranteed. A number of the personnel on the Argentine side had changed but others were known to us. He would like to listen to our appreciation of the Falkland theme, to

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identify questions, to have a theme "loosened" with the participation of all present.

2. Mr Ridley expressed thanks for the welcome and said he was pleased to be sitting round a table with the Argentines. He wanted to draw attention to some ominous events in the world which he hoped we could discuss so that our focus was wider than the specific issues we had come to talk about. The attempt to release the Tehran hostages by force had failed but the hostages in Bogota had been successfully released by negotiation: this was an example of resolving problems by negotiation. He was grateful for what had been said about Zimbabwe and acknowledged the significant part the Argentine Government had played in the eventual solution. We had now to use the new name of Zimbabwe; we had before us separate usage of the terms "the Falkland Islands" and "the Malvinas". He hoped that we could eventually agree on one but, meanwhile, suggested we simply call them "the Islands". He agreed that our two countries now had much better relations and had been delighted to welcome Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas to London. He was grateful for what had been said about Mr Williams who had made a considerable reputation for himself in London. He hoped that the Argentine Government would accept visits later this year from two British Ministers, the Minister for Trade, and the Secretary of State for Agriculture, and that the visits would lead to greater interchange and closer commercial and agricultural relations.

3. Only the problem of the Islands stood in the way of improving our relations and he hoped for frank and wide-ranging discussions today covering all aspects of the question. He agreed on the need to maintain confidentiality. It was good that Mr Monk, as a senior Island Councillor, should be present to listen to our exchanges. We had to recognise that when he returned to the Islands, he would be under intense pressure to reveal everything that had transpired. But Mr Ridley was sure that we could agree at the end what he should say. He hoped we could agree at the start to say nothing to the press and to leave until

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later consideration of any announcement or communique or message to the United Nations. It was better to decide this after talks rather than during them.

4. If the Argentine delegation contained new members, the British delegation was an entirely new team. There had been a change of government in Britain since the last talks and he liked to feel we were approaching the problem from the beginning. Whatever took place between previous governments was technically not available to him; this was one of our constitutional rules. The British Government wanted to start from a new position entirely. The problem had been given serious consideration by the British Cabinet. He now wanted to explore it on the basis of his knowledge of what his colleagues thought and not necessarily with the same thinking as that of the previous Government.

5. Comodoro Cavandoli said he understood perfectly. On the Argentine side, the only change in delegation was his participation: others had worked on the Islands or had lived in the Islands for some time. It was his intention to speak with frankness and informality. The Argentine idea had always been the same and their aims fixed. With the change in government in the UK, Argentina looked to see whether there was any change in this context. His position was the same as Mr Ridley's; he was not familiar with the discussions of the last eight years but his Foreign Ministry officials were. He hoped and wished to hear the thoughts which the Conservative Government brought to this table.

6. Mr Ridley suggested that we handle the talks by dealing with a number of items which he would mention and which we could discuss in turn. As we reached a position either of agreement or disagreement, we should not seek to resolve it but switch to another item. He wanted to stress at the beginning that, if we were to find a solution to the problem, we had to find a solution to

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all these items. We should identify the amount of common ground on each. He had various headings to put forward. Comodoro Cavandoli said he shared Mr Ridley's view that we should seek an integrated solution to all the problems, conscious of their interrelationship and the need to see them in a general framework leading to a general solution. We should not seek to spend time pursuing various parts. He understood the proposals of the British side: if there was a solution, seek for it; if not, discuss further.

7. Mr Ridley suggested that we look at the following problems:

- i) the search for oil in disputed seas;
- ii) fishing in the same areas, the most urgent problem;
- iii) the Islands themselves;
- iv) scientific co-operation, under which we would refer to Southern Thule;
- v) the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention about to be signed in Canberra;
- vi) the Antarctic Minerals Convention, on which we were making progress;
- vii) co-operation between the Islands and Argentina, e.g. the communications and YPF Agreements and other bilateral matters;
- viii) plans for the development of the Islands, i.e. farming and produce development, the Falkland Islands Company, and the Falkland Islands Committee.

8. Comodoro Cavandoli agreed. He had spoken earlier of an open agenda and like a good host, he accepted Mr Ridley's proposals for this first agenda. The order of items presented no problems. But before we embarked on them item by item, he would like some idea of the point of departure we had in mind: what was the

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validity of all our questions and our general point of view. Mr Ridley asked if Comodoro Cavandoli could explain further. Comodoro Cavandoli said he wanted to approach each issue in a general context, rather than deal with technical points, in order to see the context in which we were thinking. Mr Ridley said he was happy to fall in with this but he thought better progress would be made by looking at the items rather than by digging deep into ideological trenches. The Argentines knew our position well: we had no doubt about our legal title to the Islands and the Dependencies. Nevertheless, we wished to have good relations with the Argentine. We understood the point of view of the Argentine people; we wished the happiness of all concerned and the prosperity of the area. We were constrained by our public pledge that we would reach no solution which did not have the agreement of the Islanders. This was why it was right to have Mr Monk present as a senior representative of his people and he could interpret the true nature of the problem as such a representative of the people living there. Comodoro Cavandoli said he had not been explicit enough. It was not his aim to engage in debate on ideological problems. The question he would ask was if this stage in our talks had continuity with earlier stages. It was not a question of principle. But did this meeting have the necessary link with previous meetings.

9. Mr Ridley said he was delighted to be rescued from the sort of discussion he had been dreading. The new Government in Britain had considered the whole question afresh and did not feel it was bound by the previous Government's positions. His Government was only content for him to come to discuss on the basis of exploring the possibility and finding solutions. Neither he nor Comodoro Cavandoli had been present at the previous discussions: it was difficult to start from the position then reached. It was best to look at problems as we see them now and knowing the position of our respective Governments. He did not want to say that everything which had been done before was to be abandoned; but he felt that we

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would not want to be inhibited by anything which had happened before. He had not been present. This was not a rejection of the past so much as freedom to start afresh. Comodoro Cavandoli said he understood fully: it was not the aim to change direction but to seek new ones. But he was concerned when Mr Ridley said we should start again. During the time that discussions had been taking place, a number of agreements had been reached and signed by both parties. Changes of administration had no effect on agreements between Governments. He must ask if these elements were still agreed and if there was continuity in this respect. Ambassador de Rozas said he understood that a new Government would have different approaches but the point of departure must remain the same. Mr Ridley said he detected two points here: there was no doubt that existing agreements would be honoured and the British Government would never dream of going against signed agreements. But there was some difference in meaning between his saying we should start afresh and the Argentine feeling that this meant we should start again: he had not said that. We should take cognizance of the past but it should be no restraint on what we discussed and where we found solutions. The UK had a different political and parliamentary background: it was fundamental that, on a change of Government, we adhered to contractual agreements but that we started afresh with policies. This need not be too serious for Argentina; for us it was a constitutional point and perhaps it had been given too much significance in our talks. Comodoro Cavandoli thanked Mr Ridley and said the position was clear.

(i) Oil

10. Mr Ridley said he would like to proceed to Item I, oil. We should be protecting and exploiting the natural resources of the area so that either of us could, if he wished, explore for oil and fish in areas surrounding the Islands. We had not declared fishing zones or drilled for oil. Seismic surveys showed the possible presence of oil. It was a pity that development was held up while we waited for agreement on the future of the Islands. It

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was evident even from the last series of talks that that problem might take many years to solve. The lack of agreement was holding up proper control and exploitation of resources, allowing others to exploit them or allowing them to go unexploited. This was stupid and unnecessary and it was more sensible to try to determine some regime under which we could agree on exploitation, accepting perhaps that such a solution need not be implemented in the absence of a general solution to the problem. It would be helpful if we could meanwhile agree a particular solution.

11. Comodoro Cavandoli said we had reached a good point of departure for our general discussion. He was looking for a global solution to all elements, not just social and economic, but including sovereignty. It was lamentable that others were enjoying these resources, especially the non-renewable ones, while we failed to arrive at a solution covering access, exploitation and exploration. It was correct that we should advance on all elements, take them into account but leave them in abeyance until we reached an integrated solution. Mr Ridley said that normally we would have had further seismic surveys and these would lead us to let concessions to oil companies to put down drilling wells in the sea. Probably the geographical areas of interest would be limited, as the waters to the south, in Antarctica, and around the Dependencies were beyond modern drilling technology. But we believed that it was feasible to explore the area between the Islands and the median line half way to Patagonia. Oil today was the same as gold had been to the Spaniards. We should hasten. He did not believe the chances were enormous but they were worth exploring. But we were failing to make progress on this because of the dispute about the Islands and the Argentines' sovereignty claim, which we did not accept. It might be possible to have joint exploration or to agree on some percentage share of resources if found. Many people in the UK said we should go it alone and there was quite strong pressure on him to license oil companies to drill. In the

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absence of a solution to the problem, it was more difficult to resist pressures. This was why we would like to reach an agreement, preferably one which stood on its own, though we accepted that the Argentines might want to make it part of a general settlement.

12. Comodoro Cavandoli said he understood the British position. Where hydrocarbons were concerned, Argentina was not under the same pressures and was nearly self-sufficient. The UK had more North Sea experience; but the conditions in the South Atlantic, especially the weather, were worse. There were also pressures on the Argentines, however, in respect of the general position of the Islands. He wanted to put forward a hypothesis: we could usefully work towards the solution on exploration and exploitation; but we should not now go into technical solutions such as the details of percentage shares; we should look for a solution of the general problem. He agreed it would be useful to solve the oil problem. Mr Ridley said it would be helpful if we were able to sketch some broad agreement. If we could agree to carry forward some joint exploration, it would be an enormous contribution to working together and to show to Islanders the possibility of progress. Even apart from the general solution, co-operating in this matter would contribute to the general solution. We could either regard it as something that we could not solve except in the context of an integral solution or as co-operation which could begin now leading in time to co-operation on the general problem. Comodoro Cavandoli said it was clear that we were talking in the same terms. He understood the framework of the general agreement but we should not refuse the possibility of reaching broad agreement on many things.

(ii) Fish

13. Mr Ridley said, on fish, that normally we would now wish to declare a 200 mile fishing zone around the Islands and Dependencies. The main purpose would be not so much to enable the British fishing fleet to fish in the area as to control stocks and to license

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other countries: we would like the revenue for the Islands from licensing foreign fishermen. There was some urgency in this as the fish were being overexploited; none of us wanted that. We had the same choice as with oil: either we solved the problem as part of a general solution or we could move ahead and agree something as part of Anglo/Argentine co-operation. We needed Argentine agreement to do so and we were under heavy pressure. We had not done anything so far, as we wanted to come to New York to talk to the Argentines in good faith. There were three choices: doing it on our own; doing it in concert with Argentina in a general agreement; or leaving it aside until an overall agreement. It would be wrong to take no action on oil and fish until all elements of the problem had been solved during which time Argentina, the Islanders, and the UK would all lose valuable commercial opportunities.

14. Comodoro Cavandoli said that on fish he agreed with our concern: this was even more urgent than oil. He shared our view that fish should be exploited by those who had the rights, not, as now, through free fishing which was of no benefit to either of us. It should be possible to accomplish a good deal in this field before a general context agreement. We could advance while the general solution was pending and find a solution as soon as possible to end fishing exploitation by third parties. Without entering into a discussion of what was meant by a global agreement, much could be done if all the elements of a general agreement were on the right road. Mr Ridley said that this was entirely how we felt. We had reached a most important point in our talks. He noted Comodoro D Cavandoli's phrase of "everything on the right road". We should leave this matter asidnow for detailed discussion, possibly by our experts. Should we come back to this later? Comodoro Cavandoli said that the agenda was full enough. We should go from the general to the particular and eliminate items where difficulties were not insuperable. Where there were difficulties, we should consider

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whether to pursue them or to pass them on to experts. If there were insuperable difficulties at the general level, we should discuss further among ourselves.

(iii) Future of the Islands

15. Mr Ridley said very well. The next item was the future of the Islands. This was the point Argentina was pressing; we had been pressing on oil and fish. The British position was that we could not come to any solution which was not acceptable to the Islanders themselves. But this did not preclude discussing the possibilities. Could the Argentines tell us what they had in mind for the future of the Islands? It was a human, personal, and political problem of 1,850 people. We all wanted the best for them. Could the Argentines say what they wanted to do with the Islands and the Islanders, what their need for the Islands was, what their desires and plans for them were?

16. Comodoro Cavandoli said there was a long history. As he had explained, he was not a diplomat and the question was what 26 million Argentines wanted, not what the Foreign Ministry or the Argentine Government wanted. Mr Ridley asked what was that? Comodoro Cavandoli said he would have to give a bit of history. The Vice-Royalty of the River Plate had occupied a large area of South America. Argentina had lost much of its territory, which was its heritage: part of Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, and the east bank of the River, now Uruguay, probably more important than the Islands. But only one piece of territory had been lost by force, the Islands. School children in Argentina learned from the time they were small that the Islands belonged to Argentina and that Argentina ended at Cape Horn. In 1980, Argentina had two outstanding problems: the dispute over the Islands and litigation with Chile. Being a peaceful but not a pacifist country, Argentina was trying to find a solution with Chile, not by force, though they had come close to this. Argentina believed that the Beagle dispute would be solved in a mutually agreeable fashion; if not,

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they would not have agreed to mediation by the Pope. There was only one outstanding problem, the Islands as they belonged to Argentina and had been taken from Argentina by force. If we wanted a political reason, it was to incorporate them into Argentine territory under Argentine national sovereignty. He would be absolutely frank in honour of Mr Monk's presence at the table: Argentina understood that simple incorporation into the Argentine State was not at present an attractive possibility for the Islanders. He understood that the UK wanted the best for the Islanders; Argentina also wanted to give them the best in incorporating them. It would mean a special effort by Argentina, intellectually, economically, and socially, touching on all aspects of the life of the Islanders. He was conscious of the fears of the Islanders as to what might be their future if they were incorporated into Argentina. Turning to the history of mainland Argentina again and to relations with the UK over the last 140 years, what the UK had done in Argentina in developing the economy, in building roads and railways, would always be taken into account by the inhabitants of Argentina. Through the years, the British community had become part of the Argentine family; well-adapted, perfectly integrated into Argentine life. Their offspring had shared all of Argentina's problems and triumphs. At this table there were excellent examples in Sr Bloomer Reeve and Sr Forrester. There did not therefore exist from the intellectual or social side anything which could imply any harm. What the Islanders wanted should be analysed, studied and put into practice. He wanted to eradicate Island fears as to the conservation of their way of life. People who had taken part in these negotiations had shown Argentina's wish and predisposition to promote acceptable safeguards and to eradicate the fears of the Islanders.

17. Comodoro Cavandoli said that he wanted now to speak for the Argentine Government: it was their aim to reach a solution to the problem, to discuss all aspects and to make a major effort, because

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the Argentine Government had the objective of eliminating all those questions which made impossible a stable and viable democracy in Argentina. The only outstanding problem in international relations for the Argentine Government was the Islands. It was the aim of the Argentine Government to put the house on a sound financial footing before giving it back to its owners and to resolve all boundary problems. Ambassador de Rozas said the Government wished to deliver a clean country to a democratic Government. Mr Williams enquired whether Comodoro Cavandoli had meant that such a Government might resolve the preoccupations of the Islanders. Comodoro Cavandoli said he had not said this. He said that the Argentine Government had high on its list of priorities the solving of the problem of the Islands because it was the only outstanding international relations problem remaining. They were conscious that they had to make an additional effort to achieve that objective.

18. Mr Ridley said that, listening to Comodoro Cavandoli, he could not help thinking about our own history over the past 147 years. We had given up about one third of the world's surface and found it on the whole beneficial to do so. The only claim Britain had which he felt strongly about was our long standing claim to Bordeaux, his motive being wine. He found it hard to see the motive towards the Islands where there was no wine. Argentina was very fortunate if this was their last international problem. We had plenty left. The existence of international problems meant that there had to be Ministers; Ministers played a part in the political problems and aspirations of a country. He wanted to separate out that part of the Argentine attitude to the Islands which had to do with the long-standing public and political problem, seen in the way children were educated in schools to believe that the Islands were Argentine, from any possible solution to the future of the Islands. The issue carried with it the problems of our colonial empire. He had said that he was pleased that we had got rid of one third of the world because an empire caused problems: you got cast in the role of a colonialist which was

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expensive and tiresome as e.g. events in Rhodesia, India, Barbados and Belize had shown. It was better to try to solve the issue rather than to hold on.

19. We should seek to take account of this in our discussions. When he said that nothing would be done that did not meet the wishes of the Islanders, he was expressing in a different form the dangers for the future if Argentina were to take over the Islands without Islanders' consent. The Islands had no natural resources, no wine, gold or oil. There were only people, who, the Argentines would agree, would prefer to stay as they were. There was a distinction here. He recognised the strength of feeling on the Argentine side and Argentine ambitions, that their claim was not something trumped-up as an act of aggression and that it was long-standing and genuine. The question of title, claiming land, seemed to be at the back of the desires of the Argentine people: there was a distinction between the absence of resources and the absence of the consent of the people. These elements were separate and we had to draw the distinction. We should address ourselves to the wishes of the people. There was a problem for the Argentine Government in handing over a clean slate to a successor democratic regime. He hoped that the Argentine Government would be able to solve it soon. But it was a problem too for the Islanders, who had always lived in an entirely democratic atmosphere, who treasured democracy deeply and who preferred to stay in that democratic atmosphere so long as Argentina had not arrived there. The Islands had an enormous degree of self-government: he was always trying to make Mr Monk do things which he did not want to do and he never succeeded. It might be a good moment to ask Mr Monk whether he wanted to say anything. Mr Monk said that he would prefer to come in later.

20. Mr Ridley said we should forget the past: we had only the future to consider. Argentina had a political problem, given that the Argentine people felt that the Islands were theirs;

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we had a problem in the UK and with the Islanders who wanted the sort of life they were used to in the future also. We both had political problems. Possibly Comodoro Cavandoli could see in what he had said some possibility of moving forward, some compromises or solutions to be worked on. Possibly the help of others as guarantors or trustees could be useful. He was willing to open up various avenues of discussion; he would be happy to hear any suggestions which Comodoro Cavandoli had to make.

21. Comodoro Cavandoli said that was fine. He would like to make only one clarification: he agreed we should think of the future and his one reference to the past was because Mr Ridley had asked him why Argentina wanted the Islands. Argentina believed there was an obligation to go forward: for Britain because it had to look after responsibility for the Islands and for Argentina because it had an objective and it was perfectly clear what it was. Argentina firmly believed that there must be a solution. We needed to work on each item to find it. Throughout the years, both sides had had a good understanding of what the various elements of the problem were. We could go over these as we had done earlier to see if there were any new elements which modified or bore on the existing situation. We could go on putting on the table openly and frankly our thoughts on each item and work hard to reach a mutually acceptable position on each. He understood perfectly and absolutely Britain's position in this situation. He was almost convinced that we knew their thinking on the problem and that we knew that they were convinced that a solution could be found acceptable to both sides. He would like to sum up where we now stood: we had covered the most difficult area; it was now a question of what still lay on the table, of us asking what Argentina wanted to do with the Islands and of discussing the Islanders' problems. There was a point of agreement and, taking advantage of the position, we could follow through each of the problems. The first session ended at 13.00 hours.

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FIRST DAY, MONDAY 28 APRIL: AFTERNOON SESSION, 16.45 HOURS
(ARGENTINE MISSION)

1977 Terms of Reference

22. Mr Ridley, after thanking Comodoro Cavandoli for lunch, suggested that unless the two sides wished for clarification of anything discussed in the morning session, we could continue with the remaining items on the agenda, going into some subjects with greater depth on the next day. Comodoro Cavandoli said he had no points to raise; other members of his delegation might. Sr Oliveri Lopez asked whether, when Mr Ridley had said during the morning that signed agreements between the Argentine Government and the last British Government would of course continue to be honoured, we included the text of the Joint Communique of April 1977. This was the text of the Terms of Reference for the negotiations which began in the summer of 1977. Mr Ridley said that we had not specifically repeated those terms of reference in announcing the present talks. He believed it preferable not to say too much about the nature of the talks in public. Nevertheless, the subjects listed in those terms of reference had been discussed this morning. Comodoro Cavandoli believed that the two sides should continue leaving this question aside for the moment.

(iv) Scientific Cooperation

23. Mr Ridley turned to the next item on the agenda, scientific cooperation in the South Atlantic. He regretted that it had not been possible to persuade the Islanders to accept the draft Scientific Cooperation Agreement which the last British Government had negotiated with the Argentines in Geneva at the end of 1978. This was one of those problems which had two sides; on the one hand the Scientific Agreement would have permitted the establishment of bases in disputed areas; but on the other hand critics said the Agreement should have been reconsidered before the Argentines established their station on Southern Thule. Personally, he

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believed that the Agreement should form part of any general solution and he believed the Islanders would also agree. But in the meantime the problem was not causing immediate trouble, and he would like to discuss whether scientific activity in that part of the world could be increased. He handed over copies of the report prepared by the British Antarctic Survey on their work in the South Sandwich Islands. Comodoro Cavandoli agreed that the scientific agreement should form part of a global settlement. Mr Duggan pointed out that a lot of work had already been done jointly by the British and Argentines, for example in the Antarctic. Sr Oliveri Lopez said he would like to endorse this. The matter was linked with the next two items on the agenda, Antarctic marine living resources and Antarctic mineral resources. But he added that leaving the draft Scientific Cooperation Agreement in abeyance, while attempting to act in the spirit of that agreement, caused some uncertainty. Mr Ridley stressed that the Agreement as it had been drafted was not satisfactory to the Islanders; it gave too many opportunities to the Argentines to set up stations in the Dependencies beyond British control. There was still considerable concern at the Argentine presence on Southern Thule, which was exacerbated by the occasional radio broadcasts from Argentine operators there. Generally, scientific cooperation was another area where progress could not be made apart from a general settlement. But Britain was happy to agree that we should continue to work in the spirit of the agreement.

(v) and (vi) Antarctic matters

24. Comodoro Cavandoli turned to Antarctic matters. Mr Ridley remarked that the geographical context and constitutional context were different from those obtaining in the Dependencies. Basically, we agreed with Argentine policies in the Antarctic. Mr Duggan added that our experts had worked very closely and fruitfully with their Argentine opposite numbers. The sovereignty claims of the two countries in Antarctica could have been expected to

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divide us: they had not. It was important that we should continue to collaborate. sr Oliveri Lopez agreed. He hoped that the British delegation in Canberra would share his view that we should not import our sovereignty differences over the Dependencies into the negotiation of the Convention. Mr Duggan confirmed it was our view also.

(vii) Cooperation between Islands/Argentina

25. Mr Ridley said that, as far as cooperation between the Islands and Argentina was concerned, he wished to confirm our enthusiasm for the 1971 Communications Agreement and for the 1974 YPF Agreement, and the growing ties these had led to between the Islands and the mainland. There were also increasing links in health and education. There was the small difficulty over the provision of a jetty in the Islands for the supply of fuel; as he understood it we were awaiting a further tender from the Argentines. Colonel Balcarce hoped that an Argentine response would be ready soon. Mr Ridley said we would help in any way we could when the Argentines were ready.

26. Mr Ridley said that on the question of the provision of a house for the LADE representative, he understood from Mr Monk that the only remaining difficulty was one clause in the proposed lease.

27. Comodoro Cavandoli sought Mr Monk's views of Islander attitudes on such cooperation. Sometimes Argentine willingness to extend cooperation had met with a negative response in the Islands. He would like to know what the Islanders needed and wanted. Mr Monk said he appreciated all that the Argentines had done in communications and fuel and medicine. He explained that if Islanders had not been impressed by some new approach by the Argentines it was because of concern about Argentine intentions. There was now an opportunity for greater cooperation over freight;

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supplies which formerly came by air from the mainland now could not do so because the aircraft were taking so many passengers. This was one reason why the Islanders had been exploring other sources. He was certain that the vast majority of Islanders would agree that there were excellent opportunities for trade cooperation with Argentina, which was the Falkland Islands' nearest neighbour, provided there were no other overtones. Everything should be fully explained to allay suspicions.

28. Comodoro Cavandoli said he understood this perfectly. He believed the confusion was sometimes between intentions and means. Perhaps the Islanders sometimes believed that the Argentines intended to establish a greater presence, rather than provide a service. This conception should be eliminated in favour of absolute understanding. He was sure that there was a long list of Islander needs, which should be met, and these should be discussed. Mr Ridley asked whether some direct contact between the Council and the Argentines could not be established. Comodoro Cavandoli said he had been about to suggest precisely this himself. Mr Ridley thought that there could be a meeting every two or three months, alternately in Port Stanley and Buenos Aires. He was sure Islanders would agree to this proposal. Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas added that there was a difference between a service and a presence.

(viii) Economic development of the Islands

29. On the economic development of the Islands, Mr Ridley said that sooner or later some major economic initiatives would be required. He had identified some of these: he believed that the agricultural potential of the Islands was greater than generally supposed. But there were three impediments: the size of land holding and the unavailability of land to Islanders; the lack of people; and the lack of capital. He tended to agree with the Argentines about the undesirable structure of the Falkland Islands Company.

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The British Government was considering this but he wanted the Argentines to know that we thought this must be dealt with. As for the lack of people, he believed that they would come to the Islands if land was available. On the third point, the provision of capital, he had made enquiries of the feasibility of setting up a commercial bank on the Islands. The question was not settled but the need for access to capital was widely admitted. It was possible that the existing Savings Bank could be developed further. But it would be fruitful to discuss the establishment of a branch of an Argentine bank. A further point was the need for markets for the agricultural products of the Islands on the South American mainland; distances to Europe were too great to ship such produce there in large quantities. The industry that was most clearly lacking in the Islands was meat production and freezing.

30. Comodoro Cavandoli understood these points. Such development needed consideration in the longer term. On Mr Ridley's last point, Argentina had a well developed industry and could help with the technology. But industrial facilities on the Islands would also be necessary; the Argentines could easily help here. Nevertheless, one of the matters on which the Argentines had received a negative response from the Islanders was on the project to establish a meat freezing plant. To develop a meat industry would require an Argentine presence on the Islands. The whole question of agricultural development, and other Falkland economic development should be studied in detail. The Argentines would cooperate to the utmost, not least on the question of the bank. This item was susceptible of a solution but there had to be complete confidence by the participants and action could and would be taken.

31. Mr Ridley said he was grateful and that he would like these items to be discussed directly between the Argentines and the Islanders. In fact, none of the British delegation had been aware

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that the Argentines had proposed a meat packing station in the Islands. Comodoro Cavandoli suggested that, if the Island Councillors were to have direct contact with the Argentines on economic matters, this should include links with the Argentine private sector, independent of government, in order to develop a lasting relationship.

32. Mr Ridley said it had been a fruitful day, with a number of hopeful discoveries of each other's position. The meeting ended at 18.15 hours.

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Second Day, Tuesday 29 April: Morning Session, 1100 hours (Argentine Mission)

33. Mr Ridley suggested that Mr Monk might be invited to say a few words on the discussion of the previous day; thereafter we could consider further the idea of more direct consultation between the Islanders and the Argentine Government and private sector, before returning to the main subjects of the future of the Islands, oil and fish. Finally there was the question of public presentation of the outcome of the talks, a communique, handling the press, etc. Comodoro Cavandoli agreed this agenda.

Islander/Argentine contacts

34. Mr Monk said he believed the discussions had been both frank and far reaching. He thought that the central question should not be elaborated further. But this did not mean that relations and economic co-operation could not be improved. Often in the past misunderstandings had been caused by insufficient communications between the Islanders and the Argentines. Perhaps for very good reason the Argentines wished to alter a particular service or set up a particular business; but, if they had not explained the matter fully, they were bound to excite suspicion. The Falkland Islands were a democracy in the British tradition and full discussion went on about every subject: if the Argentines read or heard of objections to this or that proposal, it did not mean that that was the majority opinion. We welcomed the idea of joint consultation to deal with the small matters which could nevertheless sometimes be so irritating. He was sure that the majority of Islanders would welcome increased co-operation on economic matters, without prejudice to the sovereignty position. If the cloud of uncertainty was lifted, it would pave the way to increased population which then could perhaps repopulate Patagonia! He repeated that he would like to express appreciation for the services Argentina provided; and, if relations between the Islands and Argentina could always be conducted in the spirit of understanding shown during these present talks, the problems would recede.

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35. Comodoro Cavandoli said he was grateful for this statement which was very much to the point and entirely understood. A dialogue was important to avoid the kind of misunderstandings that had arisen in the past. Ambassador de Rozas, speaking personally in reply to Mr Monk, said that the freedom of ideas in the Islands would not preclude the Argentines from hoping they could change opinions there. Indeed, circumstances did change, as they had for example in Rhodesia. Perhaps with increased economic co-operation between the Islands and Argentina, the Islanders might themselves realise that their interests would be well served in a closer relationship with Argentina. That possibility should not be rejected, and Argentina would make every effort in that direction. Mr Monk replied that, since the Falkland Islands were a democracy, they would always allow the Argentines to put their point of view.

36. Mr Ridley said he thought it best to leave the arrangements for better consultation between the Islanders and the Argentines to those concerned. Mr Monk would of course consult his colleagues on their views; the link man should be Mr Gozney in the British Embassy in Buenos Aires. Colonel Balcarce explained the machinery for joint consultation set up under the 1971 Communications Agreement. Comodoro Cavandoli agreed that that consultative committee should provide the framework for the discussions now proposed but he wanted a flexible system which could work rapidly. In principle, he accepted that Mr Gozney should be the point of co-ordination. Mr Williams suggested that what was needed was a mechanism of access not of consultation, a sort of telephone exchange; agendas and formal proceedings were not required. He thought it was a good idea for Mr Gozney to be this "telephone point" on the British side and Colonel Balcarce on the Argentine side. He agreed with Comodoro Cavandoli that the details could be followed up in Buenos Aires but obviously they would need to wait until Mr Monk had consulted his fellow Councillors.

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Land, people and resources

37. Mr Ridley said he wanted to mention some thoughts he had had since the useful discussion the previous afternoon on the general attitude of the two sides to the Falkland Islands. It seemed, first, that the impediment to a better relationship between the Islands and Argentina was the feeling of "threat" hanging over their future which Mr Monk had mentioned. The "threat" was not physical but a disruption of the Islands present way of life. It inhibited economic development in the region and the evolution of a better spirit. What was needed was a way of removing this threat; whatever agreement was worked out had to be of such a time span that Islanders could feel security for their grandchildren. If it could be removed, relations between Britain and Argentina would improve across the board. On the previous day, three elements had been identified in the problem: land; resources; and people. Each side placed a different emphasis on each. For the British side for many years, the people of the Islands had been the most important of these three; hence our commitment to their wishes. For the Argentines he suspected that the key element was sovereignty over the land. The question of the resources of the Islands was important for both sides. If we could solve the problem of the land and people, there would be no remaining difficulty over the resources. We could therefore deduce from the previous day's talks that what should be considered should be how to generate a mood of content among the Islanders, while at the same time satisfying Argentine preoccupations. If the two sides could report back to their Governments and discuss these deep questions further, these two days of discussions would have been singularly fruitful. But he emphasised that from the British point of view this discussion had been purely exploratory, to see where progress could be made.

38. Comodoro Cavandoli said that from the Argentine perspective there was a small difference. The three principal points discussed the previous day had been: oil, fishing, and the future of the Islands, and the separate subsidiary matter of

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scientific co-operation. These points were all subject to a different chronology: fishing and scientific co-operation were matters for immediate action: oil exploration needed a longer time scale. But agreement on all these matters was subordinate to a general agreement on the future of the Islands and agreement by the Islanders. Sovereignty was a sine qua non, an underlying condition, for progress on the other questions. Another way of saying this was that if sovereignty was one day returned to Argentina, then Argentine priorities would be exactly the same as British ones. Everything was possible, and all other matters could immediately be put into action, if we operated on the assumption that sovereignty would one day be returned to Argentina. The concept of the future of the Islanders was not opposed to this assumption. Ambassador de Rozas said that we should agree on the main idea, without setting dates, and bring this to the attention of our Governments. Comodoro Cavandoli agreed, adding that after such an understanding was reached, all other matters would fall into place immediately. He wondered if each side could report to its Government that we had clarified the basic issue on this level of abstraction, without such detail as target dates etc.

39. Mr Ridley said he wanted to raise a practical example; it had been agreed on the previous day that urgent action was necessary on fishing. Were the Argentine side now saying that they would not favour a British declaration of a 200 mile fishing zone before a general agreement was reached? There would be immediate advantages in such a declaration, both to conserve fish stocks and to demonstrate the good relations presently existing between Britain and Argentina. Comodoro Cavandoli understood the question perfectly, and he hoped Mr Ridley would not expect him to give an immediate answer at the table. But he had to say that a unilateral declaration would be very badly viewed in Argentina. Mr Ridley asked if a separate fishing agreement could be reached. Sr Oliveri Lopez said that unilateral action without a global arrangement would complicate matters; it was a complex subject which we had discussed in the past. A global understanding

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between the two sides was better than a separate arrangement. Any unilateral move would complicate relations. Mr Ridley said that this was precisely why he had raised the question. He was not contemplating a separate British declaration; he envisaged an agreement, which did not impinge on the sovereignty issue, aimed at dealing with the problem of third party fishing. It would of course only apply to the period before a global solution. If we could make progress on matters like fish, it would be a good signal to the world of Anglo-Argentine co-operation, it would produce a benefit which would be visible to the Islanders and it would be of considerable political significance as a measure of our co-operation. Comodoro Cavandoli said that this was possible; indeed there was no absolute reason on Argentina's part why it should be impossible. But this related to what Mr Ridley had said about parallel progress in other areas.

40. Comodoro Cavandoli, asking forgiveness for returning to the matter yet again, asked whether the points of view of the two sides on the global issue were the same. Mr Ridley said he did not think that we had reached a shared position on sovereignty in these two days, but we now comprehended each other better. We were agreed on where the difficulties lay but he could not say whether it would be possible to solve them. He could only undertake to study them in good faith and see whether they suggested a solution which would be politically acceptable to the UK and the Islanders. As for a fishing agreement, he was not proposing to negotiate one today, but it might be best to keep it in the forefront of our minds; when and if the Argentines felt that the moment was right to make an act of political co-operation, we could go ahead.

41. Ambassador de Rozas said that, speaking as Argentine Ambassador in London, he had noted during the three months he had spent in Britain expressions of doubt from British bankers and industry about investing in Argentina. There was a great social and economic transformation in Britain and Argentina. It would be fruitful to restore relations to the level they were at some 50

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years ago. This would greatly promote a solution to the problem of the Islands. There was a wider context to our relations, not limited to the question of the Islands. Mr Ridley said he naturally welcomed closer ties and any business which was mutually beneficial. But there was one political danger which he had at all costs to avoid. He could not at any stage give the impression that he was doing a deal with Argentina over the Islands for the sake of greatly increased trade. Any impression of such a deal would raise a storm of political protest. The Islands problem had to be solved on its merits. It was right to confine ourselves to the agenda so that neither Mr Monk or anyone else would think that we were doing other than trying to solve the problem on its merits. Ambassador de Rozas said that there was no question of a deal; but when two countries had a larger community of interest, problems tended to solve themselves rapidly. Mr Ridley said he entirely understood this point; what he had said was not directed to Sr Ortiz de Rozas' remarks; he had merely been pointing to a pitfall we should all avoid.

Future contacts

42. Mr Ridley said that each side should report to their Governments, without any kind of agreed written position paper (each side had a record of the meetings), and then communicate through their respective Ambassadors on what we proposed for the next stage. The Argentine Foreign Minister had suggested to Lord Carrington last September that, when they next met at the General Assembly in September 1980, they should review progress. Whether he and Comodoro Cavandoli might have another meeting before then depended on how we each got on with our respective Governments. He would communicate with Comodoro Cavandoli after a few weeks and get in touch as soon as possible but Comodoro Cavandoli knew how long these matters took. Comodoro Cavandoli agreed. We should both report back. We had a good perspective. His task would be easier than Mr Ridley's as Argentina was ready to carry everything forward. Indeed the Argentine Foreign Minister had

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told him that he hoped that in addressing the UN General Assembly in 1980 his main subject would be the Islands. We should now consult our Governments. Argentina was not going to make an issue of this. We should probably have meetings at various levels before the General Assembly. Sr Oliveri Lopez said we should keep moving.

The Communique

43. Mr Ridley suggested that the communique should say very little and be low-key. He handed Comodoro Cavandoli a British draft. Sr Ortiz de Rozas said that they would want a reference to continuity and to put the communique into the context of a previous communique of a certain date. Comodoro Cavandoli said that the communique was designed also for internal consumption in both our countries. They would prepare an Argentine draft and we could seek a common denominator. The session ended at 12.55 hours.

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Second Day, Tuesday 29 April: Afternoon Session, 1645 hours (UK Mission)

The Communique

44. Comodoro Cavandoli passed over a draft of an Argentine text of a joint communique (texts at Annex). He noted that our text had excluded the word "negotiations" and referred to "discussions". Mr Ridley said that we had not been negotiating but had been holding exploratory talks. We had not said officially that we were negotiating with Argentina. This was stronger than he could agree to; he was not entitled to agree to it, although he hoped that we would be negotiating in the future.

45. Ambassador de Rozas said that in Spanish we were having negotiations. How did we construe the United Nations Resolutions? Mr Ridley said that we might come to negotiations but there was a strong difference between the position of the Conservative Government and the Labour Government which had preceded it. He was not authorised to negotiate, the talks were exploratory; we had suggested talks in New York of an exploratory nature and he had been authorised to hold exploratory talks and not on the basis of the previous Terms of Reference. He had to report back to his Government: on the basis of his report, his Government might agree to negotiations. But he could not possibly agree now to any phrase about the continuation of negotiations. Comodoro Cavandoli said that he could not agree either: he was not authorised other than to say that we were continuing negotiations. Mr Harding said we were at an important point in our contacts; we were not looking back but seeing what we should do in the future. Ambassador de Rozas suggested that we might use the Spanish word "tratativas", which meant both discussions and negotiations. Mr Harding agreed: we could each interpret it our own way.

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46. Mr Ridley said that our problem was a purely constitutional one. In theory, we disowned what a previous Government had done. We could not negotiate from that position. Mr Harding referred to the case of Rhodesia: the new Government had operated from an entirely new position, repudiating the previous Government's position. Comodoro Cavandoli said that was not the Argentine position which remained unchanged: their aim was to continue the exchanges. He understood our position but did not share it. Britain had a constitutional point but Argentina had a public opinion which would analyse every word. It would think that we had gone backward, especially when Britain had announced negotiations over Gibraltar. The removal of the word "negotiations" should be a concession to balance against the proposed Argentine wording in the first paragraph (with the mention of the 1977 Terms of Reference). We should accept that we had come to the table for different reasons and that it had not been convenient for either side.

47. Mr Ridley said that the joint Terms of Reference issued in 1977 were no longer accurate e.g. they mentioned the establishment of working groups which were no longer operating. There had been 4 rounds of negotiations at which he had not been present. We had proposed exploratory talks carefully: he was not allowed by his Government to accept the 1977 Terms of Reference.

Sr Oliveri Lopez said that they had raised the issue with the British Embassy in Buenos Aires and that their formula, used in the Minister's message, had been to hold talks as a renewal of negotiations. Mr Ridley quoted the words "an exchange of views, wide ranging and frank" from Comodoro Cavandoli's message. There had been no suggestion of negotiation on the basis of previous communique or Terms of Reference.

48. Mr Williams suggested that we had got off the point. We were meeting to record what we had done. We had said we were going to meet. We had met. Our talks had been constructive. We

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might seek to persuade each other to go further. But we were discussing a short and anodyne communique, reflecting the spirit of our talks and not going into enormous detail. The announcements we had made in advance of the talks had not been exactly the same; we should not try to correct the disparity. The difference in nuances should be reflected by referring to our separate announcements on 15 April. Ambassador de Rozas suggested that we should clarify: the disparity existed and both sides should make an announcement in their own terms. Comodoro Cavandoli said that we were at a point where the words we were using were not relevant to the importance of the issues we had been discussing. He did not want to look backwards. In our talks we had suppressed mention of words which might impede the spirit of our talks. It now appeared as if the problem was based on precise instructions we had each brought with us. A couple of elements caused problems for the communique. An anodyne communique was precisely what was unacceptable to them. He did not want to insist but it was very very difficult for them to explain the absence of the word "negotiations", particularly when negotiations had just begun on Gibraltar. Separate reports to the UN Secretary General, explaining the reasons why both sides had been at the table, might enable a continuation. He had to insist on this, it was extremely important. We had discussed very important issues and it would be a pity if administrative issues prevented us continuing.

49. Mr Ridley said that there was no issue of substance in this. We had had talks and we knew what we had talked about. He was not saying that we would not have further talks. The difficulty was that the Argentines wanted to refer back to a communique issued by our previous Government which the present Government did not necessarily accept and we had trouble over the words "discussions" and "negotiations". He thought we had solved this in the word "tratativas" and he thought it possible that we might devise a sentence to cover the further point,

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perhaps to make clear the differing views of the two Governments. We could record our disagreement in a joint communique which would be equivalent to separate communiques. Comodoro Cavandoli said he wanted to make it clear that this was very difficult. They did not accept that one Administration could not accept what its predecessors had done. Had this been the case with previous Conservative Governments? Mr Ridley said that in all these matters each Government had every right to start again. It so happened that in these talks he had explicitly said that we would not pick up from where the last Government had finished. He had made this clear to Comodoro Cavandoli when he had written to him.

Reporting to Island Councillors

50. Mr Ridley said that we might leave the communique aside for the moment and discuss what Mr Monk might say when he returned to the Islands. It was Mr Ridley's intention to say as little as possible about the discussions and not reveal any matters of substance or any change of positions. The only part which had been agreed which we could make public was the arrangement for contacts between the Islanders and Argentina. But there was some advantage in giving Mr Monk a little more scope. He could give his impressions of the nature of the talks. Mr Monk would not want to prejudice the confidentiality of the talks, of positions adopted and things said. But Mr Monk felt it would be helpful to him to report the statement he had made that morning. Mr Ridley said he would be happy for Mr Monk to do so. We must give Mr Monk as much as possible as he would be besieged on his return. He might speak on three subjects: the atmosphere and flavour of the talks; his own statement; and our agreement to consult further. These were three innocuous subjects.

51. Comodoro Cavandoli said he had a lot of sympathy with Mr Monk but, when Mr Monk made declarations, he himself would also be pursued about them. He quoted an Argentine proverb: "Love is

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paid by love". He wanted to ask Mr Monk about the climate in which we had conducted our discussions. Mr Monk said he thought the climate had been favourable and constructive. Comodoro Cavandoli was content. Mr Ridley added that he had been talking about what Mr Monk would say to his colleagues on the Council who were privileged. Mr Monk would say less on the radio and in public. Comodoro Cavandoli said that he had interpreted our discussion as agreement to what Mr Monk should transmit to Councillors. He would be grateful for Mr Monk's understanding to say less to the public and on the radio.

Conclusion

52. Comodoro Cavandoli said that there was one last important point. We should congratulate ourselves on the efforts we had made to save our talks in the past two days. But it was important when Mr Ridley reported to his fellow Ministers that he should say that, when we come back next time to discuss these issues in some depth, we can say that we are meeting in a situation where we are negotiating. He wanted to say this with all the frankness with which he had spoken during the last two days. During the last Conservative Government there had been a similar reluctance to use the word "negotiations" and our work had been stopped for three years. This was the reason why he could not agree to the suggestion made to him by Sr Oliveri Lopez that the communique should simply refer to agreement to hold future meetings and why he had wanted to say that these exchanges were continuing.

53. A formula to cover the outstanding points in the communique proposed by Mr Harding through Mr Ridley was accepted by the Argentines.

54. Mr Ridley thanked Comodoro Cavandoli for the very helpful way in which he had approached these talks throughout. He did understand that the difficulty which we had overcome had been real for Comodoro Cavandoli as it had been for him. The two

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people on either side of each of them had come to their rescue. He expressed his appreciation that Comodoro Cavandoli had managed to come to his form of words. He would certainly make it clear to his Government that, should we at some stage have a further meeting, it would be for negotiations. He could not guarantee that they would be, or what his colleagues would do; but he would do his best to persuade them in that direction. It could work that the present talks would lead to negotiations as they had over Gibraltar and we were following the same strategy in this case. Comodoro Cavandoli had mentioned that negotiations had been held up for three years: in the case of Gibraltar they had been held up for some two hundred years. He thanked both interpreters, who had been tireless, and both delegations who had been constructive and helpful. Our exchanges had been extremely valuable and successful, whatever we called them. Comodoro Cavandoli said that he was happy we were in full agreement. Our understanding was total. He thanked all who had laboured to this end, especially the interpreters.

55. It was agreed that the communique would be released on Wednesday, 30 April, when both delegations had left New York. The meeting ended at 18.20 hours.

DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE (ARGENTINE PROPOSED VERSION)

In accordance with separate announcements in LONDON and BUENOS AIRES on April 15th by the Argentine and UK Governments, an Anglo-Argentine Ministerial Meeting was held in NEW YORK from 28-29 April 1980, to discuss the FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS question and related issues in the South Atlantic, following the pertinent RESOLUTIONS of the UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY in the context of the JOINT COMMUNIQUE of the 26th April 1977.

The British and Argentine Delegations were led respectively by Mr Nicholas RIDLEY, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in LONDON, and Comodoro Carlos R CAVANDOLI, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires.

The discussions were of an exploratory nature and were conducted in a cordial and positive spirit. A full exchange of views took place.

The two Governments intend to hold future meetings in order to continue the negotiations.

DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE (UK PROPOSED VERSION)

Following separate announcements in London and Buenos Aires on 15 April by the Argentine and UK Governments, an Anglo-Argentine Ministerial meeting was held in New York from 28 - 30 April 1980 to discuss the Falkland Islands question.

The British and Argentine delegations were led respectively by Mr Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Comodoro Cavandoli, Deputy Foreign Minister.

The discussions were wide-ranging and conducted in a positive spirit. A full exchange of views took place.

The two Governments intend to meet again to continue these exchanges.

DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE (OFFICIAL VERSION)

In accordance with separate announcements in London and Buenos Aires on April 15th 1980 by the Argentine and UK Governments, a Ministerial meeting was held in New York on 28 and 29 April to discuss the Falkland Islands question and related issues in the South Atlantic within the negotiating framework referred to in relevant Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

The British and Argentine Delegations were led respectively by Mr Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, and Comodoro Carlos R Cavandoli, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires.

The discussions were of a comprehensive and wide-ranging nature and were conducted in a cordial and positive spirit.

The two Governments intend to hold future meetings in order to continue these exchanges.

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