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IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

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ps/nd Howard
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Mr Ciffasol
Mr Wright
Mr Gillmore
Mr Lee
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OO F C O DESKBY 030700Z

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CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 030700Z
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 030533Z MAY 83
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 631 DATED 3 MAY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR VISIT TO NEW YORK, FALKLANDS

1. YOU DINED AT MY HOUSE ON 2 MAY WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL,
WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY RAFAE AHMED AND A NOTE-TAKER.

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2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT, FOLLOWING THE SUSPENSION OF KAIG'S MISSION, HE FELT IT HIS DUTY TO FILL THE GAP BY SETTING UP SOME NEGOTIATING MECHANISM WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SCR 532, IF ONLY TO FORESTALL DRAMATIC AND UNHELPFUL INITIATIVES FROM OTHERS. THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE INCREASINGLY RESTIVE BECAUSE THEY DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON. HE SAW THE DANGERS OF A MEETING OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL. PERHAPS THE ANSWER WAS FOR THE PRESIDENT, OR FOR HIM AND THE PRESIDENT JOINTLY, TO BRIEF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL INDIVIDUALLY OR IN GROUPS.

3. YOU SAID THAT NO DOORS WERE CLOSED. YOU HAD DISCUSSED A RANGE OF IDEAS WITH KAIG WHO DID NOT REGARD HIS EFFORT AS BEING AT AN END. BUT MEANWHILE OUR ENFORCEMENT OF THE TEZ MUST CONTINUE. IF THE ARGENTINES CHALLENGED IT, THEY WOULD GET A SHARP ANSWER.

4. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN ROCA (ARGENTINA) EARLIER TODAY AND GIVEN HIM A DOCUMENT, WHICH HE WOULD GIVE YOU TOO, SETTING OUT IDEAS WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH BOTH PARTIES. HE WOULD NOT GIVE THE DOCUMENT TO ANYONE ELSE NOR REVEAL ITS EXISTENCE TO THE PRESS. HE THEN INVITED AHMED TO INTRODUCE THE DOCUMENT, THE TEXT OF WHICH IS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. AHMED SAID THAT IT WAS A PROCEDURAL FORMULA WHICH DID NOT GO INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES IN DISPUTE AND COULD BE REGARDED AS CONTAINING "PROVISIONAL MEASURES" UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER. IN ORDER TO CIRCUMVENT THE "CHICKEN AND EGG" PROBLEM RESULTING FROM OUR INSISTENCE THAT THE FIRST STEP MUST BE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND ARGENTINE INSISTENCE THAT IT MUST BE ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY, THE UN PROPOSED THAT THERE SHOULD BE "SIMULTANEITY" BETWEEN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE UK TASK FORCE, THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE UN ASKED FOR RESPONSES FROM US AND ARGENTINA BY 5 MAY, SO THAT THEIR SCHEME COULD COME INTO EFFECT ON 6 MAY.

5. YOU SAID THAT YOU WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS BUT THAT YOU HAD THE FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE COMMENTS:

A. THE UN TIMETABLE SEEMED PRECIPITATE:

B. IT WAS A BASIC CONDITION FOR US THAT THE OUTCOME ON SOVEREIGNTY SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDGED IN ANY WAY. IF, AS AHMED CLAIMED, THE UN SCHEME MET THIS CONDITION, WHAT CHANCE WAS THERE THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD ACCEPT IT? AT THIS POINT PEREZ DE CUELLAR INTERVENED TO SAY THAT, IF WE WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO HIS PAPER, HE WOULD FLY PERSONALLY TO BUENOS AIRES AND USE ALL HIS INFLUENCE AS A LATIN AMERICAN TO GET THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT IT TOO. YOU POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PICK THE RIGHT TIME, SO THAT THIS ASSET SHOULD NOT BE WASTED.

C. THE UK TASK FORCE HAD BEEN SENT TO PRESERVE THE INTERESTS OF

- RIGHT TIME, SO THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO...
- C. THE UK TASK FORCE HAD BEEN SENT TO PRESERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDS AND TO ENSURE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF A "BALANCED" WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH AND ARGENTINE FORCES. THE ARGENTINES HAD TO GO FIRST. THERE MIGHT BE SOME "OPTICAL" REDEPLOYMENT OF BRITISH FORCES, AND THE PASSAGE OF WITHDRAWING ARGENTINE FORCES, WOULD OF COURSE BE GUARANTEED, BUT EQUALITY OF WITHDRAWAL (FOR EXAMPLE, WITHDRAWING SO MANY ARGENTINIANS AND AN EQUAL NUMBER OF BRITISH WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE.
- D. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED IN ADVANCE. FOLLOWING ARGENTINE REJECTION OF HAIG'S PROPOSALS, THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION (INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ARGENTINE PRESENCE) WOULD HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT AFRESH

YOU CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING GRATITUDE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S IDEAS, WHICH YOU WOULD STUDY CAREFULLY. BUT YOU WANTED HIM TO BE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT WHAT WAS POSSIBLE. YOU GAVE NO UNDERTAKING TO RESPOND BY 5 MAY AND MADE THE POINT THAT THE ARGENTINES SHOULD REPLY FIRST.

6. PEREZ DE CUELLAR LEFT IT TO AHMED TO INTRODUCE AND DEFEND HIS PAPER. HE SEEMED TO AGREE WITH MANY OF YOUR COMMENTS ON IT. YOUR FIRMNESS WILL, I THINK, HAVE HAD A SALUTARY AFFECT ON AHMED WHO CAN NO LONGER BE UNDER ANY ILLUSIONS THAT HIS SKETCHY AND ILL-THOUGHT OUT IDEAS HAVE MUCH CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE. NEVERTHELESS, THE FACT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS GIVEN YOU AND THE ARGENTINES SOME IDEAS, WHICH WILL CERTAINLY BECOME KNOWN HERE (I SHALL BE SURPRISED IF PEREZ DE CUELLAR FAILS TO ALLUDE TO THEM WHEN HE BRIEFS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL), SHOULD ENABLE US TO GAIN A LITTLE MORE TIME HERE. IT WOULD BE OFF-SIDE FOR ANYONE TO INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN THE PARTIES WERE CONSIDERING IDEAS PUT TO THEM BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

PARSONS

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