

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 6359 DTG: 280238Z OCT 86 PSN: 057490
EOB970 AN08877 TOR: 301/1522Z CSN: HCE766

DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 ROSS-01 STK-01 STRK-01 SOMM-01 ROOM-01
MAT-01 /007 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP SIT PUBS
EOB:

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #6359 3010242
O 280238Z OCT 86 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 336359

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: GE, US, PREL, XF, IS, EG, JO
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST: KOHL/GENSCHER (0/2) DISCUSSION
-- WITH THE SECRETARY

1. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY DISCUSSED WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, INCLUDING POSSIBILITIES FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT POLITICAL PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS A PRECONDITION FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS. KOHL EXPRESSED FRG READINESS TO BECOME ACTIVE IN THE REGION AT THE RIGHT MOMENT. THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED IN OPTIMISTIC TERMS RECENT MODEST BUT POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS. KOHL AND THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE U.S., UK AND FRG TO THINK QUIETLY TOGETHER ABOUT POSSIBLE SMALL BUT MEANINGFUL STEPS IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. PRESENT AT THE MEETING ON THE GERMAN SIDE WERE KOHL'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY AFFAIRS ADVISOR TELTSCHIK AND GENSCHER'S POLITICAL DIRECTOR VON RICHTHOFEN. ASSISTANT SECRETARIES RIDGWAY AND CROCKER AND EUR/CE BEECROFT (NOTETAKER) ATTENDED ON THE U.S. SIDE. END SUMMARY.

2. KOHL LED OFF BY NOTING THAT BOTH THE FRG AND THE USG HAVE DISCUSSED SOME FORM OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WITH PERES. KOHL EXPRESSED UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT SHAMIR'S ACCESSION TO THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP WOULD MEAN. HE HOPED THINGS WOULD CONTINUE TO MOVE IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION, BUT COULD NOT BE SURE.

3. WHEN TALKING TO THE ISRAELIS, THE FRG HAD SPOKEN OF THE MARSHALL PLAN AS A WORKING TITLE. KOHL SAID THE PARALLEL WAS NOT EXACT, BUT CLOSE ENOUGH. KOHL SAID HE WAS ASTONISHED WHEN THE ISRAELIS IMMEDIATELY WENT PUBLIC ABOUT THE FRG-ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS, AND AT A HIGH VOLUME. NOT SURPRISINGLY, MUBARAK'S REACTION WAS NOT FAVORABLE, AND NEITHER WAS HUSSEIN'S, KOHL NOTED.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-032-104

BY LOI NARA, DATE 11/15/00

~~SECRET~~

MOODIS
MOODIS
MOODIS
MOODIS

Thatcher
VBCT

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

Thatcher visit

PAGE 02 OF 02 BONN 5480

DTG: 031212Z NOV 86 PSN: 073089

PROPOSALS, FLOWING FROM REYKJAVIK, HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD IN GENEVA, INCLUDING THE D AND S PROPOSAL WHICH HAD BEEN TABLED THE PREVIOUS DAY. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT THEIR CONTENTS, GLITMAN SAID WE WERE PROPOSING TO ELIMINATE ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES BY 1996. THIS INCLUDED, OF COURSE, BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF ALL RANGES. IN RESPONSE TO [REDACTED] COMMENT, GLITMAN NOTE THAT WE WERE PREPARED FOR A GOOD DEAL OF DISCUSSION IN THE ALLIANCE, PARTICULARLY ON THE SRINF COMPONENT OF THESE PROPOSALS.

4. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THESE ISSUES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE FRENCH DURING THE FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT ON THE TWO PREVIOUS DAYS, OCTOBER 27-28. HE SAID THERE WAS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING AMONG MRS. THATCHER, PRESIDENT MITTERAND, PRIME-MINISTER CHIRAC AND CHANCELLOR KOHL ON INF. ALL WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A ZERO-ZERO SOLUTION FOR LRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE. IT WAS FELT THAT, AFTER THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN 1983, THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE. THIS WAS THE CLEAR POSITION OF CHANCELLOR KOHL, ALTHOUGH SOME PEOPLE IN BONN HAD DOUBTS. ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS DID, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT SRINF. A FREEZE AT CURRENT LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES OF SYSTEMS IN THE 500-1000 KILOMETER RANGE WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE; THERE NEEDED TO BE A U.S. RIGHT TO MATCH THE SOVIETS. REGARDING SYSTEMS IN THE 150-500 KILOMETER RANGE, THERE SHOULD BE A JOINT UNDERTAKING TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AIM OF ESTABLISHING EQUAL CEILINGS AT LOWER LEVELS. DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO BONN, KARPOV HAD INDICATED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO THIS.

5. [REDACTED] THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A ZERO-ZERO SOLUTION FOR SRINF.

[REDACTED] ACCORDINGLY, [REDACTED] CONCLUDED, THE U.S. NEEDED TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON SRINF AND STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE THREE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS.

6. GLITMAN THEN EXPLAINED THE U.S. PROPOSALS Tabled IN GENEVA. REGARDING SRINF, GLITMAN SAID THAT WE HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS THERE SHOULD BE CONSTRAINTS ON THESE SYSTEMS, CONCURRENT WITH REDUCTIONS OF LRINF MISSILES. WE HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE MUST HAVE THE RIGHT TO MATCH THEM AT THEIR CURRENT LEVELS, THAT CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE GLOBAL I BT

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS EQ7-013/2 #105
By EST, NARA, Date 11/16/00

SECRET

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 5400
EOB063 AN001265

DTG: 031212Z NOV 86 PSN: 073095
TOR: 308/1457Z CSN: CR1854

DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 SOMM-01 ROOM-01 MAT-01 /004 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:

OP IMMED
DE RUEKJCS *5400 3081451
O 041451Z NOV 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO NSC WASHINGTON DC
O 031212Z NOV 86
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7550
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO NATO COLLECTIVE
USDEL NST GENEVA 0186

SECRET SPECAT SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 35400

SPECAT

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, GE, INF, NST
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GLITMAN'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLERY CHARACTER, THAT THE CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE, AND THAT WE SHOULD AGREE TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON SRINF FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION OF LRINF MISSILES. [REDACTED] ASKED WHAT THE RANGE DEFINITION OF SRINF WAS. GLITMAN REPLIED THAT THE NATO DEFINITION OF SRINF INCLUDED MISSILES WITH RANGES OF MORE THAN 150 KILOMETERS. IN OUR PRESENTATION AT GENEVA, WE HAD PROTECTED THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING ALL SRINF (ACCORDING TO THE NATO DEFINITION) IN THE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. GLITMAN THEN BRIEFLY EXPLAINED THE U.S. PROPOSALS REGARDING NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC FORCES, AND THE ELIMINATION BY 1996 OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES. GLITMAN EXPLAINED THAT THE REDUCTION OF LRINF MISSILES WOULD BE PHASED OVER A 5-YEAR PERIOD, IN PARALLEL WITH THE 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC FORCES.

7. [REDACTED] NOTED THAT CHANCELLOR KOHL HAD SAID IN WASHINGTON THAT THE FRG COULD ACCEPT A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. HOWEVER THE GERMANS WONDERED WHAT WOULD BECOME OF NATO STRATEGY IF REDUCTIONS WENT FURTHER. IN VIEW OF THE IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, HE NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT IN NATO ON FORUM FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. IT HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR DURING THE FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT ON THE PREVIOUS DAY HOW THE FRENCH WANTED TO HANDLE THIS MATTER. [REDACTED] THOUGHT THE ISSUE NOW NEEDED TO BE CLARIFIED IN BILATERAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE. THE GERMAN HAD MADE AN EFFORT TO MEDIATE, BUT IT WAS NOW UP TO THE U.S. AND FRANCE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FORUM.

8. [REDACTED] WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE GERMANS HAD TAKEN A DECISION ON THE PREVIOUS DAY TO COOPERATE VERY CLOSELY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Ronald Reagan Library

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

S

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 BONN 5408

DTG: 031212Z NOV 86 PSN: 073986

WITH THE FRENCH AND THE BRITISH ON ARMS CONTROL POLICY. THIS COOPERATION WAS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. RATHER, HE ARGUED, SUCH COORDINATION WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO DEVELOP A COMMON WESTERN POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT, "SPEAKING AS A GOOD FRIEND", HE FELT IT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. TO REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE UK, FRANCE AND GERMANY, IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE CONCERNS THAT EXISTED. GLITMAN RESPONDED THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE NEED TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH OUR ALLIES TO DEAL WITH THESE CONCERNS.

9. RETURNING TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS, [REDACTED] ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AT THE END OF THE 10-YEAR PERIOD. GLITMAN REPLIED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD BE FREE TO DEPLOY DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED, BUT WE WOULD SEEK TO DO SO COOPERATIVELY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. UNDER THE ABM TREATY, WE HAD NEVER OBTAINED THE REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS CALLED FOR IN THE TREATY ITSELF. WE NOW FELT THAT IF WE WERE GOING TO LIMIT OURSELVES UNTIL 1996 WITH RESPECT TO DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, THEN WE MUST OBTAIN REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, WE INTENDED TO CONCENTRATE FIRST ON OBTAINING AN INF AGREEMENT, EMPHASIZING TO THE SOVIET THAT SUCH AGREEMENT MUST NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE TO THE DEFENSIVE AND SPACE AREAS.

10. [REDACTED] SUGGESTED THAT WE NEEDED TO CLARIFY WITH THE SOVIETS HOW TO HANDLE RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE. GLITMAN NOTED THAT IT WAS THIS VERY ISSUE THAT HAD PROVED TO BE THE STUMBLING BLOCK IN REYKJAVIK. THE FACT, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ASKING FOR A STRENGTHENING

OF THE ABM TREATY SHOWED THAT THE CURRENT U.S. INTERPRETATION OF IT WAS CORRECT. SO FAR IN GENEVA, WE HAD NOT SEEN A SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO SIT DOWN AND BEGIN NEGOTIATION INSTEAD. THEY WERE QUOTING GORBACHEV'S SPEECHES. THEY WERE ALSO TALKING ABOUT LEAVING GENEVA IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IT SEEMED THAT THEY DID NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE GUIDANCE DURING THE CURRENT ROUND FROM MOSCOW ALLOWING THEM TO PUT DOWN THEIR REYKJAVIK POSITIONS. PERHAPS AFTER THE VIENNA FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE. [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT PERHAPS THE SOVIETS WERE WAITING FOR THE RESULTS OF THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS. IN ADDITION, HE SAID, KARPOV HAD TOLD HIM DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO BONN THAT THE SOVIETS STILL NEEDED SOME TIME TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF REYKJAVIK IN ORDER TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS.

BT

SECRET

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 02 BONN 5400
EOB085 AN001265

DTG: 031212Z NOV 86 PSN: 073100
TOR: 308/14582 CSN: CR1055

DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 SOMM-01 ROOM-01 MAT-01 /004 A2

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:

OP IMMED
DE RUEKJCS #5400 3081452
O 041452Z NOV 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO NSC WASHINGTON DC
O 031212Z NOV 86
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7551
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO NATO COLLECTIVE
USDEL NST GENEVA 0187

~~SECRET~~ SPECAT SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 35400

SPECAT

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: FARM, GE, INF, NST
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GLITMAN'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLERY

11. [REDACTED] REPORTED THAT KARPOV HAD ALSO DENIED IN BONN THAT THE SOVIETS WERE LINKING INF AND STRATEGIC DEFENSE. CLEARLY [REDACTED] SAID, THE SOVIETS WERE PLAYING A POKER GAME. GLITMAN SAID THAT EVERYONE SHOULD NOT BE PRESSING THE SOVIETS TO DROP LINKAGE. KARPOV, OF COURSE, HAD BEEN CALLED TO TASK IN MOSCOW AND HAD PUBLICLY CHANGED HIS POSITION. IN GENEVA, THE SOVIETS WERE FOLLOWING THE GORBACHEV LINE, NOT KARPOV. THEY HAD EVEN SOUGHT TO RAISE THE ABM TREATY WITHIN THE INF FORUM.

12. [REDACTED] GAVE IT AS HIS OPINION THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN LINKAGE FOR A LONG TIME. EVERYONE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WAS A PURELY TACTICAL MATTER. IT WAS THE GERMAN ASSESSMENT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE STILL INTERESTED IN REACHING AGREEMENT BUT THAT, FIRST, THEY WOULD WAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE U. S. ELECTIONS. SECOND, THEY NEEDED MORE TIME TO EVALUATE THE RESULTS OF REYKJAVIK. THIRD, IT WAS EVEN POSSIBLE THEY WERE WAITING FOR THE OUTCOME OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL ELECTIONS ON JANUARY 25. [REDACTED] SAID THAT HE, PERSONALLY, WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD EVENTUALLY DROP LINKAGE. GLITMAN AGREED, POINTING OUT THAT THE U. S. HAD A GREAT DEAL TO OFFER THE SOVIETS IN TERMS OF REDUCING ITS INF SYSTEMS, AND ESPECIALLY PERSHIN II.

13. [REDACTED] CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT IT WAS BOTH HELPFUL AND IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIES HAD SUPPORTED SECRETARY SHULTZ'S REPORT TO NATO, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING REYKJAVIK. THIS MEANT THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF THE SOVIETS SPLITTING THE ALLIES. IT WAS ABSOLUTE ESSENTIAL, HOWEVER, FOR THE U. S. TO CONTINUE THE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 BONN 5400

DTG: 031212Z NOV 86 PSN: 073100

PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THIS WAS NOT TO SAY THAT CONSULTATIONS HAD NOT BEEN CLOSE IN THE PAST, OR THAT THE FRG WAS DISSATISFIED. - [REDACTED] SAID HE SIMPLY WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF ON-GOING CONSULTATIONS.

BURT

BT

Reproduced at the Ronald Reagan Library

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~