SECRET NOFORN

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Robert L. Foord

Director of Scientific and Weapons Research

SUBJECT:

Response to Questions Concerning Iraqi CBW

Action Requested: None required. This memorandum addresses your questions of 22 January.

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2. We continue to assess that the Iraqis have at least a limited number of chemical warheads for their Scud and modified-Scud missiles. This assessment is based on previous reporting of Iraqi CW missile testing and the relatively straightforward modifications required for missile adaptation. The nonpersistent nerve agent sarin and the semipersistent nerve agent GF would be the most likely fills for such warheads. The Iraqis might even have some warheads filled with the persistent nerve agent VX, although

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3. If a US Patriot air defense missile were to intercept an Iraqi chemical warhead, there probably would be minimal or no ground-level CW hazard

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We have no evidence that suggests Iraqi EW agents are being sent to terrorists

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5. If Allied forces were to bomb CW or BW storage facilities, the resulting toxic contamination would be very localized. Most agents would not pose a significant hazard beyond a distance of a few kilometers from the facilities.

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the BW-agent anthrax could be carried considerable distances from the facilities by winds and form a long-term hazard over an extended area.

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6. Suspect Iraqi CW and BW storage facilities are widely scattered throughout the country. In addition, recent reporting has suggested that the Iraqis may be relocating some CW stocks to a number of previously unidentified locations.

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